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Abstract 
This thesis discusses the National War Aims Committee (NWAC), a cross- 
party, Treasury-funded Parliamentary organisation established in mid-1917 to conduct 
domestic propaganda. The thesis provides the most comprehensive examination of its 
organisational structure, expanding upon and correcting existing historical treatments, 
and demonstrating that it was a more significant element of British wartime society 
than previously assumed. It also provides much greater discussion of the NWAC's 
reception by Parliament, the press and the public. 
The thesis provides extensive analysis of the representation of patriotism in 
NWAC propaganda. This exceeds existing work, considering all its printed 
propaganda, but also reports of NWAC events in over a hundred newspapers in thirty 
localities. This detailed analysis suggests that NWAC propagandists retained many 
familiar themes of pre-war patriotism and national identity. This observation counters 
assumptions that pre-war patriotism was nullified by the mass casualties suffered by 
patriotic volunteers. However, I argue that while basic patriotic themes remained 
recognisable, NWAC propaganda reconfigured them in a narrative reflective of the 
experience of war-weary civilians. The propaganda generally revolved around a core 
idea of duty, supplemented by one or more contextual elements which demonstrated 
its necessity. I suggest several categories of interactive and interdependent 
`presentational patriotisms' used by propagandists to influence civilian attitudes. 
Further, I demonstrate that each category is discernible more widely in pre-war 
settings, suggesting that, while the model narrative might vary in different situations, 
the general history of British patriotism might benefit from applying the evidence of 
my thesis to other examples. I challenge the significance of the familiar `otherness' 
paradigm of national identity, suggesting that the recognition of difference was only 
part of the patriotic narrative supplied by the NWAC. Further, my analysis is 
particularly concerned with the interactions between local, national and supranational 
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Introduction 
This thesis discusses the National War Aims Committee (NWAC), a cross- 
party Parliamentary organisation established to conduct propaganda within Britain, 
aimed at maintaining civilian morale in the last and most draining months of the First 
World War. By July 1917, British civilians had endured three years of disruption to 
their lives. Alongside anxiety for relatives and friends in the armed forces or other 
dangerous occupations, civilians had to contend with more intense pressures of work 
(not only longer hours or changing practices but also ideological associations of all 
work with the war effort); restrictions or curtailments of leisure; shortages of supplies 
of all kinds with concomitant economic pressure; and, for the first time, a credible 
prospect of wartime death or injury at home from enemy action. The new Prime 
Minister, David Lloyd George, was convinced by December 1916 that more was 
required to bolster civilian morale than `autonomous propaganda' undertaken by the 
press and voluntary organisations. ' By the time the NWAC began operations in July 
1917, Russia had experienced the first of two revolutions and Britain had witnessed 
several strikes over working conditions and the advocacy, at a socialist `Convention' 
at Leeds, of the creation of Workers' and Soldiers' Councils, making the 
establishment of such an organisation appear all the more urgent. Over the last fifteen 
months of the war, the NWAC held thousands of meetings and distributed over one 
hundred million publications, propagating a wide-ranging and flexible patriotic 
message reflective of the total war environment in which civilians found themselves? 
' M. L. Sanders and Philip M. Taylor, British Propaganda during the First World War, 1914-18, 
(London, 1982), pp. 55-7; Niall Ferguson, The Pity of War (London, 1998), pp. 212-30. 
2 `Total war' here means a war involving and affecting every member of a society - one which is the 
pre-eminent issue and activity of that society. It does not suggest that every material and human 
resource is geared solely to the prosecution of war - such a war is almost certainly an impossible `ideal 
type': Stig Förster, `Introduction', in Roger Chickening and Förster (eds. ), Great War, Total War: 
Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front, 1914-1918 (Cambridge, 2000), pp. 7-9. 
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One major concern of the thesis is with the representation of patriotism in 
NWAC propaganda. I consider what relation its patriotic narrative had to pre-war 
language and imagery, and how the experience of total war affected its presentation. 
This thesis thus contributes significantly to the historiography of both the First World 
War and patriotism in Britain which, while enormous and ever-expanding, still 
contain significant gaps. A comprehensive history of British patriotism in the war has 
yet to be written, and this thesis contributes towards that larger subject. 
Students of the First World War are blessed with an enormous historiography. 3 
Numerous general histories demonstrate British experience within wider international 
contexts 4 The war's impact on British society has also been well served by both 
general and more specialist treatments 5 Specific sections of society - to give two 
examples, women and soldiers - have also been discussed extensively. 
6 Study of 
patriotism and national identity in Britain has likewise flourished since Hugh 
Cunningham's 1981 article on the `language of patriotism'. 7 Such historical scrutiny 
3 Jay Winter and Antoine Prost, The Great War in History: Debates and Controversies, 1914 to the 
Present (Cambridge, 2005), p. 1 gives some idea of the scale of historical writing on the subject. 
4 E. g. Stephane Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette Becker, 1914-18: Understanding the Great War, trans. 
Catherine Temerson (London, 2002); Hew Strachan, The First World War, Vol. 1, To Arms (paperback 
ed., Oxford, 2003); David Stevenson, 1914-1918: The History of the First World War (London, 2004). 
5 E. g. Arthur Marwick, The Deluge: British Society and the First World War (Boston, 1965); Trevor 
Wilson, The Myriad Faces of War: Britain and the Great War, 1914-1918 (Cambridge, 1986); Gerard 
J. DeGroot, Blighty: British Society in the Era of the Great War (London, 1996); Bernard Waites, A 
Class Society at War: England, 1914-1918 (Leamington Spa, 1987); John Turner, British Politics and 
the Great War: Coalition and Conflict, 1915-1918 (New Haven, 1992); Nicoletta F. Gullace, `The 
Blood of Our Sons': Men, Women, and the Renegotiation of British Citizenship during the Great War 
(Basingstoke, 2002). 
6 E. g. Gail Braybon, Women Workers in the First World War ([1981], London, 1989); Susan R. 
Grayzel, Women's Identities at War: Gender, Motherhood, and Politics in Britain and France during 
the First World War (Chapel Hill, NC, 1999); J. G. Fuller, Troop Morale and Popular Culture in the 
British and Dominion Armies, 1914-1918 (Oxford, 1991); Helen B. McCartney, Citizen Soldiers: The 
Liverpool Territorials in the First World War, Cambridge, 2005). 
7 E. g. Hugh Cunningham, `The Language of Patriotism, 1750-1914', History Workshop Journal, 12 
(1981); reprinted in Raphael Samuel's important edited collection: Patriotism, The Making and 
Unmaking of British National Identity, Vol. 1, History and Politics (3 vols., London, 1989), 57-89; 
Robert Colls and Philip Dodd, Englishness: Politics and Culture, 1880-1920 (London, 1986); J. H. 
Grainger, Patriotisms: Britain, 1900-1939 (London, 1986); Linda Colley, `Britishness and Otherness: 
An Argument', Journal of British Studies, 31: 4 (1992), and Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837 
([1992] London, 2003); John Wolffe, God and Greater Britain: Religion and National Life in Britain 
and Ireland, 1843-1950 (London, 1994); Robert Colls, Identity of England (Oxford, 2002); Paul Ward, 
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has become increasingly sophisticated. Historians have recognised that Britain's is a 
`four nation' history, 8 and have accordingly either striven to explain (like Linda 
Colley, for instance) how `Britishness' encompassed these diverse nations into one 
polity, or else narrowed their focus to a section of the British Isles. Others have 
objected to the use of what they consider conflationary terms like `national identity' 
or `patriotism'. Julia Stapleton has made a strong plea for avoiding elision between 
`citizenship' and `patriotism', while Peter Mandler emphasises the importance of 
`national character' as a separate analytical category, dismissing `vague' patriotism as 
`a feeling of loyalty to country that does not require a very focused sense of what that 
nation is or represents'. 9 As Part II of this thesis shows, I subscribe to neither of these 
last two arguments. I particularly reject the characterisation of patriotism as `vague'. 
`Flexible' or `diverse' are perhaps better terms, reflective of the purposive nature of 
patriotism as a form of persuasion. 
The study of patriotism and national identity has also been enriched by 
insights from other disciplines. Benedict Anderson's Imagined Communities has been 
particularly influential. Anderson asserted that the advent of `print-capitalism' `laid 
the bases for national consciousness' by fixing national languages more formally, 
overcoming differences in vernacular dialects as literacy expanded after the 
Reformation. Shared print-culture enabled individuals who would never meet to feel a 
sense of commonality. Anderson's `reflections', like Michael Billig's study of `banal 
Britishness since 1870 (London, 2004); Paul Readman, `The Place of the Past in English Culture 
c. 1890-1914', Past and Present, 186 (2005); Jonathan Parry, The Politics of Patriotism: English 
Liberalism, National Identity and Europe, 1830-1886 (Cambridge, 2006). 
8 E. g. J. G. A. Pocock, `The Limits and Divisions of British History: In Search of the Unknown Subject', 
American Historical Review, 87: 2 (1982); Hugh Kearney, The British Isles: A History of Four Nations 
([1989] 2nd ed., Cambridge, 2006); interesting assessments are offered by Raphael Samuel, `Four 
Nations History' and `Unravelling Britain' [both 1995] in Samuel, Island Stories: Unravelling Britain. 
Theatres of Memory, Vol. II (ed. Alison Light, Sally Alexander and Gareth Stedman Jones, London, 
1998), pp. 21-40,41-73. 
9 Julia Stapleton, `Citizenship versus Patriotism in Twentieth-century England', Historical Journal, 
48: 1 (2005); Peter Mandler, The English National Character: The History of an Idea from Edmund 
Burke to Tony Blair (New Haven/London, 2006), p. 7. 
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nationalism', have usefully highlighted the salience of representations of national 
identity in everyday culture and encouraged researchers to seek evidence of patriotic 
language and imagery there. 10 Finally, Anthony D. Smith's (apparently inexhaustible) 
considerations of the meanings of `nation' and `national identity' offer important 
insights for historical work. Smith stresses `the ethnic origins of nations' (as his 1986 
work was entitled), describing an ethnic group or community (ethnie) as `a type of 
cultural collectivity... that emphasizes the role of myths of descent and historical 
memories, and that is recognized by one or more cultural differences like religion, 
customs, language or institutions', usually tied (at least sentimentally) to a specific 
territorial homeland. " In his latest work, Smith offers the following `ideal-typical' 
definitions: 
[a nation is] a named and self-defined human community whose members cultivate 
shared myths, memories, symbols, values, and traditions, reside in and identify with a 
historic homeland, create and disseminate a distinctive public culture, and observe 
shared customs and common laws. In similar vein, we may also define "national 
identity" as the continuous reproduction and reinterpretation of the pattern of values, 
symbols, memories, myths, and traditions that compose the distinctive heritage of 
nations, and the identification of individuals with that pattern and heritage. 12 
This thesis is particularly concerned with this `continuous reproduction and 
reinterpretation', and argues that the ways in which NWAC propagandists represented 
(re-presented) familiar themes of patriotic language and imagery in its particular 
10 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, 
([1983] revised edition, London, 1991), esp. pp. 38-45; Michael Billig, Banal Nationalism (London, 
1995). 
11 Anthony D. Smith, National Identity (London, 1991), pp. 20-1. 
12 Anthony D. Smith, The Cultural Foundations of Nations: Hierarchy, Covenant, and Republic 
(Malden, MA/Oxford, 2008), p. 19. Original emphasis. 
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context is significant for wider historical understanding of British patriotism. 
Such a project is important because both the history of patriotism and national 
identity in First World War Britain and of the NWAC are peculiarly ill-served by 
existing work. `Nothing' in Krishan Kumar's view, `sustains a nation, or at least 
nationalism, like war', and yet much exploration of British First World War 
patriotism and national identity remains to be done. 13 Jay Winter's summary, though 
interesting, opts almost entirely to discuss the war's post-war consequences for British 
national identity. 14 Perhaps understandably in a nation dependent upon `volunteer' 
soldiers until early 1916, many considerations of First World War patriotism concern 
themselves predominantly, or exclusively, with the motivations behind voluntary 
enlistment. 15 Such a focus often betrays an assumption, explicated by W. J. Reader, 
that such patriotism was `obsolete' and that the war was an aberrant disjunction after 
which nothing remained of pre-war society and culture. However, the idea and 
representation of patriotism did not end in Britain with conscription, and it is 
troubling that, with some notable exceptions, usually related to studies of gender or 
the political left, 16 historical discussion of it should do so. Such reticence is less 
evident in French treatments of the war, where patriotism is linked with the obvious 
facts of invasion and occupation of the homeland, or in discussions of Germany, 
where the late activities of the Pan-German League and the emergence of a patriotic 
Fatherland Party (in September 1917) receive attention. 17 
13 Krishan Kumar, The Making of English National Identity (Cambridge, 2003), p. 38. 
14 Jay Winter, `British National Identity and the First World War', in S. J. D. Green and R. C. Whiting 
(eds. ), The Boundaries of the State in Modern Britain (Cambridge, 1996). 
15 E. g. W. J. Reader, 'At Duty's Call': A Study in Obsolete Patriotism (Manchester, 1988); Grainger, 
Patriotisms, pp. 267-318; Robert Wohl, The Generation of 1914 (London, 1980). 
16 Especially Gullace, Blood; Paul Ward, Red Flag and Union Jack: Englishness, Patriotism and the 
British Left, 1881-1924 (Woodbridge, 1998), esp. pp. 121-48. 
" E. g. Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker, 1914-1918, pp. 54-64; Jean-Jacques Becker, The Great War and 
the French People, trans. Arnold Pomerans (Oxford, 1993); Annette Becker, War and Faith: The 
Religious Imagination in France, 1914-1930, trans. Helen McPhail (Oxford, 1998); David Welch, 
Germany, Propaganda and Total War, 1914-1918: The Sins of Omission (London, 2000); Matthew 
14 
Even more troubling are simplistic conflations of patriotism with jingoism, 
like Brock Millman's assertion that `a "patriot" in wartime Britain was someone 
willing to employ violence on the home front to silence dissent and maintain national 
cohesion'. 18 This weak interpretation is contained within Millman's examination of 
the growing war-weariness in Britain, which is also one of the few studies to address 
the NWAC at any length. It assesses the NWAC's role in opposing dissent, as does 
Marvin Swartz's work on the Union of Democratic Control, while works by Cate 
Haste, and M. L. Sanders and Philip M. Taylor consider it as part of more general 
treatments of British propaganda. 19 Finally, John Home's excellent, but short, 
comparative treatment of the NWAC and its French equivalent discusses the 
`remobilisation' of civilians in 1917 and 191820 Other studies, matching Paul 
Fussell's preoccupation with elite literary attitudes, barely acknowledge the NWAC's 
propaganda role . 
21 No study has yet provided comprehensive discussion of the 
NWAC's organisational structure and activity (although Sanders and Taylor's work is 
invaluable for its origins), 22 and Millman's discussion sometimes appears deliberately 
misleading. 23 No study offers in-depth consideration of the language and imagery of 
NWAC propaganda specifically, and certainly not of its broader implications for the 
Stibbe, German Anglophobia and the Great War, 1914-1918 (Cambridge, 2001); Roger Chickering, 
The Great War and Urban Life in Germany: Freiburg, 1914-1918 (Cambridge, 2007). 
18 Brock Millman, Managing Domestic Dissent in First World War Britain (London, 2000), p. 99. 
19 Marvin Swartz, The Union of Democratic Control in British Politics During the First World War 
(Oxford, 1971); Cate Haste, Keep the Home Fires Burning: Propaganda in the First World War 
(London, 1977); Sanders and Taylor, British Propaganda. 
20 John Home, `Remobilizing for "Total War": France and Britain, 1917-1918', in Home (ed. ), State, 
society and mobilization in Europe during the First World War (Cambridge, 1997), 195-211. 
21 Paul Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory (Oxford, 1975); Katherine Andrews, `The 
Necessity to Conform: British Jingoism in the First World War', Dalhousie Review, 53: 2 (1973); Stuart 
Wallace, War and the Image of Germany: British Academics, 1914-1918 (Edinburgh, 1988); Peter 
Buitenhuis, The Great War of Words: Literature as Propaganda, 1914-18 and After (London, 1989); 
Gary Messinger, British Propaganda and the State in the First World War (Manchester, 1992). 
22 Also useful is Stephen Colclough, "`No such bookselling has ever before taken place in this 
country. " Propaganda and the Wartime Distribution Practices of W. H. Smith & Son', in Mary 
Hammond and Shafquat Towheed (eds. ), Publishing in the First World War: Essays in Book history 
(Basingstoke, 2007). 
23 See discussion, pp. 60-1,77-9,315 below. 
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study of patriotism. Preoccupation with anti-German rhetoric, particularly atrocity 
stories, has typified post-war discussion of British First World War propaganda at 
least since its castigation in 1928 by the wartime dissenting MP Arthur Ponsonby. 24 
Harold Lasswell's pioneering work in the 1930s, which noted that the rise of 
propaganda reflected `the communization of warfare [and] necessitated the 
mobilization of the civilian mind', demonstrated a wider-ranging narrative than 
Ponsonby suggested. 25 Furthermore, considerable atrocities were undoubtedly 
performed by Germany and its allies. Nonetheless, atrocity stories continue to attract 
most attention, with concomitant assumptions that they were nearly all deliberate lies 
concocted by journalists or the state -'black propaganda' - and, by extension, that all 
propaganda statements were lies. 26 With this focus upon the most sensationalist 
elements of wartime propaganda, the nuances of the patriotic messages conveyed are 
largely overlooked. Furthermore, none of the studies cited above consider very 
extensively the NWAC's reception. 
Despite the extensive historiographies of both the war and British patriotism, 
therefore, this thesis addresses substantial lacunae. I consider several key questions. 
How, and why, was the organisation formed, who was involved with it, and how did it 
operate? What were its aims, and what significance does this have for the manner in 
which patriotism was represented? Did the patriotic themes in NWAC propaganda 
reflect pre-war ideas? If not, how did they differ from this context? If familiar themes 
were present, were they conveyed in the same manner as before, or did their 
representation change? How successfully did the NWAC convey its message and did 
24 Arthur Ponsonby, Falsehood in War-time: Containing an Assortment ofLies circulated throughout 
the Nations during the Great War (London, 1928). 
25 Harold D. Lasswell, Propaganda Technique in the World War (London, 1938), p. 10. 
26 John Home and Alan Kramer, German Atrocities, 1914: A History of Denial (New Haven/London, 
2001). For the `shades' of propaganda: Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O'Donnell, Propaganda and 
Persuasion ([1986] 4th ed., London, 2006), pp. 16-22. 
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its reception vary between different sections of society? Finally, I seek to answer two 
questions about the wider meanings of this topic. First, what is the significance of the 
NWAC's evocation of patriotism for general understandings of patriotism and 
national identity in Britain? Second, what does the NWAC's story suggest about the 
war's impact on British society and culture? Was the war really a watershed, from 
which Britain emerged unrecognisable from the nation it had been in 1914 (as so 
many histories which conveniently end in 1914 or begin in 1918-19 imply)? 
Alternatively, can continuities in British society and culture be traced through the war 
and into the 1920s? 
To answer these questions, this thesis is divided into three Parts. Part I 
(Chapters 1-3) examines the NWAC's establishment, organisation and work. These 
chapters provide the most comprehensive historical treatment of the Committee's day- 
to-day operations. Chapter 1 examines the wartime situation which prompted its 
establishment, and discusses its links to other organisations like the pre-conscription 
Parliamentary Recruiting Committee. Chapter 2 assesses the central Committee's 
work, offering new statistical analysis which suggests that it operated on an under- 
appreciated scale. Chapter 3, meanwhile, emphasises the importance of the NWAC's 
local organisational framework, based (in England and Wales) upon Parliamentary 
constituencies and the efforts of party political organisers. It demonstrates not only 
the continuing vitality of locality as a basis for organisation, but that civilian 
remobilisation varied from place to place. 
Part II (Chapters 4-9) constitutes the thesis' core. These chapters use the 
NWAC's published propaganda, together with local press reports of events in thirty 
constituencies (the organisational unit within which local War Aims Committees - 
WACs - operated), selected on the basis of the statistics in Part Ito represent different 
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areas, social composition and levels of activity, to provide a detailed examination of 
NWAC propagandists' representations of patriotism. I disagree strongly with Niall 
Ferguson's assertion that the `content of propaganda need not long detain us' 27 While 
his brief catalogue of familiar wartime cliches may satisfy the purposes of his study, 
much more comprehensive treatment is required if the wider relevance of the content 
of wartime propaganda to British history is to be understood. 
Chapter 4 provides a (relatively) short summary of the propaganda in toto, 
demonstrating that many themes of pre-war patriotism may clearly be discerned. 
Extensive reading of NWAC propaganda enables the construction of a wider 
underlying narrative of patriotic identity. The chapter establishes a model framework 
of interactive and interdependent `presentational patriotisms' within which the content 
of NWAC propaganda can best be understood. These presentational patriotisms 
constitute broad interpretative categories within which familiar patriotic themes are 
placed to produce a qualitative rather than quantitative interpretation of patriotic 
language. These categories are `presentational' in that their interactions with each 
other supply a purposive and meaningful narrative. An essential assumption 
throughout this thesis is that patriotism is a purposive language. Patriotic rhetoric is 
deployed in an attempt to persuade people of the necessity for certain types of 
behaviour. Familiar themes and ideas were used to achieve specific things. Most 
pieces of propaganda combined lengthy discussion of various contextual topics with a 
core message emphasising civilians' duties to the nation. Considered quantitatively, 
NWAC propaganda said much more about German iniquity than civilian duty. When 
both issues are treated as parts of a wider, structured narrative, however, the often 
brief references to duty become much more significant. Warnings about German 
27 Ferguson, Pity, p. 231. 
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misrule provided one of several contextual elements by which demands that war- 
weary civilians continue to do their duty became not impertinent, but imperative. By 
placing familiar themes like anti-foreigner sentiment or celebrations of British history 
within the wider structural categories of presentational patriotisms, therefore, 
emphasis is placed much more on the purposes served by propagandists' language 
than on the number of words devoted to each theme. The fact that NWAC propaganda 
continually condemned German conduct did not mean that wartime patriotism 
overwhelmingly depended upon fearful or contemptuous negative attitudes, but that 
such attitudes played an important part in highlighting other aspects of British 
identity. 
Chapters 5-9 examine these presentational patriotisms in greater detail. Each 
chapter begins by discussing possible antecedents of NWAC rhetoric in the nineteenth 
and early-twentieth centuries, suggesting that the categorisations used here may be 
more broadly applicable. Chapter 5 considers propaganda discussion of numerous 
`adversaries' of Britain, both external and internal, and argues for an alternative 
means of interpreting negative discussions of difference to the familiar `otherness' 
paradigm. Chapter 6 also considers difference, in its positive forms, examining 
NWAC representations of Britain's allies (especially the US, France and the Empire), 
and further posits that British identity was held to repose in several values - liberty, 
democracy, justice and honour - which, while keys to `civilisation' and shared by 
Britain's allies, were also claimed as `British' creations. 
Building on this sense of proprietorship, Chapter 7 addresses the core of the 
NWAC's patriotic narrative, its emphasis on duty. It depicts a dualistic evocation of 
civilians' duty which both demanded that Britons, blessed with residence in a nation 
suffused with the key civilisational values, should accept concomitant obligations to 
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defend them, and celebrated evidence of their ready acceptance of such obligations. 
Propagandists depicted an expanding community, extending through the family, 
workplace, locality, nation and beyond, linked by the willing acceptance of duty. One 
issue that emerges strongly in the thesis is the close connection between local, 
national and supranational identities, and Chapters 6-7 particularly emphasise this. As 
Chapter 8 discusses, another element of the rhetoric of duty concerned the need for 
sacrifice. Civilians were reminded of the greater sacrifices of Britain's servicemen 
and, in combination with other issues, warned of the sacrifices to which future 
generations would be condemned by a current rejection of duty. The chapter also 
discusses the patriotic role played by religion. As is well documented, most clerics of 
virtually all denominations embraced the war. 28 The NWAC utilised their assistance 
at national and local levels, while its rhetoric was tinged with religious and quasi- 
religious language which ostensibly sanctified Britain's war. Finally, Chapter 9 
considers encouragements to civilians to anticipate the material and civilisational 
benefits of a new post-war world, where another such war was impossible thanks to 
the League of Nations, and in which Britain, maintaining the increasingly harmonious 
community established through wartime cooperation, would be a better society. 
Blended together, these various patriotic strands formed a comprehensive and flexible 
narrative of civilian experience, modifiable to the requirements of different audiences. 
Other studies of patriotism and national identity during the war predominantly 
focus on pre-war patriotism and its application immediately after the outbreak of war. 
Conversely, studies of propaganda consider patriotism too narrowly, discussing its 
wartime application in isolation, without relating it very greatly or consistently to its 
2$ E. g. Alan Wilkinson, The Church of England and the First World War (London, 1978) and Dissent 
or Conform? War, Peace and the English Churches (London, 1981), pp. 21-53; A. J. Hoover, God, 
Germany and Great Britain in the Great War: A Study in Clerical Nationalism (New York, 1989); 
Alan Ruston, `Protestant Nonconformist Attitudes towards the First World War', in Alan P. F. Sell and 
Anthony R. Cross (eds. ), Protestant Nonconformity in the Twentieth Century (Carlisle, 2003). 
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pre-war context. The major significance of these chapters is that they both identify 
how NWAC propaganda was unique, and relate its evocation of patriotism to wider 
historical discussion. The history of NWAC propaganda therefore becomes not a 
history `in parenthesis''29 but one which may be considered as part of a wider 
historiography of modem Britain. 
Finally, Part III (Chapters 10-11) considers the NWAC's reception. While 
interesting, the content of NWAC propaganda loses much significance if it had no 
discernible impact. Chapter 10 examines the reactions of Parliament, pressure groups 
and the national press. It argues that, despite an at best sceptical reaction to its 
existence and activities, the underlying response was tolerant indifference. Chapter 11 
seeks to get closer to public responses to the NWAC. The evidence suggests that the 
Committee retained a steady, if unspectacular, presence in the scenery of British life 
to the Armistice, and was apparently successful in maintaining civilian morale and 
effort. 
The thesis provides a much more comprehensive examination of material 
relating both to the organisation and its propaganda. The NWAC's papers at the 
National Archives receive much closer scrutiny than in previous studies, while 
Cabinet documents, Home Office files and the papers of Lloyd George and the 
Minister of Information, Lord Beaverbrook, provide further information on the 
NWAC's organisation and work. Its published propaganda (mostly in the National 
Archives library, together with assorted material at the Bodleian and British Libraries) 
is combined with a survey of over one hundred local newspapers covering thirty 
constituencies. By reading every discovered page of its published propaganda, 
together with a wide sample of reported speeches and events within varied localities, I 
29 David Jones, In Parenthesis (London, 1937). 
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provide a much more detailed and nuanced exploration of NWAC propaganda than 
would be possible via a small sample of its pamphlets or one or two constituencies. 
This more extensive reading suggests that, rather than simply representing familiar 
patriotic themes - pride in British history; transnational comparisons and so on - 
NWAC propaganda contained a more subtle and complex underlying narrative of 
patriotism than is evident in pamphlets like the crass Kalendar of Kultur (a 
compendium of German atrocities published in September 1917). 
There are, however, limitations to the source material available. The NWAC's 
papers, though extensive, are incomplete, having not been considered `of any great 
importance' when transferred to the Public Record Office in 1931.30 Many of the 
Executive Committee's minutes are missing, as seemingly are most of the Meeting 
Department's, while its meetings register, on which many of the statistics are based, is 
incomplete after April 1918 - thereafter, only scattered pages remain. Publicity 
Department reports have also not survived. Moreover, in assessing the NWAC's 
reception, it has proved particularly difficult to uncover individuals' opinions. While 
correspondence with the NWAC and, to a limited extent, with newspapers provides 
some insight into individual attitudes, such evidence may generally be considered the 
views of those with axes to grind, one way or another (though much NWAC 
correspondence comprises simple requests for pamphlets or other materials which 
smack rather less of such committed activism). A survey of civilian diaries and 
memoirs at the Imperial War Museum, and of working-class autobiographies, 
unearthed only one direct (and isolated) reference to the organisation, while general 
allusions to propaganda must be treated cautiously. Similar reticence is manifested in 
post-war memoirs and reflections of politicians and other influential figures, except 
30 The National Archives: Public Record Office, Kew [TNA: PRO], PRO 17/296, C. T. Flowers to 
Master of the Rolls, 14/1/31 (all abbreviated dates in this thesis are recorded in the format 
day/month/year). 
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for one three-page chapter . 
31 Lloyd George finds no room in six volumes to mention 
the organisation which he was most responsible for creating. Even Ponsonby's 
condemnation of wartime propaganda does not mention it by name. Politicians of all 
inclinations apparently preferred to forget that a Treasury-funded organisation had 
spent the last fifteen months of the war striving to maintain civilian morale. This 
memoiristic amnesia may also account for the limited historical attention that has 
since been paid to the NWAC. Nonetheless, as Chapters 10-11 show, it remains 
possible to deduce considerable more general impressions of the NWAC's reception. 
Finally, a brief explanation of the chosen local constituencies is necessary. 
They comprise only English and Welsh constituencies because the constituency-based 
organisational structure of the NWAC was implemented only in these parts of Britain. 
In Scotland, two WACs, for `West' and `East' Scotland were established in Glasgow 
and Edinburgh. The Committee never operated significantly in Ireland - though a 
NWAC `cinemotor' (a mobile cinema projector van) toured Ireland very late in 1918 
- and the Irish War Aims Committee, established in the summer of 1918, bore no 
relation to the constituency organisations discussed in this thesis. 32 Nonetheless, the 
thesis discusses `Britain' and `British' patriotism. This does not constitute ignorance 
of or lack of interest in `four nations' history. While Scotland is discussed in certain 
sections (the effect of NWAC activities on the Clyde, for instance, is discussed in 
Chapter 11), the local perspectives illustrate the `typical' methods of NWAC 
propaganda and local organisation, ranging from a very active constituency WAC like 
Evesham to a virtually inactive one (Dulwich). Furthermore, discussion of `British' 
patriotism reflects propagandists' own language. They most often discussed `Britain' 
(and generally seemed to mean `Britain' where they said `England'), though smaller 
31 Sir Harry Brittain, Pilgrims and Pioneers (London, 1945), pp. 164-6. 
32 On the Irish War Aims Committee, see: Parliamentary Archives [PA], Lloyd George Papers, 
LG/F/69/2. 
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and larger entities were also regularly discussed in patriotic terms. 
This thesis, then, contributes to the historiographies of the First World War 
and British patriotism in important ways. It makes strong claims for according the 
NWAC greater significance in British wartime society, and traces a complex and 
flexible narrative of patriotism in its propaganda, informed by pre-war patriotic 
motifs, but adapted to the requirements of a war-weary civilian society. It also raises 
important questions about the meaning and representation of wartime patriotism, 
which, clearly, did not die with the New Divisions at Loos or the Somme. Finally, it 
rejects any characterisation of the war as an abrupt end to the `long nineteenth 
century'. Much undoubtedly changed, but NWAC propaganda remained a 
recognisable descendant of the pre-war `language of patriotism'. 
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Part I: 
The organisation of the 
National War Aims Committee 
25 
Chapter 1: War-weariness, civilian unrest, and the establishment of 
the National War Aims Committee 
On 4 August 1917, the third anniversary of Britain's entry into the First World 
War, David Lloyd George, the British Prime Minister, addressed the inaugural 
meeting of the National War Aims Committee (NWAC) at the Queen's Hall in 
Westminster. Despite his reservations about the performance of the British 
Expeditionary Force (BEF) in France and Belgium (and more particularly its 
commander-in-chief, Sir Douglas Haig), he praised the `British method of advancing 
with the least cost in life' which, he said, took time but was `sure'. 
But whilst the army is fighting so valiantly let the nation behind it be patient, be 
strong, and, above all, be united... The strain is great on nations and on individuals, 
and when men get over-strained tempers get ragged, small grievances are 
exaggerated, and small misunderstandings and mistakes swell into mountains... 
The last reaches of a climb are always the most trying to the nerve and to the 
heart, but there is a real test of grit, endurance and courage in the last few hundred 
feet or score of feet in the climb upwards. ' 
By mid-1917, following a revolution in Russia, limited reports of a mutiny in the 
French Army, 2 and a series of strikes in Britain, there was genuine governmental 
concern that domestic disaffection might make it impossible to continue the war to a 
successful conclusion. Such concerns had been significant in Lloyd George's attitude 
to the organisation of the war for a much longer period. On 1 January 1915, he had 
1 PA, Lloyd George Papers, LGIF/160/1/10, `Report of Proceedings at the Inaugural Meeting of the 
National War Aims Committee'. 
2 David French, `Who Knew What and When? The French Army Mutinies and the British Decision to 
Launch the Third Battle of Ypres', in Lawrence Freedman, Paul Hayes and Robert O'Neill (eds. ), War, 
Strategy and International Politics: Essays in Honour of Michael Howard (Oxford, 1992), pp. 145-7. 
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warned the War Cabinet that `[t]here is a real danger that the people of Britain and 
France will sooner or later get tired of long casualty lists... A clear definite victory ... 
will alone satisfy the public that tangible results are being achieved', 3 and his support 
of an `indirect' strategy reflected this concern. However, public opinion, 
demonstrated by the initial wave of voluntary enlistment and a continuing electoral 
and industrial truce, remained strong throughout 1914-16. Even conscription, though 
decried by some as un-British and `immoral' - and despite the resignation of the 
Home Secretary, Sir John Simon, in protest at its introduction - passed through 
Parliament `without serious debate'. This chapter begins by briefly explaining the 
relative harmony in Britain before 1917, before discussing the factors which 
contributed to a growing sense of war-weariness and dissatisfaction. It then examines 
the process by which the government decided that systematic domestic propaganda 
was necessary to maintain public assent to the war, and describes the establishment of 
the NWAC for this purpose. 
If opposition was to be expressed to the war in its early years, it was most 
likely to come from `the left': from the Parliamentary Labour Party, Independent 
Labour Party (ILP), British Socialist Party (BSP) or the trade unions, as well as some 
radical elements of the Liberal Party. However, the war brought about abundant 
employment opportunities, 5 while the `anti-war left was a small proportion of the left, 
and only a tiny minority when compared to the population of the war as a whole'. 
This was because the pre-war left had `constructed a radical version of patriotism' 
endorsing national defence, especially in Britain, `the natural home of democracy, 
3 David Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George (6 vols., 1933-36), 1 (London, 1933), pp. 
372-3. 
4 Ward, Red Flag, pp. 121,133-40; Millman, Managing, pp. 50,73. 
5 Waites, Class Society, p. 165. 
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liberty and free institutions'. With overwhelming evidence of popular support for the 
war after 4 August 1914, Labour and the Trades Union Congress (TUC) rapidly 
agreed to electoral and industrial truces; and in 1915, following numerous strikes on 
the Clyde, accepted the Treasury Agreement, which introduced dilution (the 
employment of less-skilled men in jobs previously reserved for skilled workers), `the 
suspension of restrictive practices and enforcement of compulsory arbitration', and 
the Munitions of War Act, which inaugurated a `leaving certificate' which prevented 
workers from changing jobs without their previous employers' permission 7 This 
showed, according to James Hinton, `a readiness to oblige which went far beyond the 
minimal requirements of patriotism' 8 
Indeed, even the majority of the `anti-war left' (including Ramsay MacDonald 
and the Union of Democratic Control (UDC), the `most influential group among 
opponents of the war') believed the war had to be fought to a successful conclusion, 
despite vigorously criticising its conduct. The exceptions were a group around John 
Maclean on the Clyde who believed the war should become `a civil war against the 
British ruling class, and thus supported the idea of revolutionary defeatism', and 
`some absolutist pacifists'. While the anti-war left reserved the right to criticise the 
war, doing so, for instance, over conscription on the basis that voluntary enlistment 
was more patriotic, the majority did so within a framework of underlying belief in the 
rightness of the cause. 9 Meanwhile, the government preserved the essential image of a 
liberal state, despite ever-tightening restrictions on civil liberties, demonstrated 
especially by the Defence of the Realm Act (DORA), by allowing a certain amount of 
dissenting literature to be published unmolested, so that `[j]ust enough material leaked 
6 Ward, Red Flag, pp. 126,122. See also Waites, Class Society, p. 181. 
7 DeGroot, Blighty, pp. 113-5. 
8 James Hinton, Labour and Socialism: A History of the British Labour Movement, 1867-19 74 
(Brighton, 1983), p. 99. Cf. DeGroot, Blighty, p. 115, on the limitations of the concessions. 
9 Ward, Red Flag, pp. 126-9,138-40. 
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out, by authors sufficiently well known, to establish the fact that in the UK tolerance 
for dissenting opinion remained, liberty was preserved and censorship was light'. '0 
By 1917, however, such consensus showed signs of weakening. Following the 
1916 Somme campaign, the government had to accept it was running out of men. In 
January 1917, Germany recommenced unrestricted submarine warfare to starve 
Britain into submission. And in March, the British learned of the overthrow of the 
Tsar in Russia. These issues, directly or indirectly, contributed to the undermining of 
British public opinion. 
`At the beginning of 1917', according to the pacifist and historian Caroline 
Playne in 1933, the majority of the public remained `concentrated on keeping the war 
going'. There was also, however, `a group, small by comparison, consisting of people 
who had never liked the war and of others who believed in it but now thought the time 
had come when it should be stopped'. '' It was those `others who believed in it' that 
concerned the government. Bernard Waites contends that there `was a brutal division 
in the military character of the war with the death of idealism and voluntarism on the 
Somme', emulated at home by increasing state controls and the introduction of 
conscription with `a coercive apparatus of munitions and military tribunals which 
dispelled the voluntary character of participation and of the industrial truce'. 12 
However, public opinion seemingly held steady during the Somme campaign. It was 
the campaign's failure to achieve the `clear definite' victory Lloyd George had 
demanded in 1915 which apparently elicited an actual and (equally importantly) a 
perceived change of mood. Until the Somme, the `Kitchener' Armies, composed of 
those enthusiastic patriots of the autumn of 1914, remained largely unused in combat. 
It seems reasonable to suggest, therefore, that popular tolerance of the war's length 
10 Millman, Managing, p. 78. 
" Caroline E. Playne, Britain Holds On: 1917,1918 (London, 1933), p. 19. 
12 Waites, Class Society, p. 184. 
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was concomitant with expectations that once the massed ranks of volunteers were 
unleashed, the war would be brought to a victorious conclusion. The official film, 
The Battle of the Somme, released on 21 August 1916, produced an `intensely 
emotional response', `a reverent, almost religious mood of people deeply moved' 
which Nicholas Reeves contends may have contributed to the changing mood at the 
end of 1916.13 As far as the public knew, many men were dead or wounded who had 
voluntarily enlisted, and the battle-lines were largely unaltered. Such long-term 
success as the campaign may have had could hardly have been transparently obvious 
to the British public - ninety years on, and with access to copious official 
documentation, a decisive conclusion on its merits has still not been delivered. 14 
The aftermath of the Somme also had much more tangible effects at home. 
Most fundamentally, the government never again had sufficient manpower to meet all 
the nation's needs. By February 1917, before that year's major campaigns, the Army 
was receiving 50,000 fewer men each month than were needed to maintain its existing 
strength. 15 Naturally, the high command demanded more men be produced. Lloyd 
George, while promoting a casualty-saving strategy, nonetheless was compelled to 
find new sources of manpower, for both the armed forces and the most important 
industries. 16 Initially, the Ministry of Munitions sought to increase dilution within the 
strictures of the recently established Trade Card scheme, which had allowed the 
Amalgamated Society of Engineers (ASE) and other `craft unions' the right to grant 
their members exemptions from conscription. '? However, the Cabinet wished to 
13 Nicholas Reeves, The Power of Film Propaganda: Myth or Reality? (London, 1999), pp. 33,36. 
" See, e. g., the divergent interpretations in: Tim Travers, The Killing Ground: The British Army, the 
Western Front & the Emergence of Modern Warfare, 1900-1918 [1987] (Barnsley, 2003), pp. 127-99; 
Gary Sheffield, Forgotten Victory: The First World War: Myths and Realities (London, 2001), pp. 159- 
89; Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson, The Somme (New Haven, Conn., 2005). 
15 Brock Millman, Pessimism and British War Policy, 1916-1918 (London, 2001), p. 83 
16 Waites, Class Society, p. 203. 
17 Turner, British Politics, pp. 165,167-8; Hinton, Labour and Socialism, p. 98. 
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restructure this system. In March, it resolved that, because of the strong sentiment 
against industrial compulsion, it would be `impossible' to introduce such a scheme 
without first seeking the necessary manpower and material through `voluntary 
enrolment' and the restriction of less important industries. '8 Nevertheless, in early 
April, several unions, including the important ASE, were told by Arthur Henderson, 
Labour Party Chairman and chief representative in the coalition War Cabinet, `that 
the Trade Card scheme would have to be replaced by a more selective method of 
protecting essential workers', a centrally controlled Schedule of Protected 
Occupations. The ASE executive accepted this arrangement provided `no skilled men 
would be called up before all dilutees of military age had been enlisted', but were 
ignored by shop stewards, who had already embarked on a series of strikes (discussed 
below). 19 
Ironically, the less tangible, but real, success of the Somme campaign also 
weakened public enthusiasm for the war. The German high command, shaken by their 
immense and unsustainable casualties, altered their strategy. Specifically, they 
endorsed the recommencement of unrestricted submarine warfare (previously 
abandoned in 1916 after protests by the American President Woodrow Wilson) from 
February 1.20 Consequently, merchant shipping losses rose from 153,512 tons in 
January to 545,282 tons in April, with concomitant depletion of shipping caused by 
the reluctance of neutrals to risk the crossing to Britain? ' This meant Britain's wheat 
stocks, amounting to fourteen weeks'-worth in December 1916, were reduced to less 
than seven weeks by early May; while at one point, only four days' supply of sugar 
18 TNA: PRO CAB 23/2/1365-103: War Cabinet 103,23/3/17. 
19 Turner, British Politics, p. 168; David French, The Strategy of the Lloyd George Coalition, 1916- 
1918 (Oxford, 1995), pp. 85-6. 
20 Stevenson, 1914-1918, pp. 101,171. 
21 French, Strategy, p. 43; Millman, Pessimism, p. 71. 
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remained. 22 Though the introduction of measures of greater shipping efficiency in the 
short term, and the convoy system in the longer teim, 23 ensured Britain was never 
actually threatened with a `food crisis', the results of these losses were nonetheless 
extremely significant. In March, the Cabinet considered that publishing shipping 
losses might educate `the British public [which had] not yet realised the seriousness of 
the situation', but was also concerned that `the losses might become so serious that we 
could not publish them without risk of panic' 24 Much more significant, however, was 
the effect of such losses on food supplies. Throughout the war public opinion - 
especially working-class opinion - naturally focused on the cost of food. Concerns 
including `excess profits, high food prices and inequalities of distribution were 
affronts to the "moral economy" of the English working class', and food prices were 
the major factor in a broad dissatisfaction amounting to `a heightened "them/us" view 
of the world', particularly since wartime working conditions hindered working-class 
families from `shopping around' or buying in bulk, while the condemnation of 
profiteering and high prices enabled dissenters to emphasise their patriotism. 25 
Rationing proved an effective long-term solution, though the ill-considered decision 
to ration sugar, butter and bacon to districts `on the basis of consumption in previous 
years', thus providing more food to the more affluent, can hardly have improved 
feelings of inequality. 26 In the shorter-term, however, food concerns fed public 
disaffection. In July, the Cabinet was informed that the eight Labour Commissions 
established after the May strikes had each reported that high food prices were a major 
cause of unrest. 7 
22 French, Strategy, pp. 44,81; DeGroot, Blighty, p. 87. 
23 French, Strategy, pp. 74-81. 
24 TNA: PRO CAB 23/2/1365-97: War Cabinet 97,15/3/17. 
25 Waites, Class Society, pp. 222-4; Ward, Red Flag, p. 133. 
26 Waites, Class Society, p. 228. 
27 TNA: PRO CAB 23/3/1365-187: War Cabinet 187,16/7/17. 
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The wave of strikes across Britain in April and May was based upon a 
combination of these issues. While the ostensible reason for most of the strikes related 
to the removal of the Trade Card scheme and the extension of dilution beyond war- 
related production, in Coventry the strike related to `maldistribution and shortage of 
food''28 and a report prepared by the MoL for the War Cabinet on 24 May 1917 
affirmed some discontent at `undue profits... being amassed by the middlemen' and a 
feeling that `an unfair share of the sacrifices entailed by the War is being borne by the 
working classes'. Equally worrisome was the greater understanding of the actual 
conditions at the front which accompanied veterans' return to industry, another legacy 
of the post-Somme manpower situation, which Waites suggests `was particularly 
important in undermining patriotic zeal' 29 
One further factor in the weakening consensus on the war was the news, in 
March 1917, of the revolution in Russia. This news was greeted with cautious 
optimism by many Britons uncomfortable with an alliance with Russian autocracy, 30 
particularly the left, since the `alliance was no longer contrary to British traditions' 
like `parliamentarism and political liberty'. 1 Nevertheless, the Revolution 
reinvigorated the dissenting spirit of the left in Britain, which had hitherto been 
`shifting to the right'. 32 Dissent grew stronger and more confident in 1917,33 its most 
explicit link to the Revolution being the Leeds Conference called in June. 
While most delegates did not see Leeds `as the first step in following Russia 
but as a celebration of the Russian people's taking of the British left's advice to 
28 French, Strategy, p. 86; Waites, Class Society, p. 209; Turner, British Politics, p. 168. 
29 TNA: PRO CAB24/14, GT832: `Labour Situation', w. e. 24/5/17; Waites, Class Society, pp. 184,203. 
However, McCartney, Citizen Soldiers, pp. 109-10, suggests civilians were soon well aware of 
conditions at the front. 
30 Playne, Britain Holds On, p. 36. 
31 Ward, Red Flag, p. 143. 
32 Ross McKibbin, The Evolution of the Labour Party, 1910-1924, (3rd ed., Oxford, 1986), p. 91. 
33 Millman, Managing, p. 206. 
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follow Britain', it became a symbol of dissent's growing plausibility for the masses , 
34 
despite its limited practical effect. The anti-war elements of the ILP and BSP were 
`both grossly over-represented... [since] many members had simply abandoned both 
parties for the [ultra-patriotic] BWNL [British Workers' National League]', so that 
delegates voted nearly two to one in favour of a negotiated peace at Leeds, compared 
to a vote of more than five to one in favour of continuing the war to victory at the 
January Labour Party Conference. 35 The most unusual resolution called for the 
formation of Workers' and Soldiers' Councils, which the Ministry of Labour (MoL) 
felt was `an earnest' of `widespread pacifist agitation deliberately based on the 
Russian model... initiated with the intention to embarrass authority'. However, the 
Ministry considered that: 
Mr. Robert Smillie [Miners' Federation of Great Britain] and Mr. Robert Williams 
[National Transport Workers' Federation] were present in their pacifist and 
revolutionary capacity respectively, rather than as representative of the unions to 
which they belong, and it may be accepted that the same remarks apply to the very 
large majority of the 580 quasi-labour delegates. 
Further, it believed the Workers' and Soldiers' Councils would face too many rivals 
to succeed. Nevertheless, though the Conference: 
34 Ward, Red Flag, p. 144; Millman, Managing, p. 209. 
35 Swartz, Union of Democratic Control, p. 159; Millman, Managing, p. 208. The BWNL was an 
organisation of ultra-patriotic labour figures, led by Victor Fisher, which emerged from the Socialist 
National Defence Committee formed in April 1915 by G. H. Roberts, George Barnes, George Wardle 
(all later coalition Cabinet members and Barnes a President of the NWAC), Fisher, Robert Blatchford, 
Stephen Walsh and H. G. Wells. It later changed its name to the British Workers' League (BWL) and 
fought the 1918 General Election as the National Democratic Party (NDP): Ward, Red Flag, p. 124; 
J. O. Stubbs, `Lord Milner and Patriotic Labour, 1914-1918', English Historical Review, 87: 345 (1972); 
Roy Douglas, `The National Democratic Party and the British Workers' League', Historical Journal, 
15: 3 (1972). 
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was in no sense competent to voice the opinions and demands of Labour, but was 
rather a political [vehicle for] the discontented and disgruntled of various parties... it 
would be a mistake... to dismiss it from consideration as negligible. 
It was necessary instead for `authoritative representatives of Labour [to] make it quite 
clear to the world that the views of the Conference are not the views of organised 
Labour'. 36 Furthermore, while not in itself a serious revolutionary event, the Leeds 
Conference, occurring around the same time that news of the French mutinies began 
to reach governmental ears, significantly affected some of the War Cabinet (as will be 
discussed below), while the Revolution meant for some that `it could no longer be 
claimed that Britain was the freest country in the world'. 37 
These issues during the first half of 1917 alerted the government to the need to 
maintain public enthusiasm for, or at least acceptance of, the war. In Lloyd George's 
case, however, his preoccupation with public opinion ensured that he apprehended the 
need for an extensive propaganda campaign well before the events of 1917. At his 
first War Cabinet as Prime Minister, Lloyd George highlighted propaganda for urgent 
attention. Before his accession, propaganda was organised by the Foreign Office, and 
domestic propaganda (once the Parliamentary Recruiting Committee's (PRC) function 
had ended with the introduction of conscription) was carried out only by unofficial 
organisations - like the Central Committee for National Patriotic Organizations 
(CCNPO - supposedly confined to propaganda in the empire), the Navy League, the 
Victoria League and the Fight for Right Movement (FRM) - whose principal merit, in 
the opinion of official foreign propagandists like Charles Masterman at Wellington 
36 TNA: PRO CAB24/16, GT1034: `Report on the Labour Situation', week ending [w. e. ] 6/6/17; 
Waites, Class Society, p. 226; Chris Wrigley, `The State and the Challenge of Labour in Britain, 1917- 
20', in Wrigley (ed. ), Challenges of Labour: Central and western Europe, 1917-1920 (London, 1993), 
264. 




House, was in distributing their literature, thus enabling them to keep a low profile. 8 
This was unacceptable to Lloyd George, who sought to wrest control of propaganda 
away from any existing Ministry which might care to control it. In early January, he 
commissioned the editor of the Daily Chronicle, Robert Donald, to report on British 
propaganda arrangements 39 Donald recommended replacing the somewhat muddled 
arrangements with a central propaganda organisation directed by a single individual. 
This prompted the creation of a Department of Information under the control of the 
novelist and FRM member John Buchan in February 1917.40 According to Donald, no 
MP was willing to accept the job, suggesting antipathy towards `a somewhat 
distasteful, albeit necessary, evil' 41 Though intended to be entirely independent, the 
Department remained significantly linked to the Foiign Office, and its organisation 
into four sections by Buchan (administration; intelligence; art and literature; press and 
cinema) perhaps for this reason omitted a specific home propaganda section, despite 
Buchan's avowed intention to attend to British opinion `when direction is needed'. 2 
Despite this, the new organisation was accepted by the Cabinet on 20 February. 
Nevertheless, growing evidence of war-weariness in the early months of 1917 
meant domestic propaganda continued to occupy governmental minds. On 30 March, 
War Cabinet disapproval of the Department of Information's efforts was revealed by 
the suggestion that it `should, if necessary, organise a special branch' to `educate 
public opinion in this country in regard to the history and potentialities of the 
countries, such as Mesopotamia or Palestine, where victories have been or are likely 
38 Sanders and Taylor, British Propaganda, pp. 15-54. 
39 This account of the development of British propaganda up to the establishment of the Department of 
Information follows Sanders and Taylor, British Propaganda, pp. 55-65. 
40 DeGroot, Blighty, p. 175. 
41 Sanders and Taylor, British Propaganda, p. 63. 
42 Ibid., pp. 64-5. 
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to be achieved' 43 Similarly, at a Conference on 15 April between the Home and War 
Offices, Munitions and Labour Ministries, and the Admiralty Shipyard Labour and 
National Service Departments to establish the production of weekly reports on the 
Labour situation, it was decided that the MoL should `indicate the directions in which 
they are of the opinion that propaganda on behalf of the Government is desirable' 
beyond explanations of labour-related Departmental activities 44 In the first of the 
resultant weekly reports, David Shackleton, the permanent secretary of the MoL, 
warned of `widespread hints of suspicion on the part of the workmen as to the 
intentions of the Government and as to the effect of the measures at present in 
contemplation'. 
Further, the essential aims and causes of the war have tended to become obscured and 
forgotten... not only has the significance of the German atrocities been to some extent 
forgotten, but their very heinousness has been palliated by the blunting of 
susceptibilities due to their constant repetition. 
Shackleton concluded that: 
The chief need... is for a better education of the working-classes as to the 
actual military situation and needs, the aims of the Allies so far as it is possible to 
define them, and the results that would inevitably follow from an inconclusive peace. 
In order to bring points of this kind home, press propaganda, and even speeches 
delivered in London are not sufficient... 
What is really wanted... is an organized effort to create a right atmosphere 
43 TNA: PRO CAB23/2/1365-109: War Cabinet 109,30/3/17. Note the reflection of Lloyd George's 
taste for both `Eastern', or indirect, strategy, and for morale boosting victories of any kind. 
44 TNA: PRO CAB23/13, GT 733: `Labour Intelligence', 15/4/17. 
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throughout the country. This could be done if Members of Parliament - and 
particularly Labour Members - were to speak regularly in industrial centres, but it is 
of almost greater importance that there should be a local orator representing the 
orthodox element in the trade unions... In peace time propaganda of this nature is 
carried out on a large scale by the Party machines and it is suggested that the same 
machines might now be used.. 45 
By this time, Buchan had begun to establish domestic propaganda officially. 
On 18 May, he submitted a memorandum to the War Cabinet, acknowledging that 
though `no provision' was made in February for domestic propaganda, `a considerable 
amount of propaganda in Britain itself' was now necessary since newspapers were so 
small, owing to paper shortages, and because of the `almost entire cessation of public 
speaking'. Buchan was `anxious' to arrange `direct propaganda' in `all the chief 
centres' of Britain. He noted that `Labour Deputations' had been sent to visit `re- 
occupied territories' and felt they should `lecture in their own districts... with our 
official films and slides' and also wanted MPs to involve themselves in propaganda 
work, with the Department's `assistance in the way of information, illustrations and 
booklets'. Buchan suggested that Cabinet approval was required for Treasury 
subsidy. 46 Four days later, the War Cabinet approved his proposal `in principle' and 
instructed him to contact the Treasury regarding fimds. 47 When they decided, 
following the Leeds Conference, that `the time had come to undertake an active 
campaign to counteract the pacifist movement, which at present had the field to 
45 TNA: PRO CAB24/14, GT832: `Labour situation' w. e. 24/5/17. The `need for extensive 
propaganda... to revive the early enthusiasm' was recapitulated in the report for the week in which the 
Leeds Conference was held: TNA: PRO CAB24/16, GT1034: `Report on the Labour Situation', w. e. 
6/6/17. 
46 TNA: PRO CAB 24/13, GT774: `Propaganda at Home. Memorandum by the Director, Department of 
Information', 18/5/17. 
47 TNA: PRO CAB 23/2/1365-142: War Cabinet 142,22/5/17. 
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itself, preparations were probably already underway to establish the National War 
Aims Committee. 8 Certainly, by mid-June, negotiations had begun between the four 
party groups (Coalition Liberal, Asquithian Liberal, Conservative, Labour) on the 
subject. Robert Sanders, a Conservative Whip and future Vice-Chairman of the 
NWAC wrote on 15 June of `a scheme on foot for holding a series of meetings in the 
country to counteract the pacifist and syndicalist propaganda. Edmund [Talbot, the 
Conservative Chief Whip] wants me to represent the party on the executive 
committee. Freddy Guest [Lloyd George's Chief Whip and the NWAC's Chairman- 
in-waiting] is very keen' while J. W. Gulland, ex-Prime Minister Herbert Asquith's 
Chief Whip and the man in charge of the Liberal Party machinery, was believed 
willing to help 49 On 7 July, an account worth £5,500 was opened for the NWAC at 
the London City & Midland Bank. 5° Presumably around this time, Guest reported to 
Lloyd George that: 
My Propaganda Committee: 
Col. Sanders 
[Sir Hamar] Greenwood [Coalition Liberal MP] 
[Robert] Tootill [Labour MP and a Vice-President of the BWNL] 
[A. H. ] Marshall (Gullandite) [Liberal Whip, 1917-18] 
Guest (Chairman) 
Met at 12 Downing Street Yesterday for its first meeting. 51 
48 TNA: PRO CAB23/3/1365-154: War Cabinet 154,5/6/17. 
49 Sanders Diary, 15/6/17, in John Ramsden (ed. ), Real Old Tory Politics: The Political Diaries of Sir 
Robert Sanders, Lord Bayford, 1910-35 (London, 1984), p. 87. 
50 TNA: PRO T102/7, J. A. Jutsom (London City & Midland Bank) to Sanders, 7/7/17. 
51 PA, Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/21/2/2, Guest to Lloyd George, n. d. It is filed between a letter of 
May and another of early June, but Sanders' diary suggests this is too early. On Tootill's BWNL 
connections: Stubbs, `Milner and Patriotic Labour', p. 733, n. 1; Douglas, `National Democratic Party', 
p. 536. 
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However, the involvement of Asquith's Liberals was problematic. On the 12th, 
Sanders complained that `Gulland has been making difficulties as to joining the 
propaganda campaign now being organised... It looks rather as if his party is now out 
for blood' owing to the government's perceived unpopularity. Despite its avowed 
non-party status, an element of party politicking continued to characterise the 
organisation of the NWAC throughout 1917-18. On this occasion, however, a change 
of attitude apparently rapidly occurred, with Gulland soon `quite friendly as regards 
our speaking committee', 52 On 18 July, the Committee asked the Marquess of Crewe 
(Lord Lieutenant of London, Chairman of the London Country Council, and former 
member of Asquith's Cabinet) to act as Chairman for the planned inaugural 
meeting. 53 The next day, the manager of Queen's Hall was approached, and the 
inaugural meeting (and existence) of the NWAC was announced in The Times on 24 
July, with details of its four Presidents, Lloyd George, Asquith, the Conservative 
leader and Chancellor of the Exchequer Andrew Bonar Law, and the Labour Cabinet 
member, George Barnes, who had filled Arthur Henderson's role in the War Cabinet 
while the latter was away in Russia, and would soon replace him altogether when 
Henderson resigned in early August over the proposed Socialist conference in 
Stockholm. 54 
Alongside Sanders' suspicion that they were `out for blood', the problems 
experienced with Gulland (and, by association, Asquith) may have reflected a similar 
discomfort with propaganda to that which prompted Buchan's appointment as 
Director of the Department of Information. When later asked by the NWAC for party 
funds, Gulland wrote that there `seems to be great objection that any Government 
52 Sanders Diary, 12/7/17,20/7/17, in Ramsden, Tory Politics, pp. 87-8. 
53 TNA: PRO T 102/2, letter, unsigned to Crewe, 18/7/17. 
54 TNA: PRO T102/11, Thomas Cox (NWAC General Secretary) to Robert Humphreys, 19/7/17; `Mr 
Lloyd George and War Aims: A New Committee', Times (24/7/17), p. 7. 
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should use public money for the formation of public opinion at home - which secretly 
uses public funds'. 55 This was an attitude indicated by some MPs when the NWAC 
sought to obtain Treasury funding for their work (see Chapter 10). On 31 August, 
Sanders recorded that `Asquith and Gulland have stopped [all attempts to get public 
money] up to now'. 56 Whatever motivated their obstructionism, whether a feeling that 
such activities were un-British, or because it was bad politics to fund Lloyd George's 
brainchild with `Asquith's' money, by late July the NWAC's work was underway. 
As Shackleton suggested in May, organisation of the NWAC was turned over 
to the Conservative, Liberal and Labour party machines, confirming that `when 
politicians needed means of communication and organization... it was to the parties 
[not] the state that they turned for the machinery and expertise'. 57 In this, the NWAC 
followed in the footsteps of a previous, though unlike the NWAC, `officially official' 
domestic propaganda organisation, the PRC 58 At all levels there were parallels in 
personnel and organisation. The PRC had been an all-party organisation with Asquith, 
Bonar Law and Henderson as Presidents. At least one member of its executive 
Committee, the Labour MP (and Chief Whip during 1917) James Parker, eventually 
served on the NWAC's executive Committee (joining in October, to maintain the 
political balance when extra MPs Ronald McNeill, Walter Rea and W. H. Cowan took 
seats as heads of sub-committees). Two of the PRC's Honorary Secretaries - Sir John 
Boraston and Arthur Peters - took the same roles in the NWAC, alongside the Liberal 
officials G. Wallace Carter and G. W. Thompson, while like Carter and Peters, 
Thomas Cox and Sidney Vesey put their past experience in the PRC Meetings Sub- 
ss Letter by J. W. Gulland, read by Sir Edward Carson, Parliamentary Debates, 5th series [henceforth 
PDC(5)], 99 (13/11/17), col. 315. 
56 Sanders Diary, 31/8/17, in Ramsden, Tory Politics, p. 89. 
57 John Ramsden, A History of the Conservative Party, 3, The Age of Balfour and Baldwin, 1902-1940 
(London, 1978), p. 125. 
58 Cf. Millman's description of the NWAC in Managing, p. 229. 
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Department to good use in the NWAC, Cox as General Secretary, and Vesey as the 
Unionist organiser in the Meetings Department 59 Some of these administrators had 
pre-war experience in similar organisations. In 1911, Sir Arthur Steel-Maitland had 
criticised Cox's organisation of the National Union's Speaking Department, 
complaining to Bonar Law that his `system is wooden and rigid... Thus, if a 
constituency will not take the individual speaker he sends, it can go without 
altogether... His wares are to be taken or left. They ought to be adapted and pushed. ' 
By contrast, Boraston, Conservative Principal Agent from 1912, was part of a `team 
of experts, all of sufficient status to deal with politicians'. 0 Shortly before the war, 
Wallace Carter, as secretary of the Central Land and Housing Council and chief 
organiser of Lloyd George's land campaign, had recruited eighty full-time and 150 
volunteer speakers, supervising a campaign in which `not only were 90-120 meetings 
occurring each day, but 1.45 million booklets and 1.5 million leaflets had been 
distributed on rural matters alone'. 1 Peters, meanwhile, had been the Labour party's 
National Agent since 1908 and was, according to Ross McKibbin, `a diligent, if 
uninspired officer[, ]... both Wesleyan and teetotal, and rather oversubscribed to that 
fund of piety at Head Office which those who were neither Wesleyan nor teetotal 
found irritating'. 62 
The NWAC's organisational model was also heavily indebted to the PRC, 
establishing Meetings and Publications Departments. To spread recruiting propaganda 
across the nation, the `speaking staff of the three great parties were placed at the 
59 TNA: PRO WO106/367, `The Work of the Parliamentary Req Cte [sic]'; `Parliamentary Recruiting 
Committee. Meetings Sub-Department Report'; T102/16, `National War Aims Committee. Minutes of 
Meeting held at the House of Commons, S. W., 24th October, 1917'; T102/18, personnel list; Speech of 
Captain Guest, PDC(5), 99 (13/11/17), cols. 288-9. 
60 Steel-Maitland to Bonar Law, December 1911, cited in Ramsden, Balfour and Baldwin, p. 47 (cf. 
Cox's treatment of complainants in Chapter 11); ibid., p. 68. 
61 Ian Packer, Lloyd George, Liberalism and the Land: The Land Issue and Party Politics in England, 
1906-1914 (London, 2001), p. 125. 
62 McKibbin, Evolution, p. 4. 
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disposal' of the PRC, while: 
Local Joint Parliamentary Committees consisting of active members of the three great 
parties in the constituencies created an official organisation in almost every area 
throughout England and Wales... In nearly every case the political agents of the three 
great parties were appointed Joint Hon. Secretaries of the Local Committees... 
gentlemen... not only experienced in every phase of propaganda work, but with 
whom the members of the Sub-Department had been personally associated in 
important public activities previous to the war. 63 
Many of the NWAC's officers learnt these lessons first-hand, establishing local War 
Aims Committees (WACs), using the same agents, and providing speakers frequently 
drawn from the party speaking staffs. Before August, letters were circulated to the 
political agents of the Conservative and Liberal parties, and whatever local 
representatives of the labour movement existed. By the time the NWAC's inaugural 
meeting was held on 4 August, twenty-three WACs were already established, 
beginning with South Dorset on 28 July, and including several centres of unrest like 
Swansea, Leicester, Jarrow, Huddersfield, and Coventry (See Table 1). 64 Of these, 
only one (St. Helens) definitely had a Labour secretary, reflecting the generally 
problematic relationship with Labour experienced by the NWAC (which had not 
afflicted the PRC). These issues, however, are discussed in subsequent chapters. 
The presence of constituencies like Southport, Wells and Great Yarmouth as 
early-formed WACs probably reflects the early plans of the NWAC, explained in a 
circular letter to speakers as being `mainly confined to open-air meetings at the 
63 TNA: PRO W0106/367, `Parliamentary Recruiting Committee. Meetings Sub-Department. Report'. 
64 TNA: PRO T102/26. These statistics derive from a database constructed from the NWAC's card 
index of WACs (henceforth noted as card-index database). 
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Table 1: WACs formed by 4 August 1917.65 
Established I Constituency I Secretaries/contacts 
28/07/1917 South Dorset Col. G. F. Symes M. V. O. (L): F. W. Powell (U) 
30/07/1917 Swansea W. J. Crocker (L); B. Bottomley (U) 
30/07/1917 Isle of Thanet Rev. B. J. Salomons (L); H. W. M. Morris (U) 
31/07/1917 Leicester Chas E. Clark (U); T. W. Smith (L); W. J. Arculus 
(U) 
02/08/1917 Huddersfield James W. Morrison (L); E. Clarkson (U) 
02/08/1917 Yarmouth, Great Wm. Wade (U); W. J. Oldman (L) 
Address: 'Joint Secs... ' 
02/08/1917 Jarrow Jack Raine (L); George Clarkson (U) 
02/08/1917 St Helens A. Valentine (L); R. Waring (La); P. A. Twist (U) 
02/08/1917 Wells C. H. Poole (L); R. J. Cooke (U) 
02/ 08/ 1917 Hackney Central Stanley Barton (U); Arthur S. Brown (L) 
03/08/1917 Horncastle A. Julian (L); A. H. Beeton (U) 
03/08/1917 Lewes Harry Courtney (L); Thomas Grave (U) 
03/08/1917 Bristol West Vincent Thompson (U) 
03/08/1917 Carlisle Henry K. Campbell (L); B. L. Hilton (U: 
resigned according to note) 
03/08/1917 Hull Central A. T. Hallmark (U) 
03/08/1917 Hull East David Harrison (L) 
03/08/1917 Southport R. Standring (U); A. Keith Durham (L) 
04/08/1917 Wirral F. Harrison (L); A. Birkett (U) 
04/08/1917 Rugby J. R. Almond (U); F. M. Burton (L: deleted); J. J. 
Scrivener (L) 
04/08/1917 Harwich J. A. Bolton (L); T. Ablewhite (U) 
04/08/1917 West Bromwich Will G. Bastable (L); Alfred Curtis (U) 
04/08/1917 Rotherhithe F. H. Benson (L); W. Queen (U); W. T. Hook (U: 
deleted) 
04/08/1917 Coventry Leonard Walsh (U); Karl L. Spencer (L) 
various seaside resorts throughout the country'. This early campaign resulted in 1,298 
meetings in fifty-four `holiday resorts' by 25 September. 66 Before August, 
arrangements were made between the NWAC and the CCNPO regarding the cessation 
of the latter's propaganda work. On 27 July, Guest wrote to Sir William Grey Wilson, 
Secretary of the CCNPO, that the NWAC was `preparing to undertake a continuous 
65 Based on card-index in TNA: PRO T102/26. 
66 TNA: PRO T102/2, letter, unsigned to Councillor C. G. B. Ellison, J. P. (Barrow in Furness), 20/8/17; 
See also identical letters of same date to J. Beard (Birmingham), T102/1, and J. Cuthbertson 
(Birmingham), T102/2; T102/16, `National War Aims Committee: Meetings Department Report', 
25/9/17. The NWAC's work is examined in Chapter 2. 
44 
and vigorous educational campaign during the ensuing months', and that since its 
aims coincided with the CCNPO's, it was `thought advisable' that `all future meetings 
on these patriotic lines should be held under one name only' and that the CCNPO 
should, therefore, cease operations. Grey Wilson subsequently told a CCNPO 
organiser, that although he believed the CCNPO `as a private institution has a far freer 
field than [the NWAC] can possibly hope to have', there was no alternative but to be 
`swallowed as far as our war aims activities are concerned'. 67 
By the time Lloyd George stepped onto the Queen's Hall platform, therefore, 
the NWAC had begun to establish a nation-wide network of WACs, intended to be 
the local executives responsible for assisting the national Committee in attaining six 
aims: 
1. Generally to strengthen the national morals and consolidate the national war 
aims as outlined by the executive Government and endorsed by the great 
majority of the people. 
2. To counteract, and, if possible, render nugatory the insidious and specious 
propaganda of pacifist publications. 
3. To indicate, and, where possible, specifically define, the advantages of an 
Entente Peace, especially in relation to its effect on the daily lives of the 
people, to dwell on the democratic development and improvement in the lot 
of the working class which State control and other war changes have already 
secured; to suggest the prospect of further improvement and greater freedom 
when the war is over; generally, to envisage the rewards of success. 
4. To explain and emphasise the meaning of a German Peace - its political, 
commercial, economic and social consequences - and to call up and employ 
67 TNA: PRO T102/3, Guest to Grey Wilson, 27/7/17; Grey Wilson to N. Grattan Doyle, 2/8/17. 
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that vast reserve of moral courage and determination which lies dormant in 
the nation. 
5. To inspire all war workers at home, especially those hidden from view, with a 
living sense of their responsibility and share in the great task; to give them 
tangible proof of the Government's appreciation; so to brace and hearten 
them that, however long the war may last, its crusading character may be 
their dominating thought. 
6. To encourage unity and stifle party and class dissensions by dwelling 
insistently on the momentous issues at stake, on the gravity of the crisis, on 
the spontaneous co-operation of Oversea Dominions, on the moral and 
material support of America[, ] on the fact that the cohesion and resolution of 
the Allies depend very largely on the example and inspiration of this country, 
and on the records of history which make it impossible to conceive that the 
people of this country will waver in their fixed purpose. 68 
These guidelines were very evident in the speeches made at the NWAC's 
inaugural meeting. On 4 August, The Times announced that prominent clergymen, 
including the Archbishop of Canterbury and the most senior British Catholic, Cardinal 
Bourne, would attend, alongside over one hundred MPs, twenty Cabinet-members, 
and London and provincial mayors and councillors. 9 Speeches reflected all four 
political groups' perspectives. The Marquess of Crewe, in the Chair, was a member of 
both Asquith's wartime Cabinets, but not Lloyd George's Ministry, 70 while Lloyd 
George, Sanders and Tootill made speeches on behalf of their respective groups. Also 
present were the Italian Foreign Minister, Baron Sonnino, and the Serbian Prime 
68 TNA: PRO T102/16 `(Confidential) Aims of Home Publicity', n. d. 
69 `The Prime Minister at Queen's Hall', Times 4/8/17, p. 9. 
70 Frank P. Chambers, The War Behind the War, 1914-1918: A History of the Political and Civilian 
Fronts [1939] (reprint ed., New York, 1972) pp. 587-90. 
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Minister, while Crewe read a supportive message from General Botha in South 
Africa, J. C. Smuts having refused to speak at an event on `the saddest anniversary in 
the story of man'. 71 Thus the meeting heralded the political unity both inside the 
country and with Britain's imperial and external Allies. 
Crewe insisted: 
there is no change in our general aims as they were originally announced by Mr. 
Asquith in the Autumn of 1914... Those aims are, in two words, Reparation [for 
France, Belgium, Serbia, Poland, Romania and Armenia] and Security... based... on 
the foundation of race, or on the avowed preference of the inhabitants of each area... 
[and] not only against military attack, but against all aggression... however it may be 
disguised'. 72 
Crewe's short speech reflected the first and third aims of the NWAC, and he 
concluded: `We believe in our cause, and our goal is the liberty of the world'. 
Sonnino obviously emphasised the sixth aim, describing the `brotherly covenant' of 
Britain and Italy, and stressed the need of the Allies to `lend each other mutual 
support... for the triumph of the common cause'. However, Sonnino also touched on 
the third aim, proclaiming Italy's goal as `the liberation of our brethren from... cruel 
oppression' while stressing their desire to ensure a Wilsonian `better general 
organisation of the Comity of Nations'. 
The main event was the Prime Minister's speech, which touched on the first, 
second, fourth, fifth and sixth aims of the NWAC. Lloyd George emphasised the 
'' Smuts to M. C. Gillett, 6/8/17, in W. K. Hancock and Jean Van der Poel (eds. ), Selections from the 
Smuts Papers (7 vols. ), III, June 1910-November 1918 (Cambridge, 1966), p. 536. 
72 The following discussion draws upon the transcript of F. Primrose Stevenson's short-hand notes: PA, 
Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/160/1/10, `Report of Proceeding at the Inaugural Meeting of the National 
War Aims Committee'. 
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danger of German victory, referring to Serbians as `victims of Teutonic barbarity' and 
declaring that Britain fought to `defeat the most dangerous conspiracy ever plotted 
against the liberty of nations... carefully, skilfully, insidiously, clandestinely planned 
in every detail with ruthless cynical determination'. Without Britain's contribution, he 
maintained, the situation would have been even worse. `It would have been the 
subjugation of Europe... in servitude... at the mercy of this great cruel Power'. He 
stressed that `a bad peace goes on and on', and that there `must be no next time. It is 
far better in spite of all the cost, yea, and all the sorrow, and all the tragedy of it, to 
have done with it... Let us be the generation that manfully, courageously and 
resolutely eliminates war from amongst the tragedies of human life'. He scornfully 
acknowledged that: 
There are people in this country who would introduce... disintegrating methods to 
direct the conduct of the war (laughter). The nation has chosen its own Workmen's 
and Soldier's Committee (cheers), and that is the House of Commons... We cannot 
allow sectional organisations to direct the war, nor to dictate the peace (cheers). 
He exhorted the nation to bear the strain and see the war through to victory, declaring: 
`Anyone who promotes national distrust or disunion at this moment is helping the 
enemy and hurting his native land' and promised that `together we shall reach the 
summit of our hopes'. 
Lloyd George was followed by Sanders, who described the objects of the 
NWAC, summarising them in `two colloquial phrases... we want to tell people that we 
have got to stick it, and for God's sake don't grouse'. Drawing on his wartime 
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military service in the Middle East, 73 he demanded that people consider conditions at 
the Front when complaining about workplace privileges, food prices, beer shortages 
and air-raids before moving a resolution (appropriated from the CCNPO) `to continue 
to a victorious end the struggle in maintenance of those ideals of Liberty and Justice 
which are the common and sacred cause of the Allies'. 
Tootill, seconding the resolution, rejoiced `that the vast majority of the more 
responsible and level-headed leaders and officials and the rank and file of the great 
Labour movement of this country are firmly convinced and vigorous supporters of... 
victory'. He enquired of the anti-war left `where do we find any record of any specific 
public pronouncement directed against the indescribable devastations and inhuman 
cruelties the Central Powers have delighted to inflict upon weak and defenceless 
nations', implying that such groups were `secretly or openly backing the Germans'. 
`A great national duty of incalculable importance rests upon all of us in the present 
state of the country in relation to the war', Tootill argued, concluding, `if we were to 
suffer defeat... what becomes of our hopes and prospects for future development 
towards a truer and nobler and more enlightened state? '. 
Within these speeches were embodied all the declared aims of home publicity. 
After several months, or years, in the making, Britain had an organisation, though not 
yet technically official, dedicated solely to maintaining public patriotism. To what 
extent it succeeded is the subject of the remainder of this thesis. 
73 See Ramsden, Tory Politics, pp. 80-4. 
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Chapter 2: The work of the NWAC 
Over sixteen months, the NWAC evolved from a privately-funded, unofficial 
organisation, into a publicly-funded, quasi-official body. Influential and independent, 
it represented the primary Parliamentary device of domestic patriotic `education' for 
the remainder of the war, strong enough to withstand suggestions by Lord 
Beaverbrook that it should be incorporated within his new Ministry of Information. 
This chapter describes the enlargement of the central organisation, before examining 
the administration of the two central sub-committees, the Meetings and Publicity 
Departments (the content of their propaganda is discussed in Part 2). According to 
Brock Millman, `perhaps the most important purpose of the NWAC had nothing to do 
with propaganda' but was its `secret repressive agenda'. ' This chapter concludes by 
examining the NWAC's role in domestic surveillance and contests Millman's 
interpretation. 
When it began in mid-1917, the NWAC was a small organisation, reliant on 
private donations, comprising five MPs and based at Conservative Central Office in 
St. Stephens' Chambers. While undoubtedly `Lloyd George was the guiding political 
light of the NWAC', 2 he (and his fellow Presidents) had little involvement with its 
operations, beyond making the occasional speech and forwarding some 
correspondence. When London businessman, W. W. Howard, suggested the necessity 
of public recapitulation of `the facts relating to the beginning of this awful war', since 
`memory will fade with the time which has elapsed', offering five hundred pounds to 
assist with expenses, Lloyd George passed this letter to the NWAC. Howard was then 
informed of their work, which was `being very rapidly pushed forward'. `Seeing the 
1 Millman, Managing, pp. 245,229. 
2Ibid., p. 232. 
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work necessarily entails a heavy expenditure', the reply continued, `this Committee 
would welcome any donation to its funds which you would like to subscribe'. 3 
However, by then, the NWAC's executive, together with Sir Edward Carson, 
assigned by the War Cabinet to `assume general supervision over [domestic] 
propaganda' on 21 August, 4 had already decided that such funds were insufficient to 
effectively run the campaign. On the 30th, Carson told the War Cabinet the campaign 
might need: 
as much as 100,0001. It was understood, however, that there was a good deal of 
opposition to the use of public money for the maintenance of a cause to which a 
certain number (though a small one) of the tax-payers were opposed. 5 
This prompted extensive negotiations between the NWAC, the party central offices 
and the government, and, with no likelihood of the Conservative or Liberal purse- 
strings, controlled respectively by Sir George Younger and Gulland, loosening 
significantly, the NWAC resolved on 3 October that due to `the impossibility of 
financing the work of the Committee from private subscriptions or Party funds', the 
Committee thought it essential `to obtain the requisite money from public funds' 6 
The following day, Carson informed the War Cabinet that `funds at the disposal of the 
Committee, amounting to 17,0001, which had been raised by private subscription, 
were now exhausted', and added that further private investment might enable `the 
Pacifists [to] attribute this support to the capitalist class'. Consequently, the War 
3 TNA: PRO T102/5, W. W. Howard to Lloyd George, 16/8/17; reply (unsigned), to Howard, 29/8/17. 
° TNA: PRO CAB 23/3/1365-221: War Cabinet 221,21/8/17. 
5 TNA: PRO CAB 23/3/1365-226: War Cabinet 226,30/8/17. Sanders recorded in his diary a day later 
that `Asquith and Gulland have stopped that up to now': Sanders Diary, 31/8/17, in Ramsden, Tory 
Politics, p. 89. 
6 TNA: PRO T102/16, NWAC Minutes, 19/9/17,3/10/17. 
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Cabinet accepted `in principle' that the NWAC should receive Treasury funding 7 
On 16 October, the NWAC submitted an estimate to the Treasury for the six 
months ending 31 March 1918, amounting to £113,858 (with another five thousand 
pounds added for activities in Scotland, apparently as an afterthought). This 
comprised £780 respectively for central staff wages and office supplies; £61,878 for 
four weeks' campaign each in 345 constituencies; 8 £8,015 for staff wages in the 
Publicity Department (including £2,600 for outside literary contributors); and £42,405 
for all the various items expected to be produced by this department - such as 
pamphlets, postcards, cigarette cards, lantern lecture material and posters - including 
ten thousand pounds towards cinema propaganda. 9 These arrangements were 
confirmed by 24 October, when it was reported that the NWAC's private account had 
been closed, that the Office of Works and the Stationery Office had received the 
`necessary authority' to provide the relevant facilities, and that Sanders was assured 
that `the ordinary Treasury rules would not be unreasonably enforced'. '0 
When Parliament was consulted on the question of NWAC funding, however, 
only £1,000 was sought as a token vote in Committee because, according to Guest: 
what the Germans most want to know is the mental attitude of our workers... and if by 
a Debate in this House on a Vote for educational purposes they were to... [think] that 
we had suddenly had to adopt an active campaign... either to oppose pacifism or to 
stiffen the courage of our industrial classes, they would get more satisfaction than I 
am sure this [Supply] Committee means to give them. 
' 1 
TNA: PRO CAB 23/4/1365-245: War Cabinet 245,4/10/17. 
8 Millman erroneously suggests from these estimates that the NWAC intended to operate in all 468 
constituencies: Millman, Managing, p. 233. 
9 TNA: PRO T102/16, NWAC: Statement of Estimated Expenditure for 6 months ending March 31st, 
1918,16/10/17. 
10 TNA: PRO T102/16, NWAC Minutes, 24/10/17. 
11 PDC(5), 99 (13/11/17), col. 291. 
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Though the decision to seek a token vote received `a lot of opposition', 12 and much 
criticism for the secrecy it entailed, at both the original debate on 13 November and 
the second reading on 14 December (discussed in Chapter 10), despite considerable 
debate of the principles involved in allowing domestic propaganda to be carried out at 
all, an amendment seeking to reduce the vote to `a sum not exceeding £900' was 
defeated. 13 The warning of the Asquithian Liberal, Timothy Davies, that `[i]t will be 
£10,000 in a week's time, £100,000 in two months' time, and £500,000 in six months' 
time if we allow the £1,000 to-night', was overridden by arguments like Carson's, that 
a rejection would `allow the country to be a prey to the vilest... and the most 
unpatriotic misrepresentations... which are costing the country life after life at the 
front'. 14 Ronald McNeill, a Unionist NWAC member, argued that opposition from 
politicians affiliated, or sympathetic, with organisations like the UDC - for instance 
Noel Buxton, Joseph King, Philip Morrell, Robert Outhwaite, Arthur Ponsonby, and 
C. P. Trevelyan, all of whom spoke against the Token Vote and were six of twenty- 
two MPs, along with other UDC members like Ramsay MacDonald and Fred Jowett 
who voted for the amendment on 13 November - amounted to `an attempt here to 
instil into the public mind drops of poison', for which the NWAC represented a 
possible antidote. " 
The NWAC's increased financial requirements reflected an expansion of the 
organisation. The original five MPs were augmented by a further four, representative 
of the four main political groups. Walter Rea, an Asquithian Liberal, became 
12 Sanders Diary, 17/11/17, in Ramsden, Tory Politics, p. 91. 
13 PDC(5) 99 (13/11/17), col. 346; Vol. 100 (14/12/17), col. 1596. 
14 Speeches of Timothy Davies and Sir Edward Carson, PDC(5), 99 (13/11/17), cols. 333,316,340. 
15 Speech of Ronald McNeill,. PDC(5), 99 (13/11/17), col. 340. Trevelyan and Ponsonby were founding 
members of the UDC. On the others, see H. M. Swanwick, Builders of Peace: Being the History of the 
Union of Democratic Control (London, 1924), p. 180. 
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Chairman of the Meetings Sub-Committee on 30 August 1917, while Sir William H. 
Cowan (Lloyd George Liberal) was asked to investigate the establishment of a 
Scottish War Aims Committee. On the same day, McNeill was appointed, with 
Buchan and Peters, to establish a Publicity Department, which he chaired from 25 
September. To keep the party balance even, James Parker joined the Committee as a 
Labour representative on 24 October. 16 By September the acceptance of the sub- 
committee's report meant the Publicity Department would grow significantly, with 
salaried staff including a Director and Assistant-director, and in 1918 the central 
committee had forty-six full-time salaried members of staff, beyond the MPs and 
chief political agents who voluntarily made up the core executive. '? Treasury funding 
prompted a relocation to twenty-five rooms at 54 Victoria Street. 18 Even this was 
insufficient space for the growing organisation. In May 1918, with more staff being 
transferred to the building, Cox asked whether a partition could be `thrown across' a 
passage to make another room, and in September further `developments [had] taken 
place in one or two directions necessitating the provision of extra room'. 19 
In carrying out its duties, the NWAC was initially beset by two significant and 
inter-related problems: the lack of a definitive governmental statement on war aims 
and the reluctant involvement of Labour organisations. D. L. Mort, Secretary of the 
Briton Ferry Trades and Labour Council, in response to the NWAC's invitation to 
assist locally wrote: 
we consider it a waste of time & money... all this trouble could be alieviated [sic] if 
Cabinet Ministers made statements clear and understandable in the House of 
16 TNA: PRO T102/16, NWAC Minutes, 30/8/17,25/9/17,24/10/17. 
r Millman, Managing, p. 233. 
18 TNA: PRO T102/3, Carson to Sir Arthur Durrant (Office of Works), 5/10/17. 
19 TNA: PRO T102/10, Cox to Durrant, 28/5/18,6/9/18. 
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Commons. If Ministers made a definate [sic] statement, like the Russian declaration, 
in Workers not in Diplomatic language, everybody would understand. ° 
The point was taken. On 25 September, it was acknowledged that `the need for a 
definite statement on this subject and directions to our speakers thereupon will 
become urgent', and on 10 October, the Committee added that `Organised Labour in 
nearly every constituency declines to co-operate... on the ground that our aims are not 
defined... [T]his reason or excuse should be removed as quickly as possible' 21 This 
was seized upon by Parliamentary critics, Ponsonby suggesting it was `useless... to go 
on pretending that there is no ground for misunderstanding and misinterpretation of 
what our war aims are... Why do you not state your terms fairly? '22 The central 
committee felt handicapped by the continuing absence of a statement, noting its 
necessity again in December. 23 
While Lloyd George's January 1918 statement at the Caxton Hall alleviated 
this problem, the reluctance of many labour groups to take part in war aims work 
induced Peters' resignation, shortly after the Labour Party produced its own war aims 
statement in December. 24 His resignation, because of Labour's war aims statement 
and concerns about some of the propaganda, was announced in January. 25 Although 
Guest denied the `representative of labour' had resigned in early February (probably 
because Tootill and Parker both remained NWAC members throughout), Stanley 
Baldwin, on behalf of Lloyd George, informed the Commons in early June that Peters 
had resigned `some six months ago', but rejected Outhwaite's suggestion that Tootill 
20 TNA: PRO T102/8, D. L. Mort to Peters, 18/8/17 (misrecorded as 18 March, 1917. A reply was sent 
on 21/8/17). See also T102/3, A. E. Dutton (Secretary, Crewe and District Trades Council) to NWAC, 
23/8/17. 
21 TNA: PRO T102/16, NWAC Minutes, 25/9/18,10/10/18. 
22 Speech of Arthur Ponsonby, PDC(5), 100 (19/12/17), cols. 2005-6. 
23 TNA: PRO T102/16, NWAC Minutes, 8/12/18. 
24 John N. Home, Labour at War: France and Britain, 1914-1918 (Oxford, 199 1), pp. 309-311. 
25 `Political Notes', Times, 29/1/18, p. 7. 
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and Parker represented the Government rather than Labour. 26 However, their 
credibility as `authentic' Labour representatives was limited. 
The NWAC's reorganisation in April 1918 shows the large number of 
participants in the Committee Executive. In addition to Guest, Sanders and Cox (who 
did not attend the sub-committees), the Meetings Committee comprised Rea (as 
Chairman), Greenwood, Tootill, Boraston, Wallace Carter and Thompson; together 
with Sir Harry Brittain, representing the Anglo-American Committee; Capt. the Rt. 
Hon. Earl of Onslow, representing the War Office; Commander Walcott for the 
Admiralty; and H. L. M. Bebb as Treasury representative. While Brittain did not sit on 
the Publicity Committee, its non-MP personnel was otherwise the same, alongside 
McNeill (as Chairman), Cowan, Parker and Marshall 27 These sub-committees were 
responsible for the majority of the daily work of the NWAC, though outside 
assistance was also sometimes sought (for instance, in preparing proposals for a `War 
Trophies Exhibition', Brittain canvassed the opinions of staff at the Dorland 
advertising agency). 28 
Jon Lawrence emphasises both the `widespread belief that political legitimacy 
still rested, at least in part, in the open public meeting', and politicians' belief in, even 
reliance upon, `educating' the public which continued in Britain until 1914, and it is 
significant that early discussions about establishing a domestic propaganda body 
revolved specifically around the holding of meetings. 29 Throughout its operations, the 
NWAC continued to place almost devotional faith in the power and importance of 
public meetings, irrespective of periodical adverse comments. The presence of the 
26 PDC(5), 101 (6/2/18), col. 2241; 106 (6/6/18), cols. 1741-2. 
27 TNA: PRO T102/16, NWAC Minutes, 4/4/18. 
28 British Library of Political and Economic Sciences [BLPES], London School of Economics, Brittain 
Papers, BRITTAIN/0010. 
29 Jon Lawrence, Speaking for the People: Party, Language and Popular Politics in England, 1867- 
1914 (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 164,178-80; Sanders Diary, 15/6/17,20/7/17 in Ramsden, Tory Politics, 
pp. 87,88; n. 12 above. 
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parties' chief agents as secretaries, with their expertise in arranging political meetings, 
reflects this preoccupation, as does the fact that the (voluntary) central executive and 
party staffs were so focused on meetings that the reorganisation of the Meetings 
Department on the salaried basis of the Publicity Department was not considered 
necessary until April 1918, when District organisers were appointed to further 
coordinate meetings campaigns. 0 Moreover, the experience of NWAC staff in the 
PRC may also have reaffirmed the significance of open-air meetings. Recruiters had 
recognised that `to reach the "street-corner lad" the war had to be brought to the street 
corner' through public meetings. 31 Between August 1917 and December 1918, at least 
115 MPs agreed to speak at NWAC meetings, but only two were recorded as 
producing written material for the Publicity Department (though many speeches 
became NWAC pamphlets) 32 Early meetings of the Committee were dominated by 
discussion of meetings, with arrangements for a Publicity Department not beginning 
until 30 August and not confirmed until the end of September, while an offer to 
transcribe the inaugural meeting received the response that `the only report that will 
be required... will be that which we... [can] obtain from the ordinary Press channels'. 33 
Various groups within constituencies were rapidly identified as important 
audiences. While the original emphasis was on meetings in summer holiday 
destinations, by late September almost as many meetings had been arranged in 
`industrial areas' (995 compared to 1,298). Plans had also begun to hold meetings `in 
or near factories... in consultation with the Ministry of Munitions', and in London's 
`parks and open spaces', where pacifist propaganda was perceived to be `securing a 
30 TNA: PRO T102116, NWAC Minutes, 4/4/18. 
3' Kit Good, `England Goes to War, 1914-15' (unpublished PhD, Liverpool, 2002), p. 143. 
32 Figures based on two databases compiled from NWAC files - one from the Meetings Register in 
TNA: PRO T102/17 (henceforth noted as Register Database); and the other from ledgers of articles by 
outside contributors, and accounts of artists contributions, in T102/19 and 21 (henceforth noted as 
Articles Database). 
33 TNA: PRO T102/13, unsigned (Cox) to F. Primrose Stevenson, 31/7/17. 
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considerable measure of attention if not support'. This reflected the `widespread 
belief that the symbolism of `political occupation' and `physical control of civic 
space' engendered by public meetings was key to political legitimacy. 34 The NWAC's 
members were also concerned by the `appearance... or prevalence of anti-war views in 
certain rural districts, the Home Counties and other non-industrial areas' (perhaps 
areas expected to be more `reliable'). Consequently, every constituency was to be 
consulted about establishing a WAC. The presence of MPs was also considered 
crucial - `at least one large meeting should be held in each constituency [with another 
MP] present in addition to the local member', thus ensuring that national, rather than 
local political legitimacy was upheld, whilst allowing MPs to maintain their 
reputations in an era when public meetings remained a yardstick of political ability. 
Finally, Military Camps were targeted because of evidence of conscripts' `great 
ignorance'. 35 By mid-October, women were also specifically targeted since war- 
weariness was `prevalent among women'; `special' meetings were therefore 
necessary, to be organised with `the help and co-operation of leading women in their 
areas'. Thus, women's active involvement in public meetings was perhaps endorsed 
without their `appropriating the rituals of (male) popular politics'. 36 An advertisement 
for a NWAC lantern lecture on 15 November 1918 reflected this attitude towards 
female involvement at meetings. The phrase `Ladies admitted', suggests both that this 
was still relatively unusual, and, perhaps, that they remained not entirely `welcome' 
(although this could reflect the fact that the lecture was to be held in the Hull Soldiers' 
34 TNA: PRO T102/16, NWAC Minutes, 25/9/17. Lawrence, Speaking, pp. 164,180-88; On the 
significance of meetings for MPs' reputations, see also H. C. G. Matthew `Rhetoric and Politics in Great 
Britain, 1860-1950', in P. J. Waller (ed. ), Politics and Social Change in Modern Britain: Essays 
Presented to A. F. Thompson (Hassocks, 1987). 
35 TNA: PRO T102/16, NWAC Minutes, 25/9/17. 
36 TNA: PRO T102/16, NWAC Minutes, 10/10/17; Lawrence, Speaking, p. 190. The anti-war MP 
Joseph King alleged that NWAC speakers in Portsmouth had refused to answer the questions of women 
in mid-November, suggesting such concerns with political propriety still exercised some minds: 
PDC(5), 100 (4/12/17), cols. 245-6. 
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Club). 37 By late-October 1917, the NWAC had also sought out `Non-conformist 
Ministers... prepared to assist... in speaking at Meetings', presumably having 
identified nonconformism as a key element of pacifism. 38 Thus, the NWAC attempted 
to incorporate as many groups potentially isolated from messages to an `average' 
political audience as possible - workers, rural populations, women, nonconformists. 
To what extent these groups were considered `unreliable' elements is difficult to say. 
While the NWAC claimed to speak for `the great majority of the people', they also 
hoped to reach `those hidden from view' 39 
Standard campaigns not utilising `special' speakers - whether MPs or other 
noted figures - involved two speakers (usually one Conservative and one Liberal), 
most frequently members of the paid speaking staffs of the parties, giving two 
meetings daily between Monday and Saturday across a constituency. In December, 
with no definite war aims statement yet forthcoming, the central committee 
formulated `Instructions for Speakers', perhaps responding to criticisms directed at 
speakers' performances: 
(1) The object of the National War Aims Committee is "to keep before our nation 
both the causes which have led to this world war and the vital importance to human 
life and liberty of continuing the struggle until the evil forces which originated this 
terrible conflict are destroyed for ever. " 
(2) The War Aims Committee knows no party and does not support or oppose any 
party. 
(3) War Aims speakers must confine their speeches to an exposition of War Aims. 
These are set forth in our publications. 
37 TNA: PRO T102/7, flyer advertising lantern lecture by F. Kirkwood, Soldiers' Club, Hull, 15/11/18. 
38 TNA: PRO T102/16, NWAC Minutes, 31/10/17. 
39 TNA: PRO T102/16, `(Confidential) Aims of Home Publicity', n. d. 
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(4) War Aims speakers must make no attack upon political opponents... [nor] refer to 
any questions of ordinary party controversy. 
(5) Where it is desired to put a resolution at a War Aims meeting, the following 
official form of words should be used: - 
"That this meeting thanks ....... 
for his address, and records its inflexible 
determination to do all in its power to assist in carrying on the war to a victorious 
conclusion, so that Liberty and Justice may be established and permanent peace 
secured. "4c 
These instructions clearly emphasised national and patriotic, rather than party 
political, ideals, and were designed to ensure a level of uniformity among speakers 
and prevent a particular party from gaining an advantage via public meetings intended 
to enhance national unity, an urgent matter when public meetings were still the 
essence of political legitimacy. 
Means of improving speakers' performances were actively sought. In October 
1917, the central committee agreed that `arrangements should be made for the Staff 
speakers and regular volunteer Speakers to go to France' in groups, to `gain in 
effectiveness', and in a War Cabinet memorandum two days later, Carson suggested 
that since `an appeal is now being made to Members to address Meetings... on behalf 
of the [NWAC]... facilities should be given to them to witness for themselves what 
they desire to describe to their audience', along with groups of workers. 41 However, 
not all proposals were equally welcome. A Rochdale citizen's suggestion that NWAC 
speakers should address issues like profiteering, beer supplies and trade union 
40 TNA: PRO T 102/16, `Report up to 8th December, 1917'. This was quoted in Parliament to allay 
suspicions of the NWAC's political influence: speech of Captain Guest, PDC(5), 100 (14/12/17), cols. 
1558-9. 
41 TNA: PRO T102/16, NWAC Minutes, 10/10/17; CAB24/28, GT2268: `Propaganda. Suggested Visits 
of Workers and Others to Theatre of War. ', 12/10/17. 
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conditions drew the response that if someone would `not support the nation in this 
crisis from patriotic reasons, I do not think an unlimited supply of beer, or its total 
prohibition would help matters. We can only appeal to the patriotic impulses of the 
nation, and it is only for high ideals that people will endure' 42 
While the Meetings Department's operations became more regimented with 
public funding, 43 the basic format of campaigns did not apparently change. A database 
compiled from the Meetings Department Register allows tentative general 
conclusions to be drawn. 44 Firstly, regarding the number of days of meetings held by 
the NWAC (the unit by which the NWAC itself measured performance), 45 the 
Register suggests that, until the end of April 1918, where records become incomplete, 
there were 4539 days planned, at an average of 412.7 days per month. Extrapolating 
from this, an estimate of 6190 days' worth of meetings by the end of October 1918 is 
possible, equating to an average of 13.5 days of NWAC events each day. 46 That is, on 
any day between 1 August 1917 and 31 October 1918, thirteen or fourteen 
constituencies could be expected to be holding NWAC events (figures 1-2). While 
Millman correctly suggests that David Sweet's figure of 900 NWAC meetings is a 
considerable underestimation, his own rather cursory examination of the figures 
42 TNA: PRO T102/1, A. Barber to Wallace Carter, 13/11/17; Wallace Carter to Barber, 21/11/17. 
43 See, e. g., TNA: PRO T102/16, NWAC Minutes, 5/12/17. 
44 Though this data is incomplete. For instance, a minute records that between 4 August and 10 October 
1917,3192 meetings were held - TNA: PRO T102/16, NWAC Minutes, 10/10/17. Calculations based 
on the database suggest a total of 1197 days and thus 2394 meetings, assuming 2 meetings per day 
were held. 
45 PDC(5), 101 (18/1/18), col. 610. 
46 Extrapolation: (412.65 days x 15 months [August 1917 - October 1918] _) 6189.6 - 457 (days of 15 
months) = 13.54. Furthermore, if the general assumption is of two meetings per day, this produces an 
average of 27.08 meetings per day. Compared to these figures, Guest told Parliament that up to 3 July 
1918,10,665 meetings had been held. See PDC(5), 108 (16/7/18), col. 887. If this is divided by 337 
(the number of days between August 1,1917 and July 3,1918), a figure of 31.65 is reached, as the 
average daily number of meetings during this period. This suggests that the Register Database, though 
clearly not totally accurate - the absence of data for the early summer of 1918 precludes this - allows 
reasonably reliable estimates. 
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leaves much to be desired. 7 
Secondly, using all available Register records, at least one day of events was 
arranged in 320 local WACs (usually one per constituency, but also regional 
organisations such as `South Wales' or `Scotland'). On average, these WACs held 
17.7 days of events, ranging from a high of 162 days in Coventry to a single day in 
fifty-one constituencies (figure 3). That nearly two-thirds of the constituencies 
holding any events held one to nineteen days'-worth (and that over half of these -109 
- held one to four days'-worth), suggests either that public opinion was generally not 
perceived by local organisers to be unduly antagonistic to the war, or that these 
organisers were too apathetic or overburdened with other work to make much effort. 
Furthermore, following constituency classifications established by Neal Blewett and 
John Turner , 
48 it can be suggested that, in terms of holding any events at all, urban 
constituencies (or their local organisers) were less enthusiastic about holding events, 
rural constituencies held meetings at a relatively proportionate rate, while 
constituencies that were a mixture of urban and rural components, and mining 
constituencies, were more enthusiastic than might be expected. In terms of average 
days per constituency, urban middle and mixed class and urban/rural constituencies 
held a below-average number; whereas urban working class constituencies held about 
the average, and mining and rural constituencies held an above-average number of 
days of NWAC events (figures 4-5). It is also noteworthy that each classification was 
represented by one of the seven most active constituencies (in terms of days of 
events). This demonstrates that no type of constituency was particularly targeted 
47 Millman, Managing, p. 234. His figure of 3959 meetings arranged between April and October 1918 
echoes the number of records in the Meetings Register, the last of which was arranged on a date in late 
October, although these only represent the number of campaigns organised rather than the number of 
days or meetings. His curious footnote relates to the NWAC's minutes of September and October 1917, 
which cannot account for 1918's meetings. 
48 Neal Blewett, The Peers, The Parties and the People: The General Elections of 1910 (London, 
1972), pp. 488-94; Turner, British Politics, pp. 469-79. 
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centrally - although the significantly larger average in mining constituencies must be 
acknowledged - and (as Chapter 3 illustrates) that the impetus for organising 
meetings lay principally with local WACs. 
Figure 1: number of campaign days beginning each month, 1 August 1917 - 31 May 1918 
no date: 109 (2.4%) 
May-18: 145 (3.2%) Aug-17: 210 (4.6%) 
Apr-18: 478 (10.5%) Sep-17: 638 (14.1%) 
Mar-18: 281 (6.2%LIN 
Feb-18: 437 (9.6%) 
Jan-18: 606 (13.4%) 
Dec-17: 150 (3.3%) 
Oct-17: 928 (20.4%) 
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Thirdly, and perhaps most interesting, the Register enables conclusions to be 
drawn about the people acting as speakers at meetings. There were basically four 
types of speaker employed for NWAC meetings. Sometimes, WACs organised their 
own speakers, independent of the NWAC. These people were classified as `local 
speakers' on the register, and are often virtually impossible to classify further. Most 
frequently, however, speakers were drawn from the party speaking staffs, especially 
the Liberals and Conservatives. A third category could be described as `special 
speakers', encompassing public figures like the Earl of Denbigh (who was very active 
on behalf of the NWAC, apparently holding ninety-two meetings generally with 
65 
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audiences of about one thousand by mid-May 1918). 49 the Archbishop of York, the 
author Henry Newbolt and various American, French and Belgian speakers. Finally, 
there were MPs. Figures 6-7 provide statistics of the political affiliations of non-MPs. 
Unsurprisingly, most of these speakers with known affiliations were Liberals or 
Unionists, contributing respectively fifty-seven and sixty-three speakers, and a total of 
2,688 and 2,898 days to NWAC meetings, compared to 1,927 by all other 
contributors. 
W. J. Keel was a Liberal speaker, appearing regularly at meetings in London in 
September and October 1917, and from late July 1918 onwards. P. J. Kelly was a 
Labour speaker based in Manchester who regularly spoke in Northern areas, while 
Bryan O'Donnell was a Conservative speaker who appeared throughout the country. 
Their correspondence with staff at the central committee illuminates the process by 
which speakers were assigned, and their working conditions. Generally, speakers 
were booked for meetings anything from a couple of days to a fortnight in advance. 
Keel reported that one meeting in Poplar was: 
very good, about 200 present, speeches repeatedly punctuated with applause, but no 
questions, though apealed [sic] for... Speakers meeting lasting 1' hours but watches 
being checked by several in crowd shewed it was near opening time. 50 
Evidently, discussion of patriotic duties was only of interest for so long. Appeals for 
questions re-emphasise the continued existence of a political culture whereby 
legitimacy rested in an active engagement with the public -a need to talk `with' 
rather than `to' audiences. On another occasion, in Battersea, Keel reported that his 
49 PDC(5), 106 (13/5/18), col. 44. Most of these did not appear on the Register as they were locally 
funded and the Register related to campaigns requiring central investment. 
50 TNA: PRO T102/7, Keel to W. Kay Waterson (NWAC London organiser), 17/9/17. 
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meeting was disturbed by `a peace meeting some distance away broken up by some of 
our audience', who returned with part of a chair as a souvenir of their efforts. As 
before the war, apparently, `the use of physical force remained a central, and widely 
tolerated, element of popular politics' (though advance warning of such violence 
could also be used by the police as a pretext for cancelling a meeting) 51 However, 
unlike the pre-war situation, the way a speaker handled the crowd sometimes made 
little appreciable difference to their reaction. Kelly reported that when a colleague 
`could not get a hearing' for his speech from several hundred army-age `fine strong 
fellows' in Gower, he instead answered questions for two hours `in splendid style, 
which of course they did not like'. There is little suggestion here of the respect for 
rhetorical skill against heckling that Kathryn Rix suggests was part of the culture of 
public meetings. 52 Speakers commented on particularly troublesome areas, Kelly 
remarking that though Harborough was `a hot bed of pacifists we got very little 
opposition', while O'Donnell, when instructed to speak at Merthyr, replied he would 
`feel much obliged for the donation of a "Tin Hat" and some yards of sticking 
plaster'. 53 Both Keel and Kelly apparently worked diligently for the standard 
remuneration (£1.1.0 per day plus third-class rail fares), Keel thanking the NWAC for 
his engagements, which were `a great help... financially and have kept me from 
thinking too much of my sons death and daughters mental condition [sic]'. 54 
O'Donnell, by contrast, was seemingly a troublesome speaker. He objected to third 
class rail fares `on principle... as unbefitting my occupation... when "very temporary 
51 TNA: PRO T102/7, Keel to NWAC, 7/10/17; Lawrence, Speaking, p. 181; Jon Lawrence, `Public 
Space, Political Space' in Jay Winter and Jean-Louis Robert (eds. ), Capital Cities at War: Paris, 
London, Berlin, 1914-1919, Vol. 2, A Cultural History (Cambridge, 2007), pp. 294-6. 
52 TNA: PRO T102/7, Kelly to Peters, 3/10/17; Kathryn Rix, "`Go Out into the Highways and the 
Hedges": The Diary of Michael Sykes, Conservative Political Lecturer, 1895 and 1907-8', 
Parliamentary History, 20: 2 (2001), pp. 228-9; Cf. Lawrence, Speaking, pp. 188-90. 
53 TNA: PRO T102/7, Kelly to Wallace Carter, 28/7/18; T102/10, O'Donnell to Vesey, 13/10/17. 
54 TNA: PRO T102/7, Keel to NWAC, 29/10/17. 
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gentlemen", including warrant officers, are compelled by regulations to travel first', 
and because speakers could not be expected to compose speeches `in a crowd whose 
odour is noisier than its voice'. 55 `Surely', he added, `the N. W. A. C. does not expect 
Members and Candidates to travel 3rd class. Why should I...? ' Vesey responded that 
most MPs sought no remuneration at all. Nevertheless, O'Donnell finally received the 
difference in fares from Boraston, through Conservative Central Office. However, he 
remained a difficult employee, twice reprimanded for poor performance or 
attendance. 56 
While party speakers addressed most meetings, MPs were the star attractions. 
Over one hundred appeared at least once, according to the Register, ranging from 
frequent speakers like the Rt. Hon. W. T. Brace (who contributed twenty-seven days), 
W. Llewellyn Williams (twenty-three), C. A. McCurdy (eighteen), and J. H. Edwards 
(sixteen); to fifty-five MPs who appeared only once. Figures 8-10 demonstrate MPs' 
contributions by political affiliation. 7 The most striking statistic is that, though much 
the largest number of different MPs were Conservatives (almost half), proportionally 
they provided the smallest average number of days. The MPs most generous with 
their time were Coalition Labour MPs, who it was presumably hoped would best 
inspire workers, followed by Lloyd George and Asquithian Liberals. These three were 
all new Parliamentary groupings who perhaps, particularly in the Liberals' case, saw 
NWAC meetings as an opportunity to gain wider public recognition and visibility, 
and convey their message. Despite the NWAC's avowed restriction of party 
ss TNA: PRO T102/10, O'Donnell to Vesey, 9/8/17. 
56 TNA: PRO T102/10,, O'Donnell to Vesey, 12/8/17; Vesey to O'Donnell 13/8/17,15/8/17; 11/2/18, 
14/2/18; Cox to O'Donnell, 16/9/18. 
57 Affiliations based upon F. W. S. Craig, British Parliamentary Election Results, 1918-1949 (revised 
ed., Basingstoke, 1977); Michael Stenton and Stephen Lees (eds. ), Who's Who of British Members of 
Parliament, A Biographical Dictionary of the House of Commons, I1(1885-1918) and III (1919-1945) 
(Hassocks, 1978/1979). 
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politicking, Sanders told Parliament that when `a Minister comes down to speak on 
war aims or anything else you cannot bind him down entirely to stick to your war 
aims', while Guest admitted that `one must give more latitude to speakers of national 
importance' when they took NWAC meetings, and trust that `they will not take undue 
advantage of the opportunities' 58 Clearly, despite the NWAC's all-party nature, party 
political issues were not entirely ignored. Wallace Carter told Rea (both Asquithian 
Liberals) that for `obvious reasons we want our own leaders to take their share' 59 
The Meetings Department also ran mobile cinema ('cinemotor') tours before 
and after the summer of 1918 (while sunset was early enough to make them 
practicable). These tours have been cited as one of the NWAC's most innovative 
contributions to propaganda work '60 but were not, in fact, tremendously original. 
Travelling vans had been used to capture public imagination for propaganda purposes 
as early as the 1880's, when `gypsy caravans' with lantern lecture equipment toured 
the countryside `educating' rural Britons with a resource `beyond the means of local 
associations', while `[a]ppropriate cinematograph war films were shown from two 
vans' by the PRC in 1915.61 The NWAC, with experienced PRC men heavily 
involved, simply expanded these operations, using ten Ministry of Information-owned 
vans, originally intended for use in Russia. 2 Nevertheless, the tours were an 
impressive success. In one week in April 1918, ten tours visited fifty-seven towns and 
villages, giving shows to audiences averaging over 2,600 people (one as large as 
fifteen thousand) - perhaps 150,000 in total - and the tours were so popular that the 
58 PDC(5), 100 (14/12/17), cols. 1530,1558. 
59 TNA: PRO T102/12, Wallace Carter to Rea, 5/10/17; On Wallace Carter's allegiance: Sanders Diary, 
20/12/17, in Ramsden, Tory Politics, p. 94. 
60 Millman, Managing, p. 240; Haste, Home Fires, p. 42; Home, `Remobilizing', p. 206. 
61 Rix, "`Go Out... ', pp. 210-12; and `The Party Agent and English Electoral Culture, 1880-1906 
(unpublished PhD, Cambridge, 2001), pp. 209-210; TNA: PRO W0106/367, `Parliamentary Recruiting 
Committee. Meetings Sub-Department. Report'. 
62 Sanders and Taylor, British Propaganda, p. 106; PDC(5), 105 (29/4/18), cols. 1283-4. 
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Meetings Department had to disappoint WACs asking for the vans to visit their 
constituency. 63 The cinemotors did not, however, show NWAC-created films. The 
£10,000 earmarked for cinema was devoted to an abortive `British National Film' 
which, having been destroyed by fire upon first completion and re-shot by November 
1918, was never shown publicly as it was considered `so unmistakeably fitted for the 
particular purpose' for which it was made - that is, depicting German barbarity and 
the perils of striking - as to be unworthy of peacetime release . 
64 The Ministry of 
Information supplied films, including such titles as `Patriotic Porkers', `Our Naval Air 
Power', `With the Forces in Mesopotamia', `Woolwich Arsenal' and `With the 
W. R. A. F. ', 65 the NWAC executive having decided not to involve themselves with 
other film production. 6 The Publicity Department confined itself to producing prose, 
poetry and artwork. 
As discussed, the production of printed propaganda material was secondary to 
the pivotal role assigned to meetings. Sanders told the Commons that pamphlets 
which `for some absurd reason we call literature' left him cold, but had some effect, 
as did speeches (about which he was only slightly more complimentary). 67 This 
reflected the belief in the political legitimacy conferred by public interaction with 
voters at meetings, and plans to create a Publicity Department were not begun until 30 
August 1917, when McNeill, Buchan and Peters formed an establishing sub- 
committee. They recommended the appointment of an Editorial Committee 
comprising an Editor and two assistants to oversee the Department. The Editor should 
63 TNA: PRO T102/18, `CINE-MOTOR CAMPAIGN. Report of Attendances for week April 8th to 
13th 1918. '; T102/4, letter (unsigned) to Rev. G. L. Foster (Cambridge), 17/4/18. 
64 TNA: PRO T12519 - file 13904/1920, H. C. Brook Johnson to John Bradbury, 19/5/19; Report, 
19/3/20. On the film, see Nicholas Reeves, Official British Film Propaganda During the First World 
War (London, 1986), pp. 125-30,215-6; and below, pp. 146-7. 
65 TNA: PRO T102/5, J. M. G. ('Green's Film Service') to Barber, 11/10/18, Captain Lord Briscal for 
G. O. C. Royal Air Force, Blandford to NWAC, 8/10/18. 
66 TNA: PRO T102/16, NWAC Minutes, 5/12/17. 
67 PDC(5), 100 (14/12/17), cols. 1528-9. 
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be `a thoroughly competent and trained professional journalist... who is a well- 
informed politician, versed in public affairs generally', with his assistants being 
experts on the local press and `a news expert'. These officials should `establish 
friendly and confidential relations with as large a section of the Press as possible', and 
provide material from the Department of Information, the War Cabinet and the 
Labour Ministry without Press Bureau (the government's censor) scrutiny to `a 
carefully selected list of newspapers'. The Sub-committee thought permanent 
`salaried writers' unnecessary, as the Department could obtain pieces at `ordinary 
journalistic rates' from outside contributors. Aside from Press material, the sub- 
committee expected pamphlets, leaflets, cartoons, posters, postcards and (at this point) 
cinema and lantern lecture material to be produced for distribution by local WACs 
which `command[ed] the machinery of the party political organizations in the 
constituencies, who are accustomed to the distribution of literature'. They noted 
approvingly W. H. Smith & Sons' offer to: 
place at the unreserved disposal of the Government our organization for distributing 
printed matter throughout the Country; to co-operate with your Local Organizations; 
to promote the sale of any publication which you may issue... In short, to augment 
your publicity organization by the organization of our Firm. 68 
Furthermore, they thought material should be offered to `Free Libraries, Polytechnics, 
Mechanics Institutes, and any club willing to... make them readily available to 
Members and visitors'. Peters objected that most of this work `has already been 
commenced by the existing Literature Committee', adding that the Editorial 
68 TNA: PRO T102/14, George Tyler to `The Director of National Information, St. Stephen's 
Chambers', 22/10/17. On Smiths' propaganda activities: Colclough, `No such bookselling', pp. 27-45. 
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Committee was unnecessary and that it was wrong to `dispense with the services of 
the staffs of the Literature Departments of the great political parties... placed freely at 
our disposal without any cost'. 69 Nevertheless, the report was adopted in late- 
September, with the caveat that the Department should work with existing Literature 
Departments, and McNeill became its chairman. Soon afterwards, Gerard Fiennes, 
formerly assistant-editor at the Pall Mall Gazette and Standard (both Unionist 
newspapers), was appointed Editor, with E. W. Record, an official of the Liberal 
Publication Department, appointed his assistant. 0 
Fiennes was evidently very involved in instructing authors on the appropriate 
line to take. Asking the Archdeacon of Winchester for an article based on a sermon, 
he wrote that what he particularly wanted stressed was `the sense of absolute faith in 
the righteousness of our cause and the consequent assurance that we may trust the 
issue to God and, secondly... that the hero self-consecrated to right is also the saint'. 1 
On another occasion, he asked the prominent author Marie Correlli to produce 
something for `women and girls... to combat the sense of war weariness... which 
seems to be affecting some of them'. The piece should not be "`preachy" but... 
pointing out... [that we must] endure to the end. Also, of course, the immense 
influence... that... keeping a stiff upper lip at home has on the minds of our fighting 
men'. Other than this, however, he left the details to the author! 72 
Material produced for the Publicity Department had several possible 
destinations. Much NWAC material was published in two newspapers. Reality was 
the NWAC's weekly four-page newspaper, available free at W. H. Smith shops and 
stalls throughout the country. Though the Department of Information printed the 
69 TNA: PRO T102/16, `Report of Sub-Committee on Publicity Campaign', 25/9/18. 
'° TNA: PRO T102/12, Fiennes to Record, 31/10/17. 
'1 TNA: PRO T102/15, Fiennes to the Archdeacon of Winchester, 11/10/17. 
72 TNA: PRO T102/2, Fiennes to Marie Correlli, 23/11/17. 
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paper, the NWAC was responsible for content. 3 Further, a second illustrated paper, 
Welcome, was, if not officially a NWAC organ, at least substantially composed of 
NWAC-supplied material, receiving at least 256 pieces between March and 
November 1918, including 184 pieces of artwork. 74 The Publicity Department's 
pieces were also supplied to three News supply services or agencies, including one 
run by Cassell's Publishers; to individual newspapers and journals; occasionally to 
organisations like the Navy League; and some became pamphlets, leaflets and 
booklets (see figure 11). The newspapers which were supplied directly with NWAC 
material (rather than via the supply services or other routes) - including, in some 
provincial papers, weekly War Supplements - included national dailies like the 
Manchester Guardian, Daily Telegraph and Daily Mail; provincial papers like the 
Essex Herald, Leicester Mercury and Aberdeen Journal; religious papers including 
the Church Monthly and Jewish Express; and special interest publications like 
Nursing Notes, the British Workman, Family Friend and Our Home. As this 
abbreviated list suggests, NWAC pieces ranged across many themes. 75 Of 596 pieces 
submitted to the NWAC, 331 (55.5%) were accepted for publication by the Publicity 
Department. 
Except, perhaps, for Reality, the NWAC's pamphlets were its most obvious 
and readily accessible form of publication. A set of fifteen were advertised in various 
newspapers, including the Daily Mail and the Church Times, as being available free 
on request in September 1917.76 Included was one of the NWAC's most popular 
pamphlets, the `Kalendar of Kultur', which listed various German wartime 
73 TNA: PRO T102/3, letter (unsigned) to Robert Donald (Editor, Daily Chronicle), 12/12/17. 
74 Statistics of the destinations of Publicity Department material are based upon an Articles Database, 
based on ledgers and accounts of Publicity Department, TNA: PRO T102/21 and 19. 
75 The content of NWAC publications is extensively discussed in Part 2. 
76 See e. g. TNA: PRO T102/3, John Dumphrey to NWAC, 20/9/17, enclosing cutting of advertisement 
from the Morning Post. T102/1, Albert D. Beckwith to NWAC, 20/9/17; Arthur Boutwood to NWAC, 
21/9/17; T102/6, Rev. H. E. Jones to Cox, 24/9/17. 
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atrocities. 77 The NWAC produced several series' of pamphlets, including the `German 
Aims' series, produced by the Liberal MP Charles McCurdy; the `Message' series, 
which reproduced noted speeches (mostly by political figures, but also Rudyard 
Kipling); and Searchlights, featuring pieces by prominent Labour figures like Ben 
Tillett and Victor Grayson, popular authors including G. K. Chesterton, and speeches 
by Lloyd George, Woodrow Wilson and others. The Committee were inundated with 
offers from local citizens to assist in distributing this literature, 78 with varying levels 
of ingenuity. A Suffolk doctor, for example, having discovered one of the envelopes 
of NWAC pamphlets distributed in Barclays Bank branches, offered to place 
pamphlets in local village post offices, suggesting that since `the small branches of 
Banks are now closed... [t]he Post Offices would be the best centres for [such] 
distribution'. He received five hundred packages for the purpose, and the NWAC's 
gratitude. 79 In Cornwall, T. C. Hepp received official endorsement to employ Boy 
Scouts in the distribution of NWAC pamphlets, as did the WAC secretary in 
77 E. g. TNA: PRO T102/3, Rev. T. V. Evans to NWAC, 24/9/17; T102/4, Mrs Fulford to NWAC, 
22/9/17. 
78 E. g. TNA: PRO T102/3, S. A. Earnshaw to NWAC, 5/10/17; T102/5, Sister Mary Julia for the Rev. 
Mother (Community of the Helpers of the Holy Souls) to NWAC, 16/4/18; T102/8, J. Moor (ASE 
member, Hartlepool) to NWAC, 20/9/17; John Moore to Bartlett, 2/9/17. 
79 TNA: PRO T102/1, Dr. H. G. Biddle to NWAC, 14/5/18. 
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Plymouth. 80 W. H. Smith & Sons also used Scouts to assist their distribution efforts, as 
well as dispatching `large numbers' of pamphlets to breweries for circulation in 
village inns. 8' However, the offer by Day's Variety Agency to use a wireless- 
controlled Zeppelin to distribute pamphlets at meetings was declined - though the 
novelty would undoubtedly represent an attraction, it would also distract audiences 
from the speeches, 82 which were, after all, presumed to be the ultimate conveyor of 
political legitimacy. 
The pamphlets were certainly widely distributed. Perhaps the most intensively 
distributed was number 33, Our United War Aims, which summarised Lloyd George's 
January War Aims speech (many speeches became pamphlets, reflecting again the 
contemporary political preoccupation with them). According to the Meetings 
Register, total WAC estimates to distribute this pamphlet amounted to 2,560,200 
between 10 January and 3 March 1918, at a cost of £654.16.0. Liverpool WAC 
offered to distribute 130,000 copies without charge. These were enormous figures, 
contributing to the hundred million NWAC publications which W. H. Smith & Sons 
was thanked for distributing by the end of the war. By comparison, during the year of 
the 1895 election, the Liberal and Conservative parties each distributed around 
twenty-five million pamphlets, and only five and two million respectively the year 
before. 83 While Stephen Colclough is right to emphasise the importance of this 
activity to reaching `a truly mass audience', it nonetheless remains the case, as 
discussed above, that the NWAC's activities prioritised public meetings above 
80 TNA: PRO T102/5, Hepp to Cox, 9/2/18; T102/1, R. Wherry Anderson, `Report on Propaganda in 
Cornwall and Devon', 4/9/18. 
81 Colclough, `No such bookselling', p. 40. 
82 TNA: PRO T102/3, correspondence between H. Goodson (Day's Variety Agency) and Vesey, 11,12 
and 15/4/18. 
83 Statistics regarding pamphlet no. 33 from Meetings Register database; TNA: PRO T102/13, letter, 
unsigned (probably Cox) to W. H. Smith & Sons, 14/11/18; Rix, `party agent' p. 205. Cf also the 
distribution figures for Lloyd George's land campaign, cited p. 41 above. 
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publications. 4 
Alongside its creative and distributive roles, the Publicity Department, and the 
NWAC generally, also served as an instrument of surveillance. Beginning in August, 
1917, the NWAC examined growing numbers of newspapers, beginning with 
`Labour' papers like the Labour Leader, Daily Herald, and British Citizen and 
Empire Worker (the BWNL's journal), followed by various provincial papers from 
Birmingham, Bristol, Leeds, Leicester, Liverpool, London and Sheffield, and other 
papers like Pearson's Weekly, Tit Bits, Answers and Home Notes. 85 In October, 
Fiennes asked the Manchester Daily Despatch's Editor to send him a copy of a 
pacifist pamphlet which had been reported in the paper, along with `any similar 
pamphlets' which had been seen. 86 In November, he went further, contacting both the 
Director of Military Intelligence and the Home Secretary. He asked General 
Macdonogh whether M17b could examine `smaller provincial papers' for the NWAC, 
particularly the correspondence pages, `where the pacifist purpose does not lie on the 
surface', which the NWAC could not cover, and for which cuttings agencies were 
insufficiently expert. Any `matter which points to discontent and disheartenment 
among the people may be regarded as pacifist intendancy and this notification to us 
will be materially helpful'. Two days later, he asked Sir George Cave to `give 
instructions that a copy of everything... [seized by police] should be sent to the 
Publication Department', which would be of `enormous assistance', 87 presumably 
enabling the NWAC to more accurately address and undermine anti-war material. 
Contemporaneously, Cox wrote to the Home Office, asking that it share its 
information on `Pacifist gatherings' with the Committee so that `we may set our local 
84 Colclough, `No such bookselling', pp. 42-3. 
85 TNA: PRO T102/3, correspondence between NWAC and Messrs Everett & Sons, 9/8/17-12/12/17. 
86 TNA: PRO T 102/8, letter (unsigned), probably Fiennes, to Editor, Manchester Daily Despatch, 
19/10/17. 
87 TNA: PRO T102/8, Fiennes to Macdonogh, 14/11/17; T102/2, Fiennes to Cave, 16/11/17. 
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committee machinery going' 88 Shortly afterwards, Cox met Basil Thomson, a senior 
figure in the Metropolitan Police and head of the Criminal Investigation Department 
(CID), who ran police operations relating to `Pacifist and Revolutionary 
Organisations', and agreed that Cox would receive `early information of any pacifist 
movement which came to [Thomson's] notice and that he will try and arrange out- 
door or indoor meetings as a Counter-blast'. 9 
The NWAC was evidently undertaking a surveillance role both to better 
understand the nature and arguments of the organisations it had been established to 
counteract, and, with the arrangements between Cox and Thomson, to directly 
compete with such groups, once again, predominantly through meetings. However, 
this falls far short of Millman's characterisation of the NWAC as `secret machinery 
by which dissenters could be intimidated and in the extreme physically suppressed', 
or his scandalised suggestion that `patriot excess was not only tolerated, but 
organized, employed, even manufactured by the govemment'. 90 As Lawrence has 
shown, physical force and the `control of civic space' remained a key element of 
political legitimacy in 1914,91 and there is little to suggest this changed with the 
absence of peace-time political meetings. While speakers like Keel and Kelly 
expressed no disapproval of the disruption of pacifist meetings, neither did they claim 
they encouraged it. Nor is it clear that, had the war continued longer, the NWAC 
would have been empowered to `refer cases directly' to the Director of Public 
Prosecutions, for which Millman's only evidence is its suggestion in December 1917 
in NWAC minutes. Had this been likely, eleven months was surely long enough to 
88 TNA: PRO H045/10743/263275/265, Cox to Home Office, 15/11/17. 
89 Swartz, Union of Democratic Control, pp. 183-4,190; TNA: PRO H045/10743/263275/265, Minute 
by Thomson, 26/11/17, C. D. Carew-Robinson to Cox, 28/11/17. 
9°Millman, Managing, p. 245. 
91 Lawrence, Speaking, p. 181. See Lawrence's discussion of Millman: Jon Lawrence, `Review: Brock 
Millman, Managing Domestic Dissent in First World War Britain', Twentieth Century British History, 
14: 1 (2003), pp. 86-8. 
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establish the principle. 2 His contention that NWAC surveillance amounted to a 
sinister and `gigantic intelligence gathering apparatus', backed by evidence that they 
examined public reactions to Lord Lansdowne's letter to the Daily Telegraph in 
November 1917 (which called for a restatement of war aims that would remove 
suggestions that Britain intended to annihilate Germany), 93 is undermined by Sanders' 
diary. This shows that such steps led Wallace Carter to threaten resignation if he was 
forced to `circularise our local agents', since Asquith was uncertain of his response at 
the time, so that only a press survey was apparently undertaken. This hardly equates 
with Millman's characterisation of the NWAC as `Lloyd George's stormtroopers'. 94 
And while links existed between the BWNL and the NWAC, it is also true that the 
NWAC deliberately avoided too close a relationship, for instance denying 
emphatically that it had lent the BWNL a cinemotor. 95 
L. L. Farrar Jr. 's suggestion that `the critical issue [of British propaganda] 
became much more to discourage defeatism than to encourage aggressive 
nationalism' is surely correct 96 Millman refers to `Scheme L' -a plan to mobilise all 
armed forces stationed within Britain in the event of a `doomsday scenario' of civilian 
unrest, to be followed by a `levee en masse of volunteers' (which, incidentally, he 
only explains means `The Volunteers', equivalent to the Home Guard, in an 
endnote). 97 His suggestion that, in the event of the Scheme's implementation, co- 
operation between the NWAC, the police and the military `was only the logical next 
92 Millman, Managing, p. 247. 
93 Turner, British Politics, p. 249. 
94 Millman, Managing, pp. 246,248; Sanders Diary, 20/12/17, in Ramsden, Tory Politics, p. 94; 
TNA: PRO T102/16, `Public Opinion of the Lansdowne Letter'. 
95 TNA: PRO T102/9, letter (unsigned) to Coun. G. Naylor (Unionist Labour Party), 4/5/18. 
96 L. L. Farrar Jr., `Nationalism in Wartime: Critiquing the Conventional Wisdom', in Frans Coetzee 
and Marilyn Shevin Coetzee (eds. ), Authority, Identity and the Social History of the Great War 
(Providence/Oxford, 1995), p. 137. 
97 Millman, Managing, pp. 282-5,299, n. 37. 
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step', and that the NWAC itself would mobilise its manpower resources, 98 seems a 
gross overstatement of its power. Presumably in this event Bryan O'Donnell, 
constantly beset with leg injuries, fevers, and other maladies during his service with 
the NWAC, 99 would have hobbled forth with his "`Tin Hat" and... yards of sticking 
plaster' to see off the revolutionary workers of Britain, led by Captain Guest and 
Colonel Sanders! While the NWAC endured unflattering characterisations as both a 
corrupting political influence and a staggeringly incompetent organisation by 
Parliamentary critics, 100 none of the UDC MPs (who presumably would have been 
among the first men rounded up in Millman's doomsday scenario) suggested that it 
was involved in a sinister plan to create a mass army of `patriots', 101 the better to 
trample the last worker and the last British liberties into the ground. It seems much 
more likely that the NWAC's purpose was as advertised, `to resist insidious 
influences of an unpatriotic character' by keeping `before the country the causes 
which had led to the War, and to encourage the country to continue until those causes 
had been removed forever'. 102 As John Home suggests, while partially useful, `heavy 
reliance on coercion would undermine [the government's] essential democratic 
legitimacy and prove counter-productive'. Instead, what was required was a 
`remobilization' of public support for the war, based on voluntary local 
involvement, 103 and a reliance on the power of patriotic appeals. 
98 Millman, Managing, p. 294. 
99 TNA: PRO T102/10, folder 'Bryan O'Donnell'. 
10° Also in Swartz, Union of Democratic Control, p. 191. 
101 Millman defines, a `patriot' as a middle or working-class thug determined to use violence to silence 
dissent. Millman, Managing, p. 99. 
102 Speech of Captain Guest, PDC(5), 99 (13/11/17), cols. 286-7. 
103 Home, 'Remobilizing', p. 198 and passim. 
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Chapter 3: Rcmobilising the public: local War Aims Committees. 
To ensure a truly national campaign, NWAC activities could only be 
organised at a local level. By September 1917, it was judged that all constituencies 
required local War Aims Committees, rather than the two hundred or so initially 
targeted. ' Jose Harris claims that, politically and culturally, Britain experienced `a 
subterranean shift in the balance of social life away from the locality to the metropolis 
and the nation' after 1900,2 but local institutions and expertise remained crucial to the 
successful organisation of any nationwide campaign. Historians have recently asserted 
the `enduring power of the local' in both political and cultural terms, 3 corroborating 
Duncan Tanner's contention that, at least until 1918, the `context of social 
experience... was local, not national' and that politics consequently had to be tailored 
to non-uniform local expectations. These assertions are supported by the NWAC's 
organisational structure, and the content of its propaganda (on which, see Chapter 7). 
The central Committee could have only very limited knowledge of public opinion in 
individual localities. By contrast, party agents, who usually acted as secretaries and 
chief organisers of WACs, brought specialist knowledge of their constituency, not 
only of local political attitudes, but also of the area's human geography and the 
patterns of everyday lives. By combining central resources with local organisation and 
expertise the NWAC could offer a more flexible and locally-responsive campaign 
1 TNA: PRO T102/16, Meetings Department Report, 25/9/17. 
2 Jose Harris, Private Lives, Public Spirit: A Social History of Britain, 1870-1914 (Oxford, 1993), pp. 
18-19. See also Jon Lawrence, `Class and Gender in the Making of Urban Toryism, 1880-1914', 
English Historical Review, 108 (1993), esp. pp. 650-1. 
3 E. g. Philip Harting, `The Centrality of Locality: The Local State, Local Democracy, and Local 
Consciousness in Late-Victorian and Edwardian Britain', Journal of Victorian Culture, 9: 2 (2004), p. 
218; Paul Readman, `The Place of the Past in English Culture c. 1890-1914', Past and Present, 186 
(2005). 
4 Duncan Tanner, Political Change and the Labour Party, 1900-1918 (Cambridge, 1990), citation p. 
420. 
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than with a purely central approach. Furthermore, the involvement with, and tacit 
endorsement of, the NWAC by local figures constituted a significant ideological 
imperative, offering some appearance of spontaneity and self-mobilisation rather than 
an overarching state-driven propaganda. In principle, local involvement meant that 
propaganda was imparted to, rather than imposed upon, the public. This chapter 
analyses local involvement with the NWAC quantitatively and explains the process 
by which local committees were established and operated. Before this it considers the 
impulses towards a local organisational structure, both practical and ideological. 
As Chapter 1 demonstrated, the NWAC followed the PRC in utilising local 
party agents as secretaries of constituency WACs (as did other organisations). 5 The 
NWAC's Meetings Department reported in October 1917 that `almost every 
constituency' had a WAC, War Savings Committee, Food Economy Committee, 
National Service Committee and Munitions Works Committee, with varying 
personnel, but often the same secretaries. Similarly, the Conservative Agents' 
Journal noted the example of the Conservative and Liberal agents in Bradford, who 
held seven joint honorary secretaryships 7 The use of political agents had several 
practical purposes. First, these were men known and trusted by the central organisers, 
meaning they could carry out work locally without close monitoring. This reliability 
was assisted by the increasingly homogenous work done by party agents, by 1900, 
resulting from the mobility between constituencies accompanying their 
professionalisation. 8 A similar approach could, therefore, be expected in most areas. 
5 E. g., the Conservatives' National Union resolution to place agents at the disposal of the National 
Service Committee: Archives of the British Conservative & Unionist Party [henceforth ABCUP], Series 
H. Minutes and Reports of the British Conservative Unionist Party (microfiche ed., Hassocks, 1978) 
`Minutes of N. U. Executive Committee: 8 Feb 1917 -7 Jun 1917', minute, 13/3/17: `Parliamentary 
National Service (Meetings) Committee'. 
6 TNA: PRO T102/16, `Meetings Department Report, 10th October, 1917. ' 
7 ABCUP: `Conference Reports 1947-1963; Campaign Guides 1951-1974; CAJ 1902-1983', 
Conservative Agents' Journal, 47 (January 1918), p. 14. 
8 Rix, `Party Agent', pp. 98-9. 
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Another party political advantage in utilising agents in such activities was to ensure 
that they remained `essential' workers, immune from conscription, therefore 
maintaining the network of local political influence which had developed since the 
1880s. 9 Moreover, the NWAC's local organisation depended specifically upon the 
presence and willing involvement of agents. In the Yorkshire mining constituency, 
Osgoldcross, the local Conservative Chairman, F. S. Hatchard, reported in October 
1917 that it was impossible to form a WAC since they had no agent. 1° This 
represented an organisational difficulty for the NWAC, since many agents had 
enlisted in the armed forces or taken war work elsewhere. The Conservative Agents' 
Journal claimed that over one hundred Conservative agents had enlisted, while in 
Torquay, the Liberal W. Blackler informed the NWAC that `our Agent is in the Army 
+I am too busy to take up any work', though Torquay's WAC was actually 
established soon afterwards" The comments of Hatchard and Blackler suggest that 
the absence of agents inhibited local organisation - Torquay's WAC was seemingly 
initially established by the Conservative agent, though Liberals were subsequently 
represented. Other local party notables were apparently unable or disinclined to 
involve themselves in such (voluntary) organisational work. 
In other instances, the weak efforts of local agents were blamed for the lack of 
organised propaganda. The Conservative Horace Chatterton complained to the central 
Committee that in Norfolk `the local agents do little or nothing to organize the 
meetings', with consequent poor attendances. 12 In Eiland (the constituency of UDC 
member Charles Trevelyan), a clergyman asked the central Committee in September 
9 E. g., TNA: PRO T102/3, Capt. G. R. Donald to Cox, 31/7/17, concerning the request of Coventry's 
Liberal agent, Karl Spencer, for exemption from military service because of the proposed formation of 
a WAC. 
10 TNA: PRO T102/26 - Osgoldcross card index entry. 11 Conservative Agents' Journal, no. 46 (October 1917), p. 139; TNA: PRO T 102/26 - Torquay card 
index entry. 
12 TNA: PRO T102/2, Chatterton to Vesey, 25/1/18. 
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1917 to assist him in organising propaganda locally, having already approached the 
local agents, since `the politicians [the agents] do not intend to take the matter up'. 
However, he was informed that the NWAC was continuing efforts to establish a WAC 
in Eiland, and encouraged to place himself at its disposal thereafter, though nothing 
was seemingly done until October 1918.13 
The NWAC's commitment to a constituency-based, agent-led organisation is 
confirmed by its realignment of some local WACs to conduct NWAC work `through 
the new Constituency Organizations as soon as convenient' after the 1918 electoral 
boundary redistributions. 14 In Wigan, the Conservative agent Thomas Southworth, 
who had operated a joint-WAC for Wigan and Ince since August 1917, was asked to 
focus solely on Wigan from June 1918, as the NWAC was `working on the basis of 
new Constituencies'. " This seemingly inflexible approach perhaps reflected political 
considerations, given the concerns expressed by some MPs about the NWAC's 
potential exploitation for electoral advantage. Wigan was represented by a 
Conservative, whereas Ince had a Labour MP - the NWAC's constituency card-index 
recorded Southworth as the contact for Wigan, but R. T. Phillips (Labour) for Ince, 
perhaps indicating different approaches in the two constituencies. The central 
Committee's lukewarm response to organisation by non-political figures perhaps 
suggests concern for accountability, particularly after November 1917, when NWAC 
finances became Treasury-based. Party agents were trusted, and sufficiently expert, to 
make and adhere to appropriate estimates for events, whereas individual civilians 
were an unknown quantity. Whether this assumption was accurate is debatable, given 
the correspondence between Vesey and Sir J. W. Greenwood of the Stalybridge 
13 TNA: PRO T102/1, Rev. Luke Beaumont to NWAC, 14/9/17; NWAC to Beaumont, 18/9/17; 
T102/26 - Eiland card index entry. 14 TNA: PRO T102/13, fragment of letter (n. d. ) signed by Boraston, Wallace Carter and Thompson, on 
reverse of note in correspondence with J. Swithenbank. 
15 TNA: PRO T102/13, folder `S', letter, unsigned to Southworth, 6/6/18. 
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Conservative and Unionist Association. Greenwood wrote on behalf of the local 
agent, whose invoice for distributing 16,000 leaflets was rejected by the NWAC, 
because of Treasury instructions to pay for nothing without prior estimates. 
Greenwood complained that his agent's work throughout the war in Stalybridge had 
rendered a WAC unnecessary there: 
if he had been less energetic + patriotic he might have arranged a series of meetings + 
distributions of literature under your auspices + received ten or twenty pounds for 
himself as other Agents have done. [Instead] he has given his whole time to the war, 
been paid his usual salary by us + borne the burden of all increased charges himself. 16 
Despite Greenwood's allegation of venality, however, it remained true that 
central organisers knew more about their own provincial workforce than if they 
allowed WACs to be administered by private citizens. A further assumed benefit of 
agents' involvement was their sway over local politicians. In discussing proposals for 
an Empire-wide commemoration of the anniversary of the declaration of war, the 
secretary of the CCNPO remarked to Cox that `[w]e have not in times past found the 
majority of the Mayors very helpful, but no doubt your agents will stimulate many of 
them into hearty co-operation'. '? Where agents were unavailable, regional agents 
sometimes involved themselves. For instance, the Conservative agent W. J. Arculus 
involved himself in at least sixteen constituencies over four counties. '8 In April, when 
the Meetings Department was reorganised, `District Organizers' like Arculus were 
appointed `to supervise the efforts of local Committees' - perhaps indicating that the 
16 TNA: PRO T102/5, correspondence between Greenwood and Vesey, October 1917 - February 1918, 
citation in letter, 8/11/17. 
17 TNA: PRO T102/2, Grey Wilson to Cox, 19/6/18. 
18 TNA: PRO T102/26 - Bosworth, Derby, Derby (Mid), East Northamptonshire, Harborough, Ilkeston, 
Leicester, Loughborough, Melton, Northampton, Nuneaton, Rugby, South Northamptonshire, 
Stratford-on-Avon, Warwick & Leamington and West Derby card-index entries. 
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NWAC was not satisfied with the work of all local agents. 19 In June, Cox provided 
Charles Cockburn, the Conservative `County Organising Agent' for Northumberland, 
with the names of Northumberland's Unionist and Liberal District organisers, adding 
that the `main idea is to see that active [WACs] are established' to ensure `effective' 
and widespread propaganda. 20 While local action was preferable, therefore, alternative 
arrangements would be made where necessary. 
Most important, practically, was the agents' local expertise. Agents who had 
been in their constituencies for a while knew the best places to hold meetings, and the 
times when sizeable audiences could be obtained. They were familiar to proprietors of 
halls, schoolmasters and others whose indoor spaces were needed for winter work. 
This could sometimes be a hindrance, as in Wigan, where Southworth reported that he 
could not help with the organisation of a nationally-planned event commemorating 
the outbreak of the war since `[s]everal of the Clergy here look with great dis-favour 
[sic] on the efforts of political agents, (outside their own work) & would certainly not 
respond to the appeal if made by me, as I am so well known'. 21 Generally, however, 
local knowledge was more help than hindrance. This expertise was perhaps especially 
important in constituencies that were not entirely urban, where the population was 
spread widely. The rural constituency of Evesham, for instance, consisted of three 
medium-sized towns (Evesham, Droitwich and Pershore), together with innumerable 
smaller communities. Between October 1917 and the Armistice meetings were 
arranged in seventy-seven different parishes, with estimated attendances ranging from 
fifteen at a winter meeting in Pendock (described as `a real bit of "No man's land"') 
19 TNA: PRO T102/16, NWAC Minutes, 4/4/18. 
20 TNA: PRO T102/2, Cox to Cockburn, 13/6/18. 
21 TNA: PRO T102/13, Southworth to NWAC, 6/7/18. 
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to six hundred at Shipston-on-Stour in August 1918.2 Without expert local 
organisation, propagandists would have found great difficulty in providing 
opportunities for the whole local population to hear their messages. From their 
registration work agents also knew what sort of audience speakers might face, 
enabling them to adjust their remarks accordingly. Furthermore, as Rix notes, it was 
expected that `agents should possess not only professional knowledge, but also 
qualities such as tact, adaptability, courtesy, and an ability to keep in touch with the 
electorate', 23 all skills invaluable in persuading local dignitaries to participate, making 
arrangements with local officials or proprietors for the use of public spaces, and 
smoothing over difficulties. 
From a practical viewpoint, the parties' constituency organisations clearly 
provided `an unrivalled vehicle of political mobilization'. 4 But also important in 
leaving much of the organisation of propaganda in local hands were the social and 
ideological implications. The involvement of local notables (generally equal 
representatives of local parties) in a committee of twelve to thirty did not make them 
`mere carriers of state-produced propaganda'. 25 Rather local WACs represent part of 
the "`self-mobilization" of civil society', defined by Pierre Purseigle as `the set of 
organized and plural groups that, beyond the domestic and familial spheres, interacted 
with the State ... 
[and] established and arranged mediations of the war experience 
that imposed restrictions upon the State or offered means, however limited, to resist 
22 Statistics based on a database constructed from Speakers' Daily Reports, contained within TNA: PRO 
T102/16,22-26 [henceforth noted as Reports Database]. On Pendock, see T102/23, Speaker's Daily 
Reports [henceforth SDRs] - John Farnsworth, Evesham (Pendock), 23/1/18. 23 Rix, `party agent', p. 103. 
24 Home, `Remobilizing', p. 201. 
25 Pierre Purseigle, `Beyond and Below the Nations: Towards a Comparative History of Local 
Communities at War', in Jenny Macleod and Purseigle (eds. ), Uncovered Fields: Perspectives in First 
World War Studies (Leiden/Boston, 2004), p. 98. 
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the State's infringement on rights and liberties'. 6 By leaving the organisation of state 
propaganda ostensibly in local hands (albeit with the guidance of experienced and 
partisan political organisers) the NWAC offered communities a sense of autonomous 
involvement in, rather than subordinate manipulation by, its propaganda. 
Furthermore, the nation was not a homogenous whole, sharing exactly the same 
interests and anxieties, but an agglutination of culturally and socially diverse regions 
and localities, connected by certain ideas and institutions, but different from place to 
place. 27 In allowing local direction of propaganda, the NWAC enhanced the 
likelihood of public comprehension and acceptance of its messages. With local figures 
as chairmen, and offering introductions and votes of thanks, a local inflection was 
added to the necessarily somewhat standardised and delimited words of the centrally- 
provided speakers or NWAC publications - sometimes augmented by including 
locally-specific material in the main speaker's address. 28 Thus `the voice of authority 
was clothed in more popular accents', assisting the `appropriation of the national 
narrative through local cultural codes'29 Just as earlier, genuinely self-mobilised, 
propaganda utilised local cultural commonplaces, the NWAC's organisational 
structure and approach to propaganda suggests awareness that wartime propaganda's 
`efficiency' `depended as much on the taking of local identities into consideration and 
on the participation of local civil society, as on the potency of the state apparatus'. 0A 
memorandum in the NWAC's minutes stressed that: 
26 Horne, `Remobilizing', p. 195; Pierre Purseigle, `Introduction: Warfare and Belligerence: 
Approaches to the First World War', in Purseigle (ed. ) Warfare and Belligerence: Perspectives in First 
World War Studies (Leiden/Boston, 2005), p. 25. Original emphasis. 
27 Cf. the post-1945 Conservative view of `local patriotism' and local government, in Matthew Cragoe, 
"`We Like Local Patriotism": The Conservative Party and the Discourse of Decentralisation, 1947-51', 
English Historical Review, 122: 498 (2007), p. 980. 
28 See Chapter 7. 
29 Home, `Remobilizing', p. 206; Purseigle, `Beyond and Below', p. 99. 
30 Ibid., p. 101. 
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views expressed in the London Press do not necessarily reflect public opinion outside 
London. The tone of the provincial press is on the whole more consistent, less 
materialistic and more representative of solid English opinion. The greater communal 
spirit which prevails in Provinces... enables the Provincial Editor to crystallise public 
opinion in his district more accurately. 3 
Similarly, the NWAC's organisational structure acknowledged that local experts 
could better gauge local public mood than London-based organisers arranging 
meetings on the basis of quotas, with little concrete knowledge of their necessity. 
From the outset, the organisation of NWAC activities, whether the 
arrangement of meetings or the distribution of literature, was placed in local hands, 
except for a few centrally-arranged nationwide campaigns. The promotion of Lloyd 
George's January war aims speech was one example. The central committee actively 
encouraged the distribution of their short precis. The organisation of cinemotor tours 
was also centralised, largely because demand outstripped supply. 32 Additionally, two 
special events, `France's Day', celebrated on 12 July 1918 (the closest Friday to 
Bastille Day), and the `War Anniversary' (4 August) were heavily promoted centrally, 
and on the latter occasion a message from Lloyd George was distributed to places of 
public entertainment, to be opened and read at 9 pm. 33 These events apart, however, 
local propaganda was arranged locally. The next section offers some statistical 
analysis of the efficacy of this approach. 
In all, 344 WACs were established during the war, from a total of 528 
constituencies or regional areas recorded in the NWAC's card-index. Just over sixty- 
31 TNA: PRO T102/16, memorandum, `The Government and the Press', 20/8/17. 
32 See above, pp. 69-70,75. 
33 E. g. "`Hold Fast. " The Premier's Message to the Empire. ', Norwood Press and Dulwich Advertiser, 
10/8/18, p. 2. 
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five per cent of constituencies apparently established WACs. However, these statistics 
possibly understate the real figures, being complicated by the redrawn 1918 electoral 
boundaries. The card-index includes many entries for new constituencies about which 
nothing is recorded, and it seems likely that existing WACs from old constituencies 
sometimes continued their operations. Of those constituencies existing before 1918, 
304 out of 428 established WACs (71%). 34 Figure 12 demonstrates the rapid 
establishment of WACs. By 31 October 1917,228 committees, almost two-thirds of 
those eventually formed, were already established. Through the winter, a moderate 
number were added, but in no month in 1918 were more than nine new committees 
established until September, when the last months of the war saw forty-one new 
committees, perhaps in some cases reflecting the wish by agents or others to 
demonstrate local activity. 35 It is inaccurate to assume, as historians following 
Millman's interpretation might, that this reflected increased surveillance and potential 
coercion of industrial areas at the end of the war. Of twenty-two new WACs in pre- 
1918 constituencies after September, only three (East Northamptonshire, Eiland and 
Leigh) were working-class or mining constituencies, according to Blewett's and 
Turner's classifications. The other nineteen included the middle-class London 
constituency, Dulwich, and rural constituencies like Chelmsford and Anglesey, where 
a desire to appear active seems more likely than a sudden need, after the successful 
reversal of Germany's spring offensive, to exhort civilians to work harder. 
While there were particularly active constituencies of all types, there were 
34 Statistics from Card-index database. 
35 In some cases, these late establishments might reflect missing data or long-standing inertia after an 
earlier (unrecorded) formation. Others are almost certainly duplicates of existing WACs in former 
constituencies. For instance, John Home, utilising the Speakers' Daily Reports in TNA: PRO T 102/22-4 
refers to extensive activities in Royton in 1918. Home, `Remobilizing', pp. 209,283 n. 61. The only 
date which the Card-index database offers for Royton WAC's establishment is 5 September 1918, 
probably because Royton was a new constituency in 1918, replacing Middleton (which had a WAC by 
early-August 1917). The database is, therefore, flawed but, particularly when restricted to the pre-1918 
constituencies, still offers useful analytical material. 
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nevertheless some discrepancies between the classifications. Chapter 2 demonstrated 
that constituencies of all types were active in arranging NWAC events, although 
mining constituencies were noticeably more active. 7 In terms of WAC establishment, 
there were also interesting discrepancies. Tables 2-4 offer a statistical breakdown of 
WAC establishment by constituency classification. The first table provides figures 
based upon all records in the NWAC's card-index. These suggest that agents and local 
figureheads in urban, mainly middle-class and in rural constituencies were 
significantly less enthusiastic about forming WACs than in other constituencies, with 
only slightly over half such constituencies forming a WAC. Most likely to form 
WACs were urban/rural constituencies like Barnstaple or Ripon, containing both 
fairly large towns and significant areas of countryside. Nearly three-quarters of such 
36 Establishment dates are approximated from information recorded in the card-index. In some cases, 
there are explicit references to formation on a given date; in others the date refers to the first sign of 
organisational activity (e. g. a report of plans, an estimate). 
37 See above, pp. 61-2. 
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Table 2: WAC formation by constituency classification 38 
Type Total % No. % with Total % 
constituencies with WACs of 
WACs WACs 
Urban, mainly 58 11.0 32 55.2 9.3 
middle-class (UMC) 
Urban, mixed class 99 18.8 71 71.7 20.6 
(UMX) 
Urban, mainly 103 19.5 69 67.0 20.1 
working-class 
WC 
Urban/ Rural (UR) 79 15.0 58 73.4 16.9 
Rural 118 22.4 68 57.6 19.8 
Mining 57 10.8 38 66.7 11.1 
Unclassified (UNC) 14 2.7 8 57.1 2.3 
Totals ý:... 528 10V'-. ,,,:, -344 z, 65.2;.. "r `. -,, ', 100.1 
Table 3: WAC formation by constituency classification (pre-1918 constituencies) 
Type Total 
constituencies 




Total % of 
WACs 
UMC 43 10.1 28 65.1 9.2 
UMX 86 20.1 67 77.9 22.0 
UWC 87 20.3 63 72.4 20.7 
UR 61 14.3 49 80.3 16.1 
R 108 25.2 64 59.3 21.1 
M 35 8.2 29 82.9 9.5 
UNC 8 1.9 4 50.0 1.3 
Totals 428 100.1 304 . ej... 71.0 =., g 100 












% of total 
classification 
WACs, 31/10/17 
UMC 12 42.9 21 75.0 
UMX 31 46.3 54 80.6 
UWC 29 46.0 54 85.0 
UR 13 26.5 26 53.1 
R 9 14.1 36 56.3 
M 15 68.2 22 75.9 
UNC 4 100.0 4 100.0 
-. Totals 113 37.2 ; ,, 217 71.4' 
38 Statistics from Card-index database. 
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constituencies formed WACs, based on the complete card-index. Almost as likely to 
form WACs were urban, mixed-class constituencies (usually constituencies within 
large towns and cities), 39 over seventy percent of which had WACs. Urban, mainly 
working-class and mining constituencies, meanwhile, formed WACs at a rate of about 
two in three. 
However, like the monthly statistics, these classification figures are distorted 
by the 1918 boundary redistributions. Table 3, dealing only with constituencies 
existing before 1918, provides a clearer depiction of the pattern of WAC 
establishment. Rural and urban, middle-class constituencies remain less likely to form 
WACs (though rural constituencies in this case were least likely to form a WAC), but 
in both cases the likelihood of establishment is greater than in the overall statistics. 
Likewise, the other constituency types also show increased percentages of 
constituencies with WACs, expanding the overall average of WACs to constituencies 
from 65.2% to 71.0%. Most significant, however, is the large increase in percentage 
of mining constituencies with WACs, which become the most frequent establishers of 
WACs, rather than the fourth most frequent overall. This reflects the fact that most 
existing mining constituencies had formed WACs before 1918. The subsequent 
redrawing of boundaries and renaming of constituencies created several new mining 
constituencies, mostly sections of existing larger mining constituencies, thus 
distorting the picture somewhat 40 
Table 4 demonstrates the salience of these arguments. Again including only 
39 The statistics for these WACs include city-wide WACs like Manchester, Leeds and Birmingham, 
which subsumed all constituencies into one WAC - discrepancies between working-class and middle- 
class districts have been resolved by assigning such WACs to Urban, mixed-class classifications. 
40 E. g., the pre-1918 Derbyshire mining constituencies, Mid-Derby and Chesterfield, both had WACs. 
After 1918 they became Belper, Chesterfield and Clay Cross, the last of which was not recorded as 
having a WAC (and had no records beyond a name card in the card-index). Thus, though the two 
WACs continued as before, statistically the presence of Clay Cross in the card-index reduced the 
apparent percentage of mining constituencies with WACs. Michael Kinnear, The British Voter: An 
Atlas and Survey since 1885 (Ithaca, NY, 1968), pp. 142-5 provides maps of constituency boundaries 
before and after 1918. 
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the pre-1918 constituencies it shows the differing rates at which local communities 
remobilised. By 31 August 1917, over sixty-eight percent of the twenty-two mining 
constituency WACs eventually formed were already established. No other 
classification approached this level of mobilisation. The three exclusively urban types 
had all reached more than forty percent of their final totals, while constituencies with 
a rural element were considerably slower to mobilise. Though eventually Urban/rural 
constituencies formed a WAC more than eighty percent of the time, only thirteen 
were formed by 31 August (26.5% of the final number) and only twenty-six, a little 
over half the eventual number, by 31 October. Rural constituencies were even more 
sluggish. On 31 August only nine rural WACs existed - less than fifteen percent of 
the eventual number, and only one in twelve of all pre-1918 rural constituencies. 
Though this rate increased substantially by 31 October, rural constituencies, 
accounting for over a quarter of all the pre-1918 constituencies in the card-index, at 
this stage still only represented slightly more than three in every twenty established 
WACs. As Figure 13 emphasises, these constituencies never established WACs at a 
rate proportional to their national proliferation. 
These statistics demonstrate the strength of local judgements regarding the 
value of establishing a WAC. In a mining constituency like Mid-Glamorgan, a 
committee was formed early in August 1917, the Unionist organiser Thomas Thomas 
later informing the central committee that `[t]he I. L. P. are organising meetings in a 
fortnight's time[. We] have discussed their actions - [the] only way to counteract their 
influence is to hold open air meetings here every night'. By contrast, rural 
constituencies repeatedly insisted that WACs were not required. In Cirencester, the 
Conservative agent T. Davies wrote that he and the Liberal agent had `carefully 
considered this matter' before deciding there was `not the least occasion for anything 
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to be done, there is no anti-war propaganda beyond the usual feeling of war 
weariness '. 41 Here, local experts clearly made judgements based on the political 
exigencies of their constituencies. In East Norfolk the Liberal, W. E. Keefe, explained 
that he found `no local opinion favourable to the holding of meetings. My Unionist 
Colleague has not shown any inclination to take active steps. Think Village meetings 
are of little value [sic]'. Additionally, there were sometimes mitigating circumstances. 
The Birmingham-based Conservative regional organiser, H. Pratt, reported that there 
was `no one working in East Worcester who might take on War Aims work', 
suggesting that no agents were present, while in Ramsey, Wallis Simpson explained 
that the Conservative Association saw no benefit in a campaign and the constituency 
had no Liberal or Labour agents to approach. In North Norfolk, H. M. Upcher 
(affiliation unknown) wrote that `our Agent has resigned' and promised to report a 
decision in due course. Nothing further was heard. 42 
Complementary to the impact of the social composition of constituencies on 
41 TNA: PRO T102/26, card index: Mid-Glamorgan, 11/9/17. Cirencester, 12/2/18. 
42 TNA: PRO T102/26, card index: East Norfolk, 2/2/18; East Worcester, 4/2/18; Ramsey, 1/2/18; 
North Norfolk, 6/2/18. The similarity of the dates suggests the central committee, aware of the limited 
involvement of rural constituencies, had suggested new WACs and campaigns. 
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WAC establishment was an element of regional difference. Tables 5-6 show the 
variation in WAC establishment in London and the South; the Midlands and Wales; 
and the North 43 Whether considering all records in the card-index, or only those 
relating to pre-1918 constituencies, it is clear that while WAC establishment in the 
Midlands/Wales region conformed broadly to the national average, London/South 
constituencies formed WACs at a disproportionately low rate, whereas Northern 
constituencies formed proportionally more WACs. This cannot be ascribed to the 
presence of London constituencies which might have been expected to be less locally- 
involved and more centrally-directed. Of fifty-three London boroughs existing before 
1918, thirty-five were recorded as having WACs (66.0%), 44 almost exactly the 
regional average. Nor is it attributable to the greater proliferation of rural 
constituencies in the South since, although fifteen rural constituencies there did not 
form WACs, the proportion that did (slightly below sixty per cent) was larger than in 
the North (54.6%). That mining constituencies, the most frequent establishers of 
WACs, were entirely absent in the South, but common in the North, skews the 
statistics somewhat, as does the disproportionate absence of (generally less 
enthusiastic) urban, middle-class constituencies in the North. 45 Only slightly over half 
the Southern middle-class constituencies, eighteen of thirty-three, formed WACs. 
However, perhaps surprisingly, the other exclusively urban constituencies also proved 
43 Statistics from Card-index database. For analytical purposes, the constituencies within these regions 
consist of: 
London/South: constituencies south of northern borders of Somerset, Wiltshire, Berkshire, 
Hertfordshire and Essex. 
Midlands/Wales: Welsh constituencies (plus `South Wales' regional WAC); English constituencies 
north of Southern boundary, and south of southern borders of Cheshire and Yorkshire. 
North: constituencies north of southern borders of Cheshire and Yorkshire; also `Scotland' regional 
WAC. 
44 These and subsequent statistics refer to pre-1918 constituencies only. 
as Already a small minority of Northern constituencies, their representation in the card-index was 
further inhibited by city-wide WACs, leading to a classification in the database as urban, mixed-class. 
Any constituencies (like Sheffield Hallam) that apparently stood aloof from city organisations are 
noted individually. 
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London/South 156 36.5 103 66.0 33.9 
Midlands/ Wales 153 35.8 108 70.6 35.5 
North 119 27.8 93 78.2 30.6 
TOTALS° :- 428 ;. '100 
difficult to motivate in the South. In Southern working-class and mixed-class 
constituencies, WACs were formed, respectively, at a rate of around sixty-five and 
seventy-two percent, which in regional terms was strong. However, the comparative 
northern figures for the same classifications were around seventy-six and eighty-three 
percent. Only in urban/rural southern constituencies, like Maidstone, Reigate or 
Camborne, was there something approaching unanimous approval of the formation of 
WACs, with twenty-one of twenty-five constituencies forming WACs at some point, 
though even these statistics barely surpassed their northern equivalents, where thirteen 
of sixteen urban/rural constituencies had WACs. 
Reasons for not forming a WAC were fairly consistent whether a Northern or 
Southern constituency. At Ormskirk, the Unionist agent G. W. Can reported that he 
had consulted the local Liberal and Conservative party heads, who `agreed that there 
is no anti-war campaign going on here', therefore no committee would be formed. 
This was echoed in Croydon (which eventually formed a WAC in June 1918) by J. 
Ledger Keating, who said it was `not possible' to act; besides, there was `no pacifist 
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propaganda at present'. 6 The Conservative A. P. Hastings' excuse for not forming a 
committee in Hertford, because `as long as air raids are on it would be difficult to get 
meetings up', seems rather implausible, but it is noticeable that mostly rural East 
Anglian coastal constituencies (Midlands/Wales region), except Great Yarmouth and 
Lowestoft (neither of which were rural), consistently declined to form WACs, as did 
several inland constituencies and many of the large suburban constituencies to the east 
of London. Wallace Carter informed an American speaker that `in most of the east 
coast towns they feel that the German raiders, both by sea and air, provide all that is 
necessary in stimulating our War Aims so that up to now we have held very few 
meetings indeed in the Eastern Counties'. 7 One local historian noted that, in 
Croydon, air raids caused `a general clenching of teeth and always an increased 
determination to destroy the power which used these means of war'. 48 Possibly, 
therefore, raids were influential in such constituencies, 49 but generally the South 
simply appeared less discontented than the rest of the country. The fact that the 
Midlands/Wales figures are slightly weaker than the North is mainly attributable to 
the large number of rural constituencies there (sixty, of which sixty percent formed a 
WAC). Midland mining constituencies actually exceeded Northern establishment- 
rates, and other classifications were broadly comparable. The South, with its smaller 
industrial workforce, was less affected by the renewed controversies over dilution 
from the spring of 1917,5° which were one factor prompting the NWAC's original 
creation. Consequently there was seemingly less sense of urgency by the central 
46 TNA: PRO T102/26, card-index: Ormskirk, 7/9/17; Croydon, 25/8/17. 
47 TNA: PRO T102/26, card-index: Hertford, 1/2/18; T102/11, Wallace Carter to Major G. H. Putnam, 
7/6/18. On the effectiveness of raids as direct propaganda, see the speech of Commander Bellairs, 
PDC(5), 99 (13/11/17), col. 322. 
48 H. Keatley Moore (ed. ), Croydon and the Great War: The Official History of the War Work of the 
Borough and its Citizens from 1914 to 1919 (Croydon, 1920), p. 39. 
49 Air raids were not solely confined to southern constituencies, but by 1917 were largely confined to 
the London area and the east coast. Wilson, Myriad Faces, pp. 3 89-93,508-11. 
50 Waites, Class Society, pp. 203-8. 
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organisation and local administrators about the South. 51 
The process of establishing a WAC was usually relatively simple. 
Conservative and Liberal agents were circularised in late-July 1917, as were local 
Labour representatives (either an established agent, or figures like Trades Council 
secretaries). Those willing to help then called a meeting of local political 
representatives. In Keighley, an urban, mainly working-class constituency in West 
Yorkshire, the local WAC was announced on 11 August 1917.52 Keighley's Liberal 
MP, Sir Swire Smith, became its president, with three vice-presidents, Sir John 
Clough, J. E. Haggas, and G. W. Pickthorne, representing the Conservatives, Liberals 
and Labour. The local Conservative and Liberal agents, J. D. Hird and W. E. Foster, 
acted as joint secretaries. In all, twenty-eight men were elected to serve on the 
committee, including the Mayor, an alderman, a doctor, a knight, and three more 
Cloughs. Interestingly, there was no attempt to disguise the committee's purpose, 
which was reported as being to `hold meetings and engage in general propaganda'. 
This supports Harold Lasswell's assertion in his inter-war study of First World War 
propaganda that: 
As far as the home public is concerned, there is nothing to be gained by concealment, 
and there is a certain loss of prestige... when secrecy is attempted. The carrying 
power of ideas is greatly increased when the authority of the government is added to 
them. 53 
51 Based on this statistical analysis, thirty case studies were selected (ten per region; a representative 
number of each constituency classification; proportions based on establishment dates. Other criteria 
include secretarial affiliations and the number of grants made). Appendix 2 discusses the criteria used 
and lists the case studies. These thirty WACs form the basis for local consideration of propaganda in 
Parts 2 and 3. 
52 `Local News. Keighley. Formation of a War Aims Committee For Keighley. ', Keighley News, 
11/8/17, p. 6. See also the summary of Keighley WAC's activities by a local journalist: Keighley 
Public Library, BK424, H. A. France, notebooks, no. 4. " 
53 Lasswell, Propaganda Technique, p. 14. 
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Apparently the combination of governmental authority with local agency was 
considered sufficient justification for domestic propaganda. Keighley WAC was 
seemingly quite effective, and unlike some other cases, Labour representation was 
maintained for most, if not all, of the war. Pickthorne, an ILP veteran, continued to 
appear (or be scheduled to appear) on WAC platforms at least until July 1918 54 
In some instances, local WACs were established after specially-arranged 
regional conferences. The NWAC noted the success of a conference in Newcastle, 
which remedied many of the `elements of mistrust which found expression among 
certain labour sections'. The Meetings Department considered such conferences 
invaluable as `suggestions, criticisms and objections can be dealt with on the spot, and 
the need of securing co-operation of every available local institution can be 
emphasised'. Alongside planned conferences in Leeds and Manchester, the Meetings 
Department recommended further conferences in twenty cities across England and 
Wales. 55 In Liverpool a conference was held with representatives from across South- 
west Lancashire, presided over by Max Muspratt, the Lord Mayor of Liverpool. 
Sanders represented the NWAC. Again there was no attempt to disguise the 
organisation's purpose. Muspratt explained that the conference would `consider the 
best way to promote the work of propaganda which the [NWAC] had undertaken'. 
Archibald Salvidge, the influential head of the Liverpool Workingmen's Conservative 
Association, had been troubled at the Liverpool-Abercromby by-election in June 1917 
by the behaviour of some civilians in support of a candidate of the Discharged 
Sailors' and Soldiers' Federation. The `nasty, strident, undisciplined note' reminded 
54 'National War Aims. The Campaign in Keighley and District. ', Keighley News, 13/10/17, p. 5; 
`France's Day at Keighley. ', Ibid., 13/7/18, p. 5. 
55 TNA: PRO T102/16, `Meetings Department Report', 25/9/17. 
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him of `the disturbing things which are beginning to leak through about Russia'. 56 He 
suggested, therefore, that `the chief need of a committee of that description was to act 
as policemen, and to watch the insidious underground policy adopted... to mislead the 
people, and to sow seeds of disaffection and social unrest', confronting orators of 
`opposition propaganda' with rival meetings. The general secretary of the National 
Union of Dock Labour, James Sexton, 57 agreed with Salvidge that such critics `did 
not represent one-fifteenth of the working-classes of the city', and called for WACs to 
be established in every constituency, supported by all parties and labour groups who 
so desired. 58 All constituencies surrounding Liverpool formed WACs by the end of 
1917, except Widnes and Ormskirk (which never did) 59 
Conferences could also be arranged for other purposes. In December, Mrs 
Fletcher in Oldham was approached to speak at a `War Aims Women's Conference' 
at Newton-le-Willows. The instructions sent to local committees suggested that it 
`may be well to arrange special meetings for women of a social and educational 
nature' and encouraged WACs to seek the help of local women of `all classes'. `These 
meetings should be of a purely local and friendly nature for mutual encouragement 
and support, rather than formal public gatherings'. 0 The intention seems similar to 
the types of activity with which organisations like the Primrose League had been 
concerned since the late-nineteenth century, which allowed women a certain, limited, 
role in public and political life 61 Women were not to be addressed in the same way as 
men, but to receive more informal `support', seemingly partially maintaining the 
56 Stanley Salvidge, Salvidge of Liverpool: Behind the Political Scene, 1890-1928 (London, 1934), pp. 
159-60. On the Abercromby by-election, see Stephen R. Ward, `The British Veterans' Ticket of 1918', 
Journal of British Studies, 8: 1 (1968), pp. 157-8. 
57 On Sexton's use of `Tory' politics in Liverpool, see Tanner, Political Change, p. 141. 
58 `Allies' War Aims. Conference in Liverpool. ', Liverpool Courier, 12/10/17, p. 4. 
59 Card-index database. 
60 TNA: PRO T102/4, letter, unsigned, to Mrs Fletcher, 20/12/17. 
61 On this see Martin Pugh, The Tories and the People, 1880-1935 (Oxford, 1985), esp. pp. 43-69. 
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gendered distinction between public and private spheres. This suggests some 
continuation of nineteenth-century ideas of home and community acting as `cognitive 
boundaries, limiting aspirations and ideas about what was possible and desirable'. The 
idea of a `purely local' approach in propaganda to women implies that women should 
be addressed on `local' rather than `national' issues, thus continuing to offer `only 
limited access to alternative conceptions of their "place" from outside' 62 Women's 
accretion of a locally-delimited public role via extensive involvement in local 
government before 1914 was predicated on making this separate spheres ideology a 
`supportive language' allowing women to `avoid conflicts' between private and public 
values and work by emphasising the capacity of the `different attributes and skills' of 
their `domestic background' to `strengthen civic life'. 63 Actually, as subsequent 
chapters show, propaganda towards women did not entirely retain such inward- 
looking localness as that outlined in the above instructions, instead demonstrating 
links between local efforts and national achievements. Nevertheless, these plans 
suggest that some in authority had yet to appreciate what Nicoletta Gullace labels the 
wartime `renegotiation' of citizenship. 
Once established, WACs acted with considerable (though limited) autonomy. 
In Wigan, the NWAC encouraged the formation of a WAC, following a Navy League 
report's warning that `the pacifists have divided up Lancashire into 13 districts and 
are working them systematically. It is certainly no time to be shutting down any 
patriotic efforts'. A joint WAC was established for Wigan and Ince on 21 August 
1917, but initially seemed reluctant to hold meetings. A central report noted that `they 
62 Leonore Davidoff, Jeanne L'Esperance and Howard Newby, `Landscape with Figures: Home and 
Community in English Society' [ 1976], in Davidoff, Worlds Between: Historical Perspectives on Class 
and Gender (Cambridge, 1995), p. 44. 
63 Patricia Hollis, Ladies Elect: Women in English Local Government, 1865-1914 (Oxford, 1987), pp. 
471-2. 
64 Gullace, Blood. 
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stated that it was not advisable to hold an open-air campaign... at present', prompting 
the central committee to contact their `Central District Agents, and [ask] them to 
persuade the local Committee to hold a campaign'. Shortly thereafter, J. W. Greening, 
acting agent for the National Unionist Association in Lancashire and Cheshire, 
reported that Wigan WAC wanted strong speakers because: 
audiences at Open air meetings there are extremely critical, and... only speakers of 
the first class would be acceptable... They mention... [coalition Labour MPs] Mr. 
Brace, Mr. Roberts, and Mr. Barnes. Failing one of these they thought Mr. Hilare 
[sic] Belloc would be a good substitute. We pointed out the improbability of... these 
gentlemen being sent, but pledged... that you would send first rate men 
[representative of the three parties] 65 
Indeed, none of these speakers appeared at Wigan or Ince, though the Labour MP for 
Ince, Stephen Walsh, spoke three times in November. Other prominent speakers 
included the Conservative MPs for Wigan and St. Helens, and the Coalition Liberals 
T. J. Macnamara (a junior Cabinet-member) and C. A. McCurdy, a prolific NWAC 
contributor. 66 The work in November alone cost £55.3.8 in expenses (excluding 
centrally-paid speakers' expenses). In July 1918, Thomas Southworth, now acting for 
Wigan alone, sent a campaign plan to the central committee, outlining twenty-one 
days' meetings at a cost of £24. Southworth defended the unusual arrangement of 
Sunday meetings to the speakers as necessary `to counteract the agitation of the 
65 TNA: PRO T102/13, file S, report (copy), unsigned, `WIGAN, Lancashire', n. d. Other material in 
this file suggests this was a Navy League report; `National War Aims Committee: Report with 
reference to the position at Wigan, Lancashire', n. d. (c. September 1917); Greening to NWAC, 
18/9/17. 
66 TNA: PRO T102/17, Meetings register, nos. 479-82. 
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Pacificists [sic]', which met with central approval. 7 
The Wigan case demonstrates the limits of local independence. A WAC was 
quickly established, but initially reluctant to launch a campaign. The NWAC, with 
reports of local unrest, sought to stimulate action through regional organisers - these 
were presumably familiar to the local secretaries in a professional context while also, 
ostensibly, one stage removed from central figures demanding action. Having 
successfully persuaded the WAC to organise meetings, the central committee acceded 
to the request for prominent speakers of differing affiliations (albeit not those 
specifically requested), allowing local organisers to feel they were setting the agenda 
locally. In August 1918, Southworth was also personally sent £10 in recognition of 
his work in July, 68 a move presumably designed to encourage subsequent diligence. 
This indicates that the NWAC, though keen to let local figures make arrangements, 
would not simply defer to local judgements if they believed propaganda was needed. 
Inevitably there was more concern to mobilise an industrial constituency like Wigan 
than apparently placid rural constituencies. Nonetheless the NWAC persisted in 
pursuing activities through a local organisational structure, demonstrating not only a 
pragmatic recognition of the potentially prohibitive costliness of conducting 
propaganda without local assistance (organisers would necessarily have been sent to 
the area, and accommodated there throughout the campaign), but also a commitment 
to local inclusion, and an acknowledgement that without the participation of 
knowledgeable local activists, propaganda risked alienating people it might otherwise 
inspire. Although the NWAC was not content to let sleeping dogs lie, it sought to 
maintain local involvement and at least the appearance of local agency and choice. 
67 TNA: PRO T102/13, file S, `Wigan and Ince Divisions. National War Aims Committee Campaign. 
November 1917'; campaign plan, 8-28/7/18; Southworth to speakers, 27/6/18; NWAC to Southworth, 
18/6/18. 
68 TNA: PRO T102/13, NWAC to Southworth, 14/8/18. 
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That WACs felt they were agents of their own instruction is partially 
demonstrated by regular requests for specific speakers. In Watford, for example, 
organisers requested either J. R. Clynes or J. H. Thomas as speakers in October 1917, 
but had to settle for another Labour MP, Charles Duncan. 
69 The Unionist MP Col. 
G. R. Lane-Fox received a letter from the Liberal secretary of the Isle of Thanet WAC, 
offering his `best thanks' for agreeing to speak at Ramsgate in December, and inviting 
him to lunch with the Mayor. Other MPs were the subject of `special requests' by 
WACs. 70 Birkenhead succeeded, along with several Welsh constituencies, in 
obtaining William Brace, who was seemingly highly regarded as a speaker. 7' Not only 
MPs were specifically requested, however. The local secretaries at Kingswinford 
particularly wanted the speakers Harry Walker and A. Beveridge for a campaign, 
while both Morpeth and West Staffordshire WACs requested the Liberal speaker 
Thomas Ternent to take meetings in the week beginning 5 November 1917, but were 
disappointed, as he was already engaged at Middleton. 
72 While local WACs could not 
always be accommodated with their preferred choice of speakers, that they felt their 
opinions were sufficiently relevant to make requests worthwhile suggests an 
environment of mutual interaction rather than the NWAC simply sending whomever 
it chose. Presumably, local WACs asked for specific speakers either because of their 
reputation or because they already knew their style, and felt they would provide 
appropriate propaganda for the community. Particularly with MPs, when a specific 
speaker was unavailable, the central committee sought a replacement with a similar 
69 TNA: PRO T102/2, NWAC to Clynes, 15/9[/17]; T102/14, NWAC to Thomas, 18/9/17; T102/17, 
Meetings register, no. 310. 
70 TNA: PRO T102/4, Rev. Bernard Salomons to Lane-Fox, 19/11/17. Lane-Fox subsequently cancelled 
the meeting owing to other obligations; for `special requests', see T102/5, NWAC to Sir Gordon 
Hewart, MP, for Salford WAC; T102/12, NWAC to Sir Joseph Compton-Rickett, MP, for Newton 
WAC. 
71 TNA: PRO T102/17, Meetings register, nos. 65,176-8,663,982,987,1551. 
72 TNA: PRO T102/17, Meetings register, nos. 904 (Walker and Beveridge), 537,541,509. 
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outlook (for instance, another Asquithian Liberal). Again, this suggests more than 
simple gestures towards local autonomy; it seemingly indicates a concerted effort to 
adhere to local wishes, predicated upon an assumption that such wishes reflected 
careful judgements of varying attitudes and moods. 
This chapter has demonstrated that the NWAC relied upon a local 
organisational structure to deliver its message in an effective, extensive and sensitive 
manner, both for pragmatic and principled reasons. Only local organisation could 
hope to efficiently reach large sections of a local population, while the cession of 
some elements of control to local organisers reduced the appearance of a monolithic, 
omnipresent state. Rather than imposing itself on civilians within their own local 
communities, the involvement of local figures in the arrangement and presentation of 
propaganda served, if not to conceal the state's presence, at least to dilute its taste. 
Further, it encouraged communities to think that it was their agency which prompted 
this remobilisation, rather than state disquiet at civilian reliability. Where local 
communities proved reluctant `self-mobilisers', the NWAC was sometimes prepared 
to intervene, but preferred to maintain a local organisational basis. The rapid 
formation of WACs in 1917 indicates the local appetite for remobilisation, at least 
among political and civic elites. Moreover it enabled equally rapid dissemination of a 
wide-ranging narrative of patriotism, initially through meetings and, by September, 
through publications. Chapters 4-9 examine this narrative, suggesting that the 
NWAC's arrangement of traditional patriotic motifs into forms reflective of civilians' 
total-war experiences offered a flexible and effective stimulus to civilian morale. 
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Part II: 
NWAC propaganda and the 
representation of British patriotism 
Chanter 4: Presentational patriotisms 
Part I of this thesis detailed the establishment of the NWAC and its 
organisational structure. Part II is concerned with the ideological structure of NWAC 
propaganda. It argues that NWAC propaganda used familiar patriotic themes and 
ideas within a framework of `presentational patriotisms': broader interactive and 
interdependent discursive categories which combined to provide a flexible patriotic 
narrative reflecting civilians' total-war experiences. This narrative revolved around a 
core message of patriotic duty, contextualised by several other elements which 
demonstrated the necessity of accepting such obligations. This was not a narrative 
structure set out by the NWAC for its propagandists to adhere to, but is rather a model 
construct based on a close reading of the NWAC's printed and spoken propaganda 
(the latter reprinted in the local press). This chapter, and Part II generally, suggests 
that the interaction of the various contextual and core sub-patriotisms with each other 
within the framework offered a patriotic message adaptable to different audiences and 
situations. Setting the propaganda's content within this interpretative framework 
allows a qualitative assessment of the language used, emphasising the purposes 
behind the rhetoric. Rather than assuming that primacy should be assigned to the most 
widely discussed elements within patriotic rhetoric, this approach contends that the 
interactions of the wider presentational categories gave patriotism its vitality, by 
enabling similar conclusions to be drawn from a range of approaches. Without 
adequate contextualisation, the NWAC's core appeal to duty may have seemed 
unreasonable, given the efforts already undertaken by civilians. Hence the majority of 
most discussions explained, using one or more contextual presentational patriotisms, 
why the appeal was made. Placing several familiar patriotic ideas and images within a 
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particular presentational patriotism does not overly schematise the range of themes 
and arguments, but recognises that the same rhetorical purpose was served by several 
alternative arguments. Propagandists had many familiar patriotic themes and ideas at 
their disposal from which to construct an argument to convince war-weary civilians to 
continue doing their duty. Interpreting the manner and variety of these constructions 
may reveal more than merely re-identifying and re-cataloguing those familiar themes. 
The core duty message mixed a hortatory `civic patriotism', suffused with the 
self-denying rhetoric of `sacrificial patriotism', with a celebratory evocation of a 
`concrescent community' growing together through shared sacrifice and acceptance of 
duty. The various contextual sub-patriotisms explained why such duty was necessary. 
`Adversarial patriotism' exploited the identification of negative difference to highlight 
dangers to British society, whereas `supranational patriotism' celebrated the 
differences and similarities between Britain and its major allies. `Proprietorial 
patriotism' evoked the ideological bases behind British society, while `spiritual 
patriotism' consecrated Britain's war effort. Finally, `aspirational patriotism' offered 
civilians a sense of the material and civilisational benefits to be gained by seeing the 
war through to a victorious end. Subsequent chapters discuss these sub-patriotisms in 
detail, either in isolation or in pairs. This chapter begins by demonstrating the 
familiarity of much of the patriotic language used by NWAC propagandists. It then 
offers an overview of the narrative framework, demonstrating how the various 
presentational sub-patriotisms interacted with each other to provide a more flexible 
and meaningful message. 
There was nothing greatly original about the types of patriotic ideas and 
imagery used in NWAC propaganda. Apart from more consistently evoking 
servicemen as patriots par excellence than was usual in peacetime, many familiar 
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elements of British patriotic ideology are discernible. Most obviously, propagandists 
readily contrasted British national characteristics favourably against other nations, 
particularly Germany, but also other enemies and even Allies. This comparative 
instinct, often (though sometimes falsely) referred to as `othering' in the current 
historiography of Britain, ' was rife in all forms of NWAC propaganda. At Ripon, in 
November 1917, Major E. F. L. Wood, the constituency MP, in a speech of remarkable 
ferocity (particularly since Wood, as Earl Halifax, later gained a reputation as an arch- 
appeaser of Germany) told his large audience that Germany's `violation' of Belgian 
neutrality, the deportation of Belgian and French civilians to act as `slave' labour, the 
resort to `black piracy on the high seas', and various other immoral transgressions 
`proved beyond a shadow of doubt that there was an irreconcilable antagonism 
between the German outlook on civilisation and [Britain's]'. 2 The NWAC 
Publications Department seized upon a Philadelphia Ledger article entitled `Lest we 
Forget the Unboasting British', which insisted that `when it comes to self-laudation 
the British are the poorest advertisers the world has seen', reprinting it (rather 
boastfully) both as a pamphlet and as an article in its newspaper, Reality. 3 Such 
concerns also appealed to British insularity, identifying `unique' characteristics and 
potential threats to them. 
Another traditional patriotic motif was a recourse to history to inspire 
patriotism in the present generation. At Golborne, Lancashire, Viscount Wolmer, 
Conservative MP for Newton, encouraged his audience to `think of the history of their 
I For the antecedents of the historical study of the `other', see especially Edward W. Said, Orientalism 
([1978] 5th ed., London, 2003); Colley, `Britishness and Otherness' and Britons. 2 `Major the Hon. E. Wood, M. P., and the War', Ripon Gazette, 8/11/17, p. 3. 
3 The Unboasting British; An American Tribute (Searchlight series, 29, [1918]); "`Lest we Forget the 
Unboasting British. " A Tribute from the United States. ', Reality. The World's Searchlight on Germany, 
141,26/9/18, p. 1. 
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country and the part Englishmen had played in the history of the world', 4 while a 
cartoon appeared in Welcome (a free newspaper for servicemen on leave in Britain) 
depicting a sailor, watched approvingly by Nelson's ghost, applying the `Nelson 
touch' by hitting a German over the head (figure 14). One of the most agreeable areas 
of historical self-satisfaction related to Britain's heritage of parliamentary democracy. 
In an anonymous weekly column distributed to local newspapers, `The War and 
Westminster', Captain D. D. Sheehan, an independent Irish nationalist MP, 
emphasised Parliament's significance, celebrating `this palladium of [the British 
peoples'] liberties and sacred ark of their rights... their stoutest bulwark and 
protection'. ' Woodrow Wilson's declared intention to `make the world safe for 
democracy' provided a continuing motivation for celebrating Britain's democratic 
credentials. 
4 `Lord Wolmer, M. P., at Golborne. Why Germany Must be Beaten, ', Wigan Examiner, 4/12/17, p. 3. 
On history and identity: Christopher Hill, `The Norman Yoke', in Puritanism and Revolution, Studies 
in Interpretation of the English Revolution of the 17th Century (London, 1962); Peter Mandler, History 
and National Life (London, 2002); Readman, `Place of the Past'. 
S 'The War and Westminster. By a Soldier M. P. Parliament and the People', North Devon Herald, 
3/10/18, p. 6. On Sheehan's involvement with the NWAC: pp. 206-7 below. 
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If British patriotic rhetoric traditionally included an appreciation of freedom, it 
was one comprising both rights and responsibilities. Questions of duty and civic 
service featured prominently in NWAC propaganda, recognising the patriotic duties 
being performed by servicemen and women, and civilians, but stressing the 
continuing necessity of fulfilling civic duty at home. `Your infantryman is a quiet man 
as a rule, ' wrote Sergeant H. V. Holmes in one pamphlet. `Conscious that he is doing 
his duty, he does not very much worry about those that are not. '6 Consequently, those 
at home should also ensure they fulfilled their duty. Miss E. M. Goodman, 
pseudonymously, informed female readers in a nationally distributed War Supplement 
that while land girls and others brought in the harvest, women unable to do such work 
should instead help by undertaking the `small duty' of domestic work on others' 
behalf, like baking, cooking or washing. `This is not new women's work, it is the 
woman's part time out of mind... [except] now it is England we shall save'. 7 
Pre-war patriotic discussion had consistently referred to religion, and this was 
mirrored by NWAC attempts to involve clergymen in local committees and individual 
meetings, and through articles and pamphlets like the Liberal MP Charles McCurdy's 
To Restore the Ten Commandments, or the speech (published by the NWAC) by the 
Archbishop of York, Cosmo Lang, who said there was `a moral and religious duty to 
stand steadfast'. 8 At a meeting in Lanreath, Cornwall, Rev. L. A. Williams informed 
his audience that `England had been especially blessed by God and used by him in 
defence of liberty and justice throughout the ages', and thus was obliged to continue 
6 Sergeant H. V. Holmes (London Scottish), An Infantryman on Strikes: An Appeal to the Workers of 
Great Britain (n. p. d., probably 1918), pp. 8-9. 
Margaret Osborne [Miss E. M. Goodman], `The Woman's Part. Help for the Land Worker' in, e. g., 
Droitwich Guardian War Supplement, week ending [henceforth w. e. ] 13/7/18, p. 2. 
8 Charles A. McCurdy, MP, To Restore the Ten Commandments: The Basis of a Permanent Peace for 
Europe (London, Hodder & Stoughton, n. d. [ 1918]); Hands Across the Atlantic: Personal Impressions 
of the United States at War by the Archbishop of York (n. d. [1918]), pp. 25-6. See also Dr. Fort 
Newton, Fighting for the Faith (Searchlight series, 10). On the relation between religion and 
patriotism, see, e. g., Wolffe, God and Greater Britain; Colley, Britons. 
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this defence in the present war. 9 
Before the war, religion had been particularly useful in justifying British 
imperialism, providing a `civilising mission' to accompany the more cynical 
purposes. 1° Empire was another site of patriotic imagery, to the extent that by the 
outbreak of war some had added `British Empire' to the lexicon of British identities. " 
Empire featured frequently in NWAC propaganda, both as part of a larger British 
identity, and as a discrete element in itself. An Australian soldier in Ilfracombe, 
Devon, stressed that Britain and its (white) Empire were one since `[w]henever an 
Australian was coming to England he always said he was "going home. " The 
Australians were[, therefore, ] fighting their own battles', 
12 while the February section 
of the NWAC's 1918 British Victory Calendar (figure 15) celebrated the `occupation 
of the Cameroons' by depicting African soldiers, a rare image as most imperial 
references in NWAC propaganda focused on the white Dominions. 
As these examples suggest, there was nothing remarkable about the patriotic 
imagery invoked by the NWAC; it utilised many staple elements and characters. 
`British' lions and bulldogs featured in cartoons and in the title of a pamphlet 
transcription of a speech by Earl Curzon, The British Lion's Share. 
13 John Bull's role 
of disapproving patriot was, understandably, largely superseded by `Tommy Atkins' 
9 `British War Aims Campaign in South-East Cornwall', Cornish Times and General Advertiser, 
8/2/18, p. 3. 
10 Ronald Hyam, Britain's Imperial Century, 1815-1914: A Study of Empire and Expansion (3rd ed., 
Basingstoke, 2002), esp. pp. 108-23; Catherine Hall, Civilising Subjects: Metropole and Colony in the 
English Imagination, 1830-1867 (Cambridge, 2002), esp. pp. 136-9; Brian Stanley, `Church, State, and 
the Hierarchy of "Civilization": The Making of the "Missions and Governments" Report at the World 
Missionary Conference, Edinburgh 1910', in Andrew Porter (ed. ), The Imperial Horizons of British 
Protestant Missions, 1880-1914 (Grand Rapids/Cambridge, 2003), pp. 58-84. 
" See especially, Lord Milner, G. C. B., The Nation and the Empire, Being a Collection of Speeches and 
Addresses (London, 1913). The meaning of Empire to British national identity is, however, heavily 
debated. See, e. g., the varying interpretations in Colley, `Britishness and otherness'; Hall, Civilising 
Subjects; Bernard Porter, The Absent-Minded Imperialists: Empire, Society, and Culture in Britain 
(Oxford, 2004); Andrew Thompson, The Empire Strikes Back? The Impact of Imperialism on Britain 
, 
from the Mid-Nineteenth Century (London, 2005), esp. pp. 179-202. 
12 Speech of Lieutenant P. H. Aspinall, in Ilfracombe Chronicle, 3/11/17, p. 3. 
13 Earl Curzon of Kedleston, The British Lion's Share, (Searchlight series, 27, [1918]). 
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Figure 15: NWAC, British Victory Calendar, February 1918 
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(usually soldiers in general rather than a particular character): an over-fed gentleman- 
farmer was unlikely to engender the same response from disgruntled civilians facing 
food shortages as the ideological embodiment of loved ones doing their patriotic duty 
abroad - but this was a wartime exception to general practice. 14 Where NWAC 
propaganda was remarkable, however, was in the way it transformed these familiar 
patriotic motifs into a presentational model of patriotic ideology suitable for a total- 
war audience. To convince this audience to accept ongoing discomfort and 
deprivation required a presentational model melding elaborate contextual illustrations 
of national identity with a core message of patriotic duty to provide a cognisable 
narrative of civilian experience. The remainder of this chapter outlines the several 
presentational sub-patriotisms by which the NWAC message was imparted and 
(tentatively, given the fluidity of their interactions) the narrative framework by which 
it was delivered. 
14 On the importance of John Bull: Miles Taylor, `John Bull and the Iconography of Public Opinion in 
England, c. 1712-1929', Past & Present, 134 (1992). 
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By far the most evident contextual element, both spatially and because of the 
vituperative language characteristic of much of it, was what may be called adversarial 
patriotism. This conceptualisation seeks to avoid the now rather loaded `otherness' 
paradigm. 15 NWAC propagandists identified several adversaries, foreign and 
domestic, rather than a single, over-arching `other' against which to test British 
identity. Chief amongst these, naturally, was Germany, and certainly more ink was 
spilled and words spat in this direction than towards any other adversary (or sub- 
patriotism), but adversarial patriotism is not simply a renamed `otherness'. Linda 
Colley's seminal explication of British identity contends that, despite political and 
cultural differences at home, Britons defined themselves `as a single people... in 
reaction to the Other beyond their shores'. 16 This was not the case in NWAC 
propaganda, where `the vast majority of or `all right-thinking' Britons were 
encouraged to identify themselves against Germany and Germany's allies and 
Bolshevik Russia and most crucially against other Britons - conscientious objectors 
and `pacifists' (by which the NWAC meant both genuine pacifists and anyone 
advocating negotiated peace, like the UDC or ILP) sometimes, but not usually, 
accused of being pro-German or German-funded; but also potential strikers and the 
war-weary, who were treated adversarially, but often quite differently from `pacifists' 
as people, generally patriotic and loyal, suffering from an aberration caused by fatigue 
or despair. The essential point was to identify an adversary which threatened the 
British way of life, even (perhaps especially) amongst those broadly considered 
sound. Since Colley's work, `otherness' has been adapted conceptually so that 
multiple `others', perhaps both negative and positive, external and internal, may 
15 For some of the current arguments relating to the use of `otherness', see, e. g., the debate on cultural 
history begun by Peter Mandler in Cultural and Social History, 1: 1-3 (2004). 
16 Colley, Britons, p. 6. 
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contribute to national identity, '7 so that this distinction may not alone justify an 
alternative concept. Nonetheless, Catherine Hall asserts that `[w]e can understand the 
nation only by defining what is not part of it', 18 and, while Hall may not intend to 
eliminate alternative interpretations, it is this `only' which crystallises the major 
difficulty with the paradigm. The fundamental assumption behind `otherness' remains 
that the recognition of difference constitutes the basis of identity. Adversarial 
patriotism diverges from `otherness' most significantly in rejecting this premise and 
making the identification of (negative) difference one of several interactive aspects 
contributing to national identity. 
Another contextual sub-patriotism partially concerned with difference may be 
labelled supranational patriotism. This element transcended a simply `national' 
approach to patriotism by comparing Britain, both flatteringly and unflatteringly, with 
its allies (at least the Empire and the other `great' powers, France and the USA). For 
instance, the experiences of French civilians were heralded as examples to their 
British counterparts: despite the privations and dangers of invasion, French civilians 
continued to work hard, close to the battle-zone, and were lauded for their 
(unsurpassed) patriotism. Similarly, the American labour leader, Samuel Gompers, 
was praised for his uncompromising views on the responsibilities of labour. 
Implicitly, British labour might achieve influence similar to that which Gompers had 
with Wilson, were it similarly to renounce wartime strikes and work delays. Here 
difference was used positively to encourage British emulation of foreign virtues and 
inspire competitive patriotism. It also worked inversely, identifying virtues allegedly 
possessed by Britons but not by their allies, like modesty. Alternatively, supranational 
'7 E. g. Marjorie Morgan, National identities and travel in Victorian Britain (Basingstoke, 2001), esp. 
pp. 83-118; Pille Petersoo, `Reconsidering Otherness: Constructing Estonian identity', Nations and 
Nationalism, 13: 1 (2007). 
'8 Hall, Civilising Subjects, p. 9. 
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patriotism could involve locating common virtues and qualities, shared by the Allies 
(especially the `great' powers) which confirmed the superiority of their cause and 
their nations. It was from such conceits that much of the enthusiastic propagandising 
for a League of Nations emerged. 
This final aspect of supranational patriotism was linked extremely closely to 
the third contextual sub-patriotism, designated proprietorial patriotism., This sub- 
patriotism identified several key values - liberty, democracy, justice, honour (in short, 
`civilisation') - which were defended by Britain and its Allies from adversaries, 
foreign and domestic. Patriotic pride also necessitated that, while acknowledging 
shared Allied interest in protecting these values, Britain should be identified as either 
particularly responsible for their inception (as frequently suggested in discussing 
liberty or democracy) or particularly suffused with them. Honour was especially 
heralded as peculiarly British - only Britain went to war in 1914 without an ostensible 
direct threat to its possessions - and propagandists often spent considerable time 
discussing the causes of the war and Britain's involvement in it. 
In providing these key values, proprietorial patriotism not only created criteria 
against which to judge adversaries and comrades, it also formed the vital bridge 
between these comparative contextual forms and those sub-patriotisms comprising the 
core message of duty, particularly two mutually dependent presentational forms: civic 
patriotism and the idea that the war had established a concrescent community, that is a 
community `growing together' because of the war. These were essentially alternate 
but reinforcing interpretations of the relationship between individuals and their wider 
communities. Civic patriotism was the harsher, more demanding, side of this 
relationship, stressing that since individuals were part of a national community which 
provided cherished rights and values, they must be prepared to do their full patriotic 
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duty when required. In this interpretation, civic patriotism means a sense of the 
inherent national duties of citizenship, rather than the alternate (equally valid) sense 
of municipal identity. 19 
Concomitant with this harsh interpretation of the individual/community 
relationship was the gentler, more encouraging, idea that the war had engendered a 
concrescent community (or communities) of patriotic individuals. This concept held 
that civilians had largely done their patriotic duty during the war, and insisted that all 
benefited from this positive acceptance of civic responsibility by their communities 
growing closer together. This was applied in various ways. Links were frequently 
drawn between the home and battle-fronts, stressing the equal significance of patriotic 
duties undertaken by servicemen and civilians. Concrescent community ideas 
reinforced local pride. Speakers often tailored speeches to include references to the 
deeds of a local regiment, encouraging civilians to take pride in its achievements 
(while the civic side exhorted them to maintain their efforts in order not to let down 
their fighting brethren), and also sometimes compared the efforts of a particular 
locality favourably with others. However, in praising local efforts, the concrescent 
community idea also bolstered links between locality and nation - speakers in isolated 
areas emphasised the links between local experience and the national war effort. 20 
More broadly (particularly in published propaganda, addressing a national rather than 
local audience) concrescent community ideas could also combine with elements of 
supranational patriotism to celebrate the closer ties between Britain and its Empire, 
and between Allied nations. Concrescent community rhetoric was essential to NWAC 
propaganda, providing a determinedly positive interpretation of civilian experience; 
while other sub-patriotisms contained celebratory elements, the concrescent 
19 On which, see, e. g., Matthew Vickers, `Civic Image and Civic Patriotism in Liverpool, 1880-1914' 
(unpublished DPhil thesis, Oxford, 2000). 
20 On the continuing importance of locality in Britain, see Ch. 3. 
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community concept was the only presentational sub-patriotism solely concerned with 
praise and celebration. 
Linked closely to civic patriotism was the third element of the core duty 
message, which extended civic patriotism by explicating a specific requirement. This 
may be called sacrificial patriotism. The main purpose of this sub-patriotism was to 
demand self-sacrifice from civilians as part of their patriotic duty; a willing 
acceptance of certain sacrifices - food and fuel restrictions, longer working hours - 
for the good of the community. Servicemen and children were particularly used to 
convince civilians to accept these sacrifices. Many servicemen had accepted the 
ultimate sacrifice of death for their country, and those still serving made considerably 
more daily sacrifices than civilians. Therefore, the NWAC argued, nothing was more 
unpatriotic than civilians refusing to bear their immeasurably lighter sacrifices. An 
element of this sacrificial rhetoric was also evident in supranational patriotic 
discussion of French civilians' harder lives. Sacrificial rhetoric related to children, 
meanwhile, stressed the necessity to accept further sacrifices so that future 
generations could continue to live the British way of life. In the brooding menace of 
various adversaries, propagandists possessed an implicit or explicit image of the 
consequences of a lack of such patriotic self-sacrifice. 
Sacrificial rhetoric had long been a feature of religion, and another important 
contextual element was a spiritual patriotism. In general, NWAC propaganda showed 
an interesting mix of religious and secular rhetoric, and spiritual patriotism was as 
much a refinement of the other sub-patriotisms as a separate sub-patriotism. Hence 
the values and ideals enshrined by proprietorial patriotism were commonly labelled 
`Christian' values of civilisation, enabling claims that Britain was fighting a `holy 
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war'. 21 Furthermore, there was a strong millenarian undertone in much NWAC 
propaganda. This could be used secularly (especially influencing the concrescent 
community idea) by speakers claiming that the war had purged Britain of malignant 
pre-war characteristics like political factionalism. It was also used, however, in a 
more specifically religious sense, as some clergymen at NWAC events celebrated 
religion's renaissance in Britain during the war. Thus, although often refining other 
presentational patriotisms, spiritual patriotism was sufficiently resonant to justify its 
own category of analysis. 
The final contextual sub-patriotism is best described as aspirational 
patriotism. This informed civilians of both the material and civilisational benefits to 
be gained through the fulfilment of patriotic duty. Building on concrescent 
community rhetoric, which celebrated the more co-operative spirit between employers 
and employed, governors and governed, aspirational patriotism stressed the societal 
advances already achieved and dwelt upon the need for a `land fit for heroes' and the 
likely further benefits accompanying victory (provided Britain retained the unity 
developed since 1914). Aspirational patriotism also offered a civilisational/ideological 
aspiration of a `world without war', where militarism was eradicated and which the 
League of Nations would preserve. The alternative to the fulfilment of these 
aspirations, implicitly or explicitly, was a society at the mercy of Britain's 
adversaries, and, by inference, those of civilisation. 
Were there a master-narrative of NWAC propaganda, it might be structured 
like the framework sketched above. Adversarial patriotism would provide one or more 
adversaries, which threatened the key values of civilisation (particularly important to 
Britain) represented by proprietorial patriotism. These in turn were defended by 
21 On the two-sided nature of these claims, see Hoover, God, Germany and Great Britain. 
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nations which shared these values (supranational patriotism). Having identified the 
key values, and the threat to them, the master narrative might then celebrate civilians' 
patriotic contributions and increasing unity (concrescent community) and exhort them 
to continue in their duty (civic patriotism). This exhortation could be augmented by 
comparing servicemen's sacrifices with those of civilians (sacrificial patriotism) and 
emphasising Britain's involvement in a `holy war' (spiritual patriotism), before 
concluding by summarising those aspirations already met and others for which the 
war had to continue. However, this was not the case. The model outlined above is a 
composite image emerging from an extensive examination of NWAC propaganda, 
including meetings held across thirty constituencies. It is extremely unlikely that any 
contemporary civilian would have been exposed to NWAC propaganda to the same 
extent. Typically, a piece of NWAC propaganda would utilise perhaps two, three or 
four of these sub-patriotisms. For instance, a piece discussing the League of Nations 
might discuss supranational, proprietorial, civic and aspirational patriotism, and a 
standard critique of German atrocities might range across adversarial, proprietorial 
and civic patriotism. Though some pieces, particularly those presented as `straight' 
news might stick to one issue, the usual minimum in any NWAC piece would be a 
contextual and a core sub-patriotism, even if the core message amounted to a sentence 
or two after a long contextual illustration, to emphasise the need for continuing 
patriotic duty. 
Nevertheless, some examples of NWAC propaganda touched upon many of 
the presentational patriotisms. Probably the best example is the South African War 
Cabinet member General J. C. Smuts' speech in Tonypandy, in October 1917: 
After three years of the most agonising suffering the heart of dear little Wales beat 
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true, the hammer strokes of fate had not crushed them, but only improved their 
mettle. (Applause. ) [first instances of each sub-patriotism noted: concrescent 
community]... It had been a war not of armies, but... of peoples, of nations, of 
systems and ideals, a war of ultimate principles, and a war of the souls of the people... 
[proprietorial] the true battlefield was in the souls of the nations. 
(Applause)... [spiritual] 
What was the basis of the British Empire? It was liberty, constitutional 
government, and freedom (Hear, hear). The real principle on which they existed was 
that principle of liberty and self-government which had been conceded to almost 
every part of the British Empire... [or] would be conceded more and more in the 
future... They did not want to be slaves and dictated to by others. They wanted to 
manage their own affairs, they wanted security, freedom, and self-government in their 
industrial life in Wales, and he said that those principles, on which the British Empire 
existed, were principles of universal application, [aspirational, supranational]... 
In Germany they had no self-government and no liberty... The whole idea of 
the German system was devoted to develop power and to making the human 
individual serve the ends of the State [adversarial]... It was a moral war and a 
spiritual war. They saw to-day the agonies of a dying world... 
That was God's Providence, and, perhaps, it was better so, but he asked... 
Was the new order going to rise on the principles of liberty and freedom... or was the 
foundation going to be laid by this principle of force, of power, and of the will to 
power for which Germany stood?... 
We would not... allow the young manhood of the nations to be sacrificed to 
the Moloch of war... [sacrificial] we wanted all our energy and power devoted to 
exploiting our economic resources, to improving the internal conditions of the people, 
and as long as they had militarism and standing armies so long would poor, suffering 
mankind never see any chance at all. If they wanted a better England and Wales, and 
a better Tonypandy, they must have victory first. (Applause) [civic]. 
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he did not think it necessary to make an appeal to them, but they could 
leave a record behind for their children which would... make them remember their 
fathers with gratitude for answering the call of duty. As they had faced their 
responsibilities in the past, so he knew they, and all the peoples of the British Empire, 
would continue to respond to the very end, and contribute their all, consider their 
lives cheap, their efforts cheap... so long as they knew there would be a chance to 
live a free and righteous life for the generations to come. (Loud applause). 
The NWAC reprinted a considerably longer version of this speech as a pamphlet, 
which suggests it was representative of their message. 22 The speech demonstrates 
many of the techniques discussed above, and the fluidity with which the 
presentational forms could be employed, some (particularly proprietorial and 
aspirational patriotism) recurring throughout, blending easily with others. 
The question remains as to whether the NWAC presented `British' or 
`English' identity. Clearly, the NWAC originally concerned itself with England and 
Wales. Though some meetings were held in Scotland and Ireland, the addition of 
£5,000 for propaganda in Scotland as an afterthought in its estimates, prompting the 
eventual establishment of two central WACs for the whole country, and the fact that 
an Irish WAC was not established until mid-1918 (and even then did not apparently 
operate normally, being under the control of Sir Horace Plunkett, Chairman of the 
Irish Convention), leaves little doubt about the central focus. 23 Furthermore, the 
NWAC's logo was seemingly England's patron saint (figure 16). Nevertheless, within 
the propaganda itself, there seems to have been no conscious attempt to privilege an 
22 `General Smuts at Tonypandy', lid-Rhondda Gazette, 3/11/17, p. 1. The pamphlet was General 
Smuts's Message to South Wales: Speech Delivered at Tonypandy, Rhondda, On October 29,1917 
(n. p. d.: part of collection of NWAC pamphlets in National Archives Library). 
23 TNA: PRO T102/16, NWAC: Statement of Estimated Expenditure for 6 months ending March 31st, 
1918,16/10/17; on the Irish War Aims Committee, see PA, Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/69/2. 
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Figure 16: The NWAC's logo, from its pamphlet, The Nation Made War and the Nation Must 
Make the Peace (n. d. [19171) 
rý 
English identity over a British one: the NWAC's handbook of over ninety pages, 
produced towards the end of the war, consistently discussed `Britain' rather than 
`England'. 24 Discussion and the use of symbols relating to England seemingly rested 
on a complacent assumption of interchangeable English and British identity, rather 
than an intended denigration of the rest of Britain (and beyond), as with Lieutenant 
Aspinall's identification of Australia with `England'. Later, however, he remarked 
that: `As Britishers they could not listen to any peace talk at the present time '25 
Similarly, Smuts' Tonypandy speech discussed England and Wales, but the cherished 
ideals were identified with the `British Empire'. This issue will be returned to, as 
appropriate, in subsequent chapters. 
By adapting traditional patriotic themes for a war-weary civilian population, 
NWAC propagandists produced a narrative of Britishness through various 
presentational sub-patriotisms which, though capable of independent application, 
24 Aims and Effort of the War: Britain's Case After Four Years (London, 1918). 
25 N. 17 above. 
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were mutually dependent, interactive and reinforcing. The core appeal to duty which 
could be found in all pieces was essential, but meaningless without contextualisation 
by one or more of the other presentational patriotisms. The application of certain 
patriotic themes in this situation is itself interesting, in suggesting those considered 
sufficiently important or meaningful to be used in the urgent situation of 1917-18. 
However, it may also be argued that the absence in many propaganda pieces of some 
sub-patriotisms demonstrates an assumption of a general cognisance of the underlying 
narrative, aided by the use of existing patriotic stimuli in this form. By considering 
not only `what' was said, but also what was not, and `how' these thoroughly 
recognisable patriotic motifs were reconfigured into a narrative of total-war civilian 
experience, it may be possible to develop a richer understanding of patriotic 
discourse, certainly in the period under examination, but perhaps also more generally. 
The significance of these presentational patriotisms for the broader study of British 
patriotism and national identity is that they offer a means of interpreting familiar 
themes of Britishness beyond simply recapitulating their presence. There is more to 
be said than that things which informed representations of Britain before 1914 
continued to do so thereafter. By setting these common images within a framework of 
presentational patriotisms it is possible to discern the broader purposes they served in 
a particular context. The extensive use of one or another idea or image does not 
automatically enshrine it as the most important `source' of British identity. Rather, by 
recognising the ways in which it interacted with other elements, a more complete 
conceptualisation of Britishness may be arrived at. As in other settings, patriotism was 
not evoked for its own sake by the NWAC, but to motivate British civilians to 
continue playing their part in a total-war society. By arranging commonplace patriotic 
themes within a framework of presentational patriotisms, therefore, primacy is not 
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necessarily assigned to those most apparent, but to the purposes for which they, in 
conjunction with other themes, were deployed. Though the manner of interaction and 
the centrality of certain elements may well vary in different historical settings, such an 
approach avoids an excessively focused alternative, whereby the most extensively 
discussed themes overshadow other, perhaps equally or more important, elements. 
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Chapter 5: Adversarial patriotism 
Unquestionably, of all the presentational patriotisms employed, NWAC 
propaganda most frequently used adversarial patriotism. Harold Lasswell's claim that 
there `must be no ambiguity about whom the public is to hate' is amply demonstrated 
in NWAC propaganda, though its adversarial patriotism was more refined than simply 
ensuring that that `all the guilt [was] on the other side of the frontier'. ' Britain's 
military enemies, especially Germany, received considerable opprobrium, but so did 
Bolshevik Russia, for betraying the Allied cause, the so-called `peace-at-any-price' 
movement at home and, less extensively, anyone at home who, by striking for work 
conditions to match the realities of wartime Britain, or simply through war-weariness, 
undermined the progress of Britain's war effort. By presenting the public with a range 
of adversaries varying both in their proximity and their degree of threat to Britain, the 
NWAC could produce a more complex adversarial patriotism than with a sole, over- 
arching adversary. This chapter recapitulates the concept of adversarial patriotism and 
its distinction from `otherness', then seeks to place it in a pre-war context, before 
examining the ways in which the NWAC presented various adversaries. 
Adversarial patriotism is one of several interactive and mutually dependent 
presentational sub-patriotisms which together construct an image of patriotic identity. 
Marjorie Morgan is undoubtedly correct to suggest that middle-class Victorian 
travellers `exhibited a flexible repertoire of national identities rather than a single 
one', 2 but her study nonetheless assumes, like Colley, that this flexible identity 
depended upon the recognition of difference, `the proximity, real or imagined, of the 
Other'. Unlike an `otherness' approach (as Chapter 4 emphasised), the concept of 
1 Lasswell, Propaganda Technique, p. 47. 
2 Morgan, National Identities, p. 217. 
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adversarial patriotism does not suggest that `we usually decide who we are by 
reference to who and what we are not'. 3 While such an approach was certainly 
sometimes taken to demonstrate identity (both by NWAC propagandists and 
historically), the use of adversarial patriotism as an explanatory category assumes that 
identity is substantially formed by an evocation of the values and virtues possessed by 
a community, and not by the `mapping of difference'. 4 Edward Said argues that the 
`construction of identity... involves establishing opposites and "others" whose 
actuality is always subject to the continuous interpretation and re-interpretation of 
their differences from `, Us"'. 5 A major purpose of the concept of adversarial patriotism 
is to avoid such presumptions of the universality of difference as the basis for identity. 
If (as here) such universality is not accepted, an alternative conceptualisation of the 
role of difference in identity construction is more appropriate than simply 
misapplying an existing paradigm. Further, whereas everything different supposedly 
becomes `other', not all differences are threatening (as supranational patriotism 
shows), so not every `different' group became an adversary. Adversarial patriotism is 
concerned only with difference which threatens the community and its identity, 
locating such difference to prevent complacency and ensure an active patriotism. 
These threats need not necessarily entail completely contrasted values (though often 
this was how they were portrayed); they could simply - especially in the wartime 
context - be rather crude threats of upheaval; violent, sexual or social. Thus, 
adversarial patriotism served as a negative motivator (whereas forms like 
supranational and aspirational patriotism acted as positive motivators), demonstrating 
threats to the community and its identity, and thereby reinforcing (rather than 
constructing) this identity by its defence. 
3 Colley, `Britishness and Othemess', p. 311. See pp. 113-4 above. 
° Hall, Civilising Subjects, p. 20. 
5 Edward W. Said, `Afterword (1995)', Orientalism, p. 332. Emphasis added. 
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Adversarial patriotism may be readily found in earlier periods. In countering 
perceived fatalism among the `labouring classes', British Napoleonic-era 
propagandists sought to convince audiences that the French adversary - an `other' in 
Stella Cottrell's view - threatened Britain both materially and ideologically. 
6 Cottrell 
does not demonstrate, however, that British ideals were `defined' against those of 
France, but rather tends to show that the French adversary's failings made it a threat 
to Britain, which is not the same thing - British values remained the same as before, 
but were threatened by the French, rather than being defined in opposition to them. 
Likewise, Linda Colley emphasises the importance of the fear of invasion by the 
French ('spiritless victims of over-powerful government at home and ferocious 
exponents of military aggression abroad') in stimulating military voluntarism between 
1798 and 1805. ' It was not the existence of a `different' France, per se, but the 
assumption that it posed a threat which encouraged civilians to volunteer. Atrocity 
stories, which continued to be used by the NWAC, apparently successfully, perhaps 
as much to enliven propaganda as to convince audiences of the need for patriotic duty, 
were a familiar feature of pre-war patriotic politics, perhaps most notably during the 
Eastern Crisis of 1876-8, where William Gladstone's protest that `the name of 
England [was] discredited' by the Conservative government's support of the Ottoman 
Empire despite its treatment of Bulgarian Christians helped sweep him back into 
power in 1880.8 
Germany increasingly became identified as a serious threat to Britain in the 
later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as an economic, imperial and military 
rival. Paul Kennedy noted the existence of `a certain political gap... between 
6 Stella Cottrell, `The Devil on Two Sticks: Franco-phobia in 1803', in Samuel, Patriotism, 1, pp. 261- 
9. 
7 Colley, Britons, pp. 305-12. 
8 W. E. Gladstone, first Midlothian speech, 25/11/1879, in Midlothian Speeches, 1879, ed. M. R. D. Foot 
(Leicester, 1971), p. 57; R. T. Shannon, Gladstone and the Bulgarian Agitation, 1876 (London, 1963). 
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"Liberal" England and "reactionary" Prussia' in the 1860s which only seemed to 
widen thereafter. 9 In the 1870s and 80s, Queen Victoria, because of her familial links, 
was accused by some radicals of interfering with British policy on Germany's behalf, 
and adversarial patriotism may also be seen in warnings of German rivalry related to 
late-Victorian and Edwardian demands for conscription, tariff reform and increased 
naval building. '0 
Nineteenth-century anti-Russian sentiments differed somewhat from those of 
NWAC propagandists, whose criticism concentrated on the Bolsheviks who they 
believed had corrupted Russian democracy and betrayed the Allies. In the 1870s and 
80s, anti-Russianism was seemingly based on a perception of Russia as a serious 
strategic threat to Britain (its imperial rival in the East), so that, during the Eastern 
Crisis, Russia's decision to take military action prompted a temporary reversal of 
public opinion and an outburst of Russophobic jingoism. " Adversarial threats could 
apparently take precedence over moral outrage, as in the 1890s when potential 
disruption of the European balance of power seemed more injurious to Britain than 
Ottoman transgression of civilisation in its treatment of Armenians. 12 By contrast, in 
the early 1880s, pogroms against Jews enabled Russia (a strategic threat to Britain as 
well as a moral transgressor) to be condemned `in the name of Christianity, humanity 
and England', the latter based on England's `particular and close relationship with 
liberty'. 13 
Precursors of the NWAC's adversarial patriotic critique of `pacifists' within 
9 Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914 (London, 1980), citation p. 
465. 
10 Richard Williams, The Contentious Crown: Public Discussion of the British Monarchy in the Reign 
of Queen Victoria (London, 1997), p. 167; Frans Coetzee, For Party or Country: Nationalism and the 
Dilemmas of Popular Conservatism in Edwardian England (Oxford, 1990). 
11 Hugh Cunningham, 'Jingoism in 1877-78', Victorian Studies, 14: 4 (1971). 
12 E. g., Peter Marsh, `Lord Salisbury and the Ottoman Massacres', Journal of British Studies, 11: 2 
(1972); Roy Douglas, `Britain and the Armenian Question, 1894-7', Historical Journal, 19: 1 (1976). 
13 David Feldman, Englishmen and Jews, Social Relations and Political Culture, 1840-1914 (London, 
1994), pp. 128-35. 
130 
Britain are evident in earlier (socialist and non-socialist) criticisms of `socialism'. In 
presenting the Labour Party and ILP as `British', Ramsay MacDonald simultaneously 
denounced the Social Democratic Federation, Marxism and anarchism as `un-British', 
and syndicalism as `a word imported from France'. 14 Similarly, many of those 
involved with patriotic/nationalistic pressure groups felt that `no greater threat could 
be posed to the fabric of the nation' than a socialist doctrine of internationalism and 
class power, while, Frans Coetzee notes, `even an Englishman' became an adversary 
('enemy') if his `erroneous beliefs no longer entitled him to consideration as one of 
the patriotic community'. 15 In all the examples above, it was not simply difference, 
but the apparent threat to Britain or Britishness which provoked feelings of 
adversarial patriotism. 
Naturally, therefore, NWAC propaganda dealt extensively with Britain's most 
powerful adversary, Germany. Generally, propagandists employed a tripartite 
approach, highlighting atrocities, linking these to a broader critique of German 
society, culture and philosophy, and using the evidence of both, together with the 
examples of Belgium and (later) the peace treaties with Russia and Romania to 
demonstrate that a fair peace with Germany was impossible. The NWAC's role was 
not simply to bolster public morale in a vacuum, but to respond to criticisms by 
dissenters and their calls for negotiated peace. 16 Its critique of Germany thus met 
specific challenges rather than merely condemning Britain's principal opponent 
dogmatically. 
The brutality of the events, the visceral language often employed and, perhaps, 
14 Paul Ward, `Socialists and "True" Patriotism in Britain in the Late 19th and Early 20th Centuries', 
National Identities, 1: 2 (1999), p. 184. 
15 Coetzee, Party or Country, pp. 99,95. 
16 See above, pp. 44-5 for the NWAC's `Aims of Home Publicity'. 
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the post-war highlighting of atrocity stories to discredit propaganda, '? have meant that 
the treatment of Germany in general studies of propaganda has tended to focus largely 
on this element. 18 NWAC propaganda went beyond this, but because of their 
sensationalism, and frequent employment to precede often divergent arguments, it is 
important they be considered first. Though recognised by historians as a staple of 
propaganda throughout the war (for all sides), 19 at least one journalist praised the 
NWAC pamphlet, Murder Most Foul!, by the American clergyman Newell Dwight 
Hillis, because `in these latter war days, we have not said much about them... though 
the crimes against humanity are not forgotten we do not bear them in mind perhaps so 
much as we should'. 20 Atrocity stories remained the simplest, quickest and most vivid 
means of appealing to the public, serving three major purposes. First, they sought to 
inspire civilians through both compassionate sympathy with the victims and plain 
fear. If British citizens did not play their part, the same things might (or, more 
forcefully, would) happen in Britain, as recruiters had similarly emphasised in 1914.1 
Second, concomitantly, atrocity stories played on issues of gender and identity, 
seeking to exploit ideas of chivalry. 22 The NWAC's audience was seemingly 
predominantly male, as the decision, in October 1917, that `special' women's 
meetings should be arranged, and the presence of propaganda specifically written for 
women suggests. 23 Alongside these concerns, Lasswell argues that atrocity stories 
17 E. g., Lasswell, Propaganda Technique, pp. 46-89; Ponsonby, Falsehood. On the weakness of some 
of Ponsonby's argument, see James Morgan Read, Atrocity Propaganda, 1914-1919 (New Haven, 
1941), pp. 24-5. 
18 E. g., Sanders and Taylor, British Propaganda, pp. 137-63; Haste, Home Fires. 
19 n. 18 above; Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker, 1914-1918, pp. 45-69. 
20 `Notes by the Chiel', Evesham Standard and West Midland Observer, 22/12/17, p. 2. 
21 Good, `England Goes to War', pp. 135-7. 
22 On the gendered nature of atrocity stories, see Gullace, Blood, pp. 17-33; Grayzel, Women's 
Identities, pp. 50-85. On chivalry: Mark Girouard, The Return to Camelot: Chivalry and the English 
Gentleman (London, 1981); cf. Lucy Delap, "`Thus Does Man Prove His Fitness to Be the Master of 
Things": Shipwrecks, Chivalry and Masculinity in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Britain', 
Cultural and Social History, 3: 1 (2006). 
23 TNA: PRO T102/16, NWAC Minutes, 10/10/17. 
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served `powerful, hidden impulses' with stories of rape providing `secret satisfaction 
to a host of vicarious ravishers'. 24 Finally, atrocity stories sought to make Germany so 
abominable that it was impossible to consider `premature' peace negotiations 
(facilitating further expositions on German `kultur' and general untrustworthiness). 
NWAC propaganda often presented atrocities en masse, trusting in both the 
shock caused by weight of numbers and public familiarity with the subject-matter. A 
quick summary of various atrocities could prelude the rest of an argument. Basil 
Mathews, for instance, wrote that: 
the rape of Belgium has bitten with acid into the minds of the world... The cold 
catalogue is enough: a baby carried aloft, skewered on a bayonet in a regiment of 
singing soldiers; girls violated again and again until they died; matrons, old men and 
priests slaughtered; women and children thrust forward as a screen between "the 
gallant troops of Germany" and their enemy; organised massacre; the abuse of the 
Red Cross and the White Flag. 25 
To this catalogue he added other familiar refrains - poison gas, the shelling of 
Scarborough, the execution of Nurse Cavell, Zeppelins, attacks on hospital ships and 
many others - before spending the remaining eight pages of the pamphlet outlining 
the aims of Britain and its allies. In describing the `rape of Belgium', Mathews 
succinctly presented a highly gendered image of an innocent female Belgium at the 
mercy of the powerful and brutal Germany. Moreover, such imagery was also 
intended to prompt British audiences to recognise their own good fortune thus far, and 
the continuing threat from Germany. This message was fortified by emphasising the 
24 Lasswell, Propaganda Technique, p. 82. 
25 Basil Mathews, The Vista of Victory (London, n. d. - probably 1917), p. 6. 
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chivalrous part played by Britain's armed services, and that which could be played at 
home. The Lord Lieutenant of Wales, Sir Powlett Milbank, told a Liandrindod Wells 
audience that `their gallant soldiers were defending their hearths and homes, their 
women and children, as well as those of others, from these brutal Germans', 26 while 
in Woolfardisworthy, Devon, the Conservative speaker Bryan O'Donnell provided a 
similarly gendered image of Britain when he said that all Britons `would rise with 
indignation at the thought that the hordes of Germany should ever ruin the fair lands 
of Devonshire or any other county... [C]ome what might, the womanhood of our kind 
should be spared the sufferings of the women of Northern France, Belgium, Poland, 
Serbia and Montenegro'. 7 Such imagery was enhanced by examples like the 
September entry of the NWAC's German Crimes Calendar, which showed a dead 
mother and her children, recalling the anniversary of the first Zeppelin bombing of 
London (figure 17). 28 Significantly, seven of the twelve anniversaries on this calendar 
marked `crimes' involving British victims, although Britain had avoided the worst 
excesses, suggesting that the NWAC used atrocities not simply to highlight 
abominable behaviour but to link it to British civilian experience, past, present, and 
(potentially) future. 
Listing atrocities en masse efficiently kept them in the public mind without 
extensively reiterating familiar stories. However, the NWAC also periodically gave 
longer expositions of particular atrocities, as in an article in Reality featuring the 
testimony of a French nun, including a facsimile of her signed statement, that in 
Gerbeviller, in May 1916, German soldiers had committed various atrocities including 
26 `Allies' War Aims. ', Radnor Express, 27/9/17, p. 5. 
27 `War Aims. Successful Meeting in the West Country', North Devon Herald, 8/11/17, p. 3. 
28 The iconography echoes an earlier cartoon by Bernard Partridge of Germany's invasion of Belgium, 
depicting a German soldier standing proudly over the bodies of a mother and child amid smoking ruins: 
`The Triumph of "Culture"', Punch, 23/8/14. 
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Figure 17: The NWAC's German Crimes Calendar, September 
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covering a woman and an epileptic in petrol and burning them alive. To the 
suggestion that `apes or gorillas' might operate a similar military organisation, Sister 
Julie reportedly replied `Don't let us insult the gorilla'. 
29 Nevertheless, Germans were 
occasionally simianised in NWAC propaganda (though generally in cartoons 
reprinted from elsewhere), as a means of making the German adversary as inhuman as 
possible. One such example was a cartoon reprinted in Reality from the Bystander, by 
Wilmot Lunt and the regular NWAC cartoonist W. F. Blood, `The Go-Betweens', 
which showed three German soldiers surrendering, one a typical German stereotype - 
short, fat and wearing glasses - and another with distinctly simian facial features, 
continuing an established representation of adversaries threatening Britain, which 
29 Wilson Crewtson, `The Great German Crime at Gerbeviller. The Authorised Testimony of Sister 
Julie', Reality, 120,2/5/18, pp. 2-3. 
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originally exploited concerns that evolutionary theories undermined human identity. 30 
One reason to reject atrocity stories as the quintessence of propaganda 
characterisations of Germany, and propaganda generally, is the frequent tendency, at 
least in NWAC propaganda, to lampoon and ridicule Britain's principal adversary. As 
Jay Winter and Jean-Louis Robert note, during the war `the enemy was mocked as 
much as he was hated'. 31 In `The Teutonic Thermometer' (figure 18), Blood played 
upon pre-war concerns about German competition by showing an unwell Kaiser 
Wilhelm looking anxiously at the mercury on his `Victory' thermometer, 
conspicuously labelled `Made in Germany'. Similarly, mocking a German speech 
proclaiming `the constant activity' of Germany's navy, the Liberal MP T. J. 
Macnamara drew laughter from his audience at Ipswich by remarking that such 
activity was `often veiled from view', a reminder of the High Seas Fleet's reluctance 
to put to sea. 32 Excessive concentration on atrocities as the source of British wartime 
views of Germany risks overlooking this more confident note and depicting wartime 
Britons as paralysed with either fear or rage. 
Moreover, NWAC propaganda rarely used atrocities as ends in themselves. 
Pamphlets like "Gentlemen" of Germany, describing the torpedoing of the British 
steamer Belgian Prince and subsequent deliberate drowning of sailors by a German 
U-boat submerging with the captured sailors still on deck, without relating the atrocity 
to a wider picture, were relatively rare. 3 Generally, atrocities were part of a broader 
critique of German culture ('Kultur') and society, designed to demonstrate that peace 
30 Wilmot Lunt and W. F. Blood, `The "Go-Between. "', Reality, 143,10/10/18, p. 1; L. P. Curtis, Apes 
and Angels: The Irishman in Victorian Caricature (revised ed., Washington/London, 1997), pp. 98- 
107. 
31 Jay Winter and Jean-Louis Robert, `Conclusion', in Winter and Robert, Capital Cities at War, IT, pp. 
472-3. 
32 East Anglian Daily Times, `War Aims of the Allies. Mr. T. J. Macnamara at Ipswich. ', 3/12/17, p. 6. 
33 "Gentlemen " of Germany (London, n. d. [ 1917]). This was one of the original fifteen NWAC 
pamphlets, possibly requested by the War Cabinet, which discussed the event and asked the First Sea 
Lord to `take steps to publish particulars of the outrage'; TNA: PRO CAB23/3/1365-204: War Cabinet 
204,3/8/17. 
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was not practicable until Germany changed its internal conditions. This meant 
reforming German political institutions to something `genuinely' democratic (an idea 
that Germans contested, claiming only Germany possessed `true' democracy), 34 and 
the abolition of `Prussian militarism' as a way of life. Despite its title, Murder Most 
Foul! was not simply a compendium of atrocities, but a larger critique of Germany. It 
was not the atrocities themselves which most horrified Hillis but that they were 
`committed, not in a mood of drunkenness nor an hour of anger, but were organised 
by a so-called German efficiency and perpetrated on a deliberate, cold, precise, 
scientific policy of German frightfulness' 35 NWAC propaganda presented Germany 
as a nation saturated with militarist and expansionist ideology. This was usually 
blamed (not uniquely by the NWAC) on an intellectual triumvirate of the philosopher 
Friedrich Nietzsche, the historian Heinrich von Treitschke, and the military theorist 
34 Stibbe, German Anglophobia, p. 171. 
3S Dr Newell Dwight Hillis, Murder Most Foul! (London, n. d. [1917]), p. 4. On the military basis for 
German civilian repression, see Home and Kramer, German Atrocities, pp. 169-70. 
137 
'Cw . G. üf Oy fw ' W. Y:. " .. h- Abe N«. vn w- D, .. 
Friedrich von Bernhardi, who `glorified war as a civilising agent, a beautiful and 
necessary method of national advance', 36 though Treitschke, at least, was largely 
neglected in Germany, except via Bernhardi's writings. 37 These figures were held 
responsible for the establishment of `Kultur', as distinct from Matthew Arnold's 
"`culture"... understood as "the pursuit of sweetness and light" '. 38 
More moderate writers and speakers confined criticisms to the military and the 
Prussian Junker class. Asquith asserted at Liverpool that `it has never been part of our 
policy to annihilate or to mutilate Germany. Our warfare is waged... against Prussian 
militarism (cheers)''39 retaining the pre-war Liberal `two Germanies' distinction 
between `the ruling clique... who were reactionary and bad' and most German people 
`who were peace-loving and good' 40 However, as Stuart Wallace notes, `this 
distinction tended to lose its force... as propaganda concentrated on the dangers of 
premature peace ', 41 and others were less circumspect. Charles S. Parker, prospective 
Unionist candidate for Barnstaple, told an audience that he disagreed with President 
Wilson's claim not to be at war with the German people. He accepted that `Prussia' 
and 
the Kaiser had been responsible very largely for the creation of that spirit of 
militarism, and for the creation of the desire and determination to beat England, 
which had dominated the German people... [But] the German people would have to 
bear the penalty of these misdeeds, and... it would be impossible to sit down after 
36 'Philosophy and War', Reality, 103,3/1/18, p. 3. On the vilification of these figures, see Gregory 
Moore, `The Super-Hun and the Super-State: Allied Propaganda and German Philosophy During the 
First World War', German Life and Letters, 54: 4 (2001); Hoover, God, Germany and Great Britain, p. 
131; Wallace, War and Image, pp. 31-3,47-50,67-9. 
37 Wallace, Ibid., p. 68. 
38 Moore, `Super-Hun', p. 323. 
39 `Mr Asquith's Speech. ', Liverpool Daily Post and Mercury, 12/10/17, pp. 5-6. 
40 Kennedy, Anglo-German Antagonism, p. 398; Wallace, War and Image, p. 31; John Ramsden, Don't 
Mention the War: The British and the Germans since 1890 (London, 2006), p. 123. 
41 Wallace, War and Image, p. 170. 
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this War, except in enmity with the German people. (Hear, hear. )42 
Propagandists claimed that, from infancy, Germans became accustomed through 
education to hating Britain. The Labour MP Ben Tillett proclaimed Germany `had 
taught its young children to hate us and had convinced its young men that they could 
overcome us', 43 while at Malmesbury the barrister, Bromhead Mathews, said: 
The Kaiser claimed to be possessed of the spirit of the Most High... He wished to 
make himself world-master, to impose on us his "kultur, " which meant devilish 
ingenuity in the art of mutilation; the murder of women and children... To bring their 
people into line with this was effected by thorough education with the aid of the 
philospher [sic], the historian, the soldier Bemhardi, with the aid of clergymen who 
instead of the doctrine of peace and goodwill on earth, preached the gospel of English 
hate ... 
44 
This was not a new approach; Napoleonic-era propaganda had asserted that 
Englishmen were `hated and envied... by the French above all others'. 5 NWAC 
propagandists were, likewise, as keen as their Napoleonic-era predecessors to utilise 
arguments about the unpleasant situation of their principal adversary's workers to 
maintain public order at home. 6 To make this more convincing, such arguments were 
often put either by Labour figures or by `good Germans', who criticised or disavowed 
42 `War Aims Campaign in North Devon. ', North Devon Journal, 1/11/17, p. 2. 
43 Ben Tillett, MP, Who Was Responsible for the War - and Why? (London, 1917), p. 9. On Tillett's 
attitude to the war, see Jonathan Schneer, Ben Tillett: Portrait of a Labour Leader (Urbana, Il., 1982), 
pp. 175-97. 
"National War Aims Campaign. Meeting at Malmesbury. ', Wilts and Gloucestershire Standard, and 
Cirencester and Swindon Express, 3/11/17, p. 6. 
45 Cottrell, `Devil', p. 267. 
46 Robert Hole, `British Counter-revolutionary Popular Propaganda in the 1790's', in Colin Jones (ed. ), 
Britain and Revolutionary France: Conflict, Subversion and Propaganda (Exeter, 1983), p 60. 
139 
some or all of their native country's deeds. 7 William Stephen Sanders wrote several 
pamphlets for the NWAC. His credentials were impeccable, and most of his 
pamphlets contained an editorial note stressing his connection `with the Labour and 
Socialist movement... for over thirty years', holding positions on the Executive 
Committee of the Labour Party, and as Secretary to the British section of the 
International Socialist Bureau and the Fabian Society; furthermore, he had served two 
years as a Captain in the Army during the war, and was qualified to speak 
authoritatively on Germany, `having studied in that country for a considerable 
period'. 48 Two pamphlets, Germanys Two Voices and If the Kaiser Governed 
Britain: The Lesson of Germany, were particularly devoted to socialism and workers' 
concerns in Germany. In the former (figure 19), Sanders argued that, despite their 
peaceful rhetoric, most German Social Democrats were committed to military 
conquest. Those, like the minority Socialist Karl Liebknecht (implicitly a `good 
German', responsible for the oft-quoted `We (Germans) are slaves in everything but 
thought, and even thinking is dangerous if you talk in your sleep! '), 49 who refused to 
be `tools' of such an expansionist Parliament, were imprisoned. Sanders cited the 
Reichstag-member Paul Lensch, whose `hatred of Britain includes the British working 
classes' who would "`... lose their present privileged position... [and] be reduced to 
the same level as the workmen of other lands. "'50 The latter pamphlet provided a 
broader critique of German society, informing readers that the `baby of the working 
class... represents [for Germany's rulers] future "cannon fodder" or factory fodder... 
The higher storeys of "Kultur" are not for the child of the proletariat', and explaining 
that Germany was virtually a police-state, where trade unions received no 
47 Cf. Wallace, War and Image, p. 163. 
48 William Stephen Sanders, Is it a Capitalist War?, NWAC pamphlet no. 19 (n. p. d. ). 
49 E. g., Reality, no. 102,26/12/17, p. 4. 
50 William Stephen Sanders, Germany's Two Voices, NWAC no. 30 (London, 1918), pp. 5,9-10. 
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Figure 19: Cover of Sanders' pamphlet Germany's Two Voices 
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governmental recognition and where strikes were dealt with, not by negotiation (as, 
implicitly, in Britain), but by the district military commander threatening to send the 
workers to the trenches, or worse (figure 20). The Reichstag was `not a Parliament in 
the sense in which we understand that word' since the Kaiser appointed the 
government and the Reichstag could not make laws, while the `ruling classes in 
Germany openly avow... that political questions are matters upon which working 
people have no right to express an opinion' 
S1 The German ex-patriot banker Otto 
Kahn insisted that Germans had been `misled, corrupted and systematically poisoned 
by the Prussian ruling caste' which had instilled a `demoniacal obsession of power- 
worship and world-dominion'. 
52 
Atrocity stories vividly dehumanised the German adversary, while the critique 
51 William Stephen Sanders, If the Kaiser Governed Britain: The Lesson of Germany (n. p. d [1918]), 
citations pp. 2,13,15. 52 Otto Kahn, Right Above Race (pamphlet - Searchlight series, 28, [1918]), p. 1. 
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of German society and culture sought to illustrate that Britons would be worse-off 
under German rule. To complete the image of Germany as an intransigent adversary 
with which negotiated peace was impossible, propagandists capitalised on examples 
of German diplomacy. The German Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg's 
exasperated complaint in 1914 that Britain was going to war for a `scrap of paper' 
(the 1839 treaty guaranteeing Belgian neutrality, signed by Britain and Prussia), and 
Germany's subsequent violation of it, provided ammunition for responses to calls for 
negotiated peace. The Labour MP, Stephen Walsh, assured a Wigan audience that 
`Germany knew no international law, and her treaties were scraps of paper'. 53 The 
evidence of Prince Lichnowsky, German ambassador to Britain in 1914, an accidental 
`good German' whose private memoir was smuggled out of Germany and published 
worldwide, ostensibly proved German duplicity in July 1914 and was gleefully 
utilised. 54 Furthermore, after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, in March 1918, speakers 
and writers could also stress the harsh terms Britain could expect in any negotiated 
peace. In Watlington, Norfolk, the Liberal speaker J. A. Oglesby `warned pacifists of 
53 `War Aims Meeting at Wigan. ', Wigan Examiner, 17/11/17, p. 2; also `War Campaign. Meeting at 
the Kursaal. ', Harrogate and Claro Times, Knaresborough & Ridderdale Guardian, 9/11/17, p. 5. 
"4 E. g., C. A. McCurdy, M. P., Guilty! Prince Lichnowsky's Disclosures (n. p. d., [ 1918]); Germany 
Condemned by her own Ambassador (Searchlight series, 18 [1918]); on Lichnowsky's memoir, see 
Harry F. Young, Prince Lichnowsky and the Great War (Athens, GA, 1977), pp. 145-61. 
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the dangers of a premature peace as obtained in Russia' . 
55 `Russia, who threw down 
her arms', wrote W. S. Sanders, `received a scrap of paper', which `handed over to 
Prussian domination territory larger than that of the whole German Empire'. 56 A real 
peace, however, required complete victory, and the removal of Germany's iniquitous 
rulers. 
Britain's other external adversaries received relatively little attention, and 
most of that involved tangential further criticism of Germany. Austria-Hungary 
played little part in the propaganda, probably because British confrontations with 
Austrians were largely confined to the stagnant Salonika front and the brief period 
after Caporetto in which British troops reinforced the Italian front. Where Austria was 
discussed, it usually became a stooge of Germany. Even regarding Serbia, Austrian 
misdeeds were linked to Germany, the Liberal MP Charles McCurdy writing that 
while, to Austria, Serbia represented the apotheosis of Slav nationalism, to Germany 
it was the means of conquering the Near East and that `the high mission of Germany 
as a Kultur-bearer' had led to expropriation followed by `simple pillage and loot' 57 
Turkey, perpetrator of the single largest atrocity of the First World War, the massacre 
of possibly more than a million Armenians, 58 received some opprobrium. At Brecon, 
Liberal MP Sidney Robinson 'hoped.. . that the hand of the Turk would be removed 
from [Palestine and Armenia], and that the blight which the Turk succeeded in 
spreading over any land he had anything to do with would be removed... once and for 
55 'Watlington. National War Aims. ', Thetford & Watton Times, 23/3/18, p. 3. 
56 William Stephen Sanders, Those German Peace Offers (German Aims series, 3, [1918]), p. 2; and 
The Tragedy of Russia (London, [ 1918]), p. 9. 
57 C. A. McCurdy, MP, The Case of Serbia (Freedom of Nations series, 1, London, n. d. ), pp. 2,9-10. 
sa min H. Arslanian, `British Wartime Pledges, 1917-19: The Armenian Case', Journal of 
Contemporary History, 13 (1978), p. 517; Donald Bloxham, `The Armenian Genocide of 1915-1916: 
Cumulative Radicalization and the Development of a Destruction Policy', Past & Present, 181 (2003), 





However, criticism of Turkey was often expanded to incorporate Germany, 
implying that such behaviour was expected from a `barbarous' (and non-Christian) 
civilisation like Turkey's, but that the supposedly more `civilised' Germans should 
have intervened. 60 Conservative MP E. F. L. Wood told a Harrogate audience that the 
world `had seen thousands of Armenians massacred because Germany would not lift a 
finger to stop it', 61 while McCurdy declaimed that `the hills are white with the bones 
of slaughtered Christians' adding that nearly a million died `with the connivance of 
the German government, without any protest from the German people'. Despite the 
Armenians being `systematically exterminated', at Brest-Litovsk `Germany secured 
from the Bolsheviks the return to Turkey of those Armenians... saved from massacre 
by Russian armies, and the Turkish Government thereupon proceeded to complete 
their work of extermination'. 2 An American official claimed the massacres had been 
carried out `under the domination and leadership of German officers'. 63 Turkey's 
separation from Europe is implied in the cartoon `Four Forlorn Hopes' (figure 21) by 
the contrasted colours of the clothing, scimitar, and anxious expression of the Turk, 
compared to his German, Austro- Hungarian, and Bulgarian allies (he may also be 
backing away), while Germany's domination of its allies is illustrated by the Iron 
Crosses which they all wear. 
Bolshevik Russia had to be engaged as an object of adversarial patriotism for 
two reasons. The violent revolution by which the Bolsheviks claimed power was an 
alarming warning of what might happen if domestic unrest became too extreme, and 
59 `War Aims. Mr. Sidney Robinson, M. P. at Brecon. ', Radnor Express, 11/10/17, p. 6. Also Basil 
Mathews, The Freedom of the Holy Land (Searchlight series, 30, [1918]). 
60 Cf the cartoon `Two Revelations' reprinted from Life, in Reality, no. 123,23/5/18, p. 4, which 
claimed that `the leprous heart of the Turk dominates the Teuton'. 
61 `Major the Hon. E. Wood, M. P., and the War. ', Ripon Gazette, 8/11/17, p. 3. 
62 C. A. McCurdy, MP, The Truth About the "Secret Treaties ", (London, n. d. [ 1918]), pp. 12,13,26-7. 
63 Frederick C. Walcott, `The Prussian System as I Found it. ', Reality, 137,29/8/18, p. 3. 
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Figure 21: W. F. Blood, 'Four Forlorn Hopes', Welcome, 18,31/7/18, p. 211 
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consequently it was necessary to delegitimise their form of government to the public. 
Furthermore, the Bolsheviks' publication of several secret treaties between the Allies, 
including agreements about post-war territorial arrangements, undermined Allied 
claims to be fighting a moral war for civilisation, and could strengthen prominent 
dissenting groups like the UDC, which had made the abolition of secret diplomacy a 
key goal. M Fortunately, in propaganda if not strategic terms, the Bolsheviks also 
withdrew Russia from the war, endangering Britain, and thus it was relatively simple 
to criticise Bolshevik `betrayal' while sidestepping more awkward issues. 
Before the Bolsheviks' emergence, propagandists interpreted the Tsar's 
overthrow as positive for both Russia and the Alliance. In October 1917 the Liberal 
speaker Herbert Woodger said at South Littleton, Worcestershire, that the Tsar's 
overthrow would prevent a separate peace with Germany, and when `they had got rid 
of their Anarchists in Russia as we meant to in this country, Russia would come 
64 Swartz, Union of Democratic Control, pp. 26,192. 
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again'. 65 However, once it became clear that the Bolsheviks would make peace, the 
tone changed. By March, criticism of Bolshevism was wide-ranging. Sheehan, in his 
weekly column, wrote that many MPs believed `that the Bolsheviks betrayed their 
country to the Germans', a point echoed by Mrs Eisdon, a BWNL speaker, at a 
Keighley NWAC meeting, who said defeatists were `responsible for the present state 
of affairs in Russia' and warned that defeatism would cause the same result in 
Britain. 66 The Liberal MP J. M. Robertson believed `the horrors and the humiliation of 
the Bolshevik regime in Russia ha[d] gone far to ban revolution everywhere else' 67 
W. S. Sanders, in a heavily-distributed pamphlet, lamented that what might have 
become a `strong, independent, democratic country, has developed, under the 
guidance of folly and fanaticism into an Orgie [sic] of anarchism'. There was `little 
difference between the despotism of the Bolsheviks and the autocracy of the Kaiser', 
and Sanders inverted the public school language of manliness and patriotism in 
asserting that Lenin and Trotsky had `played the German game' by making 
themselves `dictators of Russia', `destroy[ing] industry, trade and commerce, and 
[bringing] starvation to the masses'. 68 
The most surprising, and disturbing, piece of NWAC propaganda is found in 
Reality, where a very brief section informed readers of `the real names of some of the 
Russian Bolshevik leaders' (figure 22). What is most interesting here is not simply 
that the NWAC presented several Bolsheviks' Jewish origins, but that it was assumed 
to be sufficient merely to print the names, without additional commentary, suggesting 
65 `District News. Evesham. National War Aims.. ', Evesham Journal and Four Shires Advertiser, 
20/10/17, p. 6. 
66 `The War & Westminster. By a Soldier M. P. ', Seaham Weekly News, and Seaton, Murton, Hetton, 
Rainton and Houghton-le-Spring Advertiser, 8/3/18, p. 2; `England's War Policy. ', Keighley News, 
30/3/18, p. 5. 
67 John M. Robertson, MP, The Pacifist Blind Spot (Searchlight series, 23). 
68 Sanders, Tragedy of Russia, pp. 2,3,8-9; the National Archives library copy is labelled `2nd 
million'. J. A. Mangan, Athleticism in the Victorian and Edwardian Public School: The Emergence and 
Consolidation of an Educational Ideology (Cambridge, 1981). 
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Figure 22: 'Names of Leninite Leaders', Reality, 97,17/11/17, p. 4 
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some in the NWAC assumed that anti-Semitism was sufficiently deeply-ingrained in 
Britain to make further observations unnecessary. Exposing some Bolsheviks' Jewish 
roots seemed enough to discredit them. The socialist Leeds Conference in June 1917 
prompted an anti-Semitic riot, 69 while right-wing writers like Leo Maxse combined 
anti-German and anti-Semitic sentiment throughout the war, further suggesting the 
perseverance of anti-Semitism in wartime British consciousness. 70 Such views echoed 
the anti-Semitic scapegoating by commentators like J. A. Hobson or Arnold White 
during the Boer War. 7' Interestingly, it also reflected German critiques of Britain, 
which occasionally blamed Jewish influence for the divergence of opinion between 
two nations `from similar Nordic or Teutonic stock'. 72 By casting Bolshevism as a 
treasonous, anti-democratic force, responsible for `ruining' and subjugating Russia, 
the NWAC hoped to deflect criticism of the secret treaties while making this extreme 
socialism unthinkable to Britons. Whilst devoting considerable attention to external 
adversaries, however, NWAC propaganda also dealt with those within, who, it was 
often claimed, were the only adversaries truly capable of defeating Britain. 
As important as it was to emphasise the threat posed by outsiders, it was also 
69 Millman, Managing, p. 210. 
7° Susanne Terwey, `Stereotypical Bedfellows: The Combination of Anti-Semitism with 
Germanophobia in Great Britain, 1914-1918', in Macleod and Purseigle, Uncovered Fields. 
" E. g., J. A. Hobson, The War in South Africa, Its Causes and Effects (London, 1900), pp. 189-97; 
Arnold White, Efficiency and Empire (London, 1901), ed. G. R. Searle (Brighton, 1973), pp. 79-80. 
72 Stibbe, German Anglophobia, pp. 55,59. 
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essential to avoid implying that such adversaries were so powerfully malign as to 
render victory impossible. NWAC propagandists sought to stress that, militarily, only 
Britain and its allies could win the war, while preventing complacency with warnings 
of the dire consequences which would accompany the undermining of British 
servicemen by a disruptive home front. `No', wrote the socialist Robert Blatchford, 
`we cannot be beaten. The only danger is that our victory may be thrown away, that 
class or party dissensions or mistaken ideas about the enemy and the war may drive 
our Government into a hasty and inconclusive peace'. 73 Therefore, adversarial 
patriotism required the presentation of tangible targets for hostility within Britain 
itself. Anti-Semitism provided a limited opportunity, as did Germans still `at large' in 
Britain. 74 However, `foreign' members of the community were less effective 
adversarial threats than `native' Britons who, by dissent, left themselves open to 
imputations of disloyalty. `Pacifists', `defeatists' and conscientious objectors were 
particularly reviled, as sometimes were profiteers, while strikers and anyone 
demonstrating war-weariness or discontent were also liable to lesser accusations that 
they lacked patriotism. By creating a dichotomy which placed dissent and complaint 
`beyond the Pale' of patriotic society, the NWAC sought to stifle discontent and 
maintain an image of a united, determined and willing Britain. This was the message 
of the abortive `British National Film', scripted by the novelist Hall Caine with 
contributions from Thomas Hardy and Rudyard Kipling, and music by Alexander 
Mackenzie and Edward Elgar, at a cost of over £23,500. The film depicted a German 
occupation of Chester and was intended to emphasise to the `ordinary working man' 
the need for maximum civilian exertion to prevent German atrocities in Britain. This 
73 Robert Blatchford, Can We Win? (probably Searchlight series - same design-style but not 
designated, 1918). 
74 E. g. Sascha Auerbach, `Negotiating Nationalism: Jewish Conscription and Russian Repatriation in 
London's East End, 1916-1918', Journal of British Studies, 46: 3 (2007). 
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was not only to be achieved by the startlingly realistic portrayal by the women of 
Chester of a `terrorised population', 75 but seemingly by linking atrocities to industrial 
discontent. A post-war Committee hoping to recoup the film's extravagant costs 
commercially was informed that `having special regard for the atrocity and strike 
scenes which form a prominent feature of the film' such a course would be unwise 
and (argued the Ministry of Information-linked producer Sir William Jury) `given the 
present Labour situation... might indeed be dangerous'. 76 Though the film never 
reached the public, the linking of threatened German atrocities with misguided British 
civilian conduct in NWAC propaganda was clear here. 
While dissent in Britain was certainly not always motivated by pacifism, " the 
NWAC consistently labelled nearly all criticism, particularly organised criticism, as 
`pacifist', even privately. 78 This designation perhaps contained an emasculating 
motive. Democracy dictated that `criticism' and `dissent' were viable, indeed 
essential, ingredients, but by rendering dissenters as `pacifist', propagandists could 
question their courage, resolve and moral code. 9 This moral code was also challenged 
by accusations that dissenters received German funding. At Barnstaple, Lord 
Fortescue declared that: 
Pacifists... might be divided into roughly three classes - some were simply fools, 
some were in German pay, and some were degenerates, who, he was afraid, were 
always to be found in this country, and who were the friends of every country except 
their own. (Applause). 
75 Reeves, Official British Film, pp, 125-30. 
76 TNA: PRO T1/12519, file 13904/1920; H. C. Brook Johnson to Sir John Bradbury, 19/5/19; Jury to 
Guest, 3/1/19- 
77 Ward, Red Flag, pp. 126-9,138-40. 
78 One of its aims was to overwhelm `the insidious and specious propaganda of pacifist publications'. 
TNA: PRO T102/16 `(Confidential) Aims of Home Publicity', n. d. 
79 This was certainly part of strategies to demonstrate female fitness for citizenship: Gullace, Blood, pp. 
137-41. 
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Whether `fools', employees or degenerates, Fortescue emphasised that pacifists were 
somehow aberrant, a point endorsed by the town's prospective parliamentary 
candidates, C. S. Parker and the Liberal Lieutenant J. T. Tudor-Rees, who maintained 
that the pacifist `hidden hand' was `covered with blood' and that `if any Britisher had 
anything to do with that blood-stained hand, he ought not to be allowed to enjoy 
British rule and privileges, but... sent to Germany, to be treated... as Germans had 
always been'. 80 Even the War Cabinet was `persuaded that German money is 
supporting these societies', even though the man responsible for monitoring `pacifist' 
activity, Basil Thomson, believed `that there is no German money'. 8' Labour Minister 
G. H. Roberts reported in October 1917 that there was `[n]o evidence' that the UDC or 
No-Conscription Fellowship were `financed from enemy sources', instead deriving 
their funds from `wealthy Quaker families' while the ILP contained `wealthy 
individual members' and increasing funds from its generally expanding 
membership. 82 
Regardless of factual accuracy, however, associating `pacifists' with `German 
money' was a simple, if crude, means of undermining their claims to patriotism. By 
linking two adversaries, the NWAC attempted to invalidate the idea of an 
`oppositional' patriotism harking back to an earlier, radical interpretation, 83 and refuse 
the permissibility of doubt or individualism. Having implanted doubt with such 
accusations, propagandists could then argue that `pacifists' weakened the fabric of 
British society and prolonged the war either by providing Germany with hope that the 
home front might collapse or by destabilising the war effort. Thus, as Tudor-Rees 
"'War Aims Campaign', North Devon Herald, 1/11/17, p. 2. 
81 Basil Thomson, The Scene Changes (Garden City, NY, 1937), diary entry, 22/10/17, p. 392. 
82 TNA: PRO CAB24/28/2274, GT2274, Ministry of Labour's reply to memo G. 157,10/10/17. 
Thomson later made a similar report: CAB24/35/2980, `Pacifism', 13/12/17. 
83 See Ward, Red Flag, Cunningham, `Language of Patriotism'. 
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argued, they did not deserve the protection and privileges of British citizenship. 
As with the outlining of German society, so the adversarialising of dissenters 
was best expressed by figures linked to the groups. At Tooting, the MP Charles 
Duncan told a sparse audience that he was a member of the Labour party, supporting 
the Government's prosecution of the war, unlike the ILP which was `doing [its] best 
against this country during the war'. 84 Another Labour MP, William Brace, informed 
a Breconshire audience that: `the inconsistencies of the pacifists appalled him. They 
were not prepared to lift a finger to help the country in her hour of need; they were, 
indeed, trying to create an atmosphere of war weariness. There was something worse 
than war, and that was the enslavement of free people'. 85 At Pwllgwaun, East 
Glamorgan, the Unionist speaker John Farnsworth suggested: 
to the pacifists, the British Socialist Party, and that section of the Labour Party to 
which [Philip] Snowden and Ramsay Macdonald gelonged [sic], that the people 
whom Ramsay Macdonald called "our German friends" had got to clean their 
character ... 
86 
Snowden and MacDonald, as the most influential `pacifist' speakers, were the 
individuals most commonly selected for abuse, and MacDonald was particularly irked 
by the constantly used `German friends' refrain, claiming he had `never said anything 
of the kind'. 87 However, the NWAC did not generally appear to encourage attacks on 
individual `pacifists'. Perhaps because of their status as MPs, Snowden and 
MacDonald were very rarely mentioned in NWAC written propaganda - MacDonald 
84 "`War Aims" Meeting at Tooting. ', Battersea Boro' News, 26/10/17, p. 2. 
85 `War Aims. The Builth Meeting. ', Brecon & Radnor Express, 11/4/18, p. 5. 
86 `What We Fight for, and Why. ', Glamorgan Free Press, 22/11/17, p. 1. 
87 Cited in F. P. Armitage, Leicester 1914-1918: The War-Time Story of a Midland Town (Leicester, 
1933), p. 281. 
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was quoted positively, expressing dissatisfaction with `any [peace] terms the 
Germans have yet offered' in an edition of Reality, and his endorsement was attached 
to the summary of Lloyd George's January 1918 War Aims speech, 88 but he was not 
directly criticised. Unlike prominent external adversaries like the Kaiser or 
Hindenburg, or German socialist figures, no caricatures of individual `pacifists' 
appeared. At meetings, however, individuals like Snowden and MacDonald were 
sometimes singled out for adversarialisation. This represents a paradox in analysing 
NWAC propaganda. As previously discussed, the NWAC privileged meetings and 
public oratory as the primary method of public communication. Speeches are thus 
essential in understanding the NWAC's propaganda message. However, central 
direction of content was much stronger with published propaganda, as editorial staff 
could decide what was published and where. Though the NWAC could provide 
guidelines, notes and copies of pamphlets, they had minimal control over speakers' 
comments on any occasion, beyond the power to withhold future engagements if 
unacceptable arguments were employed. 
The most notable personalised condemnation of `pacifism' discovered (in the 
local press of thirty constituencies) occurred at Leicester on 5 May 1918.89 Here, the 
local WAC held a meeting in the market-place at the same time as the local Labour 
Party's annual May Day celebration. On the NWAC platform were Lieutenant C. R. 
Pearse of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (RNVR), a Canadian soldier 
(Lieutenant Towers) and Albert Howarth, a local BWNL secretary. The major 
speakers on the Labour platform were the constituency MP (an unwell MacDonald) 
and Alderman George Banton, a veteran Leicester Labour campaigner. Shortly after 
MacDonald began speaking his meeting was disrupted, first by the national anthem at 
88 `No Offer Yet! ', Reality, no. 114,21/3/18; Our United War Aims (no. 33). 
89 Ben Beazley, Four Years Remembered: Leicester During The Great War (Derby, 1999), pp. 159-60, 
gives a brief account. The following reflects local press reports. 
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the NWAC meeting, then by a group of discharged soldiers singing Rule Britannia 
and marching through the crowd waving a flag. Finally several men, including 
discharged soldiers, attempted to rush the Labour platform and place a French flag on 
it in honour of Britain's ally, prompting police to intervene and arrest three people. 
MacDonald left the meeting early under police escort. Banton blamed the Mayor, 
Jonathan North, for inciting the disruption at a NWAC meeting in April, at which 
North regretted that: 
in some quarters Leicester had a doubtful reputation. ("Shame. ") Some had called it 
the "Pacifists' Paradise. "... Notwithstanding their small number, the Pacifists were 
able to be mischievous, and it behoved all true patriots to see that the young men of 
the country were not led astray by their wiles. Perhaps they had made a mistake in 
Leicester in not counteracting the insidious attacks of the Pacifists. (Applause, and 
"There are plenty of lamp-posts in the town. ")9o 
The event's repercussions continued to be felt in Leicester for some considerable 
time. Articles and letters in the local press called for MacDonald's resignation, also 
debating the propriety of the NWAC's involvement, 91 while on May 15, those 
arrested during the disruption, including Howarth, who asserted in court that 
MacDonald and Banton had been `preaching sedition', 92 had their cases dismissed, 
prompting the local ILP organ, the Leicester Pioneer, to argue that since DORA had 
not been invoked against such `sedition' it had not occurred, and to protest that 
although `outsiders cause a disturbance one week and threaten in a public Police Court 
90 `Our War Aims. Meeting at De Montfort Hall', 13/4/18, Leicester Daily Mercury, p. 7. 
91 See esp. Leicester Daily Mercury, 6-17/5/18. Reactions to the event are discussed in Chapters 11-12. 
92 `Labour Demonstration Disturbances. Anti-MacDonaldites at the Police Court. ', Leicester Daily 
Mercury, 15/5/18, p. 5. 
153 
to do the same another week... nothing will be done in the matter' 93 
The use of adversarial patriotism had a strong impact here, prompting violent 
disruption reminiscent of pre-war political meetings. 94 Such events, however, were 
seemingly quite rare, as were suggestions so violent as that of the Australian soldier 
who told his audience `if any pacifists come to Ilfracombe... just toss them over one 
of your huge cliffs'. 95 Generally NWAC propaganda against `pacifists' was less 
personal and more concerned to demonstrate the need for continuing unity and 
fortitude. `Don't let pacifism creep into your hearts, and disorganise the common 
union of the country', the Unionist speaker Edward Gieve implored his Barnstaple 
audience. `Pacifism means prolonging the War, and prolonging the War means more 
loss of life'. 96 Lord Leverhulme summarised the problem with `pacifism' in a Daily 
Chronicle interview (reprinted as a NWAC pamphlet): 
the pacifist suggests to Germany that timorous souls over here are looking for any 
other way out of this war than the way of victory... The only thing that can dismay the 
German Government is our resolute announcement that we'll... go on fighting... if it 
takes us twenty years more... That's the true Englishness of this war... 97 
In addressing profiteering, which the NWAC believed was partly responsible for `a 
state of mind in which anti-war propaganda secures sympathetic attention', 98 
propagandists were often scarcely less harsh. At Seeton, South Yorkshire, the veteran 
socialist chairman, George Pickthorne, blamed public discontent partly on 
93 'Sequel to the May Day Disturbance. ', Leicester Pioneer, 17/5/18, p. 4. 
94 Lawrence, Speaking. 
95 Lieutenant P. H. Aspinall, cited in `War Aims Campaign. ', Ilfracombe Chronicle, 3/11/17, p. 3. 
96 'France's Day at Barnstaple', North Devon Journal, 18/7/18, p. 2. 
97 Harold Begbie, Negotiate Now? A Business Man's Answer: An Interview with Lord Leverhulme 
(London, n. d. [1918]), p. 7. 
98 TNA: PRO T102/16, NWAC `Report Up to 8th December, 1917'. 
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profiteering. `The "food hoggs" [sic] and profiteers were criminals, and should be 
dealt with as such, for to make money out of the blood of the lads who were 
defending our shores was dreadful'. 99 Condemnation of profiteering and hoarding was 
particularly important since the crime was generally regarded as one committed by the 
wealthiest members of society and therefore corrosive of community solidarity (see 
figure 23). 100 
Strikers could also receive short shrift from propagandists (as the `National 
Film' shows). One pamphlet suggested infantrymen would rather shoot strikers `than 
kill Huns. At least the Hun is not a traitor! ' Striking for extra pay was outrageous 
when `the infantryman received a shilling a day for the work he did for you! '. 'ol 
Another pamphlet, by F. H. Rose of the ASE, was a `call from the workbench'. Rose 
complained that in recent months (the pamphlet was probably produced early in 
1918), `the decadence of the skilled worker has been marked and manifest. ' He said 
workers' grievances were national rather than sectional problems, and that: 
Millions of our countrymen and women are making sacrifices which put the rest of us 
to shame. We have sacrificed a few workshop regulations of doubtful value... [with] 
a promise to have them restored... Those who cheerfully make the supreme sacrifice 
ask us only to work steadfastly to give them the means to make it not in vain. 102 
Women were similarly reminded of their larger responsibilities. Discussing the 
successful strike of female omnibus conductors, Miss E. M. Goodman warned that it 
constituted a dangerous example to women earning less than the conductors and that 
99 `National War Aims. The Campaign in Keighley and District. ', Keighley News, 13/10/17, p. 5. 
10° Waites, Class Society, esp. pp. 61-71,222-6. 
101 Holmes, An Infantryman on Strikes, pp. 10,18. 
102 F. H. Rose, A Call to War Workers of the Engineering and Shipbuilding Industries (London, 1918), 
pp. 5,8,13-14. Some of these themes are developed in subsequent chapters. 
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Figure 23: Frank Styche, 'The Food Hog', Welcome, 16,17/7/18, p. 189 
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`though strikes are sometimes necessary, they are very wasteful, not only for the 
employer, but for the country and the worker himself [sic]... In war-time it is not 
everyone for herself, but all for England! '. 103 
By identifying numerous adversaries, external and internal, with varying 
degrees of threat to Britain, NWAC propagandists could make audiences aware of the 
need for continued dedication and the avoidance of complacency. Adversarial 
patriotism did not, and was not intended to, define British identity, but rather to 
illuminate possible threats to it. Identity was constructed primarily through the 
recognition of various cherished values and a desire to maintain and enhance them, as 
discussed in ensuing chapters. Adversaries tested British identity and patriotism. 
British failure to recognise and defeat these adversaries would be a renunciation of 
that identity (as `pacifists' had supposedly renounced their Britishness). Adversarial 
patriotism was, therefore, an essential part of a broader patriotic model, meant to 
ensure that British identity did not stagnate or become brittle but remained robust, 
vigorous and adaptable. 
103 Margaret Osborne [Goodman], `The Woman's Part. Strikers and Women's Wages. ', Droitwich 
Guardian War Supplement, w. e. 12/10/18, p. 2. 
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Chapter 6: Extra-national identity: supranational and proprietorial 
patriotism 
The war is no longer one between two groups of nations. It is the civilised world fighting 
to chastise rebels against its fundamental laws... 
... To make an end of war nothing less is requisite than a shifting of the centre of 
human allegiance from nationality to something wider. We need to feel a super-national 
patriotism. ' -Lord Hugh Cecil, MP 
As Chapter 5 demonstrated, the NWAC's interpretation of British identity 
looked both inward and outward. However, whereas adversarial patriotism provided a 
predominantly negative motivation, the supranational and proprietorial sub- 
patriotisms presented positive explanations of what being British meant. Both 
transcended national boundaries. Supranational patriotism celebrated Britain's 
similarities with, and differences from, its allies, especially the USA, France and the 
Empire (usually the white Dominions). By dwelling on examples of behaviour or 
attitude where Britons were putatively surpassed by their allies, NWAC propaganda 
sought not to inspire through fear or outrage but to appeal to British pride in positive 
ways. In lauding French or American civilians, or Dominion soldiers, propagandists 
combined an explicit message of praise and friendship towards Britain's allies with an 
implicit encouragement of patriotic rivalry. Additionally, supranational patriotism 
illuminated similarities between Britain and its `great' allies, thereby fusing 
supranational and proprietorial patriotism. Four values - honour, liberty, justice and 
democracy - were constantly invoked (sometimes with attendant emphasis on 
Christianity) to demonstrate that Britain and its allies fought for `civilisation'. The 
NWAC's handbook listed twenty-six countries which had `given their verdict' in 
favour of the war aims of `the Allied Democracies', up to Costa Rica's declaration of 
' Lord Hugh Cecil, `Can We Make Peace To-day? ', Reality, 138,5/9/18, p. 1. 
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war on 25 May 1918,2 all of which were designated parts of the civilised world. 
However, a `great power' mentality was evident in NWAC propaganda, with Britain 
and its (white) Empire, the US and France (the major military contributors on the pre- 
eminent Western Front) generally the foci of supranational patriotic rhetoric. Belgium 
and Serbia served different roles as heroic victims (or martyrs) of enemy aggression, 
providing important examples of the `little nations' or `small states' for which the 
`great civilised powers' fought, and usefully employed to appeal to the sympathy of 
Britain's own `small' sub-nations. Italy - perhaps because of the ideologically 
awkward `squalid... bribery' necessary to secure its allegiance, 3 perhaps because the 
near-collapse at Caporetto in October 1917 unhappily exemplified Allied fragility - 
featured hardly at all, despite the presence of Italy's Foreign Secretary, Sonnino, at 
the NWAC's inaugural meeting. 
By privileging Britain and its `great' allies within supranational discourse, 
NWAC propaganda sought to foster patriotic pride in Britain's global position, as a 
key representative of `civilisation'. Furthermore, proprietorial patriotism, when 
slightly removed from supranational issues, also suggested that Britain might be 
superior even to its most prestigious allies. By emphasising Britain's heritage of 
liberty and democratic institutions, and its particularly strong identification with 
honourable conduct, NWAC propagandists could (gently) suggest British 
civilisational pre-eminence. Hence, while supranational patriotism placed Britain 
among several `civilised' nations, proprietorial patriotism, emphasised in particular 
ways, allowed Britain to claim to beprimus inter pares. This (unsurprisingly) differed 
from earlier Wellington House propaganda for US consumption, which, while 
similarly stressing common Anglo-American values, had suggested that the 
'Aims and E, fJort, p. 52. 
3 Wilson, Myriad Faces, p. 27; On Italy's demands: David Stevenson, The First World War and 
International Politics (paperback cd., Oxford, 1991), pp. 47-58. 
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civilisational principles in question were particularly American. Having considered 
the historical antecedents of these forms of patriotism, this chapter examines NWAC 
discussion of Britain's major allies, before briefly considering its treatment of 
Belgium, Serbia and Italy. It then analyses the NWAC's treatment of the key 
civilisational principles of honour, liberty, democracy and justice, 5 concluding with 
suggestions about the meaning of these extra-national patriotisms within the broader 
patriotic narrative. 
A supranational tendency in British discourse is discernible in several 
elements of pre-war patriotism. The close affinity with the white Dominions 
expressed in NWAC propaganda is redolent of the attitudes of Liberal Imperialists 
like Lord Rosebery, Asquith, Grey and Haldane, as well as the pro-tariff reform 
inclinations of important figures like Joseph Chamberlain or Alfred Milner, who 
argued that `over and above [a Briton's] local and racial patriotism, he will recognise 
that his highest allegiance is to the Empire as a whole'. 6 Chamberlain was similarly 
prominent in the Anglo-American `rapprochement' of the 1890s. British support for 
the US during the 1898 Spanish-American war was based largely on assumptions of 
common Anglo-Saxonism, meaning that Britons `perceived American victories as 
Anglo-Saxon victories, redounding to the glory of the race as a whole'. 7 This Anglo- 
Saxonism combined evolutionary theory (leading on to social Darwinism) with the 
recently-established `Teutonic origins' theory in Anglo-American historiography, 
which claimed that Britain's (and, therefore, the US's) democratic instincts were 
° Jessica Bennett and Mark Hampton, `World War I and the Anglo-American Imagined Community: 
Civilization vs. Barbarism in British Propaganda and American Newspapers' in Joel H. Wiener and 
Mark Hampton (eds. ), Anglo-American Media interactions, 1850-2000 (Basingstoke, 2007), pp. 157- 
63. 
5 The spiritual element of proprietorial patriotism is addressed in Chapter 8. 
6 H. C. G. Matthew, The Liberal Imperialists: The Ideas and Politics ofa post-Gladstonian Elite 
(Oxford, 1973), pp. 152-62; Milner, Nation and Empire, p. 489. 
7 Stuart Anderson, Race and Rapprochement: Anglo-Saxonism and Anglo-American Relations, 1895- 
1904 (London/Toronto, 1981), p. 117. 
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forged in ancient Germany and transferred to Britain by Teutonic invaders after the 
fifth century. This common `ancestry' supposedly linked the nations in `a kind of 
larger patriotism of race'. 8 Furthermore, American imperialism offered the comforting 
impression of validating Britain's own imperial activities. 9 Such ideas attracted 
considerable influential endorsement, including Chamberlain, Rosebery and Arthur 
Balfour in Britain, and Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson in the US. 
Chamberlain suggested an alliance on several occasions, claiming Britons' `duty to 
establish and maintain bonds of amity with our kinsmen'. Indeed, Chamberlain went 
further, suggesting in 1899 a triple alliance between Britain, the US and Germany. '° 
Chamberlain's late expression of Germanophilia reflected broad earlier 
engagements with `Germany'. Alliance against Napoleon prompted an Anglo-German 
`meeting of minds' between `natural allies', " while in the 1820s the Anglican linguist 
Joseph Bosworth stressed England's debt to `the Gothic tribes for our existence, our 
language, and our laws'. The philologist Max Müller developed and popularised such 
ideas in the 1860s, influencing historians like E. A. Freeman in their development of 
`Teutonic origins' theories, 12 at a time, after Napoleon III's accession to power in 
France in 1848, when Britain was particularly receptive to an `English history that 
connected the English to the Germans'. 13 Elite opinion supported Prussia in the 1870 
Franco-Prussian War, linking Prussian and British Teutonic destiny as the `coming 
race', and the hugely popular invasion story The Battle of Dorking can be interpreted 
as a call for Britain to `not merely admire [Prussia's] organization and group 
8 Anderson, Race, pp. 12,28-45. 
9 Bradford Perkins, The Great Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1895-1914 (London, 
1969), p. 67. 
1° Perkins, Great Rapprochement, Chamberlain cited p. 59; on triple alliance, p. 61; Anderson, Race, p. 
15; Cf. Kennedy, Anglo-German Antagonism, pp. 388-9. 
Ramsden, Don't Mention, pp. 16,17. 
ýZ Cited in Clare A. Simmons, "`Iron-worded Proof': Victorian Identity and the Old English 
Language', in Leslie J. Workman (ed. ), Medievalism in England (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 206-12. 
13 Mandler, National Character, p. 86. 
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dedication, but emulate it'. 14 All these examples, contain elements of supranational 
patriotism, through either a close ideo-racial identification or an appreciation of useful 
examples to follow. 
Both Liberals and socialists in the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries 
saw `no contradiction between patriotism and internationalism'; Liberals in the mid- 
nineteenth century argued that British and world interests were the same, namely the 
`spread of liberal constitutionalism and free trade', while the ILP `saw 
internationalism as a plurality of patriotisms', celebrating internationalism via May 
Day celebrations imbued with British (or more precisely, English) symbolism. 15 
Generally, the British approach to foreign nations before 1914 echoed early-Victorian 
selectivity whereby certain foreign characteristics could be admired, but often with 
`more than a hint of condescension'. 16 This was certainly so with attitudes towards 
France. Although during the mid-nineteenth century Britain often required French 
assistance to attain sufficient international influence, 17 attitudes towards France were 
rarely complimentary. Even alliance in the Crimea occasioned little supranational 
friendliness, and despite Napoleon's assistance throughout the 1850s he continued to 
be regarded with `vehement distrust'. 18 He appeared `to have no respect for 
constitutional traditions or press and personal liberties'. Significantly, however, 
Francophilic comment became more acceptable after the 1860 Anglo-French 
Commercial Treaty, when Napoleon embraced free trade, suggesting willingness to 
14 Mandler, National Character, p. 108; Clare A. Simmons, `Anglo-Saxonism, the Future, and the 
Franco-Prussian War', in Leslie J. Workman and Kathleen Verduin (eds. ), Medievalism in England II 
(Cambridge, 1996), pp. 134-6,140; Cf. I. F. Clarke, Voices Prophesying War, 1763-1984 (London, 
1966). 
15 parry, Politics, p. 388; Ward, Red Flag, p. 114. 
16 Bernard Porter, "`Bureau and Barrack": Early Victorian Attitudes Towards the Continent', Victorian 
Studies, 27: 4 (1984), pp. 418-22, citation p. 421. 
11 Parry, Politics, pp. 7-9; Geoffrey Hicks, `An Overlooked Entente: Lord Malmesbury, Anglo-French 
Relations and the Conservatives' Recognition of the Second Empire, 1852', History, 92: 2 (2007), pp. 
187-206. 
18 Parry, Politics, pp. 211-3,224; `The Impact of Napoleon III on British Politics, 1851-1880, 
Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 6th series, XI (2001), pp. 156-7. 
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accept `English tutelage'. 19 Here supranational and proprietorial patriotism were 
combined - because Napoleon accepted `British' ideas, France became a nation with 
something potentially meaningful to offer Britons in thinking about themselves. 
Writers like J. S. Mill and Matthew Arnold, following the French historian Guizot, 
argued that France surpassed Britain in `social civilisation' and sought through 
French, German and American examples to `synthesis[e] the best of existing 
cultures... thus achieving the highest potential of humanity'. 20 Similar impulses 
influenced Lloyd George's `imitation and rivalry' of German social administration, 
selecting the admirable organisational elements without the militaristic and 
compulsive tenets which might offend liberty-loving Britons, while other social 
reformers sought inspiration from Britain's white Dominions, especially Australia and 
New Zealand. 21 
Peter Mandler has recently discussed the `civilizational perspective' which 
informed English national character during the nineteenth century. Initially a 
counterblast to French Revolutionary `democracy', `civilisation' emphasised `loyalty 
to institutions rather than group identification around a common culture', and for a 
long time `portray[ed] an English way of doing business rather than an English nation 
or people'. 22 Nevertheless, early-nineteenth century literature dwelt on qualities which 
equipped Englishmen for self-government, namely `individual liberty' based on a 
combination of individuality and associative behaviour. 23 J. P. Parry has similarly 
stressed mid-nineteenth century Liberal emphasis on `civilisation', together with a 
19 Parry, politics, pp. 225,236; Robert and Isabelle Tombs, That Sweet Enemy: The French and the 
British from the Sun King to the Present (London, 2006), pp. 256-65. 
20 parry, Politics, pp. 243-9. 
21 E. P. Hennock, British Social Reform and German Precedents: The Case of Social Insurance, 1880- 
1914 (Oxford, 1987), pp. 170-2,177-9; Antoinette Burton, `New Narratives of Imperial Politics in the 
Nineteenth Century', in Catherine Hall and Sonya O. Rose (eds. ), At Home with the Empire: 
Metropolitan Culture and the Imperial World (Cambridge, 2006), pp. 220-7. 
22 Mandler, National Character, pp. 28-33,38. 
23 Ibid., p. 53. 
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constitutional stress on Parliament's role in establishing British freedom and self- 
government, a democratic tradition assumed to derive from Anglo-Saxon society, and 
to have been progressively reclaimed since the imposition of the `Norman Yoke' 24 
While Englishmen later identified with `Teutonic' characteristics, they remained more 
comfortable with images of themselves as `products of civilization', 25 and while 
Britons, as highly civilised people, could appreciate certain foreign lessons, these 
were combined with a recognition of Britain's pre-eminence in the world. 26 
Proprietorial patriotism is demonstrably evident in this understanding of Britishness 
(and Englishness), and supranational patriotism followed closely. 
This is clear in Giuseppe Garibaldi's lionisation. Lord John Russell compared 
his virtual liberation of Italy with the Glorious Revolution of 1688, and when 
Garibaldi visited Britain in 1864 he was mobbed wherever he went. 27 Such adulation 
was provoked by an assumption that `Italians had shown their respect for "the English 
way"' in seeking to introduce constitutional government, thus `confirming the pride of 
the English in their own country'. 8 Fifty-four years later, such resonances continued 
when supranational and proprietorial patriotism were combined in a cartoon in Reality 
(reprinted from Life) showing Garibaldi, alongside Oliver Cromwell, George 
Washington and Joan of Arc, confronting a German soldier on the Styx with the 
assertion `We Fought for Liberty - you Against It' (the supranational element 
overlooking the fact that two of those figures fought for liberty from England)29 
Of Britain's allies, NWAC propaganda gave most attention to the USA. A new 
24 Parry, Politics, pp. 43-5; Hill, `Norman Yoke'. 
25 Mandler, National Character, pp. 101-5. 
26 Porter, `Bureau', pp. 418-32; Mandler, National Character, p. 71; Parry, Politics, pp. 12-13,21,243- 
9,388. 
27 Derek Beales, `Garibaldi in England: The Politics of Italian Enthusiasm', in John A. Davies and Paul 
Ginsborg (eds. ), Society and Politics in the Age of the Risorgimento. " Essays in Honour of Denis Mack 
Smith (Cambridge, 1991), esp. pp. 197-8. 
28 Parry, Politics, pp. 230-3,242-3; Porter, `Bureau', pp. 417-8. 
29 Reality, 132,25/7/18, pp. 2-3. 
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Figure 24: Frank Styche, 'The New Ally', Welcome, 17,24/7/18, p. 198 
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ally (technically an `associate power'), having declared war in April 1917, the US 
represented enormous military and economic resources, making Allied defeat 
extremely unlikely. While this was recognised and celebrated (figure 25), most 
relevant NWAC propaganda was concerned with the ideological meaning of US 
involvement. Generally, propagandists approached the USA in two (sometimes inter- 
related) ways. First, it could be described as an impartial, democratic judge, which 
had stood aloof, calling for peace, until circumstances compelled it to abandon 
isolationism and join the war on Britain's side. Its delayed entry allowed 
propagandists to argue that American intervention was a judgement on the justice of 
the Allied cause and enemy iniquity. This judgement supposedly endorsed Allied 
decisions and behaviour, prompting the second propaganda treatment of the US, 
which extended this general approval to more specific claims about close Anglo- 
American ties. Thus, NWAC propagandists strove to use supranational patriotism 
relating to the US both to show how Britain could improve, and as a source of 
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patriotic pride that Britain was not only supported by, but culturally, ideologically and 
linguistically bound to, the war's supposed moral arbiter. 
A regular speaker for the NWAC, the American Judge Henry Neil, informed 
his Leicester audience that `America had been in no great rush' to declare war, but 
that Germany's behaviour had persuaded Americans of their `duty to the rest of the 
world... to fight, not only for their own freedom, but for the freedom of others'. In 
Cheltenham, Rev. P. Campbell Morgan said the US's `sword' was `unstained' having 
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never been `unsheathed... save in the cause of liberty'. 30 NWAC propaganda, 
emphasised the disinterested and unselfish motivations behind the US's entry into the 
war (though given the immense financial links with the Allies, particularly Britain, the 
US eventually had little alternative but to protect its investment) 31 Nevertheless, the 
US's moral authority was exploited by publishing American accounts of German 
misdeeds, including the former ambassador in Germany, James W. Gerard and a 
former Consul in Ireland, Wesley Frost, who claimed to have `collected... much of 
the evidence on which America [had] entered the war', 32 citing twenty-one examples 
of German naval barbarity against civilian shipping. 
Furthermore, with its exalted status, the US was an example ostensibly worthy 
of British emulation. British workers were regularly provided with evidence of the 
hard work of patriotic Americans. Reality quoted the US labour leader Samuel 
Gompers' appeal to `fellow-workers' in Britain to acknowledge their duty to soldiers 
making `the supreme sacrifice' by themselves making `the greatest physical sacrifice 
possible' at work. 
33 In Sheffield, local Trades and Labour Council `Bolsheviks' were 
reportedly dismayed by the US labour delegate W. H. Shortt's strident patriotism. 
Shortt declared `that if the criticisms he had just listened to were uttered in Germany 
the man who uttered them would promptly be in jail', adding that though American 
workers had taken years to be convinced of the war's necessity, they now fully 
supported their Government, having `set aside for the time being trade union 
30 'America's Partin the War. ', Leicester Daily Mercury,, 11/10/18, p. 3; `America's Partin the Great 
War. ', The Looker-On. A Social, Political and Fashionable Review for Cheltenham and County, 
6/4/18, p. 4. 
31 Kathleen Burk, `The Diplomacy of Finance: British Financial Missions to the United States 1914- 
1918', Historical Journal, 22: 2 (1979); Britain, America and the Sinews of War, 1914-18 (London, 
1985); Strachan, First World War, pp. 815-992. 
32 James W. Gerard, When Germany Will Break (Searchlight series, 9, n. p. d. [1918? ]); Wesley Frost, 
Devils of the Deep (n. p. d., [1917? ]), p. 3. 
33 'Time to Do and Dare', Reality, 140,19/9/18, p. 1. 
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Figure 26: 'America's View of Unity', Reality, 119,25/4/18, p. 1 
AMERICA'S VIEW OF UNIrY 
principles'. 34 
However, while the US served as an object of emulation, NWAC 
propagandists also sought to stress the nations' very close bonds, converting effusive 
praise of American moral authority into patriotic self-congratulation. In a speech on 4 
July 1918 Woodrow Wilson, a noted Anglophile, 35 compared the US revolutionary 
hero, George Washington, with the arbiters of Magna Carta, asserting that 
`Washington... like the Barons at Runnymede, spoke and acted, not for a class, but a 
people', a statement reprinted more than once by the NWAC. 36 The NWAC had 
already claimed Wilson's allegiance, quoting Sir Mark Sykes' assertion in December 
1917 that Wilson `had blood in his veins of English stock'. 37 Similarly, at 
Malmesbury, Bromhead Mathews had remarked that Americans were `only a bit of 
34 'American's Plain Talk. No Sympathy with Sheffield Malcontents. ', Sheffield Daily Telegraph, 
16/5/18, p. 2; `A Straight Talk. U. S. Labour will Not Meet German Workers Till Liberty is Assured. ', 
Sheffield Independent, 16/5/18, p. 3. 
35 Perkins, Great Rapprochement, pp. 289-91. 
36 'What are the Conditions of Peace? President Wilson's Answer', Reality, 130,11/7/18, p. 4; 
Woodrow Wilson, Wilson's Message: The Conditions of Peace (Message series, 3, n. p. d. [1918]). 
37 `What Britain has Done', Reality, 101,18/12/17, p. 4. 
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Old Britain after all' 38 The NWAC's Liberal assistant-editor, E. W. Record, twice 
returned to turn-of-the-century language, asserting that with civilian steadfastness `the 
united Anglo-Saxon race' would triumph. `Britain's word is pledged. America's word 
is pledged... It is not the Anglo-Saxon way to juggle with the obligations of 
honour... [or] compromise with those... without honour'. Record averted the paradox 
of the US fighting for liberty alongside its erstwhile oppressor by arguing that Britons 
were glad the US had won independence, since the `American Colonists fought for 
English ideals while we fought against them'. 9 By contrast, a Texan clergyman, Dr. 
Fort Newton claimed the Revolution was irrelevant since the `American forefathers 
stirred themselves to war... not in anger against Britons, but because a German sat 
upon the throne of England in 1776' 40 
In discussing the US, NWAC propaganda used supranational patriotism 
simultaneously to exhort, by suggesting that morally and effort-wise the US surpassed 
Britain, and to exult by providing examples of the close ties between the nations, 
allowing citizens to comfort themselves by basking in reflected transatlantic moral 
sunlight. Proprietorial patriotism attempted to provide even greater self-satisfaction, 
but this was also attainable by inverting supranational patriotism, and awarding 
Britain's allies British attributes. Hence, in Harrogate, a speaker referred to `the 
bulldog tenacity of the British and French troops, and lately that of the Americans ', 41 
thus deeming Britain's allies honorary Britons, by categorising them as one of 
Britain's national animal symbols (figure 27). 
38 `National War Aims Campaign', Wilts and Gloucestershire Standard, 3/11/17, p. 6. 
39 `A Letter from London. By "Thought-Reader" [Record]', North Devon Herald, 8/11/17; 12/9/18; 
18/7/18, all p. 3. This was apparently not a permanent attitude: the 1924 film America was banned 
because its portrayal of the War of Independence `was considered offensive to Britain': John M. 
Mackenzie, Propaganda and Empire: The Manipulation of British Public Opinion, 1880-1960 
(Manchester, 1984), p. 79. 
40 Dr. Fort Newton, `Seen Above the Smoke of Battle', Reality, 124,30/5/18, p. 3. 
41 `Remembrance Day. ', Ripon Gazette, 8/8/18, p. 3. 
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Figure 27: David Wilson and W. F. Blood, 'The Same Strain', Welcome, 15,10/7/18, p. 175 
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Both of Britain's principal allies had only recently become `friendly powers', the US 
in the mid to late-1890s, 42 France since the 1904 Entente Cordiale. While Anglo- 
Saxonism provided a pre-war point of Anglo-American unity, no such idea linked 
Britain and France, and culturally and socially Britain had less in common with 
France than the US or Germany. Therefore, France played a different supranational 
role to the US in NWAC propaganda. As a `front-line' nation, French civilian 
experience (unlike American) demonstrated how much harder life could be for 
Britons. Further, France had fought alongside Britain since 1914, and was thus more 
appropriately the subject of gratitude and admiration. Finally, exalting Britain's 
traditional enemy in comparison to its current adversaries served to highlight the 
issues at stake in the war. 
42 On earlier attitudes: James Epstein, "`America" in the Victorian Cultural Imagination', in Fred M. 
Leventhal and Roland Quinault (eds. ), Anglo-American Attitudes: From Revolution to Partnership 
(Aldershot, 2000). 
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The occasion for most NWAC propaganda treatments of France was `France's 
Day', 12 July 1918 (the Friday before Bastille Day). Other nations' public holidays 
had been celebrated in Britain before. During the height of Anglo-Saxonism in 1898, 
4 July `was celebrated as a holiday throughout Britain', 43 and various national 
holidays were marked in Britain during the war. However, on France's Day, 117 
constituency WACs planned some sort of event 44 Unusually, this was a centrally- 
promoted NWAC event, organised to `let our gallant Allies see that our people are not 
unmindful of the debt we owe to the French people' and to reciprocate France's 
celebration of St. George's Day. The NWAC suggested that Mayors should lead 
meetings and towns should send telegrams to the French President, fly the French flag 
on all public buildings, play the Marseillaise at places of public entertainment and 
address schoolchildren on the day's significance 45 At Keighley, where the Keighley 
News stressed that few places had `established closer relations with France than this 
district', the Corporation declined to hold an official meeting though it enacted the 
other suggestions. 46 Elsewhere, more marked enthusiasm was evident. In Evesham 
every schoolchild saluted the tricolore and sang the Marseillaise. 47 In Barnstaple, the 
Unionist speaker Edward Gieve remarked: 
France and England had often been at each other's throat during the olden days, but 
whether on land or sea there had always existed between the two countries a knightly 
chivalry, which had made us cherish a great respect for France ... 
48 
a' Anderson, Race, p. 119. 
44 Statistics from Register Database. Average events per day was 13.54. 
45 Letter from Boraston, Wallace Carter and Thompson to Keighley WAC, reprinted in `War Aims 
Committee and Corporation. Correspondence About France's Day', Keighley News, 13/7/18, p. 4. 
' `Local Topics. Keighley Townspeople's Greeting to France', Keighley News, 13/7/18, p. 4. 
47 `France's Day', Evesham Journal, 13/7/18, p. 8. 
48 `France's Day at Barnstaple', North Devon Journal, 18/7/18, p. 2. 
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In saying this, Gieve subtly emphasised civilised values, suggesting that though 
traditional enemies, Britain and France had always fought according to certain 
principles, implicitly absent from the current war. Similarly, Record acclaimed 
`France, clean of soul, the pattern of chivalry... our once "sweet enemy, " now our 
truest and noblest friend', arguing that Joan of Arc's defeat in fighting against a 
`wrong done... by England' was a higher victory, vindicated by its cause, in the same 
way that (an unthinkable) defeat would be against Germany. 49 In Liverpool, the Lord 
Mayor argued that the storming of the Bastille was `the first great act of democracy 
asserting its right' and symbolised contemporary principles, ignoring traditional 
English uses of `civilisation' as a counterweight to French `democracy', so 
At Ipswich, the local MPs, Asquithian Liberal D. F. Goddard and Unionist 
Captain F. J. C. Ganzoni both argued that France was at the pinnacle of civilised 
resistance. Goddard reminded his audience that France had `suffered in a good many 
ways far more than we had in England' (a point already stressed by the Mayor, H. D. 
Phillips) and that France fought for `good feeling between peoples, for freedom, for 
justice, and England shared... her ideals'. Ganzoni quoted France's revolutionary 
ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity and asked whether any other nation `had given 
more evidence of its real love for liberty and the lengths for which it was prepared to 
go in order to defend it' S1 Taken together, these arguments presented a cultivated 
example of supranational patriotism. While stressing France's strong heritage of 
liberty, and that it suffered more than Britain (or England), Goddard's linking of 
49 [Record], `Letter from London', North Devon Herald, 18/7/18, p. 3. 
50 'Homage to France. Her Suffering and Glory. ', Liverpool Daily Post and Mercury, 13/7/18, p. 3; n. 
23 above. 
S1 'France's Day. Ipswich Celebrations', East Anglian Daily Times, 13/7/18, p. 5. On French 
propaganda uses of Revolutionary rhetoric: Michael Moody, "`Vive la Nation! " French Revolutionary 
Themes in the Posters & Prints of the First World War', Imperial War Museum Review, 3 (1988); John 
Home, "`L'impöt du sang": Republican Rhetoric and Industrial Warfare in France, 1914-18', Social 
History, 14: 2 (1989). 
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English and French ideals blurred this privileging of France. Furthermore, the 
phraseology of Ganzoni's question enabled consideration that Britain could claim to 
be more liberty-loving, since it had declared war without being directly threatened. 
Ganzoni also celebrated the `knitting together' of Britain and France by the war, a 
point emphasised elsewhere. At Liverpool the French Consul, Baron Barriere, 
referred to the `communion of hearts' between the nations `in defence of liberty', 
while in Wakefield the Deputy-Mayor, C. Hardy-Richards, insisted that after the war 
`we wanted ourselves and France to be more friendly, to be, as it were, as of one race 
and one nation (cheers)' 52 
Like pre-war social reformers, NWAC propagandists regarded France with a 
`highly selective eye', seeking examples to influence `the condition of England 
[Britain]'. 53 Admiration expressed for `hardy, wholesome, untiring folk, who knew 
the value of work and who seemed to find in the performance of duty its own absolute 
and sufficient blessing' (which sounded rather more like a traditional description of 
Englishmen), 54 or claims that `[o]ne does not hear of strikes in France', 55 suggested a 
wholly committed home front, whereas areas of France were actually rife with strikes 
and discontent, if not defeatism, throughout 1917 and 1918.56 Nevertheless, France 
was an important example as it had both (unlike Britain or the US) suffered the 
indignity of invasion, showing Britons that life could be worse, and (unlike Belgium 
or Serbia) continued to play a major role militarily, economically and industrially, 
thus providing a positive rather than negative motivation for British civilian exertion. 
With the US and France, supranational patriotic propaganda proclaimed ties of 
52 `France's Day. ', Liverpool Courier, 13/7/18, p. 3; `France's Day. ', Wakefield Express, 13/7/18, p. 7. 
53 Hennock, Social Reform, p. 206. 
54 [Sheehan], `The Homes of France. Their Glory and Their Grandeur. ', Cornish Times War 
Supplement, w. e. 24/8/18, p. 2; for English comparison, Parry, Politics, p. 62. 
"Holmes, Infantryman on Strikes, p. 12. 
56 P. J. Flood, France 1914-18: Public Opinion and the War Effort (Basingstoke, 1990), pp. 145-81; 
Becker, Great War, pp. 238-66. 
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culture, language or ideals, and could use comparisons to reflect credit upon Britain. 
This was extended in discussing the Empire, which was portrayed as the ultimate 
proof of Britain's civilisational credentials. The Empire enabled patriotic self- 
congratulation because of the voluntary involvement of imperial nations in the war 
(ostensibly demonstrating both the liberty enjoyed by British possessions and their 
adoption of British values), 57 and because the Empire arguably constituted a prototype 
League of Nations. Imperial figures, from the former anti-British Boer War hero and 
Imperial War Cabinet member Smuts to ordinary soldiers, provided comforting 
illustrations of benevolent British rule and the desirability of Britain's way of life. 
NWAC propaganda usually focused on the white Dominions (figure 5), probably 
considering that they were culturally closest to Britain, and because of the 
awkwardness of discussing self-determination or the `rights of small nations' while 
maintaining control over colonial possessions with little or no self-government. 
Where non-white colonies were discussed, it was not in terms of equality but 
condescension. Bonar Law displayed a paternalist attitude towards India when 
discussing its part in Palestine, arguing that: 
as an indication of the differences of spirit between the Alliance and our enemies, I 
think that we have as much reason to be proud of the fact that Indian troops, after our 
rule in India, have played that part as in the part which has been given to us. 8 
Bishop Frodsham, preaching at Oxford, celebrated that: 
" Aims and Effort, pp. 8,54-5. 
"Bonar Law's Message: The Way to Security (Message series, 7, n. p. d. [1918]), p. 16. Germany had 
accused France and Britain of barbarity in using colonial troops in a `white man's war'. Audoin- 
Rouzeau and Becker, 1914-1918, pp. 150-2. 
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Figure 28: Wilmot Lunt and W. F. Blood, 'Four of the Finest', Welcome, 16,17/7/18, p. 181, shows 
(clockwise from front) a South African, Australian, Canadian and New Zealander. There is no 
comparable cartoon of non-white imperial soldiers, (though possibly because no Indian or black 
Not only in India, but also among the less developed races of Africa and the South 
Seas, there is apparently a genuine appreciation... that the British Empire stands for 
the moral principles of justice, truth, and recognition of the rights of all humanity. 
Nevertheless, he warned that involving `tropical African races' in `killing... white 
men... at the instigation of white men', together with German militarism made it 
essential to maintain peace and order by replacing native religions and customs with 
Christianity. 59 
By contrast, discussion of the white Dominions reflected considerably more 
identification between Britain and its colonies. In Wigan, the Conservative MP Rigby 
59 Bishop Frodsham, The British Empire After the War: Being the Ramsden Sermon preached before 
the University of Oxford on Whit-Sunday (May 19th), 1918 (London, [1918]), pp. 4,12-14. For 
biographical details: John Charles Vockler, `Frodsham, George Horsfall (1863 - 1937)', Australian 
Dictionary of Biography, 8 (Melbourne, 1981), pp. 590-591. 
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Swift asserted that `so long as the blood of Englishmen flowed through English veins, 
so long as this people peopled the British Empire'. 60 Germany would be prevented 
from wreaking destruction. At Barnstaple, Australian Lieutenant P. H. Aspinall told 
his audience that in Britain's `great colonies were people who were English as much 
as [the audience] were English, who had the same passionate love of being 
Britishers', while Smuts stressed he had `fought... for freedom in the Boer War', 
claiming (incredibly, given the guerrilla tactics, farm-burning and concentration 
camps) that it had been `carried on by both sides in a sportsmanlike manner, and in a 
clean, chivalrous way'. 61 Smuts', and South Africa's, involvement in the war was 
therefore claimed to demonstrate Britain's superior civilisation - even its most recent 
enemy fought willingly alongside it. The theologian P. T. Forsyth wrote that Britons 
were recognised as `trustees of justice over the world, and apostles of constitutional 
liberty', and boasted that Britain had `given' its franchise and constitution to the 
Boers, because `[w]e could win the peoples we conquer, and neither carries malice'. 2 
In acknowledging ties between Britain and its Dominions, some also 
advocated closer post-war imperial unity. Former First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Francis 
Bridgeman referred at Ripon to the debt owed to `those galant [sic] patriots from our 
great Colonial Empire', asking: 
Are our Crown Colonies after the war to remain in the same subordinate position... 
or shall they be invited to... take their place by the side of the legislators of the Old 
Country? We owe them this, and we ought to be proud of their co-operation. 3 
60 `To Combat Pacifism', Wigan Examiner, 10/11/17, p. 7. 
61 `War Aims Campaign in North Devon. ', North Devon Journal, 1/11/17, p. 2; `Prussianism Must 
Go. ', Sheffield Daily Telegraph, 25/10/17, pp. 5-6; General Smuts, The British Commonwealth of 
Nations: A Speech made by General Smuts On May 15th, 1917 (London, 1917), p. 2. 
62 P. T. Forsyth, The Root of a World-Commonwealth (London, 1918), p. 8. 
63 'Major the Hon. E. Wood, M. P., and the War. ', Ripon Gazette, 8/11/17, p. 3. 
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The Empire's wartime service prompted a more general revival of ideas of Imperial 
Federation and imperial patriotism; a competition was even launched to add an 
imperial verse to the National Anthem. 
Other propagandists suggested the Empire constituted a miniature League of 
Nations. Smuts said it was `a community of states and nations far greater than any 
empire' like Germany's or Rome's, while both Curzon and Lloyd George, less subtly, 
insisted that both the Empire and the Allied nations were Leagues of Nations, Lloyd 
George adding bombastically that the Empire's dissolution would be `a crime against 
civilisation'. 5 In discussing Empire, NWAC propaganda sought ideological 
legitimacy by glossing over the less creditable domination of Britain's non-white 
possessions and focusing on voluntary imperial support and the cultural sympathy 
between Britain and the white Dominions. The propaganda thus attempted to divert 
discussion from embarrassing considerations of imperial power towards expositions 
of international co-operation between amicable states which redounded to Britain's 
credit and enabled it to claim proprietorship of ideas of liberty and international 
democracy. 
As previously discussed, Belgium featured in NWAC propaganda largely as a 
victim (often heavily gendered) of German aggression. Rather than an active military 
ally, `brave little Belgium' had been `ruthlessly violated by a nation sworn to protect 
her'. 66 Belgians were sometimes imbued with similar values to their `great' allies: 
Belgium was held to be particularly honourable in refusing to assist Germany by 
6'4 Percy A. Scholes, God Save the Queen! The History and Romance of the World's First National 
Anthem (London, 1954), pp. 141-3; Keith McClelland and Sonya Rose, `Citizenship and Empire, 1867- 
1928', in Hall and Rose, At Home, p. 290. 
65 Aims and Effort, pp. 84-5,89-90; Lloyd George's speech on this subject was also reprinted as Lloyd 
George's Message: Looking Forward (Message series, 6, n. p. d., [1918]). 
66 F. J. C. Ganzoni cited in `France's Day. ', East Anglian Daily Times, 13/7/18, p. 5. 
176 
allowing free passage through its territory. 67 However, very rarely was Belgium 
considered an object of supranational patriotism like France, which had similarly 
suffered invasion and was frequently offered sympathy for its sufferings. One limited 
example was the Labour MP William Brace's argument at Llandrindod Wells that 
`Wales was a small nation, and it would be passing strange if Wales were to be 
indifferent to the claims of Belgium, Servia [sic], Montenegro, Roumania, and all the 
other small nations'. 8 The explanation, seemingly, was a `great power' mentality 
amongst NWAC propagandists - it was appropriate to link Belgium and Wales via 
supranational patriotism because Wales too was a `small nation', a sub-section of 
Britain; by contrast, supposedly, Britain and its `great' allies protected small nations, 
defending the principles of a civilisation for which they were most responsible. Once 
again this was a case of enabling British pride in the war, and a pragmatic 
acknowledgement that if nations like Belgium and Serbia were considered `equals' of 
Britain, protests against British involvement would be harder to refute. Rather than 
melodramatically emphasising principles and chivalry, arguments for continuing the 
war would have to rely on the much less appealing issues of British diplomatic 
interests which, though important, were unlikely to mollify disgruntled and war-weary 
civilians. 
When mentioned, Italy was generally an adjunct to the `great' allies. The 
NWAC's handbook noted that Italy was one of the `four most important powers' 
which acted together in military, economic and supply matters. 69 Similarly, on 
France's Day at Keighley, the Liberal MP, W. H. Somervell, described Italy as one of 
the `three great European States' which had `long stood as a special representative of 
the cause of liberty', perhaps recalling British Liberals' fascination with Italian 
67 E. g., Mathews, Vista of Victory, pp. 7-8. 
68 `Allies' War Aims. ', Radnor Express, 27/9/17, p. 5. 
69 Aims and Effort, p. 85. 
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unification. 70 However, probably for the reasons suggested above, little was said 
about Italy. McCurdy defended Italy's territorial ambitions, claiming it had `entered 
the war to free Italians... suffering under an oppression which Englishmen have 
happily never known', 7' but this was unusual. It may simply be that Italy was too 
remote in British imagination to be of much propaganda value. Shortly after 
Caporetto, Major-General Sir George Aston reported that the setback had made Italy 
`one in the determination to see the war through', before recalling that Napoleon had 
been defeated by strategic withdrawals, 72 thus creating a meaningful message about 
remaining united in adversity. Generally, however, Italy was overlooked in NWAC 
propaganda, too powerful to be a victimised `small nation'; too ideologically and 
militarily weak to often rank alongside the `great' allies fighting. 
In claiming that the war was fought on behalf of civilisation, NWAC 
propaganda sought to elevate it above matters of national interests and power politics, 
recognising that, important as these were, they were inappropriate for maintaining 
civilians' emotional investment in a physically and mentally draining total war. As is 
already evident, supranational and proprietorial patriotism were often closely 
interwoven. At Shrewsbury, the Earl of Powis said that although the war was arduous 
and painful, Britons could take comfort that: 
we are steadily being drawn into closer relations with those of our own kin and race - 
(applause) - and... making what we hope and believe will be lasting friendship with 
the noble Allies with whom we are fighting for the cause of civilisation. (Loud 
applause. ) 
73 
70 `France's Day at Keighley. ', Keighley News, 13/7/18, p. 5. 
'' McCurdy, Truth About "Secret Treaties ", p. 17. 
72 Major-General Sir George Aston, `The Situation in Italy', Reality, 96,10/11/17, p. 4. 
73 `Remembrance Day at Shrewsbury. ', Shrewsbury Chronicle, 9/8/18, p. 2. 
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Propagandists continually stressed that Britain and its allies fought for liberty, honour, 
democracy and justice. However, there were also persistent underlying attempts to 
stress Britain's special part in establishing these values. Despite representing 
Woodrow Wilson as the icon of democracy, and referring to France's association with 
liberty, NWAC propaganda frequently sought to establish Britain as the progenitor of 
modem civilisation, continuing long-held assumptions about Britishness. At 
Liverpool, in October 1917, the Conservative Attorney-General, F. E. Smith, 
explained that British soldiers would have to bear the brunt of the fighting `until the 
daughter nation, the United States, took her stand by [Britain's] side... in the last 
great struggle for civilisation'. Following Smith, Asquith developed the civilisational 
theme and, while using America as a moral example, again suggested British pre- 
eminence in establishing civilised principles. Arguing that Britain entered the war 
simply to defend Belgium and Serbia, Asquith claimed the question was now: 
whether or not the world is to hold with the best ideals which civilised races have 
framed for themselves... 
Why has America come into the contest? Has she any selfish interest to 
serve, any territory to acquire[? ]... We have seen the practical and universal 
aggregation of the free democracies of the world fighting side by side for the cause of 
triumph on which the whole prospects of future freedom depends... When we... feel 
depressed and despondent we can... recall the great struggles our forefathers made, 
both at home and abroad, in the same sacred cause ... 
74 
Hence, proprietorial patriotism served two purposes. Combined with supranational 
patriotism, it established Britain among a community of like-minded nations fighting 
74 `Picton Hall. Mr. Asquith & Unruly Women. ', Liverpool Daily Post and Mercury, 12/10/17, p. 6. 
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for principles which should be universal, attempting to provide reassuring 
assumptions about strength, security and unanimity. However, by extending the 
argument to suggest Britain's primary responsibility for the development and 
distribution of these principles NWAC propaganda was intended both to allow pride 
and self-satisfaction in Britain's civilisational pre-eminence, and to more clearly 
illuminate what was at stake for Britons in the war. Making war on behalf of 
principles was one thing, but proprietorial patriotism was used to illustrate concrete 
reasons for continuing British commitment to the war. Not only was Britain fighting 
for principles, but British-made principles integral to Britishness and threatened by 
adversaries adhering to different, un-British, principles. At Golborne, Lancashire, 
Viscount Wolmer explained that: 
They were defending their own birthright. (Loud cheers. ) Did they realise what a 
great thing it was to be Englishmen?... [I]t was our nation which had given to the 
world its conception of political liberty and civil justice and right. That 
achievement... was the result of many centuries of struggle and development... To- 
day we are a self-governing people... because we, as a nation, had been able to 
establish certain vital principles. We had learned, and we had taught others - (hear, 
hear) - that... a pledge once given must be adhered to - (hear, hear) - at all costs. 
(Applause. ) They had learned as Englishmen - that a man's word was his bond... 
They had also learned that those who governed had responsibilities to those whom 
they governed... [T]he whole fundamental consideration upon which their civil rights 
were built, their political power, their national stability and safety depended upon 
those very principles... challenged by the Central Powers ... 
75 
75 `Lord Wolmer, M. P., at Golbome', Wigan Examiner, 4/12/17, p. 3. 
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A frequent stress of NWAC propaganda was on the principle of honour. This 
reflected long-standing preoccupations. The proverb `an Englishman's word is his 
bond' (and its antecedents) had been part of the national lexicon since the early- 
sixteenth century, 76 while concern with `fair play' and chivalrous behaviour were key 
tenets of British conduct, inculcated especially at public schools, at least since the 
mid-Victorian period. " Basil Mathews argued that `Europe [was] the first home of 
that great and ever-growing tradition of simple honour in the relations of human 
life... that code of loyalties and faith which stands between us and barbarism'. 78 
Frequently, however, `honour' was claimed to be a particularly British virtue, 
providing an effective response to suggestions that Britain should have remained 
neutral. Britain's declaration of war in defence of Belgian neutrality, which it had 
guaranteed by treaty in 1839, provided considerable opportunity for self- 
congratulation. W. S. Sanders observed that `Great Britain could have kept out of the 
war if she had chosen to place capitalistic interests... above national honour', 79 while 
at Cheltenham the Mayor argued that anyone who claimed Britain should have 
avoided war meant it should have `denied our pledged and sworn word to Belgium', 
ignored France and `made as much profit' as possible from `nations to whom we had 
given our word of honour'. 80 The speaker thus accused dissenters of dishonourable 
greed, inverting a common dissenting critique of the war. 
As noted in the previous chapter, honour could also be discussed adversarially 
against Germany, by highlighting its disregard of international law and obligations. 
76 `An Englishman's Word is his Bond', in Jennifer Speake (ed. ), The Oxford Dictionary of Pro verbs 
(Oxford, 2003). Accessed online (10 May 2007): 
http: //www. oxfordreference. com/viewsfENTRY. html? subview--Main&entm--t90. e647. 
77 E. g., Mangan, Athleticism; Jonathan Rutherford, Forever England: Reflections on Masculinity and 
Empire (London, 1997), pp. 12-19; Girouard, Return to Camelot. 
78 Mathews, Vista of Victory, p. 13. 
79 William Stephen Sanders, is it a Capitalist War? (NWAC pamphlet no. 19, n. p. d. [1917? ]), p. 3. 
80 `Remembrance Day', Looker-On [Cheltenham], 10/8/18, pp. 9-10. 
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With this in mind, propagandists could develop expositions of honour containing 
threats to proprietorial patriotism, emphasising that if Britain did not accept its 
obligations, it would cease to be the same nation. At Barnstaple the Liberal, Tudor- 
Rees, asserted that for `a thousand years our ancestors had built up a record for 
rectitude, honour, and integrity'; and had Britain not aided Belgium, `[o]ur honour, 
our credit, our traditions would have been gone', while the Unionist John Farnsworth 
argued at Hirwain that such a `stain' on Britain's honour would have `handed down a 
heritage of littleness' .81 Because of Germany's dishonourable conduct, demonstrated 
not only by atrocities but by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Lord Leverhulme claimed 
that peace with an unreformed Germany would `undermine our Anglo-Saxon 
mentality for centuries. We should never be the same race again'. `Isn't there a time' 
he asked, `when a nation must say, and mean it, Death rather than Dishonour? '82 
Britain's reputation for honourable conduct was also held to place it at the 
forefront of the democratic world. Reality quoted the Greek Prime Minister 
Eleutherios Venizelos' assertion that after Germany's provocation of war, `the 
democracy of the entire world turned enquiring eyes... [towards] the attitude of 
England'. 83 NWAC propaganda extensively considered `democracy'. This served, 
within adversarial patriotic discussion, to identify a significant difference between 
Britain's external adversaries, including Bolshevik Russia, and Britain and its allies, 
which was considered an effective way of addressing working-class grievances, as 
was a less oppositional approach of elucidating the benefits and virtues accompanying 
democratic behaviour. 84 Wilsonian democracy was highlighted as principled 
81 `War Aims Campaign in North Devon. ', North Devon Journal, 1/11/17, p. 2; `What We Fight for, 
and Why. ', Glamorgan Free Press, 22/11/17, p. 1. 
82 Lord Leverhulme, One or the Other (Searchlight series, 14, n. p. d. [19181). 
83 `Greek Faith in Victory', Reality, 98,24/11/17, p. 4. 
84 E. g. `The Meaning of Democracy', Reality, 135,15/8/18, p. 4, quotes the Labour Minister J. R. 
Clynes advocating change by peaceful voting rather than revolution. 
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statesmanship which, by association and endorsement, NWAC propagandists could 
use to validate Britain's role in the war, 85 simultaneously undermining dissenters by 
fervently embracing the figure and principles to which many dissenters had looked for 
assistance and inspiration. 86 Furthermore, by noting Wilson's connections with 
Britain, and demonstrating Britain's democratic heritage, attempts were made to claim 
British ownership of the principle. 
Wilson's claim, that the US intended to `make the world safe for democracy', 
was a refrain taken up repetitively in NWAC propaganda, used almost as a simple 
catchphrase by speakers and writers as padding for their arguments. 87 Wilson himself 
was also effusively praised. The Irish nationalist, Sheehan, labelled Wilson `our 
greatest "moral" leader' in his (anonymous) weekly column for the NWAC, while at 
least four pamphlets were produced in his name and he was quoted regularly in 
Reality. 88 However, while applauding Wilson's principles, propagandists were equally 
pleased to exploit his credentials to illuminate Britain's own democratic qualities. The 
Labour MP James Parker told a Leicester audience that `Mr. Lloyd George, President 
Wilson and the Labour Party were in substantial agreement' over war aims, while at 
Swaffham, Norfolk, the Liberal MP Sir Richard Winfrey claimed that Wilson's peace 
85 For links between Wilsonian and Lloyd Georgian democracy: Roland Quinault, 'Anglo-American 
Attitudes to Democracy from Lincoln to Churchill', in Leventhal and Quinault Anglo-American 
Attitudes, pp. 129-32. An interesting corrective of views of Wilson as `apostle of liberty' is provided by 
Erez Manela, `Imagining Woodrow Wilson in Asia: Dreams of East-West Harmony and the Revolt 
against Empire in 1919', American Historical Review, 111: 5 (2006). 
8 Paul Mulvey, `From Liberalism to Labour: Josiah C. Wedgwood and English Liberalism During the 
First World War', in Purseigle, Warfare and Belligerence. 
87 E. g. Aims and Effort, pp. 77,91; R. McNeill, MP, cited in `Lest We Forget. What We Are Fighting 
For. National War Aims. ', East Anglian Daily Times, 27/11/17, p. 5; C. A. McCurdy, Freedom's Call 
and Duty: Addresses Given at Central Hall, Westminster, May and June, 1918 (London, n. d. [ 1918]), 
20. 
[Sheehan, ] `The War & Westminster. ', Seaham Weekly News, 26/4/18, p. 2. The pamphlets were: 
Wilson's Message; A World Peace. President Wilson's Programme (NWAC pamphlet no. 34, n. p. d. 
[1918]); Our Two Duties (Searchlight series, 8, n. p. d. ); Why are We Enlisted? President Wilson's 
Answer (Searchlight series, 26, n. p. d. [1918]). 
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terms were the same as those established by Asquith in 1914.89 
In a speech in October 1918, reprinted as a pamphlet, Viscount Grey asserted 
that `the people of this country are perfectly capable... of knowing a democracy when 
they see it' 90 Nevertheless, NWAC propaganda carefully explained the meaning of 
British democracy. Sheehan stressed the contemporary significance of Parliament as 
`the great centre of civic liberty'. He celebrated the fact that the vote, previously `the 
privilege of property, is now proudly regarded as the badge of citizenship' adding that 
the proposed enfranchisement of some women was a `mighty and tremendous' 
event. 91 This exemplifies the melodramatic democratic narrative which Patrick Joyce 
claims formed social identity through the inclusiveness that the presentation of 
democratic motifs inferred, 92 although by 1918 such inclusiveness was more directly 
provided by increased enfranchisement. 
Elsewhere, propagandists dwelt on Britain's democratic heritage. At 
Llandrindod Wells, Brace reminded listeners that `they stood on the same ground as 
Pitt, Palmerston and Gladstone... and the ground was firm', adding that Britain: 
was to all intents and purposes a republic... as free in its constitution as any 
republican government... was ever likely to be. (Cheers. ) The people were 
supreme... in the people's House of Parliament. The monarch was guided not by his 
own will, as in Germany, but by the opinion of his Parliament... Their present 
constitution fitted in with the genius of their race. 93 
89 our War Aims. ', Leicester Daily Mercury, 13/4/18, p. 4; `War Aims. Sir R. Winfrey, M. P., at 
Swaffham. ', Thetford & Watton Times 9/3/18, p. 1. 
90 Grey's Message: The League of Nations (Message series, 8, [19181), p. 10. 
91 [Sheehan, ] `The War and Westminster', North Devon Herald, 26/9/18, p. 6. 
92 Patrick Joyce, `The Constitution and the Narrative Structure of Victorian Politics', in James Vernon 
(ed. ), Re-reading the Constitution: New Narratives in the Political History of England's Long 
Nineteenth Century (Cambridge, 1996), esp. pp. 181-7. 
93 `Allies' War Aims', Radnor Express, 27/9/17, p. 5. 
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Brace unambiguously linked democracy with British identity (continuing long- 
standing traditions), 94 and, in praising Britain's relative freedom compared to 
republics, also suggested British democratic pre-eminence. By attempting to establish 
incontrovertible links between Britain and democratic principles, NWAC propaganda 
also used democratic rhetoric to criticise internal adversaries who considered the 
increasingly proscriptive governance of Britain anti-democratic and Prussianised. 95 
Brace argued that striking imperilled democracy: `Down tools, and the divine right of 
kings will soon become an established fact; work, and Democracy will reign'. 96 At 
Wigan the Unionist MP R. J. Neville retorted to a heckler who shouted that 
`Democracies' should try Germany for its wartime actions: "`Well go and do it... you 
are a democrat["]', thus inverting dissenters' interpretations of democratic language. 
Neville's assumption (which received `loud applause') was that Britain indisputably 
fought for democracy, therefore all `democrats' should willingly fight in that cause. In 
appropriating democracy as an ideological lodestar, NWAC propaganda again had a 
dual purpose; democracy provided an intellectually-satisfying reason to make war, 
while responding to dissenting challenges by trying to undermine their interpretation 
of democracy. 
`Justice' had three major meanings within NWAC propaganda. It could be 
discussed with regard to justice for small nations - that is, providing self- 
determination and national security; in reference to bringing Germany to justice for its 
crimes; or to emphasise that Britain fought a `just war'. NWAC propagandists 
submerged these ideas into calls for a `peace of justice', which again signified a 
rhetorical undermining of dissent (and German peace proposals) by providing an 
alternative to the `peace with no annexations or indemnities' proposed by Kerensky in 
94 Robert Colls, `The Constitution of the English', History Workshop Journal, 46 (1998). 
95 Ward, Red Flag, pp. 133-7. 
96 `Rt. Hon. Wm. Brace M. P. at Glyncorrwg. ', Glamorgan Free Press, 1/11/17, p. 1. 
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May 1917 and subsequently adopted by Bolsheviks, British dissenters and, when the 
war turned against the Central Powers, by Germany. In this case, dissenters were 
arguably misrepresented by NWAC propaganda. At Bath, for instance, the prominent 
dissenter Ethel Snowden (protected from prosecution under DORA by her husband's 
Membership of Parliament), 97 argued: `No peace would be democratic and worthy 
which did not include the complete destruction of German and all other kinds of 
militarism, and was not founded upon justice for all the peoples of the world'. 8 
Nevertheless, NWAC propagandists claimed that the disruptiveness of dissenters 
meant they constituted an adversarial threat to the war's prosecution. 
As already discussed, references to the protection of the rights of small nations 
aimed to foster pride in British chivalry. Linking these rights to justice provided 
another reason for the necessity of continued effort. In Harrogate, the Conservative 
MP, E. Wood, claimed that: 
They maintained that the weaker individual should have the same consideration as the 
stronger, ... applied that doctrine internationally and said that every State, be it as 
powerful as the German Empire or as weak as Belgium, had an equal right of just 
treatment before the great international bar of nations. (Applause. ) 99 
The socialist A. S. Neill said `vengeance' against Germany should be divine, but that 
`foul outrages' like the Lusitania's sinking had to be punished. `Justice demands it in 
order that it may be shown that crime is still crime'. ' 00 In Reality, a cartoon portrayed 
a scene from The Merchant of Venice, with Wilson, as Portia, telling the Kaiser 
97 Miliman, Managing, pp. 185-6. 
98 "`To a Democratic Peace. " Mrs. Philip Snowden in Bath. ', North Wilts Guardian, 1/3/18, p. 5. 
99 `Major the Hon. E. Wood, M. P., and the War. ', Ripon Gazette, 8/11/17, p. 3. 
100 [A. S. Neill], Our Real War Aim: By a Socialist (Searchlight series, 15, n. p. d. [1918]). 
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Figure 29: Detail from 'A Daniel Come to Judgment', Reality, 146,31/10/18, pp. 2-3 (reproduced 






(Shylock) `be assured thou shalt have justice, more than thou desir'st' (figure 29). 101 
NWAC propagandists combined discussion of the rights of small nations and 
the need for Germany to be brought to account for its actions into calls for a `peace of 
justice'. For instance, Lloyd George asserted that there was `no right you can 
establish, national or international, unless you establish... that the man who breaks the 
law will meet inevitable punishment', further insisting that `complete victory for the 
cause of justice and international freedom' was the only way to establish a viable 
League of Nations, which would otherwise be dominated by an abidingly militarist 
nation. 
102 
Justice could also mean a `just war'. Such discussion was usually linked to a 
spiritual approach to patriotism (discussed in Chapter 8). However, one interesting 
element related to Ireland. In July 1918, Sheehan referred to Irish recruitment, 
lionising the nationalist MP Colonel Arthur Lynch, who had fought against Britain in 
101 Note again the possible anti-Semitism in this choice of characters. 
102 Lloyd George's Message, pp. 5-7. Chapter 9 discusses the League of Nations further. 
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the Boer War and been sentenced to death for treason. Sheehan praised Lynch's 
`strong sense of natural and political justice' in offering to assist in Irish recruiting, 
quoting Lynch's trust in Ireland's `traditional regard' for `right and justice'. In this 
instance, Sheehan sought both to re justify the war and place Ireland alongside Britain 
and its `great' allies as a principled nation, while also attempting to pique Irish 
patriotic pride by hoping Ireland would `right herself before the world' by providing 
more soldiers. 103 
Frequently, `justice' went hand-in-hand with `liberty' in NWAC 
propagandists' arguments. 104 Justice for small nations invariably also meant liberty, 
and Grey spelt out liberty's importance to a League of Nations, avowing that `you 
must have every Government in the League of Nations representing a free people' 
(though he did not define `freedom', perhaps fearing awkward imperial questions). 'os 
However, the general NWAC argument was not merely that liberty was essential to 
peace, but that Britain was peculiarly endowed with it. Basil Mathews claimed that 
Britain's successful Middle-eastern campaign meant that `from Gaza up to 
Damascus... the chains of the ancient despotism of Turkey are broken and a new era 
of freedom, justice and security lies ahead'. '°6 NWAC propaganda frequently referred 
to Britain's heritage of liberty. In so doing, it created another key part of British 
civilisation that was threatened by adversaries, and another reason for continuing 
efforts to preserve Britain's identity. Additionally, propagandists acknowledged the 
necessary wartime restrictions on British liberty, stressing the importance of 
103[Sheehan], `The War and Westminster', Seaham Weekly News, 12/7/18, p. 2. Note the similarity in 
discussion of Lynch's and Smuts' erstwhile opinions here. On Ireland, see also Ibid., 26/4/18,17/5/18, 
both p. 2. 
1°4 E. g., `War Aims Campaign. "Liberty, Justice, and Right. ", Ripon Gazette, 25/10/17, p. 2; 
`Downham Market. War Aims Meeting. ', Dereham & Fakenham Times, 2/3/18, p. 5. 
105 Grey's Message, p. 10. 
106 Basil Mathews, The Freedom of the Holy Land (Searchlight series, 30, n. p. d. [1918]). Note the 
spiritual element here. 
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continuing the war to victory so that these liberties could be reinstated. Hence, the 
propaganda again sought to respond to criticism. By recognising complaints that 
British liberties were infringed by the war, the propaganda was again designed to 
invert criticism, arguing that the government intended to restore full freedom as soon 
as possible, and that by interfering with the war's progress dissenters served only to 
prolong such infringements. Furthermore, without total victory, some restrictions 
(especially a permanently militarised state) might remain, since unreformed 
militaristic adversaries would necessitate continuing, semi-mobilised, vigilance. 
As already shown, NWAC propaganda presented the Empire as proof of 
British liberties, since Britain's imperial possessions voluntarily involved themselves 
in the war. However, it was often stressed that Britain was peculiarly suffused with 
liberty, and introduced it to the world. Milner declaimed on St. George's Day that 
`[o]rdered liberty, the golden mean between anarchy and despotism, is our country's 
great gift to the world'. 
107 As with democracy, Britain's long association with liberty 
was carefully demonstrated. Churchill described the US Declaration of Independence 
as `the third of the title-deeds on which the liberties of the English-speaking race are 
founded', along with Magna Carta and the Bill of Rights, adding that the principles it 
embodied matched those of British contemporaries Lord Chatham and Edmund 
Burke, `who in turn received them from John Hampden and Algernon Sidney'. 108 At 
Evesham, the vicar of All Saints' Church, Rev. Dr. Walker recalled the Battle of 
Evesham of 1265, at which Simon de Montfort was killed and his rebellion largely 
crushed. Walker said the battle had `helped to make English liberty' labelling de 
Montfort `the father of the English Parliament, the champion of liberty', and implying 
107 "Beyond All Price. " The Secretary of State for War', Reality, 120,2/5/18, p. 4. 
108 `Mr. Churchill on a "Union of Hearts. "', Reality, 130,18/7/18, p. 4. Note the irony that Magna 
Carta's arbiters neither spoke English nor considered themselves Englishmen, but nevertheless became 
national symbols. Anderson, Imagined Communities, p. 118. 
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that this was responsible for the contemporary position of England `at the head of 
nations that would be free'. 109 Here Walker linked local identity with national 
patriotic pride, ' 0 suggesting that Evesham's links to Britain's heritage of liberty made 
it partially responsible for Britain's position several hundred years later. Such a 
tendency also corroborates recent historiographical suggestions about the significance 
of anniversaries to British identity. ' 11 It is noteworthy that no references have been 
found to historical Welsh, Scottish or Irish attempts for liberty, despite the positive 
gloss put on US and French resistance to English authority, presumably to maintain 
the image of a totally and timelessly united nation and (certainly with Ireland) for fear 
of stirring up nationalist sentiment within Britain. 
By tracing British associations with liberty through history, NWAC 
propagandists also retorted to Germany's attempt to subvert British naval supremacy 
by endorsing Wilson's demand for `freedom of the seas'. At Keighley, H. F. Wyatt, 
the former Navy League figure who co-founded the Imperial Maritime League, 112 
suggested that Britain's navy made Britain more suffused with liberty than elsewhere: 
Military power had proved fatal to the liberties of the people, but sea power stopped 
at the shore and safeguarded popular liberty, and had... allowed us to develop our 
own institutions of which we are now so proud. 
113 
In Reality, an article lampooned Germany's demand for the reduction of British 
maritime influence, arguing that `the German conception of "freedom" at sea means 
the removal of the policeman! ', and citing Britain's naval heritage and `pre-eminence' 
109 `Evesham. Remembrance Day at Evesham. ', Evesham Journal, 10/8/18, p. 6. 
110 On links between local and national identity, see discussion, Chapter 7. 
111 Roland Quinault, `The Cult of the Centenary, c. 1784-1914', Historical Research, 71: 176 (1998); 
Readman, `Place of the Past'. 
112 Coetzee, Party or Country, pp. 78-84. 
113 `The Navy and Popular Liberty. ', Keighley News, 16/3/18, p. 5. 
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in exploring the oceans, establishing harbours, depots and coaling stations for 
international use, and acting as global policeman, in suppressing the slave trade, for 
instance. 114 
By dwelling on Britain's heritage of liberty, NWAC propaganda also 
suggested what would be lost without complete victory. The New Age's socialist 
editor, A. R. Orage, warned that if Germany were not fully defeated, Britain would be 
either conquered or would have to `adopt the most rigorous militarism' to deal with 
the German threat. ' 15 Similarly, in Ripon, the Liberal speaker Dockett warned that a 
premature peace would mean that `[i]nstead of bring[ing] liberty and freedom to the 
world, we should have an armed truce' and compulsory national service. 116 NWAC 
propaganda again served a dual purpose here. Propagandists attempted to flatter 
audiences and dignify British identity by emphasising Britain's traditional (and pre- 
eminent) association with liberty. Simultaneously, repetitive dwelling on liberty's 
importance to Britons (implicitly more important than to more recently `free' peoples) 
meant that threats of its loss, either by conquest or inconclusive peace necessitating 
continuing wartime restrictions, could be used both to persuade war-weary civilians to 
continue doing their utmost for the war effort and to present dissent as unpatriotic, 
interfering with the war effort, delaying success and forcing the government to limit 
the people's liberties for longer than it wished. 
While both supranational and proprietorial patriotism transcended national 
boundaries, one locating commonalities between Britain and its major associates, the 
other identifying key (shared) elements of civilised culture, they were both also 
intended to demonstrate British uniqueness and the nation's pre-eminently civilised 
14 "The Freedom of the Seas. "', Reality, 103,3/1/18, p. 2. 
115 `Answers to a Few Questions', Reality, 114,21/3/18, p. 1; reprinted as A Socialist Talks it Over 
(Searchlight series, 5, n. p. d. [1918]). 
116 `War Aims Campaign', Ripon Gazette, 8/11/17, p. 4. 
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society. Supranational patriotism provided comforting images of military, economic, 
industrial and cultural strength and security, alongside a chivalric purpose in uniting 
Britain with its `great' allies to protect the rights of small nations. Additionally, it 
aimed to motivate British competitive patriotism, suggesting that US or French 
civilians outdid Britons in their work ethic, enthusiasm or resolution. Combined with 
proprietorial patriotism, however, supranational patriotism simultaneously encouraged 
British assumptions of superiority. While the US ostensibly demonstrated by its 
involvement the justice of Britain's cause, for example, praise of US democratic 
instincts was tempered by asserting British biological and ideological ancestry. 
Proprietorial patriotism provided the key ideological basis for British identity. 
In highlighting the major tenets of civilisation - honour, democracy, justice and 
liberty - it drew Britain and its allies closer together, acclaiming their common 
protection of these values against adversarial threats. In recognising common values, 
it also partly enabled the endorsement of an international body, the League of 
Nations, which would inevitably impinge upon Britain's liberty. 117 In another way, 
however, it was meant to demonstrate that Britain was at the forefront of civilisation, 
thus boosting patriotic self-esteem. Care was taken to demonstrate the British heritage 
of each key civilisational value, suggesting that it may be correct to argue that 
`English[British] history formed a normative basis for... conceptualizations of 
national belonging' and that `historic continuity functioned as... perhaps the essential 
repository... of English (or British) conceptions of nationhood'. "8 Certainly, NWAC 
propagandists were not content to discuss contemporary issues solely with reference 
to the present. However, it is worth reiterating that NWAC propaganda was created 
for a purpose and was partly reactionary. By constructing evidence of `historic 
117 See Chapter 9. 
118 Readman, `Place of the Past', pp. 150,197-8. 
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continuity', propagandists could more successfully answer dissenting criticism. 
Further, as the next chapter shows, proprietorial patriotism, combined with the threats 
embodied in adversarial patriotism and the rivalry represented within supranational 
patriotism, was held to provide both the reasons why British citizens had done so well 
in the war, and the motivation to strain every sinew to maintain the British way of life. 
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Chapter 7: Patriotisins of duty: civic patriotism and the idea of a 
concreseent community 
In the NWAC's patriotic narrative, the values celebrated by proprietorial 
patriotism supplied the foundations of British national identity. Supranational 
patriotism provided a validation of this value-based identity and a means of 
demonstrating that more could be done. Adversarial patriotism reminded Britons of 
threats to their identity to revitalise their commitment to the war effort. Quantitatively, 
these sub-patriotisms represented a substantial proportion of the NWAC's 
propaganda, often the majority of a speech or article. However, purposively, they 
merely contextualised the NWAC's core message, that the British people not only had 
a particular national identity, but were duty-bound to maintain it. Sometimes this 
message amounted to a minuscule proportion of the overall piece - `the moral of the 
story'. Over-explication of Britons' duties without such contextualisation might be 
counter-productive, potentially discouraging citizens by making stark demands for 
public exertion without a reasonable purpose. 
NWAC propagandists' recognition of the danger of antagonising war-weary 
civilians with unreasonable demands was manifested in their discussions of duty. 
Together with a rhetoric of sacrifice, NWAC propaganda espoused a complementary 
view of duty stressing obligations but emphasising the praiseworthy meeting of these 
by most individuals and communities, with `consent and coercion [becoming] 
reciprocal functions of each other'. ' In this dual approach, civic patriotism was an 
extension of the contextual sub-patriotisms, especially proprietorial patriotism. Since, 
so NWAC rhetoric assumed, Britons lived in a privileged nation with institutions and 
1 See Pierre Purseigle's discussion of civil society. `Introduction', in Purseigle, Warfare and 
Belligerence, pp. 24-7. 
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laws to protect key civilisational values, citizens should work unstintingly to maintain 
the British way of life. Because they were Britons however, they amply understood 
the relationship between responsibilities, rights and privileges, and had responded to 
the crisis in such a way that they grew closer together within several concrescent 
communities; occupational, local, regional and national (also imperial or international, 
when blended with supranational patriotism). By highlighting communal ties, NWAC 
propaganda sought to override sectional distinctions such as class or political 
affiliation. 
In this (probably coincidentally) NWAC propagandists echoed the views of 
the sociologist R. M. Maclver, whose 1917 study, Community, 2 stressed that `rank and 
wealth and religion are properly accidental in respect of the right of citizenship, and 
where they determine citizenship the community is incomplete'. Nationality, Maclver 
argued, was merely `the colour of community... a way of being human, a communal 
individuality'. 3 `Our life' he maintained, 
is realised within not one but many communities, circling us round, grade beyond 
grade. The near community demands intimate loyalties and personal relationships, the 
concrete traditions and memories of everyday life. But where the near community is 
all community, its exclusiveness rests on ignorance and narrowness of thought... 
Instead, community expanded, but without obliterating smaller communities, which 
2 Jose Harris warns that English `ideas about community may have flourished, not when the social 
reality of community was strong, but when it was relatively week [sic]'. Harris, `English Ideas about 
Community: Another Case of "Made in Germany"? ', in Rudolf Muhs et al (eds. ), Aneignung und 
Abwehr. Interkultureller Transfer zwischen Deutschland und Großbritannien im 19. Jahrhundert 
(Bodenheim, 1998), p. 157. 
3 R. M. Maclver, Community: A Sociological Study: Being an Attempt to Set out the Nature and 
Fundamental Laws of Social Life [1917] (4th ed., London, 1970), pp. 253,280. On Maclver: Sandra M. 
den Otter, British Idealism and Social Explanation: A Study in Late Victorian Thought (Oxford, 1996), 
pp. 200-2; Matthew Grimley, `Maclver, Robert Morrison (1882-1970)', Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography (Oxford, 2004) [http: //www. oxforddnb. com/view/article/70086, accessed June 26 2007]. 
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`fulfil[led] a service which the greater cannot fulfil' 4 NWAC propaganda adhered to 
similar principles, discussing the war in local as well as national contexts, hoping that 
appeals to the `intimate loyalties and personal relationships' of the `near community' 
would ensure dedication to the wider national community. This chapter seeks possible 
antecedents of civic patriotism and the concrescent community idea. It then shows, 
separately, how the ideas were expressed, before demonstrating their duality through 
a larger examination of their propaganda uses. 
Matthew Vickers imbues the term `civic patriotism' with a narrower, 
municipal (though equally valid) sense to that used here. Nevertheless, he 
demonstrates a similarly exhortative patriotism in Liverpool between 1880 and 1914, 
and equally interactive local/national identity (which this study locates within a 
separate concrescent community idea). Liverpool's image revolved around commerce, 
its port encouraging residents to consider themselves members of the `Second City of 
the Empire', thus enabling local pride to rest on nationalimperial prestige. In Vickers' 
interpretation, `emphasis on the individual's relationship with the community 
represented a resolution of the tension between personal freedom and communal 
efficiency'. 5 Individuals seeking municipal influence donned `the mantle of good 
citizenship'. Those who did not, or `damaged the city's reputation[, ] could be accused 
of lacking civic patriotism and adjudged unworthy of the status and privileges of 
citizenship. '6 Around 1900, civic patriotism is discernible in responses to the poor 
physical condition of army recruits. Anna Davin stresses the resultant increasing state 
and voluntary intervention in motherhood (or `bringing up the next generations of 
citizens') as `a national duty not just a moral one'. In 1908, the British Medical 
4 Maclver, Community, pp. 260,262. See also David Miller, On Nationality (2nd ed., Oxford, 1999), 
pp. 65-92. 
Vickers, `Civic Image and Civic Patriotism', pp. 7,45. 
6 Ibid., pp. 142,161. 
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Association president exceeded the public health questions on which the debate had 
hitherto focused, exhorting mothers to inculcate in children `the importance of self- 
control, of obedience, and of patriotism'. Such concerns also influenced calls for 
`citizen training' in organisations like the Scouts, to complement skills developed at 
school, home and church. 8 
Gladstone championed Irish Home Rule after 1885 partly because he thought 
it a `necessary act of justice' which would `instruct the newly emerging democracy' 
about the importance of conscience and `civic selflessness'. He believed such an 
`uplifting moral tale' would `educate [them]... into the principles of humility, and of 
mutual obligations between classes, interest groups and nations'. 9 Here again is the 
interwoven nature of the two sub-patriotisms. Likewise, Robert Owen previously 
believed his model communities constituted a `perfect mode of social organization' 
and exemplary citizenship, the effectiveness of which would convince public 
authorities to establish them nationwide. Owen assumed that all classes in Britain 
`have really but one interest' (a sentiment also expressed by NWAC propagandists). 10 
It is now a historiographical commonplace that nations are `imagined 
communities' of `deep horizontal comradeship'. 
" In late-nineteenth century Britain, 
perhaps the most potent community `imaginations' belonged to Idealists. Sandra den 
Otter notes of the Idealists' concept of a moral state: 
Defining the state as a moral entity and... casting citizenship as a moral endeavour... 
7 Anna Davin, `Imperialism and Motherhood', History Workshop Journal, 5 (1978), pp. 9-65, citations 
pp. 13,55. 
Allen Warren, `Sir Robert Baden-Powell, the Scout Movement and Citizen Training in Great Britain, 
1900-1920', English Historical Review, 101: 399 (1986). Cf. the criticisms of John Springhall and Anne 
Summers in Vol. 102 (1987). 
9 Parry, Politics, pp. 373-6. 
10 Serge Dupuis, `Utopian Socialism and Revolution: Robert Owen', Cahiers Victoriens et Edourdiens, 
48 (Oct 1998), Economic and Social Issues in Victorian and Edwardian Britain, ed. Jean-Pierre 
Dormois, citations pp. 99-100. 
1 Anderson, Imagined Communities, p. 7. 
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diminished the legalistic, retributive character of the state. Instead they emphasised its 
positive face, while... reminding their audience of the duties of moral citizenship. 
The nation, to Idealists, `was a community of shared history, language and 
institutions, but... also an imagined community which cut across regional, class, 
religious and sexual divisions'. 
12 The NWAC's debt to idealist thought is seemingly 
confirmed by the involvement as a speaker of Professor Sir Henry Jones, author of 
Idealism as a Practical Creed, who believed `rights ought to be considered essential 
to a liberal society, but only if they coincided with the duty to serve the wider good of 
society'. 13 This approach extended earlier interpretations of society and community. 
Jose Harris, while acknowledging a `grumbling undercurrent' of ideas about 
community in earlier years, contends there was an `indifference to notions of 
community' until around 1870. Thereafter, however, `there was a shift from viewing 
society as an aggregation of private individuals to a vision of society as collective, 
public, evolutionary, and organic'. 
14 
Harris and den Otter concur that this increased attention reflected anxiety 
about the `perceived disintegration of communal values', 
15 which may be meaningful 
to consideration of the NWAC's community emphasis. However, it may be argued 
that throughout the nineteenth century various people contemplated `community', 
whether or not they used that particular term. This is especially evident in interactions 
between local and national identity, which has recently been the subject of an appeal 
1Z Sandra den Otter, "`Thinking in Communities": Late Nineteenth-Century Liberals, Idealists, and the 
Retrieval of Community', in E. H. H. Green (ed. ), An Age of Transition: British Politics 1880-1914 
(Edinburgh, 1997), pp. 79,81. Note the links here with proprietorial patriotism. See also, den Otter, 
British Idealism, pp. 149-204. 
13 Den Otter, "`Thinking in Communities-, pp. 71-2. Henry Jones, Idealism as a Practical Creed 
(Glasgow, 1910). Jones spoke at NWAC events on at least 22 days according to the Meetings Register 
database. On his propaganda links, see also PA, Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/79/32. 
14 Harris, `English Ideas', p. 148; Harris, Private Lives, p. 37. 
15 See n. 2 above; den Otter, "Thinking in Communities"', p. 84. 
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for greater historical attention. 16 Rosemary Sweet stresses that the evolution of the 
`fiscal-military state' in eighteenth-century Britain, while strengthening national 
consciousness, served also to `enhance local and regional identities'. Any "`national" 
parliamentary identity' was accompanied by a `complex range of locally defined 
identities'. 17 Tom Paine found to his cost that ordinary British radicals in the 1790s 
would not accept criticism of their local attachments, or denial of the possible 
evolution of radical ideas `from the cottage to the region, the nation and beyond'., 8 At 
a cultural level, Liz Bellamy shows that the novels of Maria Edgeworth and Walter 
Scott were less about distinguishing Ireland or Scotland from England than `the 
emergence of a sense of British identity' sufficiently confident to appropriate `images 
of Irishness and Scottishness'. Scott's examination of local culture analysed `the 
relationship between local and national character' and insisted that Highland society 
was being `superseded by [a] more civilised, national' system `based on the 
interdependence of the parts within a complex whole'. 19 While post-1830 reforms 
derogated some local control over daily life to more centralised authority, residence in 
towns and villages continued to create an `immediate sense of belonging', the public 
life in which `gave substance to parochial and civic identities'. 20 Furthermore, as 
Philip Harling and J. P. Parry suggest, despite increasingly centralised government, 
locality still remained critical in mid to late-nineteenth century Britain, allaying public 
scepticism based on the `legacy of Old Corruption... [an] abiding mistrust of the 
16 Readman, `Place of the Past', pp. 176-9. 
17 Rosemary Sweet, `Local Identities and a National Parliament, c. 1688-1835', in Julian Iloppit (ed. ), 
Parliaments, Nations and Identities in Britain and Ireland, 1660-1850 (Manchester, 2003), p. 49. 
18 Ian Dyck, `Local Attachments, National Identities and World Citizenship in the Thought of Thomas 
Paine', History Workshop Journal, 35 (1993), pp. 121-6. 
19 Liz Bellamy, `Regionalism and Nationalism: Maria Edgeworth, Walter Scott and the Definition of 
Britishness', in K. D. M. Snell (cd. ), The Regional Novel in Britain and Ireland, 1800-1990 (Cambridge, 
1998), pp. 54-77; citations pp. 73,66,69. 
20 David Eastwood, Government and Community in the English Provinces, 1700-1870 (Basingstoke, 
1997), passim. Citation p. 91. 
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centre' and implying `popular sovereignty and control' 21 K. D. M. Snell's recent 
study, Parish and Belonging, also emphasises the prolonged significance of the parish 
to local community and identity. 22 Nonconformist resistance to Clause 25 of the 1870 
Education Act was also predicated on local action. 23 By 1900, Britishness (or 
Englishness) was increasingly sought in smaller communities and localities, whether 
by resurrecting local dialects, 24 pageantry, 25 or artistic and touristic identifications of 
local quintessences of the nation. 26 `[T]ies of locality and community' may have 
begun to `irrevocably break down' by 1900,27 but this must not be exaggerated. 
Welcome, produced for servicemen on leave, always contained significant guidance 
for soldiers in London, including a map, information about transport and 
Figure 30: Welcome's mast-head. Note the symbolism here of a small local community to which 
the soldier returns. I Containint Usefot S nformatio"i rom, ited 7 
. :. 1 the Nwtional War A-rn- Committ¢a_1_ 
r ... 





21 Philip Harling, `The Powers of the Victorian State' in Peter Mandler (cd. ) Liberty and Authority in 
Victorian Britain (Oxford, 2006), p. 46; J. P. Parry, `Liberalism and Liberty', Ibid., p. 86. 
22 K. D. M. Snell, Parish and Belonging: Community, Identity and Welfare in England and Wales, 1700- 
1950 (Cambridge, 2006). 
23 J. P. Parry, `Nonconformity, Clericalism and `Englishness': the United Kingdom', in Christopher 
Clark and Wolfram Kaiser (eds. ), Culture Wars: Secular-Catholic Conflict in Nineteenth-Century 
Europe (Cambridge, 2003), pp. 159-65. 
24 E. g., Patrick Joyce, Visions of the People: Industrial England and the question of class, 1848-1914 
(Cambridge, 1993), esp. pp. 279-304; Philip Howell, `Industry and Identity: the North-South Divide 
and the Geography of Belonging, 1830-1918', in Alan R. H. Baker and Mark Billinge (eds. ), 
Geographies of England: The North-South Divide, Material and Imagined (Cambridge, 2004), pp. 64- 
87, esp. pp. 82-7. 
25 E. g. Vickers, `Civic Image and Civic Patriotism', pp. 43-75; Readman, `Place of the Past'. 
26 E. g. James Vernon, `Border Crossings: Cornwall and the English (imagi)nation', in Geoffrey Cubitt 
(ed. ) Imagining Nations (Manchester, 1998); Catherine Brace, `Finding England Everywhere: Regional 
Identity and the Construction of National Identity, 1890-1940', Ecumene, 6: 1 (1999). 
27 Harris, `English ideas', p. 146. 
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accommodation, warnings about unscrupulous tradesmen (perhaps suggesting a 
metropolitan cynicism absent in the provinces), and weekly articles by the NWAC 
contributor Will Owen, giving potted histories of places worth visiting. This implies 
that though provincial soldiers may have seen occupied Baghdad or Jerusalem, they 
might be ignorant of their own capital city. In this context, an assumption that 
involvement in a national community still required concomitant ties of locality seems 
reasonable. 
Clearly, NWAC discussion of citizenship and community was indebted to 
lengthy discursive heritage. 28 Nevertheless, these broad principles required adaptation 
to the wartime situation. 29 The underlying principle for most expositions of civic 
patriotism was a reference to Britain's armed forces. Often explicitly linked to a 
rhetoric of sacrifice (discussed in Chapter 8), elaborations on servicemen's continuing 
contributions negated claims of civilian hardship. Discussing soldiers in Wigan, the 
Labour MP Stephen Walsh asserted that through `their wonderful courage... 
indomitable cheerfulness, [and] the majesty of their continued effort' Britain's 
civilian army had `reached the high-water mark... [of] British valour'. Similarly, 
Britain's Navy ensured that `food was brought to our homes, that raw material came 
to our factories, that the... [people] of these islands were protected'. Civilians had `a 
responsibility... only secondary to that of our soldiers and sailors' which, given such 
examples, they should willingly bear. 
3o 
Walsh's note about the Navy's role in supplying food to Britain contextualises 
persistent demands for economy as a civic duty. At Malmesbury, the barrister 
Bromhead Mathews told his audience to remember `that every little bit of food saved 
28 On the problematic relationship between citizenship and patriotism, however, cf. Stapleton, 
`Citizenship versus Patriotism'. 
29 Gullace, Blood, deals extensively with the `renegotiation' of citizenship during the war, towards a 
recognition of service as its ultimate arbiter. 
30 `War Aims Meeting at Wigan. ', Wigan Examiner, 17/11/17, p. 2. 
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meant probably the life of a soldier or sailor saved', since economising on food meant 
fewer ships were needed for delivering and protecting food supplies, thus ending the 
war sooner through their redeployment elsewhere. 1 Similarly, in June 1918, Record 
wrote in his regular column that the success of rationing and the extra American 
assistance `does not absolve us from continued effort to economise food' or produce it 
at home, since any `slackening of effort' would undermine the work already done. 32 
Alongside economising on provisions, civilians were told it was their civic 
duty to invest as much money as possible in War Bonds and War Savings Certificates. 
In asking for £25 million per week from the public, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
Andrew Bonar Law, appealed `to the patriotism of the people' who should realise that 
, it is the clear duty of everyone to have the country's need first in his mind' and not 
invest anywhere else unless national coffers were full. 33 Speakers' reports confirm 
they sometimes stressed civilians' financial responsibilities (occasionally also sharing 
platforms with National War Savings Committee [NWSC] speakers). At Weymouth, 
the Liberal speaker R. J. Allen lectured on "`Our duties as citizens. " Special stress was 
laid on our financial obligations, [because] of the asserted refusal of many to 
subscribe'. 34 
Civilian reluctance was evidently targeted here by Allen. In some cases, civic 
patriotism sought to convince civilians of their duties through shame. In October 
1918, Reality quoted Ben Tillett's letter to Dock and General Workers' Union 
secretaries, which argued that since nineteen out of twenty servicemen were working- 
class, strikes were `nothing better than assassination'. 
35 In February Sheehan criticised 
31 `National War Aims Campaign. Meeting at Malmesbury. ', Wilts and Gloucestershire Standard, 
3/11/17, p. 2. 
32 [Record, ] `A Letter from London', North Devon Herald, 20/6/18, p. 3. 
33 Bonar Law's Message, pp. 7-9. 
34 TNA: PRO T102/23, SDRs - R. J. Allen, South Dorset (Weymouth), 2/7/18. 
35 'What Ben Tillett Says. ', Reality, 143,10/10/18, p. 4. 
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`young men [in industry] who have had three years' exemption from fighting' but 
wanted to `evade their patriotic obligations' by opposing dilution through outdated 
industrial agreements. Sheehan, who had `put in... time at the Front' regarded such 
actions as `undiluted selfishness and rank disloyalty'. 36 Such criticism was the 
strongest and most propagandistically hazardous element of civic patriotism. It 
needed to balance the intent to expose recalcitrant civilians to the community's 
obloquy with the risk of further antagonising essential workers. In such situations, 
concrescent community ideas were particularly important since discussing the 
majority of loyal and hard-working citizens assisted propagandists' attempts to 
prefabricate public opinion and place individuals or groups ('adversaries' in some 
cases) outside this `consensual' patriotic community. As Nicoletta Gullace stresses, in 
recognising the superior claims of `service' to the right of citizenship, emphasis was 
also placed upon `ideological conformity'. 7 
To stress the importance of civic patriotism and the local population's duties, 
most NWAC meetings were chaired by prominent local representatives. At large 
meetings, local MPs or Mayors might preside and make short introductory speeches, 
at smaller meetings perhaps local councillors or clergymen. Other representatives 
might also propose a vote of thanks. This symbolically tied community figureheads to 
the NWAC's message while also indicating the likelihood of local censure for those 
who avoided their patriotic duties. In extreme examples, this could easily extend into 
adversarial patriotism, as in Leicester when the Mayor was accused of inciting 
violence against Ramsay MacDonald. 
38 
As previously mentioned, the idea of a concrescent community functioned 
36 [Sheehan, ] `The War & Westminster', Seaham Weekly News, 1/2/18, p. 2. 
37 Gullace, Blood, p. 196. See also Howell's contention that "`the people" could always be a principle 
of social exclusion as well as of social inclusion': Howell, `Industry and Identity', p. 86. 
38 See pp. 150-2 above. 
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partly as an extension of civic patriotic pressure, by placing dissent outside the 
community's embrace. However, concrescent community rhetoric should be 
considered more a means of acknowledging and congratulating the consenting 
majority. The coercive element of the concrescent community idea is only apparent 
within broader contextual interactions with adversarial and civic patriotism. While the 
NWAC's remit was partly to isolate and invalidate dissent, it intended also to 
communicate with `the great majority of the people', `strengthen the national morals' 
and provide `tangible proof of the Government's appreciation... to brace and hearten 
them'. 39 By identifying sources of civilian pride, concrescent community rhetoric 
enabled NWAC propagandists to motivate by both heartening and hectoring, 
recognising civilians' agency, not their incapacity. In written propaganda this 
generally focused upon the strength and contribution of the national community. 
Locally conducted spoken propaganda, however, placed considerably more emphasis 
on reasons for local pride, implicitly or explicitly linking the bonds and qualities of a 
local community to the larger national context. 
Speakers often dwelt on the special qualities or achievements of a locality to 
stimulate communal pride. For instance, in Devon the Conservative speaker, C. S. 
Parker, recognised `Combe Martin had done well, both in recruiting and in war 
work', 40 while his Liberal colleague, Tudor-Rees, `was impressed... with the 
grandeur of the scenery'. He told an Australian co-speaker `that if all the scenery of 
Australia could be rolled up and gathered into one it would not compare for a moment 
with the beauty of the scenery between Combe Martin and Ilfracombe. (Applause and 
laughter)' .41 
This friendly rivalry could also be used more aggressively to highlight 
one locality's virtues. At Ipswich, the local Conservative MP, F. J. C. Ganzoni, told his 
39 TNA: PRO T102/16 `Aims of Home Publicity', n. d. 
40 `War Aims Meeting', North Devon Herald, 8/11/17, p. 5. 
41 `War Aims Campaign', Ilfracombe Chronicle, 3/11/17, p. 3. 
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audience that `in East Anglia, in Suffolk, and in Ipswich, they could look with 
gratitude on their record... They had not been losing time in Ipswich as they had in 
Coventry'. 42 This also demonstrates expanding communal ties, with Ganzoni referring 
to the town, county and region and comparing all three favourably with Coventry. 
Another means of tying smaller communities to a regional one was to stress 
local associations with the county regiment. Ganzoni stressed that: 
The 4th Suffolks were one of the few Territorial regiments honoured with the 1914 
star... That Battalion was composed of men who had not waited to be fetched - and 
was still in the trenches. They had been nobly supported by the people of Ipswich 43 
Ganzoni's lionisation of Suffolk's volunteers overrode problematic questions about 
conscripts' contributions, who faced equal military peril, but were sometimes 
marginalised by `the rigid correlation between patriotism and voluntarism'. While 
Ganzoni's praise of Suffolk voluntarism attempted to demonstrate exceptional local 
patriotism, it also risked alienating relatives of conscripts. 44 Rather than associating 
locality with a regiment, individual soldiers could alternatively become foci of local 
patriotism. On France's Day 1918 at Wakefield, the Deputy-Mayor presented a 
Distinguished Conduct Medal to Sergeant-Major Jones of the King's Own Yorkshire 
Light infantry, remarking that `[e]veryone was proud that another Wakefield lad had 
a2 `War Aims of the Allies', East Anglian Daily Times, 3/12/17, p. 6. Strikes in Coventry were reported 
at the end of November. 
a3 Ibid. See also Asquith at Liverpool: `Picton Hall. Mr. Asquith & Unruly Women. ', Liverpool Daily 
Post and Mercury, 12/10/17, p. 6. 
as Ilan R. Bet-El, `Men and Soldiers: British Conscripts, Concept of Masculinity, and the Great War, 
in Billie Melman (ed. ), Borderlines: Genders and Identities in War and Peace, 1870-1930 (New York, 
1998), p. 74. Also, Bet-El, Conscripts: Forgotten Men of the Great War (2nd ed., Stroud, 2003). On 
recruiting and local patriotism: Nicholas Mansfield, English Farmworkers and Local Patriotism, 1900- 
1930 (Aldershot, 2001). 
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won that distinction (applause)' 45 
The NWAC also produced propaganda for soldiers on leave, contributing 
articles and cartoons to Welcome. Most of this material was heavily concerned with 
inculcating concrescent community ideals. A regular contribution was Owen's quirky 
guide, `Bits of Old London', which generally recommended less renowned or 
metropolitan attractions (including six public houses in thirty-one editions). He 
described Shepherd Market near Piccadilly as `a modest little country town' where 
`the simple life of the village' continued to exist in the middle of London. His 
column's title evoked a timeless sense of place, and an earlier column portrayed 
houses in Holborn as representative `of what London must have been in the merrie 
days when much-married Henry ruled'. 46 Another regular NWAC article was J. E. 
MacManus' weekly `Sport and Play'. MacManus reported the week's entertainments 
and sporting events, predominantly football or cricket and boxing, as well as rugby, 
athletics and slightly bemused descriptions of baseball matches between North 
American servicemen. 7 Servicemen were encouraged to feel part of the concrescent 
community, with sport (as recently stressed in another context) providing `a reminder 
of civilian life and identity' 48 NWAC-employed cartoonists provided comforting 
images of home and community, along with implied sexual reward for soldiers, as 
demonstrated in figures 2-3. In both examples, soldiers are accompanied by women, 
in idealised pastoral scenes. Many other drawings showed servicemen with women 
either in rustic settings or at home. In these media, propagandists provided a generic 
summary of `Blighty', representing less a `highly differentiated mosaic of regions', 49 
45 'France's Day. ', Wakefield Express, 13/7/18, p. 7. 
46 Will Owen, `Bits of Old London', Welcome, 11,12/6/18, p. 126; 7,15/5/18, p. 78. 
47 E. g. J. E. M[acManus], `Sport and Play', Welcome, 8,22/5/18, p. 93. 
48 Eliza Riedi and Tony Mason, "`Leather" and the Fighting Spirit: Sport in the British Army in World 
War I', Canadian Journal of History, 41: 3 (2006), p. 499. Also Fuller, Troop Morale, pp. 86-94. 
49 Brace, `Finding England Everywhere', p. 94. 
206 
Figure 31: Wilmot Lunt and W. F. 
"BLIGItTY. " 
"', Welcome, 8,22/5/18, P. 85. 
Figure 32: Frank Styche, untitled ['Joining the Army' - NA: PRO T102/19, Publicity Department 
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than a similar pursuit of `symbols of unity and coziness [sic] which were [universally] 
applicable' to that portrayed within German conceptions of Heimat. In this system, 
`community was the core symbol; it led to the related symbols of home and family, 
both evoking togetherness'. Confino notes that Heimat constituted an uniquely 
German conception of national identity, 50 but the NWAC's propagandising of 
servicemen suggests at least partly recognisable local-national archetypes in Britain. 
The NWAC's commitment to linking local and national identity was 
demonstrated by the lengths to which speakers went to hold meetings. At Great 
Comberton, Herbert Woodger struggled `to reach meetings owing to floods'. 
Nevertheless, he considered that a total attendance of thirty-three constituted `two 
very good village meetings' since the population was only 167. Days earlier he had 
held a meeting attended by only twenty people, `there being 12 inches of snow down'. 
The importance of meetings to convince isolated localities of their national role was 
confirmed by Woodger's report that another meeting of fifty-five people `resulted in 
£1000 being invested in War Bonds'. 51 By stressing the community leitmotif and 
presenting an interactive local/regional/national identity as most relevant, the 
concrescent community idea also helped avoid discussion of sectional differences of 
class or Irish nationalism. This best explains the anonymisation of the Irish nationalist 
MP Sheehan's `War and Westminster' columns. The assistance of an Irish nationalist 
ought to have had significant propaganda value for the NWAC. However, he had 
been `dropped overboard from the [Nationalist] Party ship', in 1906 alongside his 
political mentor William O'Brien over their advocacy of a policy of conciliation of 
Ulster sentiments in the hope of maintaining a united independent Ireland. He retained 
5O Alon Confino, The Nation as a Local Metaphor: Württemberg, Imperial Germany, and National 
Memory, 1871-1918 (Chapel Hill, NC, 1997), pp. 170,212-3. 
51 TNA: PRO T102/23, SDRs - Herbert Woodger, Evesham (Great Comberton), 19/1/18; (Bushley), 
16/1/18; TI 02/24, SDRs - Herbert Woodger, South-West Norfolk (Stow Bridge), 11/3/18. 
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his seat as an All-for-Ireland League MP in December 1910.52 Dissident Irish 
nationalists could, therefore, have disavowed his arguments as unrepresentative, 
undermining his message and damagingly demonstrating sectional discord. 
Consequently, his talents as a writer and status as a `Soldier M. P. ' were more valuable 
than his Irish nationalism. As previously discussed, Sheehan's articles often stressed 
the importance of parliamentary democracy to British identity. However, they also 
significantly propagated the concrescent community idea, by partially breaking down 
the distinction between governors and governed, and emphasising MPs' equal efforts 
and privations. While reverential about Parliament, he was considerably more 
irreverent about its occupants, remarking in one article, in reference to rationing, that 
the `shilling lunch has been done away with, and the cheap wine is no longer to be 
had cheaply, as in the old days that delighted us all', thus associating MPs with 
regretful sentiments at the loss of accessible alcohol, through restrictions imposed by 
the Central Liquor (Control Board) since 1915 53 The implication was that MPs 
shared the concerns of the `man in the street', and thus worked in his interests. 
The concrescent community idea proposed that the community was growing 
closer together at all levels through the need to work together for victory. In some 
cases this rhetoric took on an almost millenarian tone, spiritual or secular (see chapter 
8). The former Trades Union Congress (TUC) president, Harry Gosling, wrote that 
the war had: 
broken down many of the barriers which formerly existed between different classes. 
Men of various sections of society who are working together have come to know one 
another's good qualities, and have learned to understand each other's point of 
52 D. D. Sheehan, Ireland Since Parnell (London, 1921), pp. 198-9,218-41; Sally Warwick-Haller, 
William O'Brien and the Irish Land War (Dublin, 1990), pp. 252-64. 




Barriers of sex were also supposedly being dismantled. At Liverpool, Asquith 
celebrated `the magnificent... co-operation of every class of the community'. 
Describing a munitions factory with eight thousand women workers, Asquith 
expressed delight that: 
out of such varying walks of life women who were fitted for other work have done 
their duty nobly... [W]omen have given to the cause an adaptability and flexibility 
that have made them largely responsible for the success of the war (cheers). 55 
Sheehan confirmed that `the war services of the feminine sex' had `secured them [sic] 
those great social and political privileges' embodied by the Representation of the 
People Act. 56 Finally, the idea of a concrescent community was demonstrated by 
propagandists through political co-operation. Hence most NWAC meetings were 
addressed (at least) by both a Liberal and a Conservative speaker. At Tooting (where 
Liberal and Labour MPs spoke) Rev. H. E. D. Keppel remarked, `[b]efore the war, they 
found their politicians engaged in the merry game of party politics... But when the 
57 
war started, our politicians put patriotism first, and party politics afterwards'. This 
conception of the war effort as a unifying force in British society had taken root at the 
beginning of the war, as Kit Good notes, 58 but it also drew upon existent pre-war 
political rhetoric. As with Liberals after the 1880s, NWAC propagandists (including 
politicians of all three major parties) propounded a message of `inclusive, 
5' Harry Gosling, JP, LCC (President, TUC, 1916), Peace: How to Get and Keep It (London, n. d. 
[1917? ]), p. 13. 
5 `Piston Hall', Liverpool Daily Post and Mercury, 12/10/17, p. 6. 
56 [Sheehan, ] `The War and Westminster', North Devon Herald, 7/11/18, p. 6. 
57 "`War Aims" Meeting at Tooting. ', Battersea Boro' News, 26/10/17, p. 2. 
58 Good, `England Goes to War', pp. 44-52. 
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participatory cross-class political ideals', hoping it would `underpin continued social 
stability at home' S9 Some even predicted, like Gosling, that the experiences of the 
war would lead to a new, less factionalised and more co-operative domestic and 
international society afterwards 60 
Both civic patriotism and the concrescent community idea, then, contained 
multiple rhetorical strands providing a flexible approach, modifiable to the perceived 
tastes of particular audiences. However, while either could provide compelling 
individual representations of civilian experience, their potency lay in combining 
concrescent community rhetoric's exultant tendencies with exhortative recapitulations 
of civic patriotic duties. Each modified the other, tempering praise with reminders of 
continuing expectations; softening criticism of war-weary civilians by acknowledging 
their great efforts. The only medium in which this dual discussion was not employed 
was in NWAC propaganda for servicemen in Welcome. Here concrescent community 
rhetoric was heavily apparent, but there was little or no civic patriotic discussion, the 
NWAC presumably deciding that servicemen need not be reminded of their 
obligations. The remainder of this chapter provides examples and analysis of the 
general interaction of these principles, to demonstrate their interdependence. 
In his article `The Home Offensive', Percy James Brebner concocted a scene 
in which a soldier awarded the Victoria Cross (VC) returned to his home town. 
Responding to admiration by friends and neighbours, Brebner's soldier argued that 
any soldier would have done the same: `What makes heroes, as we call `em, is doing 
the job which happens to lie alongside'. The soldier asks what the people at home 
have done, and proceeds: 
59 Parry, Politics, p. 341; Paul Readman, `The Liberal Party and Patriotism in Early Twentieth Century 
Britain', Twentieth Century British History, 12: 3 (2001). 
60 See Chapter 9. 
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Here's old man Collins growing taters and things to help out the food, like a good 
`un, in spite of his age; and there's Mrs Tibble, bringing up clean, straight young `uns 
to be good Englishmen and look after the Country when we've gone; and here's Sally 
doing in Huns as cheerily as the gunners themselves [as a munitions worker]... Why 
you're all heroes, that's what you are, and I feel a bit of a fraud... because of this `ere 
cross. Thank God for you all, say I. We are all doing our bit, and that's what the 
Country wants 61 
Brebner uses concrescent community language extensively here, emphasising that 
civilians were already doing their part towards the war effort. John Price has recently 
discussed the importance of `everyday heroism... performed during the course of 
everyday life' without `enforced responsibility or duty' in prompting assumptions of 
heroism as `integral' to a `morally-upright national character [which] transcended 
accepted social divisions'. 2 In demonstrating the equal `heroism' of winning a VC 
and growing potatoes, the argument is advanced of communal affinity between 
soldiers and civilians, reinforced by the soldier's familiarity with his friends, while the 
`naturalised' dialogue is presumably intended to appeal to `ordinary' people rather 
than an elite readership. Nevertheless, in asserting that heroism was `doing the job 
alongside', which was `what the Country wants', Brebner's soldier very lightly 
introduces civic patriotism, noting the underlying expectations of the national 
community. 
While in this example civic patriotic exhortations are downplayed, 
servicemen's opinions were useful to the NWAC partly because their criticisms of 
61 Percy James Brebner, `The Home Offensive', in (e. g. ) Ilfracombe Chronicle War Supplement, w. e. 
2/11/18, p. 2. Judging by other submissions to the NWAC, Brebner was probably a religious journalist; 
most of his articles were sent to Christian journals like the Church Monthly and The Kingdom. 
Information from Articles database. 
62 John Price, `Heroism in Everyday Life': The Watts Memorial for Heroic Self Sacrifice', History 
Workshop Journal, 63 (2007), pp. 273-5. 
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civilian shortcomings were more likely to be palatable than those of people who had 
not `done their part' militarily. In Leicester, a genuine VC-winner, Captain Robert 
Gee, returned home to give a very critical speech concerning civilian efforts. Gee 
announced that: 
they heard too much about people being sick and tired of the war. Tommy Atkins was 
tired of the war, but he did not want to come back home with his tail between his legs 
like a beaten cur. (Cheers. )... 
[He] reminded those present that while civilians... were enjoying high wages, 
under conditions of safety and comfort, the men at the Front went out to fight for their 
protection for "a bob a day"... [W]hen he looked at the rate of wages paid at home he 
did not think they had done their duty to the country in the amount of money they had 
subscribed to the war loans.. 63 
Gee's critique of civilian contributions to the war-effort contained no concrescent 
community language. However, his harsh judgements were softened by his localness. 
As the `Cottage Houses V. C. ', M he could take a more uncompromising stance than 
non-soldiers or outsiders whose credentials to criticise would be less secure. 
One reason for Smuts' popularity during the war was the breadth of his 
`qualifications' to address the public. As an imperial figure and former enemy he was 
an ideal exponent of the British Empire's virtues. As a War Cabinet member he 
conveyed credible knowledge of the situation. As a soldier who had served during the 
war, he could claim, to an extent (limited somewhat by his seniority of command), to 
represent servicemen's opinions. At Sheffield, Smuts said that he knew: 
63 'France's Day. Stirring Speech by Captain Gee, V. C. ' Leicester Daily Mercury, 13/7/18, p. 1. 
I `V. C. 's Straight Talk' (Editorial), Leicester Daily Post, 13/7/18, p. 2. 
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that in Sheffield - in this part of Yorkshire, anyhow - the best relations... continued 
to exist between the various sections of the industrial community... [G]ood will 
between the various classes, co-operation and mutual confidence between them, were 
necessary, not only to win the war, but for the great tasks that awaited us after the 
war. (Cheers. )... 
The older men and women... had worked as they had never worked before, 
and so every part of the nation had contributed their all to this great common cause... 
It was true there had been cases - lamentable cases sometimes of greed and 
selfishness [like profiteering and shirkers] but... the vast bulk of the nation had done 
its duty magnificently. (Hear, hear. ) And they had worked not for themselves... [but] 
for their common mother - the nation, the empire, and the world. (Cheers. )... 
Our armies at the front were filled with a matchless spirit of fortitude... 
courage and... endurance. All that we could hope and try for was that the nation at 
the rear, that the women and men before him and of this nation and of the nations of 
65 the Empire, and of our Allies, will be just as strong... 
In these portions of a much larger speech, Smuts interwove many themes of civic 
patriotism and the concrescent community idea. The concluding paragraph was a 
straight civic patriotic demand for civilians to match the soldiers' example, while his 
reference to `lamentable' examples of `greed and selfishness' verged on adversarial 
patriotism. Emphasis on the necessity of class-transcendent goodwill was also 
couched in terms of obligation rather than celebration. However, all these demands 
and admonishments were modified by references to the `magnificent' work already 
done by most civilians, while his conception of the concrescent community embraced 
`Sheffield', `Yorkshire', `the nation, the empire and the world'. In this way, Smuts 
could insist upon continuing civilian effort without suggesting (except implicitly) that 
65 `Prussianism Must Go. ', Sheffield Daily Telegraph, 25/10/17, pp. 5-6. 
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civilians had not done enough. Smuts could also claim to speak as a `local' since he 
and Sir John Jellicoe were to receive the freedom of the city, or, as the Sheffield 
Independent's editor wrote, `to become citizens of the Empire's busiest and most 
indispensable centre'. 66 
As a `Soldier M. P. ' (as his articles were labelled), Sheehan also claimed to 
speak for servicemen. In March 1918, Sheehan said soldiers on leave had told him 
that, despite their own high morale: 
they were more concerned about... certain manifestations at home of a disquieting 
character. The reluctance of some of our young and well-paid workers to serve calls 
forth strong comments on the part of the men who have been through it and done 
their bit... 
Later, Sheehan returned to the issue of rationing, asserting that MPs were `submitting 
cheerfully, as in duty bound, to the new rationing regulations', adding that it could not 
be said `that we are faring any better than the humblest citizen in the land' 67 Here 
again is the duality of civic patriotism and the concrescent community idea. In 
discussing soldiers' concerns, Sheehan made it clear that those who refused to play an 
appropriate part in the war evaded their civic obligations, again noting the lucrative 
wages earned by civilians. That the criticism was by servicemen was, again, intended 
to render it more acceptable. Furthermore, by equating MPs' experiences of rationing 
with those of `the humblest citizen', Sheehan suggested that it benefited the 
community by bringing governors and governed closer together. Within this cosy (if 
unconvincing) assumption of equality, the phrase `as in duty bound' both clarified 
66 `The Outlook. Smuts and Jellicoe. ' (Editorial), Sheffield Independent, 25/10/17, p. 4; also 
`Honouring Sheffield' (Editorial), Sheffield Daily Telegraph, 24/10/17, p. 4. 
67 [Sheehan, ] `The War and Westminster, Seaham Daily News, 8/3/18, p. 2. 
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that this abstemiousness was an obligation `cheerfully submitted' to and, seemingly, 
suggested that the acceptance of such obligations was inherently tied to communal 
happiness and harmony. This equated to T. H. Green's supposition that humans found 
freedom `only in "society"', which brought `individual will into conformity with the 
rules and well-being of the wider organic whole' 68 
Food loomed large in E. M. Goodman's weekly articles `The Woman's Part', 
published in `War Supplements' supplied to provincial newspapers like the Nuneaton 
Observer and Droitwich Guardian. Each week Goodman provided recipes which 
made the most of wartime ingredients, and regularly admonished her readers to avoid 
waste. In April 1918, Goodman counselled that since meat joints were so small, `we 
shall learn, like Tommy in France, that a good stew is better than a second-rate joint', 
and might even `prefer the roast beef of Old England in this disguise'. 69 In July, she 
argued (like Bromhead Mathews) that everything imported risked sailors' lives. `To 
be wasteful now is to be foolish and possibly cruel'. 70 Generally, Goodman's articles 
informed women about their duties to the nation, both at home and at work. Her 
articles were often patronising and hectoring, redolent of the pre-war advice to 
working-class mothers discussed by Davin. 7' However, there were also elements of 
concrescent community rhetoric in her articles. Discussing women's involvement in 
aeroplane construction, Goodman wrote that the general training received was 
essential to women's futures since `the woman living at home or in service has to be 
jack of all trades'. She added: 
68 Hams, Private Lives, p. 228. 
69 Margaret Osborne [Goodman], `The Woman's Part. Stews, and the Way they Cook them in France', 
Nuneaton Observer War Supplement, w. e. 6/4/18, p. 2. 
70 [Goodman]. `The Woman's Part. Household Salvage: A Real Way to Help. ', Droitwich Guardian 
War Supplement, w. e. 27/7/18, p. 2. 
71 See n. 7 above. 
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To be taught well, to be paid for learning, to be sure of good money after eight weeks 
sounds too good to be true. There must, girls think, be a "catch" somewhere. Is it that 
this is war-work, and will cease when peace comes?... [E]ven if it does, the good 
money will have been earned, and the learner will have had her education. 
The emphasis was on the benefits to be gained through war-work. Though Goodman 
also stressed an obligation to undertake war-work, she encouraged readers that if air 
power was essential to victory, `women will help to win it, even if they do not fly'. 72 
Goodman asserted that women's duties, at home and in the workplace, served 
multiple purposes - personal, familial, local and national. While elaborating on the 
responsibilities of womanhood, they also celebrated women's enhanced roles and 
status as a result of the war, and, in providing recipes and housekeeping tips, imbued 
mundane household tasks with enhanced national significance. Spring cleaning 
became a patriotic rather than personal duty, 73 and cooking a stew made a housewife 
`like Tommy'. Domesticity, previously regarded as a feminine and private sphere, 
became in this rhetoric part of public life, challenging the idea of the public sphere as 
men's province (and adding another strand of `women's work' to Gullace's 
`renegotiation of citizenship'). Thus, the articles sought (however patronisingly) to 
acknowledge women's domestic contributions to the war effort, whether in the home 
or the factory. 74 
The Minister of Munitions, Winston Churchill, also celebrated women's 
contributions to war-work in munitions factories, in a Parliamentary speech converted 
72 [Goodman, ] `The Woman's Part. Housemaids for Aeroplane Making. ', Droitwich Guardian War 
Supplement, w. e. 17/8/18, p. 2. 
73 [Goodman, ] `The Woman's Part. How to Tackle Spring Cleaning Difficulties in War Time. ', 
Nuneaton Observer War Supplement, w. e. 11/5/18, p. 2. 
74 Gullace, Blood, pp. 145-66. Interestingly, Goodman made no mention either of nurses, or of 
members of the Women's Auxiliary Army Corps, who served in dangerous military settings throughout 
the war. 
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into a pamphlet, praising their `diligence and... devotion... their skill, their strength... 
[and] their loyal and unwearying spirit'. Churchill stressed the positive contributions 
of war-workers, ignoring the discontent manifested by strikes (which he said cost 
much less than one percent of total work-time) and war-weariness. `Instead of 
quarrelling, giving way as we do from time to time to moods of pessimism and 
irritation, we ought to be thankful', Churchill argued, that no `strain is too prolonged 
for the patience of the people' 75 However, his assertion that people should `be 
thankful', nonetheless contained a civic patriotic message. While claiming not to 
doubt civilian reliability, Churchill emphasised the people's responsibility to continue 
to be cheerful, diligent and `loyal'. 
A similar underlying civic patriotism was apparent at meetings in Brecon and 
Keighley. At Brecon, the Deputy-Mayor, David Powell, asserted that the war had 
drawn all persons in these islands closer together than ever before. Differences of all 
kinds - social, political, religious and others were all forgotten. (Hear, hear. ) Reports 
from the battle-field, where "Colonel" and "Tommy" lie together - and looking 
around that hall both on the platform and in the audience it could truly be said that 
now - 
"None are for a party, 
But all are for the State; 
The rich man helps the poor, 
And the poor man loves the great. " 
The main speaker, the Coalition Liberal MP Sidney Robinson, continued the 
concrescent community rhetoric, suggesting the meeting was needless, since he was 
" Winston S. Churchill, MP, The Munitions Miracle (British Effort Series, 1, n. d. [1918]), pp. 10,8, 
15. 
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sure the people of Brecon took `the highest patriotic view of the situation'. He praised 
`the services that Brecon had specially rendered' before extensively describing 
German behaviour. In conclusion, however, Robinson `appealed to one and all to 
work together... even if we had to suffer inconveniences [since those of servicemen 
were much worse]... to strive and help forward our Empire in this great crisis'. 76 This 
is a classic example of NWAC propaganda. The bulk of the meeting was devoted to 
adversarial patriotism, criticising Germany and it allies, and `pacifists', but it was 
book-ended by celebrations of Brecon's contributions, civilian and military (in 
praising the South Wales Borderers), and a reminder of civic patriotic duties to work 
together despite difficulties. Without initially celebrating local achievements, the long 
diatribe against Britain's various adversaries might have provided a negative 
motivation of fear and outrage, but alternatively might have demoralised the audience 
by implying insurmountable suffering. Furthermore, without the civic patriotic 
conclusion there was a risk of civilian complacency. They were warned about German 
conduct and the dangers of `pacifism', but after hearing that they had done and were 
doing wonderfully, assumptions might be made that little else was required. By 
supplementing this praise with calls for continuing exertions, however, the message 
was that adversaries threatened Britain, and needed to be counteracted by intensive 
civilian effort, which the speakers were sure, given Brecon's previous conduct, would 
be forthcoming. 
At Keighley, in December 1917, local Liberal MP Sir Swire Smith was joined 
by the Labour MP Will Thorne, and J. W. Morkill, a Conservative County Councillor, 
in extolling the virtues and explaining the responsibilities of the people of Keighley. 
Smith said: 
76 `War Aims. Mr. Sidney Robinson, M. P. at Brecon. ', Radnor Express, 11/10/17, p. 6. 
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there was not a town in the whole of the kingdom... that had been [completely] 
converted like Keighley... to the manufacture of works for war. When the time came 
for them all to put their shoulders to the wheel Keighley sent a larger quota of 
volunteers... in proportion to the population. The town had also taken a leading part 
in the War Loan and the management of the food department... [for the assistance of 
which] one of their officials had been taken to headquarters in London... 
Smith's praise was based upon Keighley having accepted its civic patriotic 
responsibilities. Because Keighley had done more than its fair share in several ways, 
he implied, including providing a local representative to a national organisation, they 
could feel especially proud. Morkill, moving the resolution, declaimed that: 
he... had proof that of those men... called up compulsorily it was not that they 
"funked" or were disloyal, but because nine out of ten thought they had domestic 
circumstances which prevented them from leaving home with a quiet mind... One 
thing that had struck him in his work at Keighley was the magnificent fellow-feeling 
which filled all hearts. (Applause. ) 
Unlike Ganzoni's ambivalence towards conscripts at Ipswich, Morkill exonerated 
Keighley's conscripts from accusations of patriotic misconduct. Following Smith's 
praise of Keighley's recruitment record, Morkill's defence of conscripts suggested 
concern that conscripted manpower should not discredit the town's patriotic 
credentials. There was no reference to well-paid workers being `combed-out'; rather, 
conscripts were concerned about familial responsibilities. 
Continuing Morkill's assertions of `magnificent fellow-feeling', Thorne 
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`thought the organised workers of the country had done their duty from top to 
bottom'. Unusually, he cautioned that food shortages could `mean the defeat of the 
Government', thus introducing an element of discord and class politics, but tempered 
this by arguing that `if the workers and others knew they were getting their fair share 
he [doubted] serious trouble would break out'. Thome employed a slightly inflected 
form of concrescent community imagery, arguing that workers had thus far done their 
duty and would continue to do so, providing they were fairly treated. Thorne added a 
more censorious civic patriotic message by saying he `could not see the utility' of 
food strikes. However, he also concluded that `he did not think the working-class 
families would waste anything, at all, for... they had nothing to waste'; to understand 
`the difficulties', Lloyd George and the Food Commissioner, Sir Arthur Yapp, should 
`send their wives to purchase like others had to'. This is all quite surprising at a 
NWAC meeting, where Labour speakers often took more straightforwardly patriotic 
lines, arguing for uncomplaining co-operation to more swiftly end the war, after 
which social grievances could be addressed. However, Thorne's approach seems a 
clever amalgam of civic patriotism and concrescent community ideas. While his co- 
speakers used more conventional arguments about a fully united local community, 
Thorne `was compelled to speak from the working-class standpoint'. He praised the 
co-operation of `organised workers' and moderately criticised the government and 
food shortages. This all suggested that Thome remained a true representative of the 
working class and not, as some `old colleagues' would argue, `a Jingo standing upon a 
capitalist platform'. By withholding unequivocal backing of government policy, 
Thorne could more convincingly espouse workers' obligations. `So long' he said, `as 
they meant to bring [the war] to a victorious conclusion that Government would get 
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ardent support' from the Labour Party. " Thorne argued that complaint and criticism 
was legitimate alongside continuing support for the prosecution of the war. Further, 
by standing on the same platform as Smith and Morkill, he tacitly endorsed their 
sentiments. His speech specifically addressed workers, told them they had done their 
duty and empathised with their discontent, but disavowed striking and pledged 
unequivocal support to the war-effort. This was a subtler and probably more effective 
argument than Labour-affiliated speakers or writers making identical arguments to 
Liberal or Conservative colleagues. 
Concluding, J. E. Haggas, the Conservative vice-president of Keighley WAC, 
said `it was the duty of Keighley to set an example to the rest of the country'. This 
epitomises the combination of civic patriotism and the concrescent community idea. 
By conducting local campaigns, NWAC propagandists tailored arguments to local 
susceptibilities, hoping to exploit `intimate loyalties and personal associations' for 
national purposes. 78 Appealing to local vanity through praise of a locality's `special' 
contributions to the war effort prepared audiences for (or moderated) insistence upon 
civilians' duty to match servicemen's examples and work even harder, as 
uncomplainingly as possible, for victory. The supposed nobility of this effort was 
sometimes corroborated by propagandists with reference to a sense of a concrescent 
community, growing together through the adversity of war. This occasionally 
amounted to an immanent millenarianism, sometimes secular, sometimes spiritual. 
The predication of national identity upon an interactive concrescent 
community meant sectional divisions could generally be overridden by a string of 
experiential communities, from family to nation, Empire or `civilised world'. It was 
difficult to tie individuals solely to bonds of solidarity with every other individual in 
77 `Mr Will Thorne, M. P., on War Aims. Making Germany Pay. A Successful Keighley Meeting. Mr. 
J. W. Morkill's Fine Tribute to Keighley. ', Keighley News, 15/12/17, p. 5. 
78 See n. 4 above. 
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the nation. Therefore, by focusing partly upon the tangibility of everyday experience, 
NWAC propagandists hoped to link each small community progressively to several 
larger ones, until Keighley became (and was assumed to desire to become) an 
example to the nation. By linking local communal destinies to larger `imagined 
communities', national demands could be made locally. Residents of Okehampton, 
who `did not see that scarcity of food in many of the great centres of industry', could 
therefore be asked to help in feeding `millions of workers' of `this England of ours', 
although `greater food production [and] more economy' could perceptibly only lead 
to more local discomfort. 79 Additionally to such bonds of geographical community, 
civilians in the First World War were bound together by a common bond of sacrifice 
which, as the next chapter demonstrates, completed the NWAC's evocation of 
patriotic duty. 
79 Speech of George Lambert, MP, `War Aims. Mr Lambert Addresses Okehampton Meeting. ', North 
Devon Herald, 10/1/18, p. 6. 
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Chanter 8: Dutifiil saerifiee and spiritual patriotism 
The war has brought to us anxiety, sorrow, and sacrifice, but it has also brought many 
blessings. It has brought us to a new unity enduring beneath the surface of minor 
discords, a new revelation of the capacities of heroism and steadfastness in the hearts of 
our people, a new outlook upon the meaning and worth of our common life. ' - C. G. 
Lang, Archbishop of York 
Ernest Renan defined a nation in 1882 as `a large-scale solidarity, constituted 
by the feeling of the sacrifices one has made in the past and of those one is prepared 
to make in the future'. 2 Within NWAC propaganda, civic patriotism and the 
concrescent community idea were linked by consistent references to `sacrifice' which 
completed the evocation of duty. NWAC propaganda demonstrated an interesting mix 
of religious and secular language, illustrated by its varied interpretations of `sacrifice'. 
Servicemen exemplified sacrificial patriotism, willingly fighting (conscription 
notwithstanding) and, if necessary, dying for Britain. Allen J. Frantzen, linking 
sacrifice closely with chivalry, argues that such emphasis on sacrifice `countered the 
impersonal scale of mechanized warfare': 
The belief that soldiers had freely sacrificed their lives to protect noncombatants was 
not merely a topos. Self-sacrifice was, rather, the foundational idea of the chivalric 
tradition, and it served to ennoble and particularize the good that each warrior had 
given to the cause. 
Consequently, propagandists insisted civilians were duty-bound to accept their own, 
smaller, `sacrifices'. However, servicemen's sacrifices were also presented as 
' Hands Across the Atlantic, p. 3. 
2 Ernest Renan, Quest-ce Qu'une Nation? [1882], cited in Anthony D. Smith, The Nation in History: 
Historiographical Debates about Ethnicity and Nationalism (Cambridge, 2000), p. 12. 
3 Allen J. Frantzen, Bloody Good: Chivalry, Sacrifice, and the Great War (Chicago/London, 2004), p. 
198. 
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religiously-charged events requiring commemoration. Religious rhetoric thus 
sanctified servicemen's actions and, by association, the war itself. Additionally, 
NWAC propagandists, spiritual and secular, sometimes engaged in `millenarian' 
speculation, arguing that the war had produced, or would create, a new order of 
harmony and social co-operation. This chapter traces sacrificial and spiritual 
patriotism in pre-war Britain. It then examines the ways in which NWAC propaganda 
discussed `sacrifice', and considers the use of religious language and the involvement 
of religious figures with the NWAC before summarising the importance of these sub- 
patriotisms to the NWAC's patriotic master-narrative. 
While `sacrifice' is used extensively in this chapter, a more appropriate term 
might be `self-sacrificial patriotism', acknowledging the `willing' nature of sacrifice. 
For Frantzen, in both the mediaeval period and the twentieth century, chivalry enabled 
a fusion of `sacrificial' (vengeful) and `antisacrificial' (forgiving) responses to the 
death of Christ into a third, `self-sacrificial' conflation of `powers and piety'. Chivalry 
`enshrined the ideal of voluntary suffering and portrayed military exploits as a form of 
ascesis'. 4 Rene Girard, whose thought Frantzen adapts, argues that Christ's 
crucifixion `is in no way presented as a sacrifice' in the Bible, misunderstanding of 
which leaves humans `still clinging to the sacrificial vision that the Gospel rejects' .5 
For Girard, sacrifice represents a diversion of the community's inherent violence 
(caused by the `mimetic rivalry' of members of the community desiring the same 
object) onto a single "`sacrificeable" victim' -a `scapegoat' - so that `sacrificial 
catharsis' prevents `the unlimited propagation of violence' within the community. 6 
Sacrifice is a `collective murder or expulsion' carried out upon an arbitrarily chosen 
4 Frantzen, Bloody Good, pp. 3,42. 
5 Rend Girard, `The Nonsacrificial Death of Christ' [1987], in Girard, The Girard Reader, ed. James G. 
Williams (New York, 1996), pp. 178-9. 
6 Rend Girard, `Mimesis and Violence' [1979], Girard Reader, pp. 12-13; Girard, Violence and the 
Sacred [1972], trans. Patrick Gregory (Baltimore/London, 1979), pp. 4,30. 
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`surrogate victim', whom the community can `unite against' to maintain community 
stability by restricting violence to a single act rather than `an onslaught of reciprocal 
violence'.? 
Girard's definition of sacrifice seemingly invalidates the term here, having 
more of an adversarial patriotic implication. However, if `violence' is considered a 
manifestation of `imitation' (mimesis) whereby `two or more partners try to prevent 
one another from appropriating the object they all desire through physical or other 
means', 8 then, figuratively, violence may be deemed a fragmentary disturbance or 
disruption of the community (in other words, `to do violence to' the community by 
disruption). Considered thus, Girard's arguments about sacrifice become more 
relevant to sacrificial patriotism: 
[The] common denominator [in all sacrifices] is internal violence - all the 
dissensions, rivalries, jealousies, and quarrels within the community that the 
sacrifices are designed to suppress. The purpose of the sacrifice is to restore harmony 
to the community, to reinforce the social fabric. 
Sacrificial patriotism is arguably, therefore, reconcilable with Girard's interpretation. 
Discussing the sacrifices of servicemen, together with those of civilians, aimed to 
prevent more widespread societal disruption. `Self-sacrifice' will not be widely used 
because NWAC propagandists used an extensive `language of sacrifice' similar to 
that identified by Max Jones-10 Put simply, both propagandists and civilians 
7 Girard, `Mimesis and Violence', p. 11; Violence, pp. 257,102,94-5. 
8 Girard, `Mimesis and Violence', p. 9. Emphasis added. 
9 Girard, Violence, p. 8. 
" Max Jones, "`Our King upon his knees": The Public Commemoration of Captain Scott's Last 
Antarctic Expedition', in Geoffrey Cubitt and Allen Warren (eds. ), Heroic Reputations and Exemplary 
Lives (Manchester, 2000), esp. pp. 115-9; Jones, The Last Great Quest: Captain Scott's Antarctic 
Sacrifice (Oxford, 2003). 
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considered rationing (for instance) a `sacrifice'. 
A further terminological doubt concerns the use of `millenarianism' in 
describing religious and secular claims of societal improvement, directly related to the 
war. Anthony D. Smith argues that, while `religion is vital to both the origins and the 
continuing appeal of both nations and nationalism in the modern world', and though 
`nationalism often has a special role for the messianic hero and heroine, and for the 
idea of a messianic age' it is nonetheless inappropriate to ascribe millenarian 
(millennial) impulses to national identity. Smith argues that while `millennialism' 
`wishes to flee a corrupt world' and `expects imminent supernatural intervention to 
abolish the existing order', `nationalism seeks to reform the world in its own image' 
and `preach[es] the necessity of human autoemancipation to realize the true spirit and 
destiny of the nation'. Further: 
The drama of the nation has three climactic moments... its golden age, its ultimate 
national destiny, and the sacrifice of its members. But, since the ultimate destiny of 
the nation can never be known... all we can be sure of is that it will come about only 
through the commitment and self-sacrifice of its members, and that is what the nation 
must continually uphold, remember, and celebrate. 
' I 
For Smith, although the `cult of sacrifice' is `closely linked to the ideal of national 
regeneration and revival', 
12 sacrifice is not tied to millenarian predictions of a future 
`golden age', but is the means by which `ultimate national destiny' may be achieved. 
Nonetheless, NWAC propaganda seems to claim more than that sacrifice was an 
`autoemancipatory' contribution to national destiny. Some propagandists directly 
" Anthony D. Smith, Chosen Peoples (Oxford, 2003), pp. 15,218. 
12 Smith, Cultural Foundations, p. 45. 
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suggested a return to a more harmonious and cooperative society in language 
definitely tinged with millenarianism, broadly defined. There is no suggestion of 
frequent allusions to Christ's second coming, inaugurating a `thousand-year age of 
blessedness'. Rather, there was a more generalised `belief in a future golden age of 
peace, justice, and prosperity', 13 `a collective... form of salvation to be experienced 
and enjoyed by a whole community or the larger part of it'; sometimes infused with 
overtly Christian language. Malcolm B. Hamilton maintains that millenarianism `runs 
as a current through society, greatly varying in intensity over time, attracting varying 
numbers of followers... with varying degrees of influence in their lives and in society 
generally'. 14 Conceivably, NWAC `millenarianism' constituted another `bold 
appropriation of the language of popular protest', like the conversion of `jubilee' - an 
Old Testament term referring to land-redistribution after fifty years to restrict long- 
term wealth - into a term for state ceremonial, likewise seeking to maintain social 
cohesion. 15 
In NWAC propaganda, `sacrifice' was frequently used to describe 
servicemen's actions, including the `ultimate sacrifice' of martial death. Such 
sacrificial rhetoric was common to Britain, particularly in imperial contexts in the 
later-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, where sacrifice, heroism and 
(sometimes) chivalry were conflated to demonstrate patriotic values. Jones' 
description of the `language of sacrifice' used to `ascribe meaning' to the doomed 
1913 Antarctic expedition resonates elsewhere. In the Antarctic explorers' case, their 
deaths `were redeemed by their contribution to a higher cause', varying according to 
13 `Millenarianism, n. ', Oxford English Dictionary, 
h p: //dictionary. oed. com/cizi/entry/00309652? single=1&guerv tme=word&gueryword=millenarianis 
m&first=l&max to show-- 10 [accessed 26/7/07]. 
14 Malcolm B. Hamilton, `Sociological Dimensions of Christian Millenarianism', in Stephen Hunt 
(ed. ), Christian Millenarianism: From the Early Church to Waco (London, 2001), pp. 13,25. 
15 Wolffe, God and Greater Britain, p. 156. 
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inclination. For Winston Churchill, the explorers' positions in the armed forces 
demonstrated that their colleagues `would not fail the Empire in their hour of need', 
whereas the Peace Society was told that Scott was `a hero for pacifists, prepared to 
sacrifice his life for science'. Christabel Pankhurst, meanwhile, associated Scott and 
Lawrence Oates (whose decision to die in solitude rather than burden his comrades 
became the epitome of `gentlemanly' self-sacrifice) with suffragist sacrifice. 
Narratives of the expedition became `sites for the negotiation of collective identities', 
from familial to national level, rather than `instruments of social control'. 16 
Several heroic sacrifices became nineteenth-century paradigms of patriotic 
duty. Horatio Nelson's death at Trafalgar in 1805 was resurrected in the late- 
nineteenth century as an heroic example of dutiful self-sacrifice. Beyond being a 
`hero of national defence against foreign tyranny', '? Nelson had ostensibly accepted 
`a lifelong obligation... [of] self-sacrifice and dedication', reflecting late-nineteenth 
century views of a moral duty of service. '8 The 1857 Indian `Mutiny' created several 
heroes who `blended Cromwellian [religious] fervour with chivalric qualities'. 19 Most 
prominent was Sir Henry Havelock, who died during the siege of Lucknow. 
Evangelically religious, Havelock became a `wish-fulfilling projection of an idealized 
and omnipotent national identity... the very figure of the nation' and a `Christian 
soldier' prepared `to undergo self-sacrifice "even unto death"'. Havelock's example 
reminded people how small their `hardships' were, `compared with those of soldiers - 
of martyrs - of our crucified Lord'. 
20 
While imperial `heroes' like Scott, Nelson, Havelock, Charles Gordon and 
16 Jones, "`Our King"', p. 115; Last Great Quest, pp. 235-6. 
John M. Mackenzie, `Heroic Myths of Empire', in Mackenzie (ed. ), Popular Imperialism and the 
Military, 1850-1950 (Manchester, 1992), p. 113. 
18 Cynthia Fansler Berhman, Victorian Myths of the Sea (Athens, OH, 1977), pp. 96-8. 
19 Mackenzie, `Heroic Myths', p. 117. 
20 Graham Dawson, Soldier Heroes: British Adventure, Empire and the Imagining of Masculinities 
(London, 1994), pp. 99,123. 
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David Livingstone'21 presented self-sacrificial embodiments of national prowess, 
expanding nineteenth-century concerns with chivalry and selflessness associated 
sacrifice also with everyday activities. Mark Girouard argues that upper-class 
chivalric preoccupations fed by authors like Walter Scott and Kenelm Digby 
encompassed a broader social spectrum after 1830 as middle-class radicals produced 
works `noticeably conditioned by the spirit of chivalry'. 22 Both Girouard and Frantzen 
note the importance of `muscular Christianity' in further developing chivalry's public 
significance, imbuing it with a sense of moral purity, self-restraint and self-reliance 
which permeated works like Samuel Smiles' influential Self-help (1859). 23 Self- 
sacrifice became both exemplary and mundane. John Price highlights the 
memorialisation of `everyday heroism', mirroring the exemplary heroism of famous 
figures with the deeds of people like Alice Ayres, a `[k]ind, unassuming, hard- 
working, selfless, conscientious and dutiful' maid who died rescuing her master's 
children (also her nieces and nephews) from a fire. 4 Such interplay between 
`exemplary' and `everyday' self-sacrifice is also discernible in Charles Dickens' A 
Tale of Two Cities (1859). While the wealthy lawyer Sidney Carton's courageous 
substitution of his life for his married (French) friend's at the guillotine was `a far, far 
better thing that I do, than I have ever done', the lowly maid, Miss Pross, in protecting 
her employers from the maniacal Madame Defarge, earlier declared `I am a Briton... I 
don't care an English Twopence for myself. 25 In the political realm, early-twentieth 
century tariff-reformers (unsuccessfully) labelled a small increase in food prices as a 
21 On Gordon and Livingstone, see e. g., John Mackenzie, `The Iconography of the Exemplary Life: The 
Case of David Livingstone', in Cubitt and Warren, Heroic Reputations, p. 86. Jeffrey Richards, 
`Popular Imperialism and the Image of the Army in Juvenile Literature', in Mackenzie, Popular 
imperialism, pp. 80-108; Mackenzie, `Heroic Myths'; John Wolf, Great Deaths: Grieving, Religion 
and Nationhood in Victorian and Edwardian Britain (Oxford, 2000), esp. pp. 136-53. 
22 Girouard, Return to Camelot, pp. 34-76, p. 76. 
23 Ibid., pp. 141-4; Frantzen, Bloody Good, pp. 137-44; also Olive Anderson, `The Growth of Christian 
Militarism in mid-Victorian Britain', English Historical Review, 86: 338 (1971). 
24 Price, `Heroism', pp. 262,272. 
25 Charles Dickens, A Tale of Two Cities (Oxford, 1999), pp. 361,352. 
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result of imperial preference `small and transient sacrifices' for the greater end of 
imperial unity. 26 
In 1894, the Idealist F. H. Bradley argued that `in itself self-sacrifice is an evil, 
and there is always some presumption against it', maintaining it was not inherently 
virtuous and only appropriate when contributing to the greater good of society. 27 
Bradley's interpretation reacted against the contemporary promotion of self-sacrifice, 
particularly by Christian authors. 8 Sacrificial language was closely linked with 
religion. John Wolfe demonstrates that, both nationally and locally, the Church's 
appropriation of sacrificial heroes blended `a Christian concept of martyrdom' with 
`the cause of the nation and the Empire'. Gordon's representation combined 
Christianity, Englishness and imperialism as `a martyr who laid down his life for his 
country, his fellow human beings and his God'. 29 
According to Jay Winter, increasing interest in spiritualism during the First 
World War marked a `[c]ontinuity, not transformation' of existing religious and 
spiritual attitudes. 3° In broader terms, too, such continuities are evident, and historians 
have suggested the close bonds between religion and national identity in Britain in the 
century or so before the war. Linda Colley contends that despite `other powerful 
identities', Britain's predominant Protestantism constituted the `foundation' of British 
identity in the eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries, 31 while J. P. Parry argues that 
nonconformists in the 1870s `saw themselves as true patriots' defending English 
16 Coetzee, Party or Country, p. 57. 
27 F. H. Bradley The Limits of Individual and National Self-Sacrifice (reprinted from the International 
Journal of Ethics, n. p. d., 1894), p. 11. 
ZS E. g. Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, Self-Sacrifice (London, [ 1872]). 
29 Wolffe, Great Deaths, pp. 150,152. Cf. figure 33. 
30 Jay Winter, `Spiritualism and the First World War', in R. W. Davis and R. J. Helmstadter (eds. ), 
Religion and Irreligion in Victorian Society: Essays in honor of R. K. Webb (London/New York, 1992), 
185. 
Colley, Britons, pp. 53-4. Cf. J. C. D. Clark's argument that `Protestantism alone was not enough' to 
forge Britishness: `Protestantism, Nationalism and National Identity, 1660-1832', Historical Journal, 
43: 1 (2000), p. 274. 
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liberties. 32 Wolffe convincingly argues that, rather than becoming `secularised' before 
the war, Britain had seen `changes in the ways of being religious', with ideas of 
Christianity, nationality and imperialism interacting in a patriotism with `absolute 
spiritual claims which led it to the threshold of... [equating] the cause of Britain with 
the cause of God', drawing strength from tensions between English and British 
identities 33 
Millenarianism maintained a limited presence in British thought up to 1914. 
For instance, Edmund Burke used the millenarian sentiments of Rev. Dr. Richard 
Price to discredit both Price and the Revolution. 34 Millenarianism motivated peasants 
to rise up at the 1838 `Battle of Bosendon Wood', its most important aspects being 
`its vision of an alternative world' and its evidence that `attachment to the Church of 
England' did not necessarily represent ideological conformity, according to Barry 
Reay. 35 While millenarianism as a protest movement had little impact for much of the 
nineteenth century, 36 it is reasonable to argue that claims of a better society or future 
golden age remained before the war, particularly regarding war itself, which 
continued to be considered `an instrument of God's purpose' despite the decline of 
more explicitly millenarian interpretations after the 1850s. 37 
As with all its exhortations to duty, sacrificial patriotism in NWAC 
propaganda was most effective when stressing servicemen's roles. Girard argues that 
an appropriate sacrificial victim should be `neither too familiar to the community nor 
too foreign to it' and `should belong both to the inside and to the outside of the 
32 Parry, `Nonconformity', p. 179. 
33 Wolffe, God and Greater Britain, pp. 256-60. 
34 Frans De Brueyn, `Anti-Semitism, Millenarianism, and Radical Dissent in Edmund Burke's 
Reflections on the Revolution in France', Eighteenth-Century Studies, 34: 4 (2001). 
35 Barry Reay, The Last Rising of the Agricultural Labourers: Rural Life and Protest in Nineteenth- 
Century England (Oxford, 1990), p. 188. 
36 Although see Ernest R. Sandeen, The Roots of Fundamentalism: British and American 
Millenarianism, 1800-1930 (Chicago/London, 1970). 
37 Wolffe, God and Greater Britain, pp. 232-4. 
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community'. 38 This encompasses servicemen's status admirably. By alluding 
generally to servicemen's sacrifices, propagandists could maintain some distance 
between servicemen and civilians, while concomitantly most civilians probably had 
personal ties to a serviceman. Where appeals were more closely linked - references to 
particular regiments, for example - servicemen could remain both inside and outside 
the community insofar as they were known to it but separated by their service abroad. 
Sacrifice carried a heavy imperative, an expected reciprocation. 39 By 
emphasising servicemen's sacrifices, the message, usually explicit, was that civilians 
must match them. At Barnstaple, the Conservative speaker Edward Gieve insisted: 
... we could not allow the work of the men who 
had made the great and supreme 
sacrifice, whether they were French or English, to go for nought... These men from 
the factory, the farm, or the field, from the office or from the shop... willingly came 
forward in the cause of liberty and freedom and for our protection... and everyone 
must make sacrifices to help those men who were making so many sacrifices for us 40 
Gieve's message created distance from the local community by referring generally to 
French and English servicemen, but simultaneously added a connection by referring 
to several civilian occupations from which they were drawn. His typical emphasis on 
willingness was somewhat disingenuous, given that conscription had been in effect in 
France throughout the war, and in Britain since 1916, but such rhetoric aimed to 
enhance the self-sacrificial nature of death pro patria, the image of `discipline, duty, 
and sacrifice willingly - but not easily - made'. 
41 and emphasise that civilians were 
38 Girard, Violence, pp. 271-2. 
39 On sacrifice's repetition and re-creation: Ibid., pp. 93-5. 
40 'War Aims. ', North Devon Herald, 18/7/18, p. 7. 
41 Frantzen, Bloody Good, p. 232. 
233 
expected, accordingly, to play their part. 
At Wigan, Liberal MP T. J. Macnamara struck a more personal note by relating 
that his father had served in a Lancashire regiment and that he had been brought up 
among the `rough heroes of the Crimea': 
I have seen the red poppies waving over the heaped up clay of stalwart Lancashire 
heroes, and shall it be said that you for whom they made their last great sacrifice... 
were so... indifferent that you made terms with your enemy and left the work for 
which they gave their lives unaccomplished? 
Here again heroism and sacrifice appeared synonymous, requiring similarly `heroic' 
responses from civilians. Macnamara stressed that peace with an undefeated Germany 
was unacceptable - or, in the blunt words of Unionist speaker G. W. Worsey 
elsewhere, `an everlasting insult to the brave fellows who had made the supreme 
sacrifice' - particularly, as Macnamara suggested at Wigan, to those most closely 
connected to the local community. " 
There were plenty of propagandists prepared to make self-sacrificial duty even 
more explicit. In a pamphlet intended for women, Mary Martindale wrote that `[w]e 
know that love is the greatest force in the world, and we know that love means self- 
sacrifice', associating women with what Frantzen sees as a particularly manly and 
chivalric sentiment by reminding them of their duty to stoically bear their burdens, 
and not `to turn coward, to fail our men'. 
3 Women's acceptance of sacrifice was 
essential, not only to maintaining domestic productivity, but to servicemen's morale. 
Interestingly, a religious interpretation of 1880 by Rev. John Cooper had chosen a 
42 `War Aims Meeting at Wigan. ', Wigan Examiner, 17/11/17, p. 2. On the changing status of soldiers 
after the Crimean War: Anderson, `Christian Militarism'; `National War Aims. ', Keighley News, 
13/10/17, p. 5. 
43 Mary Martindale, One Englishwoman to Another (Oxford, [1918]), pp. 7,2. 
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feminised analogy to describe self-sacrifice, describing its pain as a `momentary and 
limited' one, `like that of a woman in travail' (a comment unlikely to endear Cooper 
to female Christians), whereas the joy of self-sacrifice equated to that of a mother 
watching her child grow 44 As Christabel Pankhurst's adoption of Scott and Oates as 
sacrificial comrades also shows, self-sacrifice could appeal beyond mere `manly' 
chivalry. At Chippenham, the barrister Bromhead Matthews reminded his audience 
that they `had been making great sacrifices', especially acknowledging the suffering 
of parents who had `given a son to the great cause': 
They [civilians] had greater sacrifices going on not far off... Blood had been poured 
out like water... they must make sacrifices in such things as Tea and Sugar [sic]. Let 
them remember what the Wiltshire Regiment had already done and they were going 
to do more... 
Bromhead Matthews did not hide the war's horrors, instead using the bloody violence 
of the battlefield (linked to the local regiment) to persuade his audience that further 
domestic sacrifices were necessary to obtain `the thing for which our boys had died'. 
In his interpretation, this meant maintaining democracy (rather than autocracy), truth, 
justice, the rights of small nations and most importantly freedom. 45 Limited access to 
tea and sugar was negligible compared to the military sacrifices and the principles for 
which they were made. 
Frequently, calls to recognise servicemen's sacrifice or demands for civilian 
self-sacrifice were couched in overtly Christianised terms (as in figure 33, which 
appeared above a poem entitled `The Supreme Sacrifice'). Trevor Wilson argues that 
44 Rev. John Cooper, Self-Sacrifice: The Grandest Manifestation of the Divine, and the True Principle 
of Christian Life (London, 1880), p. 131. 
45 'War Aims Meeting. ', North Wilts Guardian, 2/11/17, p. 2. 
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`sacrifice' was `the key word' that enabled clergymen to endorse the war (which 
contradicted many of their teachings) by erroneously conflating the sacrifice of Christ 
(who could have prevented his own death) and of soldiers. 6 In some examples, this 
seems incidental - indicating the continuing power of Christian rhetoric over 
everyday language in wartime Britain. Alan Wilkinson argues that soldiers often used 
`the language of Christian redemption... because it was the only one available which 
seemed to give [events] some positive meaning', 
47 and this was presumably equally 
true for civilians or propagandists, though the latter found many ways to speak 
positively about the war. In his `call from the workbench', the ASE-member F. H. 
Rose liberally used religious language to bolster demands for greater industrial output 
and less union discord. The war was a `life and death struggle' for civilisation, and its 
`cause and conditions call for sacrifices by all orders of the community, demand 
faithful service, and exhort to every holy and righteous impulse' 48 Rose's pamphlet 
rejected selfish over-protection of industrial privileges regardless of the wartime 
46 Wilson, Myriad Faces, p. 179. 
47 Wilkinson, Church of England, p. 192. 
48 Rose, Call to War Workers, pp. 5-7. 
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emergency, and was couched mostly in plain language. Michael Snape contends that 
`the Christian culture of contemporary British society could serve to ameliorate the 
brutality and bitterness of war', 49 and Rose's resort to religious terminology like 
`faithful service' and `holy and righteous impulse', along with the call for sacrifice, 
suggests the underlying strength of this culture. 
Other propagandists provided more overt references to the interconnectedness 
of sacrifice and Christianity. The Texan pastor of the City Temple, Dr. Fort Newton, 
described the Allies as like `knights of old, linked in a crusade', arguing that 
democracy required a complementary `spiritual vision' to eradicate the world's evils. 
`Spirituality', he concluded, `includes the impulse of self-sacrifice'. 50 On 4 August 
1918, the anniversary of Britain's declaration of war, commemorated throughout 
Britain with special interdenominational services and civic events (often organised 
with the encouragement or involvement of local WACs), the Mayor of Croydon, 
Howard Houlder, celebrated: 
that spirit of self-sacrifice which had animated all sections of the community, and 
more particularly... the way in which the women of the land had come forward... 
It was essential that the people... recognise that Almighty God was above all 
things, and unless the nation... showed a spirit of true religion and acted up to 
Christian principles then the war would be prolonged... [H]e believed the country 
must ascertain the will of God and do its best to carry it out... 51 
Such an argument might seem unremarkable from a clergymen, but from the secular 
49 Michael Snape, God and the British Soldier: Religion and the British Army in the First and Second 
World Wars (London/New York, 2005), p. 192. 
50 Newton, `Seen Above the Smoke of Battle', Reality, 124,30/5/18, pp. 2-3; reprinted as Fighting for 
the Faith (Searchlight series, 10, n. p. d. [ 1918]). 
51 'Remembrance Day in Croydon', Croydon Times, 7/8/18, p. 1. 
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head of the town it presents an interesting picture of the continuing vitality, at least 
among some, of strong Christian sentiments 52 This did not merely reflect the 
religious nature of the commemoration, though such associations clearly prompted 
propagandist attention. E. W. Record assured readers in April 1918 `that the pain and 
suffering, not only of our men in the battle but also of our women in the home... shall 
not have been endured in vain' since the `freedom of mankind has been bought, like 
the Redemption of Mankind, only by the greatest of sacrifices'. Record congratulated 
industrial workers who had foregone Easter holidays after the German offensive for 
exhibiting `the spirit, not only of true patriotism, but of true democracy working for 
the highest ends'. 53 Interestingly, in both examples, care was taken specifically to 
acknowledge women's suffering and sacrifices, with Record explicitly comparing 
their tribulations with those of Christ while also (like Rose) placing industrial issues 
within a Christian context. 
Naturally, clergymen also made such comparisons. At Wigan the Rector, 
Canon R. G. Matthew, insisted `no life was wasted that was spent for righteousness 
and self-sacrifice, for it was by lives given for others that the whole nation was 
ennobled and lifted up to a higher standard of devotion'. 
54 Though not referring 
directly to self-sacrifice by servicemen or civilians, he was addressing a congregation 
gathered to commemorate the war anniversary, meaning that he, implicitly at least, 
consecrated the actions of Britons involved in the war, who `ennobled' the nation. By 
inference, such consecration also rendered the war `holy' (as discussed later). It is 
unclear whether Wigan's War Anniversary events were influenced significantly by 
the NWAC. The local secretary merely advised the national organisation to write to 
the Mayor, as he felt local clergyman would not respond to an initiative suggested by 
52 See Wolffe, God and Greater Britain, pp. 92-3,128-34 
53 [Record]. `Letter from London, North Devon Herald, 11/4/18, p. 3. 
54 'Wigan's "Remembrance" Day: Mayoral Visit to the Church', Wigan Examiner, 6/8/18, p. 2. 
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him. 55 Possibly, therefore, Matthew's sermon was composed without the NWAC's 
instigation (though he certainly attended NWAC events, including Macnamara's 
meeting). 56 If so, this suggests that NWAC propaganda corresponded significantly to 
the ways in which other public opinion-formers expressed themselves. 57 
The NWAC also appropriated sermons for its ends, twice reprinting one 
preached by the Congregationalist, J. H. Jowett, at Westminster Chapel. The 
publication of material by prominent nonconformists like Jowett and P. T. Forsyth 
was presumably an attempt to entice British nonconformists to NWAC propaganda, 
alongside attempts to circulate propaganda through Methodist circuit plans. 58 Jowett 
cited Psalm 121 (`I will lift up mine eyes unto the hills') as part of a larger demand to 
`keep in communion with the mountains of rectitude' (that is, to continue to fight for 
the right reasons). Continuing the metaphor with quotations from Lowell and Milton, 
Jowett celebrated that: 
even now... in our long strugglings we can cherish their mountain visions, and even 
breathe their mountain air, while we are toiling along the dull, low road that is getting 
filled up with graves and is heavy with the scent of death and sacrifice 59 
Here, Jowett sought not to glorify sacrifice, which carried the `scent of death', but to 
encourage his audience to take comfort in the higher ideals and `lofty uplands of 
righteousness'. This demonstrates the diversity of the NWAC's `language of 
ss TNA. pRO T102/13, Southworth to NWAC, 6/7/18. Sometimes (e. g. Evesham, Keighley or 
Wakefield), press reports mentioned the involvement of local WAC figures at War Anniversaries, 
either explicitly as WAC representatives or by name, but often they did not, making debatable the 
extent of NWAC involvement. 
56 `War Aims Meeting at Wigan. ', Wigan Examiner, 17/11/17, p. 2. 
57 On clergymen's views and role in wartime `propaganda', see especially Wilkinson, Church of 
England; Hoover, God, Germany and Great Britain. 
58 On the effectiveness of these attempts, see pp. 332-3 below. 
59 Dr. J. H. Jowett, "`We Can Endure, We Are Going to Endure. "', Reality, 126,13/6/18, pp. 2-3; 
Jowett, "`We Can Endure"' (Searchlight series, 19, n. p. d. [1918]). 
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sacrifice'. Jowett's interpretation equated sacrifice solely with death, whereas others 
adopted a much more comprehensive construction which compared less significant 
sacrifice - shortages and civilian hardships - with death, the `supreme' sacrifice. 
Sacrifice thus performed a comparable function to civic patriotism and the 
concrescent community idea. While describing the tea shortage as a `sacrifice' 
enabled civilians to feel a sense of commonality with servicemen, emphasis on the 
`supreme' sacrifice reminded them that they had little right to complain but rather an 
obligation to match servicemen's examples. 
That there was no definitive meaning of sacrifice within NWAC propaganda is 
demonstrated by the Liberal MP W. H. Somervell's address at Keighley's (NWAC- 
influenced) War Anniversary meeting. Somervell argued that all at the 
interdenominational service: 
were trying to rise above the level of politics and above even patriotism, because 
religion, being greater than either, included the less and excelled it. No one could 
deny the patriotism of our enemies, who had endured far greater sacrifices than we 
had done. 
Somervell suggested that `the enemy's' patriotism (he was not specific) lacked `the 
higher touch'. He asked his audience to exceed `mere patriotism' and `be an 
expression of the highest religious devotion'. 60 Somervell reversed the usual 
interaction of sacrifice and religion, making sacrifice something Britain's enemies 
made more extensively, attempting to encourage civilians that they were suffering 
less, rather than acknowledging Britons' difficulties. In stressing that Britain's 
superiority lay not with patriotism or sacrifice, but with its more devoted Christianity, 
60 `Fourth War Anniversary. ', Keighley News, 10/8/18, p. 5. 
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he offered assurance that through Britons' affinity with God their position was 
unassailable. Nonetheless, though not using sacrificial language, Somervell asked his 
audience to tolerate `the trifling inconveniences of our comfortable life here for the 
sake of our men'. Hence, though his terminology differed dramatically, Somervell 
still addressed the same key issues of sacrificial patriotism: the need to accept 
privations and match servicemen's examples. This is a salutary reminder, however, 
that the patriotic categorisations employed in this thesis (as with all such) remain 
permeable and unable to perfectly fit every case, though Somervell's speech still fits 
well within the broader patriotic narrative. 
As Somervell's speech partly demonstrates, spiritual patriotism was no mere 
annexe of sacrificial patriotism or commemorative crutch, but also had independent 
vitality. NWAC propaganda used religious or quasi-religious imagery to provide 
reassurance that Britain was fighting a holy war, for Christian principles, to achieve a 
millenarian regeneration of church and society. Such rhetoric was assisted by the 
frequent presence and involvement of clergymen in NWAC propaganda: as writers, 
speakers, chairmen or members of the platform party, clerical association with 
propaganda assisted the infusion of religious language into NWAC rhetoric. 
At Wakefield's War Anniversary (organised by Wakefield WAC's secretary), 
the Mayor, G. Blakey, accompanied by at least five clergymen of different 
denominations on the platform, assured his audience that because Britain fought: 
for such high ideals, the very fundamentals of religion... we have no doubt in our 
minds and hearts. We have a special right, it seems to me, to approach God and ask 
him to bless our arms and give us victory. 61 
61 `Entering the Fifth Year of War. ', Wakefield Express, 10/8/18, p. 5. 
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Here, Christianity became synonymous with civilisational values and because of this 
victory was assured, provided Britons continued to work and fight for these 
principles. Indeed, the NWAC undoubtedly viewed the principles for which Britain 
supposedly fought as Christian. The resolution moved at its inaugural meeting 
contained the assertion that the war was a `struggle in maintenance of those ideals of 
Liberty and Justice which are the common and sacred cause of the Allies' 62 This 
terminology should not be brushed aside as a mere linguistic convenience. Had the 
Committee simply wished to emphasise the allies' deep commitment to the ideals, it 
could have expressed itself in plenty of secular terms instead of `sacred': `firm', 
`indissoluble' or `profound', for instance. Rather, it evokes an intense faith in 
civilisational principles. Even if this faith was, for some, one of rational 
enlightenment, the fact remains that a religious term was used to give it rhetorical 
force. `Nationalism' was originally used in English `to express the doctrine of the 
divine election of a nation'. Britain's assumed status as a chosen people, which Smith 
traces at least to Elizabethan England, meant that principles, asserted as British, 
effectively became `sacred' by association 
63 In Rev. L. A. Williams' interpretation, 
because Englishmen were `not only individuals, but belonged to a corporate body, 
which they called the nation' and which was `especially blessed by God and used by 
him in defence of liberty and justice throughout the ages', `God must give England 
victory', otherwise `not only liberty and justice, but religion as well would be no 
more'. Consequently, civilians should `all be prepared to sacrifice something', even 
their sons, if necessary. Such rhetoric was geared towards maintaining what Smith 
calls the `sacred communion of the people' (the nation), by convincing civilians to 
62 PA, Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/160/1/10, Primrose Stevenson, `Report of Proceeding at the 
Inaugural Meeting of the National War Aims Committee', p. 22. 
63 Smith, Chosen Peoples, pp. 46-8. 
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`strive to ensure that their nation continue[d] to be "authentic" or "true to itself" 64 
Regarding British imperial responsibilities, Bishop Frodsham wrote that 
Britons were `in earnest in their desire to uphold the rights of the natives, and [thus] 
vindicate... their Christian principles'. 5 Frodsham's reference to vindication implied 
that Britain's failure to accept its responsibilities would forfeit its right to claim such 
Christian values for itself. A similar point was made by the Bishop of Zanzibar, Frank 
Weston, who demanded that Britain take responsibility for Germany's African 
colonies after the war since `[t]he German does not understand the elementary 
principles of humane Government'. 66 Weston feared African sacrifices would be 
dishonoured by Britain's refusal to accept its duty. In condemning German 
imperialism Weston's clerical status perhaps provided a less controversial voice for 
imperial matters than was possible with a more political figure, who would enable 
dissenting claims that Britain fought for imperialistic aims, though Weston 
complained after the war that his letter was misleadingly reconfigured by 
propagandists, omitting criticism of British imperial policy. 67 
Additionally, adversarial patriotism was arguably sanitised by adding a 
spiritual element. Anti-German or anti-Turkish comments became religiously-founded 
moral judgements rather than opportunistic xenophobia. To maintain peace, Frodsham 
called for Africa to be `Christianised', since `Mohammedanism' stood there for 
`slavery, the degradation of women, and the love of war for war's sake'. 68 
Interestingly, Frodsham criticised German rather than Turkish (Islamic) rule in his 
speech, seemingly implying that Germany followed Islamic principles. Liberal MP 
64 `British War Aims. ', Cornish Times, 8/2/18, p. 3; Smith, Chosen Peoples, esp. pp. 32-3,258-9. 
65 Frodsham, Empire After War, pp. 8-9. 
66 Frank Weston, D. D., Bishop of Zanzibar, The Black Slaves of Prussia: An Open Letter Addressed to 
General Smuts (London, 1918), p. 12. 
67 Ponsonby, Falsehood, pp. 114-5. 
68 Frodshanz, Empire After War, pp. 13-4. 
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Charles McCurdy insisted that `German Christianity is a different Christianity from 
the rest of Europe', 69 and went further in Reality, arguing that Germany wanted: 
to destroy the monuments of a Christian civilisation which the Germans have never 
themselves possessed, a civilisation which they hate... [as] they have exhibited in the 
destruction of churches and cathedrals. 0 
Other critics scoffed (somewhat hypocritically) at perceived German feelings of 
religious superiority. At Glyncorrwg, Labour MP William Brace said Germany was `a 
nation which believed it was the Chosen People, and its Emperor the chosen 
instrument of the Almighty God'. The Earl of Denbigh likewise said Germans 
`suffered from a swelled head, regarding themselves as heaven-sent people destined to 
rule the world'. Interestingly, Germans made identical complaints about Britain, 
claiming that in fighting British imperialists Germany also fought for small nations. In 
criticising perceived German religious presumptions, propagandists ignored the 
sentiments expressed by countrymen like Williams. In the same Glyncorrwg speech, 
Brace attributed the steadfastness of the outnumbered British during the 1914 retreat 
from Mons to `some Divine Force', while the vicar of All Saints Church in Evesham, 
Rev. Dr. Walker, reminded his War Anniversary congregation that `it was God's 
grace that we existed today, and that England stood at the head of nations that would 
be free'. 7' Clearly this use of spiritual patriotism was Janus-faced. Where Britons 
69 C. A. McCurdy, MP, Freedom's Call and Duty: Addresses Given at Central Mall, Westminster, May 
and June, 1918 (London, [1918]), p. 12. Williams also complained that `German theology' 
had 
`invaded' the Anglican church before the war; see n. 68 above. 
70 C. A. McCurdy, M. P., `The Devil's Miscalculation', Reality, 144,17/10/18, pp. 2-3. See Nicola 
Lambourne, `First World War Propaganda and the Use and Abuse of Historic Monuments on the 
Western Front', Imperial War Museum Review, 12 (1999). 
71 `Rt. Hon. Wm. Brace M. P. at Glyncorrwg. ', Glamorgan Free Press, 1/11/17, p. 1; Col. The Earl of 
Denbigh, Why Germany Made War (German Aims Series, 2, n. p. d. [ 1918]), p. 13. Brace perhaps 
alluded to the `Angel of Mons', on which, see Wolffe, God and Greater Britain, p. 241; Winter, 
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described their own nation as blessed, it was meant as a reassuring comfort, `proved' 
by the Christian nature of the principles for which Britain fought. Similar claims by 
Germans, however, supposedly demonstrated German arrogance and (in Denbigh's 
view) blasphemy, throwing further doubts upon their claims to be a genuine Christian 
nation, alongside those prompted by atrocities (figure 34). 
Sanctification of servicemen's sacrifice; specifically linking civilisational 
principles with Christianity; the assumption that Britain was `especially blessed'; and 
the questioning - or denial - of the Christianity or religious morality of Britain's 
enemies combined into claims that Britain was engaged in a holy war. Record insisted 
the war was `a war of principles... [involving] the first principles of our religion'. He 
noted that it had been called the `Last Crusade' and reminded readers that a crusade 
was a religious war, adding that Germany had begun the war not `for a religious end' 
but `as a war of greed'. 72 Record's endorsement of the idea of a holy war was 
predicated upon both Britain's religious principles and what he considered German 
disinterest in such ideals. Similarly, the Texan pastor Fort Newton insisted that the 
war was `a holy war... for the preservation of those opportunities for which mankind 
has striven... a war for the high privilege of spiritual growth'. 73 At Llandrindod 
Wells, Liberal MP Sir Francis Edwards agreed that Britain was fighting a `righteous 
war' for the `common good of humanity', asserting that the nation would otherwise be 
unable to bear the strain. 
74 Edwards again linked Christianity with civilisational 
principles here, implying that it was the `righteousness' of those ideals which moved 
Britons to accept the war's necessity. Here, spiritual patriotism arguably overrode a 
more constitutional or legalistic interpretation of British values. Alternatively it could 
`Spiritualism'. On German attitudes: Hoover, God, Germany and Britain, p. 53; Welch, Germany, 
Propaganda, pp. 62-3. `Evesham. Remembrance Day at Evesham. ', Evesham Journal, 10/8/18, p. 6. 
72 [Record], `A Letter from London', North Devon Herald, 15/8/18, p. 3. 
73 Seen. 51 above. 
74 `Allies' War Aims. ', Radnor Express, 27/9/17, p. 5. 
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be suggested that such constitutional values had permeated the national consciousness 
so considerably that they were almost sacred tenets, the breaching of which sanctified 
war in their defence. 
75 In either case, spiritual patriotism enriched proprietorial 
patriotic arguments about liberty, justice, democracy and honour in a way which 
suggests the vitality of religion in Britain during the war. Not only were these 
principles presented as rational requirements of civilised society, but also as articles 
of faith. 
In December 1917 the capture of Jerusalem by troops commanded by Sir 
Edmund Allenby provided the ultimate representation of Britain's holy war. Reality 
quoted the Daily Express' opinion that Muslims would `welcome General Allenby 
into the Sacred City with the same fervour as the Christian and the Jew' since the 
Turks had mistreated everyone, whereas Allenby had walked into the city `in all 
75 See Wolffe, God and Greater Britain, p. 256. 
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appropriate simplicity, bringing peace for all creeds and justice for all races'. 76 The 
next edition reproduced a Punch cartoon showing Richard the Lionheart surveying 
Jerusalem, with rays of light shining on the city, soon followed by a Spanish cartoon 
showing Christians bowed down in prayer above the city (figures 35-6). The 
juxtaposition in the latter cartoon (particularly useful since it came from a neutral 
state) of modem-day British soldiers marching past seemingly anachronistic pilgrims 
suggested Britain's capture of Jerusalem was the outcome of a timeless (international) 
Christian struggle, complementing Bernard Partridge's image of English Christian 
chivalric adventure, consecrating the war through the recapture of the `Holy City'. 7 
With the successful conclusion of the Palestine campaign in October 1918, Record 
labelled Richard and Allenby `Crusaders Old and New', urging readers to `keep 
[Richard's] uplifted sword ever in mind until the greatest of all crusades is finally and 
completely accomplished and the real Armageddon [rather than Allenby's victory at 
Megiddo, the setting of the biblical Armageddon] the last of battles, fought and 
won'. 78 Record's reference to Armageddon again implied Allied religious superiority, 
suggesting that the Allies were on God's side, fighting Satan's representatives on 
earth. 
Such religious and quasi-religious rhetoric within NWAC propaganda 
unsurprisingly sometimes extended into millenarian attitudes. Millenarianism, 
whether distinctly religious or more general and secular, added a purposive edge to 
sacrificial and spiritual patriotism. The eminent Scottish theologian P. T. Forsyth 
wrote that: 
Even a war like this is but a province of a profounder strife which runs through 
76 `Freedom for Palestine. ', Reality, 101,19/12/17, p. 4. 
77 See Frantzen, Bloody Good, pp. 76-7. 
78 [Record], `Letter from London', North Devon Herald, 3/10/18, p. 3. 
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Figure 35: Bernard Patridge, 'The Last Crusade' (reproduced from Punch), Reality, 102, 
26/12/17, p. 1 
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history[, ]... the standing world-war for the Kingdom of God and its righteousness; 
and [Christianity] regards it as the first charge on humanity. 
Forsyth added (echoing F. H. Bradley) that `neither sacrifice, martyrdom nor 
obedience has in itself moral value'; Germans `sacrifice to a God without a 
conscience'. Sacrifice and society became moral when it `establishe[d] the moral 
righteousness of the world, and recover[ed] the moral soul of universal things'. For 
the Congregationalist Forsyth, `righteousness... gives the law to patriotism and 
consecrates liberty'. Hence it was man's duty to act with a moral `passion', without 
which `religion is hollow and patriotism ignoble'. Thus the war became `a war for the 
moral salvation of mankind'. 79 Forsyth's extensive calls for moral righteousness and 
the restoration of the Kingdom of God amounted to a millenarian rallying-cry to 
Britain. It was imperative not only that Britain won the war, but won it in a manner 
that would ensure a better society emerged. At Bethany Chapel in Pwllgwaun, East 
Glamorgan, Conservative speaker J. Farnsworth expressed similarly strong views. He 
believed Britain's declaration of war, based on principles of honour and justice, 
served `to establish human brotherhood' far better than `international Socialism' ever 
could. Britain `had written out the articles of a new charter of international 
righteousness', and `God's Kingdom was being brought a little nearer'. 80 
The theologian Forsyth's views, and those expressed at a chapel by 
Farnsworth's, exceeded most propagandists' arguments. However, with less intensity, 
propagandists frequently argued that Britain's involvement in the war had regenerated 
British society. Wilkinson indicates the widespread `conviction that pre-war England 
79 Forsyth, Root of Commonwealth, pp. 3,15-6,20. 
"'What We Fight for, and Why. ', Glamorgan Free Press, 22/11/17, p. 1. 
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had been selfish, lazy, squabbling and morally enfeebled', but was reunited by the war 
which would `purify' the nation. 81 Such a view was often expressed generally in 
NWAC propaganda, frequently as a counterpoint to celebrations of the emergent 
wartime concrescent community. Occasionally, this went further in a millenarian 
direction. At Evesham's War Anniversary meeting (arranged by Evesham WAC), the 
Conservative speaker, A. H. Coulter, reflected that before the war `the country was 
engaged in petty strife, class was set against class and the people were selfish- 
minded... [whereas] today the people were full of selflessness, charity, brotherliness 
and self-sacrifice'. Coulter assured his audience that victory was near, and with it 
`righteousness, the true righteousness which alone exalteth a nation, would reign 
supreme'. 82 While celebrating Britain's concrescent community in relatively plain 
language, Coulter's address reached a crescendo of overtly biblical rhetoric. Here 
again, the principles Britain ostensibly fought for - `right' against `might', `truth' 
against `falsehood' - were attached to a more religious and millenarian viewpoint 
which meant for Coulter that `righteousness' would `reign supreme' over a nation 
united and converted by the war into a co-operative, selfless and `brotherly' 
community. Coulter suggested an impending golden age for Britain in which 
everyday principles of good conduct, bound to Christian `righteousness', would create 
a peaceful and happy society. Such a viewpoint was also expressed by Lord Curzon, 
albeit in less religious language. Concluding a speech (reproduced in two NWAC 
pamphlets) on Britain's war effort in July 1918, Curzon argued that Britons felt they 
were: 
fighting for something bigger than the War itself, bigger, even, than the peace [to 
81 Wilkinson, Church of England, p. 188. 
82 `Evesham. Remembrance Day at Evesham. ', Evesham Journal, 10/8/18, p. 6. 
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follow]... A new world is in process of being built up out of the smoking and battered 
ruins of the old; and it... will be to us a great and crowning and sufficient reward. 83 
Curzon's claims about a new world emerging from the ruins of the old suggests a 
millenarian interpretation of the war as a purgative (divine or otherwise) of Britain's 
pre-war societal ills. Such less well-defined millenarian attitudes towards British 
society, together with broader demands for a more equitable society reflecting all 
citizens' efforts during the war, contributed to a sense of aspirational patriotism 
(discussed in Chapter 9) - an idea that the patriotic efforts of the community were not 
only rewards in themselves, but would have material post-war benefits. 
Sacrificial patriotism, together with civic patriotism and the concrescent 
community idea, created a core message of duty. It was a flexible concept, capable of 
use both as an instrument of moral and emotional blackmail, by stressing the 
`supreme' sacrifices being made by servicemen (adding depth to the compulsive tone 
of civic patriotism), and as an additional means of creating a community of sentiment 
between civilians and servicemen, by emphasising common `willing self-sacrifice'. 
Sacrifice was often discussed in overtly spiritual terms, further contributing to 
communal feelings by suggesting that such self-sacrifice was morally uplifting and 
effectively sanctifying the sacrifices and the war in which they were made. Spiritual 
patriotism also enhanced the other sub-patriotisms. Except for occasional discussions 
like that of Forsyth, discussed above, spiritual patriotism was less extensively invoked 
in NWAC propaganda than other contextual elements. Where it played a strong part, 
it was often at events with a religious setting, such as War Anniversary services and 
meetings, or meetings (like Farnsworth's at Pwllgwaun) conducted at a church or 
83 Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Great Britain's Share ([London], 1918), p. 20. 
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chapel. Nonetheless, spiritual patriotism remained a significant presence in the 
language employed by propagandists, adding a sense of faith. Smith describes 
nationalism as `a secular, anthropocentric, ideological movement, but [one which] 
also draws, in varying degrees, on some of the symbols, myths, and rituals of the 
designated population's religious traditions'. 84 Such a judgement seems demonstrable 
in the NWAC's patriotic narrative. The civilisational principles for which 
propagandists affirmed Britain fought were sometimes consecrated almost as holy 
guidelines, again making the war itself holy, while conversely spiritual patriotism 
added a theological edge to criticism of Britain's overseas adversaries. Such 
transformation of the war into a holy mission prompted millenarian suggestions that 
the war was stimulating a reorganisation of Britain into a peaceful and harmonious 
society. In one of her articles, E. M. Goodman argued that `[p]atriotism, like religion, 
can "make drudgery divine. m85 However, many propagandists did not see patriotism 
and religion as separate but as mutually beneficial and interactive ideas. Religious 
rhetoric enriched sometimes mundane arguments of NWAC propagandists and turned 
potentially (and sometimes actually) straightforward secular demands for a better 
post-war society into a sacred national mission. Where millenarian speculations set 
the imaginary scenery of post-war life, however, aspirational patriotism was intended 
to give Britons a sense of the material benefits of the war. 
s' Smith, Chosen Peoples, p. 30. 
85 Margaret Osborne [Goodman], `The Woman's Part. Not Too Old at Forty - or Even Sixty. ', 
Nuneaton Observer War Supplement, w. e. 4/5/18, p. 2. 
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Chanter 9: A. spirational Patriotism 
Aspirational patriotism developed the arguments of the other sub-patriotisms 
to provide a vision of Britain's future. Adversarial, supranational and proprietorial 
patriotism provided broad contextual milieux within which civilians could derive 
understandings of the war's meaning at a relatively impersonal national level, while 
discussions of duty through civic patriotism, the idea of a concrescent community and 
sacrifice emphasised the patriotic role and significance of individuals and smaller 
groups and communities, seeking to make patriotism a personal commitment to a 
collective cause. These sub-patriotisms were partially refined by spiritual patriotism, 
which attempted to endow high-minded civilisational values, criticism of adversarial 
proclivities, and sacrificial rhetoric alike with a sacral sense, enabling arguments that 
Britain was engaged in a holy war together with concomitant consolation for loss and 
deprivation. While the first three, contextual, sub-patriotisms were (largely) outward- 
looking and homogenising in intent, the three core patriotisms of duty presented a 
more inward-looking, individualised account of British identity. Combined, these 
concepts provided a dualistic and comprehensive explanatory framework within 
which divergent civilian interests and imperatives could be accommodated. 
Aspirational patriotism drew together these varied strands into an evocation of 
the post-war world -a world usually presumed to centre upon Britain, with British 
aspirations becoming civilisational and civilisation requiring a harmonious Britain. In 
combination with the other sub-patriotisms, aspirational patriotism confirmed that 
individual `welfare [was] bound up with the community', service to that community 
thus constituting a form of personal `goal-fulfilment'. ' In providing epilogues to other 
' Miller, On Nationality, pp. 66-7. 
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sub-patriotisms, aspirational patriotism similarly operated dualistically, offering both 
civilisational/ideological aspirations for `a world without war' - to be effected by 
eradicating militarism and establishing international co-operation via a League of 
Nations - and a more material, pragmatic and individualised set of aspirations. These 
latter are neatly (though anachronistically) encapsulated by Lloyd George's promise 
at the 1918 general election to make Britain `a fit country for heroes to live in', and 2 
equate to a Durkheimian form of `patriotism... directed towards the interior affairs of 
the society, and not its exterior expansion'. Durkheim argued that if each state's `chief 
aim [was]... to set its own house in order', all would be `diverted' from international 
rivalry. 3 NWAC propagandists prophesied a more harmonious and equitable society 
in post-war Britain, extending concrescent community rhetoric about the social 
ameliorations stimulated by the war. Reconstruction, social and electoral reform, class 
and gender harmonisation were all presented as rewards for soldiers' and civilians' 
patient wartime service and sacrifices, with the implicit corollary that any calls for 
such improvements before peace were selfish and short-sighted. 
This may appear more the politics of self-interest than patriotism. However, 
aspirations for rewards and societal improvement could readily be endorsed as 
patriotic by the assumption that Britain's national and international strength and 
prestige depended on the vitality of the individuals within. This was emphasised by 
Lloyd George in September 1918, when he declared that: 
if Britain has to be thoroughly equipped to meet any emergencies of either war or 
peace it must take a more constant and a more intelligent interest in the health and 
2 `Mr. Lloyd George On His Task. ', Times, 25/11/18, p. 13. 
Excerpt from Emile Durkheim, Professional Ethics and Civic Morals, in Anthony Giddens (ed. ), 
Durkheim on Politics and the State (Cambridge, 1986), pp. 203-4. 
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fitness of its people... You cannot maintain an Al Empire with a C3 population. 
By utilising the language of national efficiency (as Lloyd George explicitly did), 
civilian demands for material rewards for war service became justifiable concerns for 
the nation's welfare, and aspiration a patriotic virtue rather than a self-interested vice. 
This chapter seeks historical antecedents of aspirational patriotism, then examines the 
discussion of civilisational and ideological aspirations for a better world. Material 
aspiration in NWAC propaganda is then addressed, before the chapter (and section) is 
concluded by placing aspirational patriotism within the framework of the NWAC's 
patriotic master-narrative. 
Lloyd George's reference to national efficiency suggests one partial precursor 
of aspirational patriotism. Early-twentieth century concerns about the physical 
condition of potential Boer War recruits prompted efforts to improve British civilian 
fitness. However, the emphasis was often less on meeting the aspirations of the 
governed than of elites .5 Although the conscriptionist T. C. Horsfall claimed it would 
`create a sense of national solidarity for social reform as well as a new feeling of 
comradeship through the intermixture of classes', the overriding concern of 
conscription was national defence, and when invasion scares fuelled demands for it, 
references to reform were sidelined. 
6 Similarly, infant mortality campaigns were 
predicated upon `attacking' the `inadequacy of individuals' rather than 
acknowledging societal shortcomings - this was (patriotic) reform imposed upon, not 
4 Lloyd George's Message, pp. 9-10. 
5 G. R. Searle, The Quest for National Efficiency: A Study in British Politics and Political Thought, 
1899-1914 (paperback ed., London, 1990). 
6 Matthew Hendley, "`Help us to secure a strong, healthy and peaceful Britain": The Social Arguments 
of the Campaign for Compulsory Military Service in Britain, 1899-1914', Canadian Journal of 
History, 30: 2 (1995), pp. 273-4. 
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requested by, working-class mothers. ' While the meeting of aspirations was largely 
incidental to such efforts, aspirational patriotism is more discernible in other 
examples. Though regarded as a potential `antidote' to socialism, the suggested 
introduction of profit-sharing in industry in the late-nineteenth century had also aimed 
to create `a more just, productive, and progressive society'. 8 At around the same time, 
the emergence of `new Liberal' concerns with social reform reflected interest in a 
collectivism aiming at `social harmony which entailed self-sacrifice and altruism' .9 
This collectivism had `deep roots... in pressures from below', and though new Liberal 
social reform partly represented a `politics of containment', 10 it was presented in 
patriotic terms to the public as `a high type of national life' providing those previously 
excluded with `a new and vast stake in the country'. 
University extension lecturers sought to address working-class aspiration by 
engaging working-class students with expectations of equal intellectual capacity, 
given similar educational opportunities. The thought of John Ruskin created a late- 
nineteenth century link between teachers and students. Ruskin's attempt to redefine 
capitalist economics to reflect `human rather than material values' provided a point of 
`mutual confidence' between `dissenting intellectuals' and working-class audiences, 
who shared an `essential similarity of outlook' on this point for a time. 
12 University 
extension lecturers ostensibly collaborated with, rather than imposed upon, working- 
class aspiration in the national interest, using their expertise to assist self-motivated 
intellectual development. 
Davin, `Imperialism and Motherhood', pp. 53-4. 
8 Robert F. Haggard, The Persistence of Victorian Liberalism: The Politics of Social Reform in Britain, 
1870-1900 (Westport, Conn., 2001), p. 115. 
9 Michael Freeden, The New Liberalism: An Ideology of Social Reform (Oxford, 1978), p. 93. 
1° Stuart Hall and Bill Schwarz, `State and Society, 1880-1930' in Mary Langan and Schwarz (eds. ), 
Crises in the British State, 1880-1930 (London, 1985), p. 20; David Sutton, `Liberalism, State 
Collectivism and the Social Relations of Citizenship', Ibid., p. 74. 
R. Rea, MP, cited in Freeden, New Liberalism, p. 166. 
12 Lawrence Goldman, `Ruskin, Oxford, and the British Labour Movement 1880-1914', in Dinah Birch 
(ed. ), Ruskin and the Dawn of the Modern (Oxford, 1999), pp. 79-83. 
256 
Nonetheless, F. M. L. Thompson's discussion of the limits of `social control' is 
a salutary caution (useful for historians of propaganda) that changing working-class 
values between 1800 and 1900 did not simply reflect "`middle-class values"... 
imposed on the workers; they were also "working-class values" developed through 
selection and adaptation to the changing environment'. Thompson's argument that 
`the working class was eminently capable of generating its own cultural evolution and 
development in response to [its varied] aspirations and needs', 13 is equally applicable 
to NWAC propaganda - propagandists did not address civilian aspirations out of 
simple generosity, but because demands were made for material recognition of war- 
work. Examples may thus be found in which aspirants took the improvement of their 
socio-political position into their own hands. Jonathan Rose highlights the importance 
of mutual improvement societies in fostering working-class `pride and independence' 
through the sharing of knowledge. Like University Extension (but less directed `from 
above'), mutual improvement afforded `invaluable training in forming and expressing 
opinions', as often ill-educated men developed literacy skills, and presented and 
discussed papers on multifarious subjects. Mutual improvement fostered communality 
through a `general sharing of knowledge', which cherished collaborative education 
and condemned `selfish and unneighbourly' private study. 
14 Individuals' aspirations 
thus combined with those of the wider community, in ways similar to NWAC 
concrescent community rhetoric, though Rose provides no evidence that mutual 
improvement served as a locus of national identity. 
Aspiration and national identity markedly converged, however, in demands by 
middle and working-class men and women for parliamentary reform. John Garrard 
13 F. M. L. Thompson, `Social Control in Victorian Britain', Economic History 
207,196. 
Review, 34: 2 (1981), pp. 
14 Jonathan Rose, The Intellectual Life of the British Working Class (New Haven/London, 2001), pp. 
67,75,86. 
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emphasises that middle-class men demonstrated their `political fitness' before the 
1832 Reform Act `by virtue of their attachments to civil society'. Participation with 
charities, for example, provided `enhanced status and citizenship within vibrant local 
communities' - middle-class men traded active acceptance of social and civil 
responsibilities for `the granting of full political rights for their own sake'. 15 Similarly, 
working-men seeking the vote before 1867 stressed that they had `demonstrated their 
fitness for the vote through... social and cultural institutions' like friendly societies, 
also claiming rights to representation since they were `taxed and subject to the law 
and might be required to defend the country', while the `virtues of work' were held to 
demonstrate workers' `skill, intelligence and contribution to the national well-being'. 
Working-class political aspirations were demands for recognition of their national 
contribution. Additionally, such demands assumed that working-class voters offered 
constitutional benefits of `moral purification of politics and a disinterestedness of 
purpose'. The granting of the working-class franchise was held by some to be the key 
to class harmonisation. 16 
Women, too, sometimes based claims for citizenship on the different qualities 
they offered the nation, often employing a `rhetoric of "women's mission"', which 
emphasised gender differences (rendering men unfit to vote on their wives' behalf) 
and women's philanthropic roles. Suffragists denied that they claimed political rights 
self-interestedly, endorsing instead the relation of rights and duties. 
" Female claims 
to an independent political identity often centred upon their affinity with family and 
domestic political affairs. Female Chartists, according to Anna Clark, developed a 
15 John A. Garrard, Democratisation in Britain: Elites, Civil Society and Reform since 1800 
(Basingstoke, 2002), pp. 121-50, at pp. 148-50. 
16 Keith McClelland, "'England's Greatness, the Working Man"', in Catherine Hall, McClelland and 
Jane Rendall, Defining the Victorian Nation: Class, Race, Gender and the British Reform Act of 1867 
(Cambridge, 2000), pp. 92-4,106. 
17 Jane Rendall, `The Citizenship of Women and the Reform Act of 1867', in Hall et al, Defining, p. 
163. 
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`militant domesticity' which justified their involvement in politics by claiming that 
the `duties of motherhood' extended beyond the home to a responsibility to ensure 
appropriate political discussion and legislation of such issues. '8 In such arguments, an 
underlying theme was that women's enfranchisement would benefit the nation by 
providing broader perspectives. 
Besides Britain's traditions of anti-militarist sentiment, which had scuppered 
pre-war attempts to introduce conscription in Britain, 19 some antecedents of the 
`world without war' strand of aspirational patriotism are discernible in pre-war 
internationalism. 20 Late-nineteenth century British political thought contained an 
element of liberal internationalism - inspired by intellectuals like T. H. Green, Herbert 
Spencer and Henry Sidgwick -`founded on a belief that it was possible to build a just 
international order on the basis of existing patterns of cooperation between distinct 
political communities' and advocating `the development of international law, 
arbitration, free trade, and multilateralism' and `supranational structures'. 21 In the 
early-twentieth century, J. A. Hobson believed internationalism would be manifested 
initially `as an extension of national industry', arguing that industrialism `bound 
peoples together in community and co-operation at both the national and international 
level'. Hobson hoped industrial cooperation would render `external aggression 
redundant'. 22 A decade later, the pacifist Norman Angell (erroneously) asserted that 
internationalised credit, industry and communications were leading to economic 
18 Anna Clark, `Manhood, Womanhood, and the Politics of Class in Britain, 1790-1845', in Laura L. 
Frader and Sonya O. Rose (eds. ), Gender and Class in Modern Europe (Ithaca, NY/London, 1996), p. 
275. Also Michelle de Larrabeiti, `Conspicuous Before the World: The Political Rhetoric of the 
Chartist Women', in Eileen Janes Yeo (ed. ), Radical Femininity: Women's Self-representation in the 
Public Sphere (Manchester/New York, 1998), pp. 106-26. 
19 Anne Summers, `Militarism in Britain before the Great War', History Workshop Journal, issue 2 
(1976); cf. Searle, New England?, pp. 501-5, for a summary of some limits to this anti-militarism. 
20 Many examples have already been traced above, pp. 157-60. 
21 Duncan Bell and Casper Sylvest, `International Society in Victorian Political Thought: T. H. Green, 
Herbert Spencer, and Henry Sidgwick', Modem Intellectual History, 3: 2 (2006), pp. 211,213. 
22 P. J. Cain, Hobson and Imperialism: Radicalism, New Liberalism, and Finance 1887-1938 (Oxford, 
2002), pp. 148-9. 
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interdependence and the irrationality of war. 23 Mainstream British labour movements, 
meanwhile, averred an attachment to a `pluralism' of nationalities, endorsing socialist 
internationalism to an extent, whilst keeping it 'distant'. 24 The Social Democratic 
Foundation (SDF), which considered itself the most international of Britain's socialist 
groups, arguably combined elements of both strands of aspirational patriotism. While 
embracing internationalism, the SDF's domestic political programme involved the 
promotion of social reform to create `well-fed, educated workers' capable of 
conducting a `revolution' -a replacement of existing economic and social conditions 
with an alternative which empowered the dispossessed (rather than a violent 
upheaval). 25 
Hobson and Angell's internationalist aspirations are particularly interesting as 
both became UDC members. The NWAC's promotion of a League of Nations 
appropriated UDC-influenced ideas. In publicising their organisation in September 
1914, the five co-founders - Angell, MacDonald, E. D. Morel, Arthur Ponsonby and 
C. P. Trevelyan - made `the establishment of a Concert of Europe, whose 
deliberations and decisions shall be published' one of their `Cardinal Points'. 26 In 
1914 the UDC member and historian G. Lowes Dickinson called for a league of 
nations to be established, and by March 1915, several UDC members had involved 
themselves with the Bryce group (headed by the former Ambassador to the US and 
the man responsible for the influential `Bryce' report into German atrocities, James 
Bryce) which proposed the establishment of such a league. The UDC also cooperated 
with the League of Nations Society, established in May 1915, and later UDC 
z3 Howard Weinroth, `Norman Angell and The Great Illusion: An Episode in pre-1914 Pacifism', 
Historical Journal, 17: 3 (1974). 
24 Ward, Red Flag, pp. 50-8. 
Z5 Graham Johnson, "`Making Reform the Instrument of Revolution": British Social Democracy, 1881- 
1911', Historical Journal, 43: 4 (2000), esp. pp. 978-80,989-94. 
26 Cited in Sally Harris, Out of Control: British Foreign Policy and the Union of Democratic Control, 
1914-1918 (Hull, 1996), p. 55. 
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`proposals for an international framework for world peace' showed strong affinities 
with these two groups. 27 By late 1915, the UDC claimed to have influenced Woodrow 
Wilson's call for the establishment of a League of Nations, and subsequently made 
much of the similarity of their foreign policy views. 28 In adopting the League as a key 
part of the `world without war' element of aspirational patriotism, NWAC 
propagandists were probably influenced more by Wilsonian principles than an 
intention to undermine dissenters by embracing their ideas - nevertheless, this was a 
beneficial propaganda effect. By advocating the League, NWAC propagandists 
reduced its power as a rhetorical weapon of dissent. 
Wilson's Independence Day 1918 speech on `the conditions of peace' was 
reprinted by the NWAC. In it, Wilson called for the `destruction of every arbitrary 
power anywhere that can... disturb the peace of the world', and the `establishment of 
an organisation of peace... [enforced by] the combined powers of free nations'. 29 In 
September 1918, Lloyd George claimed that it already existed in the form of both the 
British Empire and Allied cooperation, fighting in the cause of `international right' 
adding that `a Germany freed from military domination will be welcome' in the 
League. 3° In a well-distributed pamphlet (reaching a `2nd million'), the former 
Foreign Secretary, Grey, emphasised this. Germany would be welcome only if it 
abandoned militarism and recognised that `the condition of true security for one 
nation is a sense of security on the part of all nations'. Grey felt the League was 
`essential... to secure each person in a quiet life' 31 The muted emphasis here was on 
a new world order of peace and cooperation, a point made more explicitly by the 
Liberal MP McCurdy: 
27 Harris, Out of Control, pp. 101-2. 
28 Ibid., pp. 124,136-8; Swartz, Union of Democratic Control, pp. 25-6,135-8. 
29 Wilson's Message, pp. 5-7. 
30 Lloyd George's Message, p. 7. 
31 Viscount Grey of Fallodon, The League of Nations (London, [1918]), pp. 8,11. 
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it must be a League of Nations, not of dynasties -a League of Peoples, not of 
emperors or kings... [and] as President Wilson has said, a League of Honour... it 
must rest on a basis of moral law; it must be more than an agreement, it must be a 
creed - the articles of faith of a new brotherhood of peoples, pledged to observe 
peace and renounce war... 
Such rhetoric promised a better post-war world, rewarding the contributions of all to 
peace, and asserted that the war would not be repeated. These were all arguments 
calculated to promote endurance - if civilians would never have to tolerate such 
disruptions again, they might bear them longer to ensure that outcome. McCurdy 
acknowledged that `[wie cannot abolish the possibility of war any more than... any 
other crime', but argued that the League's establishment would enforce a common 
international treatment of war as `discreditable, disreputable [and] criminal' 32 
The League of Nations enabled the NWAC to align itself with mainstream 
Labour opinion. The joint War Aims Memorandum of the Labour Party and TUC (28 
December 1917) called for the League's establishment, together with an `International 
High Court' and `Legislature' to ensure peaceful international resolution of disputes. 
In introducing the text in a pamphlet the ubiquitous McCurdy wrote that `British 
Labour has gone boldly to the root of the evil' by denouncing autocracy, adding that 
`Europe must be drastically disarmed' 33 As early as September 1917, at Llandrindod 
Wells, the Labour MP, Brace, endorsed the League of Nations at a NWAC meeting, 
expressing the hope that its creation `would make it impossible for such a disaster as 
32 McCurdy, Freedom's Call, pp. 25-7. 
33 Charles A. McCurdy, MP, The War Aims of the British People: An Historic Manifesto, (London, 
[1918]), pp. 5-6. The NWAC also published the memorandum of the Inter-Allied Labour and Socialist 
Conference (23 February 1918): Charles A. McCurdy, MP, A Clean Peace. The War Aims of British 
Labour (London, 1918). 
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that which they were experiencing to ever recur. Given the NWAC's troublesome 
relationship with much of the Labour movement, the opportunity to identify common 
ground in an endorsement of the League was invaluable. 
The League constituted the international enshrinement of Britain's 
civilisational principles, and its advocacy represented, in a sense, a perceived triumph 
of `British' values. By supporting its establishment, NWAC propagandists offered a 
vision of a world without war in which Britain could continue to flourish. The 
League's successful establishment depended, however, upon eradicating `militarism'. 
Though Germany (or, more frequently, Prussia) was often blamed for the 
development of militarism, NWAC propagandists also went further, again inverting 
dissenting arguments by acknowledging Britain's militarisation. By accepting this, 
however, propagandists hijacked dissenting criticism and argued that only complete 
victory could remove militarism from society. An inconclusive peace would force 
Britain to retain a strong military deterrent, consequently reducing the government's 
ability to effect societal improvements. At Ripon, in November 1917, Liberal speaker 
James Dockett argued that an immediate peace would mean that: 
instead of having a peace so that we might begin to improve the lot of the people, 
instead of having a peace of liberty and freedom, we should have an armed truce. 
Instead of destroying militarism... [it] would compel every nation to adopt militarism 
as its national policy... 
35 
Likewise, at the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce, the Earl of Denbigh said (in a 
speech reiterated at a NWAC meeting) that `a happier and more contented England 
34 `Allies' War Aims. ', Radnor Express, 27/9/1917, p. 5. 
35 `War Aims Campaign. Public Meeting at Ripon. ', Ripon Observer, 8/11/17, p. 4. 
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was impossible as long as a powerful and aggressive Germany... forced us to 
maintain a great army and to remain a great military nation'. 
36 
In both these examples, the duality of aspirational patriotism is evident. While 
eradicating militarism became a high principle, essential to establishing a better and 
more peaceful world, it was also closely linked to the possibility of societal 
improvement at home. Thus, propagandists attempted to merge more intangible 
civilisational benefits, which flattered individuals' sense of intellectual and moral 
probity, with assertions that such ideals affected everyday life. This also highlighted 
the interrelationship between everyday life and international affairs. Basil Mathews 
underscored the importance of a total victory which destroyed militarism: 
The regulation of life under military and official control to-day in our own lands we 
accept because of the War. But the thought of that permanent detailed direction of our 
actions by officials backed by military power is simply unendurable to men who have 
centuries of liberty in their blood... If we do not win the War we and our children for 
generations will live and die under the lash of militarism. 
37 
These were clear references to the language of the `Norman Yoke' and the `freeborn 
Englishman' (presumably extended to all Britons). 8 Britons, Mathews suggested, 
would willingly subordinate their freedom in the national or civilisational interest for 
a certain period, but could not countenance permanent limitations. Therefore, playing 
their individual roles in an endeavour to modify international behaviour became of 
personal, as well as national importance. 
Within such arguments is a sense of ongoing tension between comforting 
36 `The Empire's Peril. ', Liverpool Daily Post and Mercury, 7/5/18, p. 3. 
37 Mathews, Vista of Victory, p. 14. 
38 On English (and British) associations with liberty see, e. g., Hill, `Norman Yoke'; Ward, Red Flag; 
Mandler, National Character, esp. pp. 87-91; Parry, Politics. 
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illusions of Britain as an island `physically as well as morally and metaphorically 
separate', 39 and the reality, demonstrated during the war by Britain's dependency on 
imported food (or simply by its entanglement in a total war), and acknowledged by 
expectations of post-war international cooperation, that British life was affected 
considerably by global events and decisions often beyond British control. Arjun 
Appadurai's comment that the `locality (both in the sense of the local factory or site 
of production and in the extended sense of the nation-state) becomes a fetish which 
disguises... globally dispersed [driving] forces' may perhaps be extended beyond 
economic production to incorporate socio-political issues as well. 0 The interaction of 
supranational and proprietorial patriotism, and the dualism inherent in aspirational 
patriotism, suggests that NWAC propagandists felt it necessary to remind civilians 
that Britain and British life was not, and could not be, isolated from international 
influence, while simultaneously continuing to suggest the overriding significance and 
superiority of Britain. 
Propagandists frequently dwelt on hopes of a better world, and most 
references carried the message that international improvement intrinsically meant 
fulfilling national and individual aspirations as well. In an elegant example (unlike the 
brutal descriptiveness of most of his pamphlet), Mathews wrote that: 
We have to be the architects of a new world... [in which] the differences of class, the 
problems of capital and labour, the injustices inflicted by social and economic 
oppressions, the international and interracial competition of interests, indeed, the 
whole world-complex of modem civilisation can be... unravelled and set right. 
1 
39 Behrman, Victorian Myths, p. 40. 
40 Aijun Appadurai, `Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy', Public Culture, 2: 2 
(1990), p. 16. 
41 Mathews, Vista of Victory, p. 15. 
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Though described as problems of international civilisation, such inequalities and 
rivalries were largely transferable to a narrower, British, focus. By phrasing his 
arguments in this way, however, Mathews executed a rhetorical sleight of hand. 
While mollifying British civilian disgruntlement, he portrayed such social inequalities 
(accurately) as worldwide civilisational problems to be addressed post-war, rather 
than uniquely British. The argument thus sought to defuse civilian discontent through 
international comparisons and by suggesting that the world generally would become a 
fairer place following the successful conclusion of the war. Additionally, by not 
acknowledging specifically British problems, such discussion allowed a certain 
deniability for those wishing to ignore or downplay British social inequality. Similar 
sentiments were expressed by Ripon's Mayor, T. H. Fleming, who argued that the 
world was being tested by `a great travail of soul', after which Fleming `hoped that 
the next generation would be a better generation for [our] sufferings... and that the 
next world would be an infinitely better world that the one in which we were living'. 2 
Fleming here extended sacrificial and spiritual patriotic language to reassure his 
audience that their current discomfort and loss was serving a greater end than the 
resolution of international power-politics, but while he referred specifically to local 
experience and suffering earlier in his speech, his call was notably for a new world. 
Other propagandists, however, demonstrated some recognition of the 
national/international/civilisational tensions discussed above. At Keighley the Liberal 
MP, Somervell, believed: 
A new world was in process of being built... in which war would be unknown, in 
which class war at home, industrial injustice and acrimony must be ended, and a 
42 `War Aims Campaign. ', Ripon Observer, 8/11/17, p. 4. 
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cleaner, healthier, happier Britain, safeguarded for the successors of those who had 
given their lives.. 
43 
Seemingly, to Somervell, the world still largely meant Britain and some other 
landmasses. While alternating between discussing global peace and national harmony, 
his rhetoric does not suggest significant engagement with the notion that international 
and intranational harmony were interrelated 44 References to the outside world seem 
almost a wartime exception to the norm, though it is also possible that Somervell's 
rhetoric sought to demonstrate immediacy and relevance to his audience rather than 
reflecting his own views. 
The best evocation of the ties between civilisational-ideological and internal- 
pragmatic aspirations in NWAC propaganda is found in the arguments of J. C. Smuts. 
His speech at Sheffield, in October 1917, merits lengthy quotation as it synthesised 
virtually the entire meaning of aspirational patriotism. Britons, Smuts said: 
had seen their privileges curtailed, their holidays go... and they had done it all for the 
common cause and for their common mother - the nation, the empire, and the world. 
(Cheers. ) The reward would come in time... and he was sure... [the same civilian 
resolution] would make of this country a new world. (Cheers. )... 
They would have fought this war to small purpose and victory would be of 
little value if, after the war, they were going to indulge in class war or economic 
chaos... They wanted to see the State in this country fulfilling its proper function; they 
wanted to see greater happiness more widely diffused among the classes, and they 
wanted to see more justice in this country. They wanted to see less poverty and less 
43 `Fourth War Anniversary. ' Keighley News, 10/8/18, p. 5. On patriotism's perception as a means to 
maintain class harmony: Parry, Politics. 
44 Although cf. Somervell's laudation of France, which problematises this assertion. "France's Day at 
Keighley. ', Keighley News, 13/7/18, p. 5. 
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luxury... 
He wanted to see... [m]ore economic freedom and more security for all 
workers in that world after the war, in which he hoped there would be no idlers, rich 
or poor. (Cheers. )... If we were to reap those fruits and see the new and better 
England[, ]... that new world towards which we hoped to move,... [m]ilitarism must 
be swept away from the face of the earth. (Cheers. )... 
The practical achievement of the war should be the establishment of 
machinery for securing peace... We wanted to see a league or society of nations 
which would have force behind it, and which would see that there was no future 
danger, no future threat against the peace of the world.. 45 
Smuts captured the essence of aspirational patriotism here, melding grand predictions 
of national and global societal change with practical demands for its achievement: the 
eradication of militarism; a League of Nations; the fulfilment of the state's `proper 
function' of social amelioration. Like Somervell, Smuts' `new world' was largely 
located in the North Sea. Unlike Somervell, however, Smuts - an international 
statesman who later coined the term `holism' - displayed awareness of the multiple 
layers of human interaction and identification, labelling nation, empire and world the 
`common mother' and nodding to International socialism (even communism) by 
referring to `all workers in the world'. Smuts emphasised that material reward and 
ideological aspiration went hand-in-hand, that it was patriotic to expect social change 
as it would benefit not only individuals but the nation and the whole international 
society. 46 
Such rhetoric was intrinsic to the NWAC's message. The third of its `Aims of 
45 'Prussianism Must Go. ', Sheffield Daily Telegraph, 25/10/17, pp. 5-6. 
46 On the significance of Smuts' holism to his rhetoric: Saul Dubow, `Smuts, the United Nations and 
the Rhetoric of Rights and Race', Journal of Contemporary History, 43: 1 (2008), pp. 59-60. 
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Home Publicity' was `to dwell on' wartime political and social improvements and `to 
suggest the prospect of further improvement and greater freedom when the war is 
over; generally to envisage the rewards of success'. 47 If propagandists' discussions 
often privileged British examples for specific promises, this was not necessarily a 
parochial rejection of the outside world, but a pragmatic understanding of the 
propaganda's ultimate purpose - to persuade Britons to continue their participation in 
the war effort. High-minded aspirations for a better world had some value, but 
individuals' aspirations also required attention. Concrescent community rhetoric 
stressed the (supposed) existing communal harmony, and such discussion often 
extended into an aspirational patriotic suggestion that such harmony would become 
permanent in post-war Britain. At Pwllgwaun, for instance, the Conservative speaker 
John Farnsworth claimed: 
With every strain of circumstance and danger that surrounds us we believed that we 
were coming out of the struggle a better nation than when we went in, and that the 
world would be a cleaner place to live in than it was before. 8 
Here again, Farnsworth referred to the wider world, but emphasised national 
development. British exertions would improve Britain, and help to cleanse the whole 
world by its defence of high ideals. 
Propagandists recognised, however, that vague allusions to change were 
insufficient to satisfy public opinion and made stronger claims for specific 
improvements. At Tooting, local speaker H. R. Selley said that Britain's politicians 
`wanted to make this old England of ours a better place to live in that it had been in 
47 TNA: PRO T102/16 `(Confidential) Aims of Home Publicity', n. d. 
48 `What We Fight for, and Why. ', 22/11/17, Glamorgan Free Press, p. 1. 
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the past'. Selley asserted (optimistically) that political factionalism would be set aside 
in favour of introducing `legislation which would better the social conditions of the 
boys who had fought, and the women who had suffered'. 9 Selley clearly linked 
service to the nation with future rewards, implicitly replacing the idea that civic 
participation was its own, 'character'-building, reward with one that offered material 
recompense for material assistance. 50 Sheehan, with his insider's view of Parliament, 
wrote that `for the future the claims of human beings as such are to have a new 
recognition', the most vital of which were `[h]ealth, housing, education, secure 
employment and a "living wage"', along with the seemingly autarchic and 
protectionist concern for the `urgent anxieties of national safety in the field and on the 
farm'. 5' Again, the `welfare' of Britain was stressed, in a patriotism of `set[ting the 
nation's] own house in order'52 
Such acknowledgements of necessary reform responded to labour demands. 
Indeed, figures like Harry Gosling, the former TUC President, and the MP Will 
Thorne, exploited NWAC propaganda to make demands, building upon the increased 
wartime governmental recognition of unions. 3 Gosling asserted that education was 
`essential, and on education must be built... assurances of future world peace'. 
Furthermore, he stressed that `labour' expected extended pensions and health 
insurance, `a fuller share in the gains of industry' and influence over industrial 
direction. While celebrating the increased closeness and harmony engendered by the 
war, Gosling concluded his pamphlet by insisting that it was `to the good of the 
country that labour should grow to the full,... use its strength, and use it wisely. It is 
a9 1"War Aims" Meeting at Tooting. ', Battersea Boro' News, 26/10/17, p. 2. 
so On service and character: Harris, Private Lives, p. 249. 
51 [Sheehan, ] `War and Westminster', Seaham Weekly News, 21/6/18, p. 2. 
52 See n. 3 above. 
53 Waites, Class Society, pp. 29-31,205-6. 
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essential that the old artificial barriers of class should disappear'. 54 At Kcighley, 
Thorne argued that: `we were never going to get back to the old economic conditions, 
and if we wanted to prevent an industrial war after the military conflict, it would all 
depend upon the attitudes taken up by the employers of labour'. 55 While Thorne's 
public outburst was largely uncontrollable by the NWAC, by publishing Gosling's 
views it accepted their validity (or their propaganda value). 56 Gosling's conclusion 
emphasised the patriotism of workers' aspiration, echoing some of the arguments of 
nineteenth-century franchise campaigners and social reformers in asserting that labour 
advancement benefitted the whole nation. In allowing labour figures to issue such 
challenges within its own propaganda, the NWAC attempted to demonstrate 
continuing British free expression by featuring varying opinions, as well as a tacit 
endorsement of that opinion. If such challenges were made, however, it was 
imperative that they be answered with evidence either of action already taken, or of 
good future intent. Thorne had himself acknowledged the possible ameliorations 
represented by the Whitley Committee (established by the Ministry of 
Reconstruction), the first of whose four reports on the improvement of employer- 
employee relations was published in July 1917.57 
Other speakers and writers responded to this need. Lloyd George, in a NWAC- 
published September 1918 speech, acknowledged that there had been a `community 
of sacrifice' which meant that after the war `the nation... will expect put right the 
wrongs, inequalities, and stupidities from which millions have suffered and the 
community has suffered'. 
58 Lloyd George's rhetoric again bore a patriotic tone: 
individual sufferings (albeit in their millions) were important because they affected 
I Gosling, Peace, pp. 9,11,13-4,16. 
ss 'Mr Will Thorne, M. P., on War Aims. ', Keighley News, 15/12/17, p. 5. 
56 On the pamphlet's publication: Harry Gosling, Up and Down Stream (London, 1927), pp. 219-20. 
57 For the Whitley reports and their reception: Home, Labour at War, pp. 245-9,271. 
58 Lloyd George's Message, p. 11. 
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the community as a whole. Given the purpose of his articles, it is perhaps unsurprising 
that the most extensive and frequent references to reform are by Sheehan. Discussing 
H. A. L. Fisher's Education Bill in June 1918,59 Sheehan rejoiced that `the public is at 
last beginning to take education seriously', which was necessary so that Britons could 
`hold our own' against German technical education. His conclusion espoused: 
... the 
hope that it will bring us a long way towards the abolition of class and caste in 
this country. Social equality is not a dream of the workers alone... All the best social 
feeling of to-day revolts against a state of things which should condemn any boy to a 
lower place in the world than his natural gifts of mind, disposition, and character 
would enable him to fill 
60 
Sheehan's rhetoric confirmed the association of idealistic aspirations for social reform 
with more pragmatic national concerns with `service'. Educational reform was not 
only good for workers, but for the nation which they could thus better serve. 
Furthermore, it is interesting that Sheehan's concern only extends to male education, 
suggesting that, despite the ongoing renegotiation of service and citizenship to include 
women, 61 it still remained permissible, at least to Sheehan, to `condemn' girls to `a 
lower place' than they might deserve. 
Again in celebratory mood in August 1918, Sheehan (an Irish nationalist) 
praised the `wonderful equanimity of the British character' which enabled Parliament, 
during total war, to enact `the most comprehensive and remarkable set of laws... [of] 
any era'. Sheehan cited franchise expansion and educational reforms, `questions of 
maternity of child welfare, [sic] and public health', and the curbing and limiting of 
59 See Wilson, Myriad Faces, pp. 816-7. 
60 [Sheehan, ] `War and Westminster', Seaham Weekly News, 7/6/18, p. 2. 
61 Gullace, Blood. 
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enemy alien activity, as evidence that the government had already taken steps to 
ensure victory and a better post-war Britain 
62 
While primarily addressing civilian concerns, the NWAC also assured 
Britain's future civilians that reforms were in hand. In September, Bombardier John 
S. Cairns used his regular (NWAC-paid) column in Welcome to inform fellow 
servicemen of Lloyd George's remark about an `Al Empire'. Reviewing Lloyd 
George's speech, Cairns continued: 
So he promises better conditions for the workers after the war. Well, we'll see that we 
get `em. In the past it was pretty difficult to get a million or two out of the public 
purse for this particular purpose. But this war has changed everyone's outlook, and - 
provided we make a clean job of it - for the better. 
63 
Generally, however, the NWAC seemingly recognised that servicemen's immediate 
aspirations were rather more fundamental than social reform (as figure 37 shows), and 
aspirational patriotism in this context was firmly rooted in images of home and family 
from which servicemen were necessarily separated TM 
NWAC discussion of aspirational patriotism involving women confirms that 
aspiration and reward was linked to `national' service. The 1918 Representation of the 
People Bill, while enfranchising married women over thirty and some women who 
had seen active service abroad as nurses or in the Women's Auxiliary Army Corps or 
62 [Sheehan, ] `War & Westminster', Seaham Weekly News, 23/8/18, p. 2. 
63 Bombardier B III [Cairns], `Just Between Ourselves', Welcome, 26,25/9/18, p. 305. 
64 For servicemen's continuing ties with home and community, see esp. McCartney, Citizen Soldiers; 
Fuller, Troop Morale; David Englander, `Soldiering and Identity: Reflections on the Great War', War 
in History, 1: 3 (1994). 
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Figure 37: Wilmot Lunt and W. F. Blood, 'Waiting for Daddy', Welcome, 21,21/8/18, p. 241 
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merchant marine, failed to enfranchise those munition workers (and other domestic 
female `war-workers') who were acknowledged by propagandists to have 
contributed so significantly to the war effort. 6' Nevertheless, propagandists explicitly 
linked the partial female enfranchisement to war service. Once again, Sheehan was 
prominent in elucidating the significance of franchise reform. In September 1918, he 
wrote that `[t]he vote at one time, the privilege of property, [sic] is now proudly 
regarded as the badge of citizenship. And, to a limited degree, women have been 
associated with the duty of government'. Sheehan compared the admission of women 
with that of Labour MPs after 1906, arguing that rather than diminishing its authority 
or prestige, Parliament had `unquestionably gained in respect, authority and influence' 
through their admission. After hearing a female BWNL speaker named Elsdon 
addressing a war aims meeting in Keighley, the secretary of Keighley WAC, C. H. 
65 E. g., `Picton Hall. Mr. Asquith & Unruly Women. ', Liverpool Daily Post and Mercury, 12/10/17, p. 
6; Churchill, Munitions Miracle. On this paradox, see Gullace, Blood, pp. 167-94, esp. pp. 169-78. 
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Foulds, remarked that though previously opposed to female enfranchisement, 
Elsdon's performance convinced him that nobody 'could oppose the right and justice 
of them having [the vote]' . 
66 Both these examples suggest that women's war service 
was interpreted as `proving' `political fitness', as men had done throughout the 
nineteenth century. 
67 By taking so public a role (and by espousing arguments desired 
by those in power - in this case, a strong critique of `pacifists' and `defeatists') 
Eisdon not only ostensibly demonstrated that women served the nation, but also 
exhibited female `independence' through civil activity which women's primary, 
`respectable', status as head of the household had supposedly made questionable. 68 
An alternative interpretation was given by E. M. Goodman. Her weekly articles 
on `The Woman's Part' frequently discussed domestic issues, offering advice on 
cooking and housekeeping within wartime constraints, with a lesser emphasis on 
female work outside the home. Assessing a speech by Christopher Addison on 
reconstruction in November 1918, Goodman noted his reference to children as `the 
country's most important crop', scoffing that women had always known this, but 
celebrating that he had not scolded women about child-rearing `as we have come to 
expect', instead recognising that `not parents alone, but the whole nation, is to blame 
for this'. 69 Continuing, Goodman claimed that the Ministry of Reconstruction was 
transforming the understanding of women's work - rather than forbidding women to 
work in unsuitable jobs, `the work must be made suitable for women' through the 
improvement by employers of working conditions. Goodman concluded that the 
Ministry's policy recognised: 
66 [Sheehan, ] `The War and Westminster', North Devon Herald, 26/9/18, p. 6. After their inclusion in 
the Herald in mid-September 1918, Sheehan's articles ran a week earlier there than in the Seaham 
Daily News; `England's War Policy. ' Keighley News, 30/3/18, p. 5. 
67 Garrard, Democratisation. 
68 See, e. g., Rendall, `Citizenship of Women', pp. 122,161-2. 
69 Cf. the pre-war situation described by Davin, `Imperialism and Motherhood'. 
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that women play a great part in the prosperity of the nation, and that their part is a 
double one. Women are now recognized as citizens, and they have a citizen's duty, 
which I take it, is to give his [sic] country a little more than he costs it... A woman's 
chief duty as a citizen is often the care of future citizens, but there is no reason why 
she should spend long years of idleness before this special task is done, and after it is 
finished. 
... 
Now that the nation is... altering its house to suit us, what are we going to 
do for the nation? We cannot be helped much unless we help ourselves and each 
other... most of the work of bringing up the new citizens of the world is women's 
work. If we are to receive, it is that we may give again. 
70 
Goodman's emphases here were threefold. She rejoiced that the Ministry's 
interpretation of citizenship included women. This was based not so much on 
`separate' but dual spheres of domesticity and employment, with the concomitant 
assumption that female work was not a necessary evil but a civic virtue contributing 
as much to the `prosperity of the nation' as motherhood. With this enhanced status, 
however, Goodman reminded readers of the associated extension of women's civic 
duties, an `equality' of expectation as well as opportunity integral to legitimate 
citizenship. In Goodman's rhetoric, aspirational patriotism again represented the 
promised acknowledgement of service but also, partially, service on women's own 
terms. Essential war-work undermined chauvinistic claptrap about woman's `proper 
place', demonstrating instead that women, like men, served their country 
multifariously, whether by making babies or bombs, cleaning the house or conducting 
a bus. By linking reward with obligation, the acknowledged aspiration endorsed 
70 Margaret Osborne [Goodman], `The Woman's Part. Beginning in Time. ', Droitwich Guardian War 
Supplement, w. e. 9/11/18, p. 2. 
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female agency. Women had accepted their duties during the war, and would similarly 
accept the duties associated with enhanced civic status. 
Sheehan's claim that women's right to stand as parliamentary candidates 
amounted to `full equality with men' is laughable, given the franchise exclusions, but 
his assertion that `those great social and political privileges' were the result of the 
`war services of the feminine sex' once again highlights the service-reward nexus of 
individualised aspirational patriotism. " The examples of propagandists' discussion of 
the meeting of individual aspirations through reform are noticeably drawn from a 
narrower field than most elements of the NWAC's patriotic message. There are 
seemingly two main explanations for this. The first is that it was difficult to allude to 
specific future reforms unless some government announcement had been made; hence 
Sheehan dwelt on Fisher's Education Bill and franchise reform, and Goodman 
responded to a ministerial speech. Specific references tended to be made in written 
rather than spoken propaganda, over which the NWAC had editorial control. 
Furthermore, speakers' instructions stressed that speakers `must not refer to any 
questions of ordinary party controversy'. 
72 While allusions to a better world or nation 
or to general societal reform were acceptable, speakers (usually representing a 
particular party) could not discuss reform in detail, since much of it was susceptible to 
differing interpretations. Nevertheless, the combination of civilisational aspirations 
for a better world, acknowledgement of individual grievances and the need for reform 
at home, alongside limited discussion of specific reforms, was sufficient to provide an 
optimistic element within the NWAC's narrative, recognising that civilians needed 
not just reminders of what they were working to defend but also of the beneficial 
possibilities of development beyond pre-war conditions which victory promised. 
71 [Sheehan, ] `War and Westminster', North Devon Herald, 7/11/18, p. 6. 
72 TNA: PRO T102/16, `National War Aims Committee. Report up to 8th December 1917'. 
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Aspirational patriotism was the final element of the NWAC's patriotic master- 
narrative. Discussion of civic patriotism, the concrescent community and sacrificial 
patriotism portrayed duty as the cornerstone of British patriotism. Proprietorial 
patriotism established several key civilisational values, shared with other nations but 
over which, supposedly, Britain could claim particular ownership and, as such, owed 
a particular duty to defend. Supranational patriotism contextualised both Britain's war 
efforts and its civilisational credentials, offering encouragement that British ideals 
were held also by numerous powerful allies, and providing a means of demanding 
further efforts through evocations of civilian contributions elsewhere. Adversarial 
patriotism enabled the NWAC to identify several adversaries, external and internal, 
who threatened the continuing vitality of these ideals, whether through militaristic or 
revolutionary (external), or moral (internal) destructiveness, which could be flexibly 
tailored to inspire fear or disgust. Spiritual patriotism generally acted as a comforting 
rhetoric, feeding off and inflecting other sub-patriotisms. Aspirational patriotism 
completed the NWAC's evocation of civilian experience by providing several reasons 
for continuing civilian optimism. Discussion of a `world without war', in which 
militarism was eradicated and a League of Nations established to ensure international 
harmony, offered assurances that all the wartime discomfort and loss would serve a 
wider purpose for humanity of which individuals could be proud, rather than being the 
potentially renewable consequence of international power-politics. Suffering for a 
wider humanity was all very well but, as the other element of aspirational patriotic 
rhetoric demonstrated, NWAC propagandists recognised the necessity to offer British 
civilians encouragement through tangible improvements to their own communities, 
which would not only preserve Britain's way of life but enhance it. Aspirational 
patriotism amounted to a negotiation between the state and civilians, trading wartime 
278 
service for post-war rewards. The ultimate purpose of NWAC propaganda was to 
maintain, and where necessary remobilise, civilian patriotism and morale sufficiently 
to enable Britain to see the war through to victory. The next section considers the 
NWAC's reception and influence, but it may be surmised here that the 
implementation of aspirational patriotic rhetoric, encouraging increased civilian 




The reception of the NWAC 
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Chapter 10: Parliament, pressure groups, the national press and the 
NWAC 
Hitherto it has been both the theory and the practice of our constitutional 
organisation that public opinion should form itself under the influences of the 
free agencies of the Press, the Platform, the Theatre and of Literature, and that 
the public opinion thus formed should shape both Government and its policy. It 
is a dangerous innovation that the process should be reversed and that 
Government should set itself to shape public opinion otherwise than by the 
public utterances and actions of the statesmen who compose it. It may be 
excusable in a time of crisis like the present, but its ulterior possibilities cannot 
be overlooked. - Staffs Committee: War Aims Committee + Information Ministry, 
Report of Sub-Committee' 
Notwithstanding the generally-agreed importance of maintaining civilian 
morale, the existence of a publicly-funded body intended to persuade civilians to act 
and think in certain ways offered troubling possibilities of future exploitation. The 
following two chapters consider the NWAC's reception. Chapter 11 considers local 
responses to the NWAC and its propaganda by individuals and the local press. This 
chapter discusses the reactions of Parliamentarians, pressure groups and the national 
press. It examines the debates on the NWAC in the House of Commons on 13 
November and 14 December 1917, and in the House of Lords on 8 May 1918. It then 
offers a wider discussion of MPs' views before considering the discussion of the 
NWAC in the national press and by pressure groups like the UDC and BWL. Though 
commentary was rarely flattering, the continuing involvement of many MPs as 
NWAC speakers, alongside its declining discussion in later months, suggest it 
became, to some extent, an accepted (or tolerated) part of the wartime scenery. 
Brock Millman suggests that, had the war extended beyond 1918, Lloyd 
George's government might have created a Britain where `national life would move to 
a beat established by a universal and uniform propaganda system in which functional 
distinctions between the government, the NWAC and the private press would cease to 
1 TNA: PRO TI/12292, file 10179. 
281 
have any meanings at all'. ' However, there is little contemporary evidence that 
prominent Parliamentarians or pressmen, even those - like Snowden, MacDonald or 
Ponsonby, or H. W. Massingham at The Nation - who prominently dissented from 
government policy, were very seriously beset by such fears. While concerns about 
civil liberties were expressed, much opposition to the NWAC related to more prosaic 
fears of future electoral advantage. Major-General Sir George Aston, who had been 
involved with the NWAC's operations, noted that `[p]arty politicians are suspicious 
folk, unwilling to trust any Government with money to spend on propaganda, for fear 
that they will spend it in their own interests, rather than in the country's'. 3 The Daily 
News & Leader's Liberal editor, A. G. Gardiner, assumed that the NWAC would be 
maintained by party funds. In September 1917, he suggested: 
No question is likely to be raised of the value of sound propaganda work to the Allied 
cause... Of course, if it were the intention to throw the costs upon the public funds, 
the taxpayer would have had a just right to complain... The political parties are doing 
nothing: their funds must have been steadily increasing in the last three or four years. 
Patriotism and common-sense alike dictate their employment on so natural and 
suitable an object as national propaganda. 
Despite his intense distrust of Lloyd George's attempts to influence public opinion, 
Gardiner admitted no hostility to domestic propaganda, nor that Carson's appointment 
as Cabinet liaison `stamps [it] as purely Government work'. 4 However, he felt the 
appropriate funders were the parties, seemingly drawing little distinction between this 
and standard electoral propaganda. The difficulty was that, while willing to provide 
2 Millman, Managing, p. 253. 
3 Sir George Aston, `Propaganda - and the Father of It', Cornhill Magazine, 48: 284 (1920), p. 240. 
4 `The New Propaganda', Daily News & Leader [henceforth Daily News], 19/9/17, p. 2. Stephen Koss, 
Fleet Street Radical: A. G. Gardiner and the Daily News (London, 1973), pp. 168-242. 
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premises, manpower and expertise, neither of the two largest parties were prepared to 
finance NWAC activities. 
Consequently, Parliament was asked to approve Treasury funding. At the 
Committee stage in November 1917, in a debate lasting more than three hours, the 
principal objection was the potential political advantage which could accrue to the 
government from controlling such a publicly-funded organisation. This was bolstered 
by objections to the presentation of a token vote, rather than a full estimate, which 
limited Parliament's ability to check expenditure. Several Members criticised the 
quality or value of NWAC propaganda, while some also highlighted the threat the 
organisation posed to civil liberties. 
Perhaps surprisingly, the first critic was not a `pacifist' MP, but the City of 
London Conservative, Sir Frederick Banbury. Banbury doubted `anyone would cavil 
at the expenditure' but demanded a full estimate. Further, he strongly protested 
against this use of public money for political agents. To set up a Committee... and 
then to take money which is not accounted for to Parliament and distribute it amongst 
the various political agents, under the auspices of the Whips, is a very dangerous 
precedent.. 
Banbury feared the subsidisation of party machinery by public funds. By accepting a 
token vote, he implied, Parliament became liable for the upkeep of party staffs. This, 
said the `pacifist' Liberal Joseph King, was `a perfect scandal, a mass of jobbery'. 
The proposals were also mildly rebuked by the former wartime Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, Reginald McKenna, who noted that the NWAC, while representing `the 
5 Speech of Sir Frederick Banbury, PDC(5), 99 (13/11/17), cols. 292-6. Subsequent references to this 
debate are from this volume. 
6 Col. 324. 
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views of the vast majority of the country[, ] does not represent the whole of the 
country'. McKenna thus reiterated that party funds were the best way `to instruct 
public opinion upon party questions'. McKenna denied that the NWAC's cross-party 
composition elevated it above party politics, equating its work with `a Budget 
campaign, a land campaign, and a House of Lords campaign', all of which the Liberal 
party had subsidised.? This was the root of parliamentary opposition to the funding. 
Despite Carson's rejoinder that the NWAC's work was `not a party purpose [but] a 
national purpose', 8 most speakers judged that since its major intention - counteracting 
`pacifist' propaganda - placed it in opposition to a section of MPs, public funding 
advantaged one section of the House against another. 
Naturally, this point was made most stridently by those who felt themselves 
targeted by the NWAC. The UDC founder, Charles Trevelyan, asserted that the public 
money requested was `directed against us'. He considered it `a party political move', 
employing `public money for a political purpose. ' Trevelyan warned the House that: 
you are setting a precedent of attacking, with public money, what you say is a 
comparatively insignificant movement[, ]... which will allow [a future] Socialist 
Government - or any other Government of the sort you dislike - to use public 
money... for its own party purposes... 
I implore Members of this House, whether we here are right or wrong, to 
consider whether it ought to have a campaign waged against us... paid out of the 
public purse? 9 
Trevelyan's colleague, the disillusioned Liberal Robert Outhwaite, suggested that, 
7 Cols. 308-11. 
8 Col. 314. 
9 Cols. 302-5. 
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despite Guest's assurance that the NWAC's purpose was not to `support or defend the 
Government', the money would be used corruptly for `keeping this Government in 
office' should public opinion turn against it. 1° Extending these arguments, the Liberal 
MP for Coventry, David Mason, said it was inappropriate for the majority to seek to 
stifle minority views, either inside or outside Parliament. Mason, who though outside 
the `pacifist' Parliamentary group (see table 7) retained strong affinities with them, 
having become an `independent, anti-war Liberal' in 1914,11 suggested that the public 
included people sympathetic to the `pacifist' Parliamentary minority who would be 
obliged to subsidise the suppression of their own views: 
There are eight or ten hon. Members on the second bench opposite who represent a 
considerable section of opinion in the country, and though the House may not agree 
with their views, you have no right to use public funds to advance a propaganda 
which is not in accordance with the views which they are not allowed to express in 
this House. This seems to me to be a most vicious principle... a premium on 
corruption. 
12 
This was the major concern for MPs. While most speakers acknowledged the right 
and appropriateness - sometimes the necessity - of instructing public opinion, there 
was considerable resistance to using taxpayers' money to fund the suppression of 
minority opinion. Trevelyan's reference to a future socialist government (a point 
echoed by Mason) sought to demonstrate the proposal's illiberality. Despite a 
supporter's claim that the vote constituted no precedent since it was an emergency 
war measure, and McNeill's claim that if the Committee was `doing party work out of 
10 Speeches of Capt. Guest, col. 287; Robert Outhwaite, col. 320. 
1 Harris, Out of Control, p. 203; Edward David, `The Liberal Party Divided 1916-1918', Historical 
Journal, 13: 3 (1970), p. 513, n. 11; Stenton and Lees, Who's Who, p. 240. 
12 Cols. 324-6. 
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public funds' then it was the work of a party `composed of the nation itself against 
one `deliberately attempting to frustrate the will of the nation', 13 such an appearance 
of limiting free speech was somewhat troubling. `Pacifist' MPs like Trevelyan utilised 
an `oppositional' patriotism, recalling earlier radical interpretations which saw the 
active holding to account of governments as `true patriotism'. During the war, 
exponents of this oppositional patriotism held that `the government at war was not the 
nation, and misrepresented its interests', especially by `the suppression of English 
liberties through the restriction of anti-war activities'. 14 In February 1917, for 
instance, Lady Margaret Sackville had condemned press jingoism, which 
`narrowed... love of England to a barren nationalism, which bickers and quarrels and 
shouts and slanders like a drunken fish-wife'. The UDC, by contrast, cared for the 
`true England' - its `wide tolerance', `generosity', `humour', `humanity and richness 
of outlook'. 15 
Beyond this, several MPs criticised the quality of NWAC propaganda, 
suggesting it was unworthy of public support. The Liberal Alexander Whyte 
(Parliamentary Private Secretary to Churchill until 1915) said that the use of public 
money for distributing pamphlets which were virtually a `gramophone for the "Daily 
Mail"' was a `public scandal'. 16 Arthur Ponsonby complained that he had seen sixteen 
NWAC leaflets, which consisted of `snippets' of speeches, `two pictures from 
"Punch, " and a number of leaflets describing German atrocities'. He criticised the 
`reckless' wastefulness of the distribution, claiming that 250,000 pamphlets had been 
sent to a recent by-election, and adding that NWAC meetings had `not been a very 
13 Speeches of Commander Carlyon Bellairs, cols. 321-3; Ronald McNeill, col. 340. 
14 Ward, Red Flag, pp. 132-3. 
15 Lady Margaret Sackville, `Patriotism', U. D. C, 2: 4, February 1917, p. 46. 
16 Cols. 296-7. 
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striking success'. " The most damning verdict was offered by the Liberal John 
Whitehouse (who became a member of the UDC's General Council on 31 October 
1918). 18 He argued that NWAC propaganda was `unworthy of this country... of any 
country. It makes an appeal to... the fleeting passions that sometimes sweep over the 
world'. Whitehouse suggested it should instead emphasise the steps taken to preserve 
peace in the future, including the League of Nations. He urged Guest `not to use this 
propaganda to increase the hatred of the world, but to make it constructive, and to 
show us how all may be led into the paths of peace'. 
19 Despite McNeill's attempt to 
brush aside Whitehouse's criticism, such specific denunciation was probably useful to 
the NWAC. If propagandists did not cease to condemn German behaviour they did 
present a much wider discussion than that criticised in Parliament. 
This extensive criticism of NWAC propaganda and its purposes 
notwithstanding, a vote on an amendment to limit funding to £900 was defeated by 
132 votes to 22 (plus two tellers). While critical comments were made by non- 
`pacifist' MPs like Banbury, McKenna, and Timothy Davies, the majority derived 
from that opposition bloc. An article in The U. D. C. numbered this group at eleven, 
with four additional `semi-detached members' (King, Chancellor, Harvey and 
Arnold), but overlooked Richard Denman, an UDC General Council member in 1917 
as well as Richard Holt and Noel Buxton who had close ties to the group. Other MPs 
who voted to limit NWAC funding also had links to the group, but were less 
prominent, like Mason, Percy Molteno, John Burns (a `silent' supporter) and the 
" Cols. 298-9. Similar criticisms were offered by Tyson Wilson, Noel Buxton and Philip Morrell. On 
NWAC involvement at by-elections: TNA: PRO T 102/14, letter (unsigned) to Edward Turton, MP, 
25/4/18, re. his promise to speak at South Hereford by-election. 
18 `Fourth Annual General Meeting of the U. D. C. ', U. D. C, 4: 2, December 1918, p. 287. 
19 Cols. 336-8. 
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Welsh Liberal nationalist (soon to convert to Labour) Edward John. 23 Of the twenty- 
four MPs who voted for the amendment, only two - the unopposed Conservative, 
Banbury, and the radical Sydney Arnold (later a `Wee Free' Liberal), 24 who defeated 
a Coalition Conservative and an ILP candidate at Penistone - retained their 
Parliamentary places. Eight retired (temporarily in the case of Denman and Harvey), 
and the other fourteen lost their seats (all except Whitehouse to Coalition candidates). 
Of those who defended the Committee, four (Guest, Greenwood, Cowan and 
McNeill) were members, Carson was its Cabinet liaison, and only three, the 
Conservative Chairman Sir George Younger, Commander Carlyon Bellairs and 
Clement Edwards - who welcomed any stick with which to beat `pacifists' - acted 
independently. Yet they obtained a comfortable majority. This suggests that, for many 
MPs, Treasury funding of domestic propaganda was uncontroversial. The apparent 
mood was one of tolerant indifference towards the Committee. Sanders noted that, 
despite Guest's weak advocacy, `eventually only 22 voted against it', 25 perhaps 
indicating that he had expected more opposition. 
Upon its second reading, on 14 December, the token vote received 
substantially similar criticism as previously over four hours. Critics like Whitehouse, 
Outhwaite and Mason again condemned the means by which the money was sought 
and spent. Beginning the debate, the anti-conscriptionist, Leif Jones, reiterated the 
view that it was `essentially corrupt... for the Government of the day to use the funds 
at its disposal to push purposes which are not entirely national purposes'; that the 
propaganda was inappropriate, including the advocacy of tariff reform, and in some 
23 Swanwick, Builders of Peace, pp. 34-5; David, `Liberal Party Divided', pp. 513-4,523; (on 
Molteno); Harris, Out of Control, p. 203 (on Mason and Molteno); Taylor, Troublemakers, p. 133 (on 
Burns); Kenneth O. Morgan, `Peace Movements in Wales, 1899-1945', Welsh History Review, 10 
(1981), pp. 412-6 (on John). 
24 Wilson, Downfall, pp. 177,189. 
25 Sanders diary, 17/11/17, in Ramsden, Tory Politics, p. 91. 
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cases `vulgar and inane'; and claimed that NWAC operations compromised press 
freedom. Jones said Treasury funds were being used to place advertisements in 
newspapers, but were withheld from those whose `views are obnoxious' to the 
NWAC's executive. He condemned this as `a very dangerous, corrupting power... 
liable to misuse at any moment', a point reiterated by Whitehouse. 26 Replying for the 
Committee, Sanders suggested that private subsidisation would have undermined its 
effectiveness through suggestions that it was beholden to the rich, and that the parties 
had refused to supply the money. Seeking to reassure critics about the costs, Sanders 
revealed that the NWAC had spent considerably less than their estimates, and that 
local committees had to submit estimates ahead of meetings. Furthermore, though 
some of the propaganda might be considered of dubious quality, `experienced 
political organisers' assured him `that speeches and pamphlets, and what for some 
absurd reason we call literature', did influence public opinion, and that it was 
important to respond when criticism was expressed elsewhere. 27 Sanders' insouciance, 
intended to placate critics, instead encouraged Molteno to insist that Sanders had `no 
belief in the propaganda' and could therefore make no justified demand for public 
funds. 28 
Later, the UDC member Richard Holt added his dissent. `This', he said: 
is a proposal to propagate certain views held by a majority, but it is rather remarkable 
that, coincident with this propaganda, we have an attempt made to prevent the 
expression of the opposite view. 
29 
zb Speech of Leif Jones, PDC(5), Vol. (14/12/17), cols. 1515-25; Whitehouse, cols. 1539-43. 
Subsequent references to the debate are from this volume. 
27 Cols. 1525-31. 
28 Cols. 1531-2. 
29 Col. 1578. 
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Holt's criticism related to the introduction of Defence of the Realm Regulation (DRR) 
27c in mid-November, requiring that every pamphlet include the author's name and 
address and be presented to the Press Bureau for possible censorship before 
publication, as should any new newspaper or periodical established after 18 
November. NWAC publications, however, were exempt from these requirements, 
demonstrating to critics that the measure simply attempted to reduce critical 
publications by intimidation 30 This, together with the proposed disfranchisement of 
conscientious objectors, represented to Holt the `growing spirit of oppression by the 
Tory-jingo knock out blow lot'. 31 Holt asked whether the Treasury bench believed 
NWAC propaganda 
should be carried into any constituency in which there is likely to be an election, or 
... 
be carried on during the period of a General Election?... I cannot help entertaining 
a suspicion that the reason why the estimate has not been produced... is the fact that 
we might find ourselves carrying on an electioneering campaign on the strength of 
this Vote. 
Further, he wanted to know whether the vote would be rescinded if the Committee 
ceased to represent all (non-Irish) parties in the House. 
32 Shortly before the token 
vote's successful passage, Guest assented to Herbert Samuel's demand for a `definite 
assurance' of a `policy of not conducting any propaganda of any sort in connection 
with either a by-election or a general election'. Samuel also expressed relief that 
Carson had denied that he controlled the NWAC, since `some of his speeches have 
30 Questions by Ponsonby (19/11/17) and W. C. Anderson (23/11/17) in PDC(5), 99, cots. 850,1531. 
For a disinterested condemnation, see the Manchester Guardian's editorials, 16,21,27 and 29 
November. 
31 Holt diary, 22/11/17, in Dutton, Odyssey, p. 51. 
32 PDC(5), 101 (14/12/17), cols. 1578-9. 
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not commanded absolutely universal confidence', and the NWAC would be most 
successful if it represented `the concensus [sic] of opinion of the various schools of 
thought'. 
33 
Carson's involvement clearly harmed the NWAC's reputation amongst MPs 
(and much of the press). He was too divisive a figure and too strident an orator to act 
as an effective administrator for the NWAC, though critics amplified his role beyond 
its real function as a conduit to the War Cabinet. The Committee-member Walter Rea 
was told by Wallace Carter as early as September 1917 that there was `a growing 
tendency for Labour to stand aloof and when it is generally known that Sir Edward 
Carson is a member of the Committee our difficulties are likely to be increased'. 34 The 
Nation lamented that Carson, previously `denounced' as a rebel `conspiring to 
overthrow law' now `dominate[d] the country' by directing the NWAC and 
suppressing the statement of war aims, while Labour Leader suggested that `Pacifist 
England was to him but another Sinn Fein Ireland - needing a Dublin Castle to 
destroy it! %35 Carson's part in the armed opposition to Irish Home Rule rendered him 
unfit, in many eyes, for a position of governmental responsibility. Those who 
celebrated his resignation from Cabinet and propaganda duties in January 1918 were 
hardly comforted, however, by the installation of Beaverbrook (an unprincipled 
`intriguer first, last & always', as Gardiner remarked in 1942, retaining his earlier 
animosity) as Minister of Information. 
36 While the NWAC remained outside his 
control, preserving a fig-leaf of independence from the government, Beaverbrook 
made every effort to absorb it until finally instructed by the War Cabinet in March 
that it was to remain separate. The NWAC also rebuffed his attempt to have a 
33 Cols. 1592-3. 
34 TNA: PRO T102/12, Wallace Carter to Rea, 15/9/17. 
35 `The New Magnificat', Nation, 22/12/17, pp. 407-8; `Suppressing the Pacifists - And Freedom! ', 
Labour Leader, 22/11/17, p. 5. 
36 Koss, Gardiner, p. 246. 
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sympathetic MP, the Conservative J. A. Grant, appointed to the Committee to oversee 
its operations. 37 
Nonetheless, domestic propaganda was commonly elided with Beaverbrook's 
actual function by parliamentarians, the press and the public. 
38 In the House of Lords 
in May, the Earl of Denbigh -a prominent NWAC speaker - concluded a long 
exposition of the continuing menace of pacifism in Britain with a resolution regretting 
`that stronger measures have not been taken to combat the various agencies in this 
country who are serving the cause of the enemy' 
39 Denbigh was seconded by Lord 
Beresford, who hoped Beaverbrook would `use propaganda in every way he can to let 
the people of this country know the tremendous danger the pacifists are in our 
midst' 40 Beaverbrook was obliged to explain that while his Ministry could `assist and 
support propaganda at home', its direction was the NWAC's responsibility. 
41 When 
Denbigh again complained in the Times, Beaverbrook provided the official response, 
outlining the NWAC's difficulties. Because of its all-party composition it had to avoid 
discussing issues of party controversy and had instead to `be content to preach the 
general doctrines of patriotism'. Beaverbrook suggested that it was a `lesser evil' to 
leave things as they were `than to stir the embers of party dissension by making that 
committee a Government office directly responsible to Parliament in the usual way'. 
2 
Seizing the opportunity, the BWL executive wrote to the Times to boast that they were 
holding `thousands' of meetings and reassure Denbigh that `there is at least one 
workers' organisation that is carrying on patriotic propaganda with energy and 
37 PA, Beaverbrook papers, BBK/E/3/8, memoranda, February-October 1918; BBK/E/3/9, 
correspondence with Grant, c. 5-26/3/18; Sanders and Taylor, British Propaganda, pp. 79-80. 
38 E. g., TNA: PRO T102/1, letters to Beaverbrook by Rose Belcher, 25/4/18; Dorothy Bates, 14/9/18. 
39 Speech of the Earl of Denbigh, Parliamentary Debates (Lords), 5th series, 29, cols. 1009-18. All 
subsequent references to debate from this volume. 
40 Col. 1023. 
41 Cols. 1023-8. 
42 `National War Aims. Lord Beaverbrook on Home Propaganda. ' Times, 22/5/18, p. 7. 
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enthusiasm', demonstrating once again that the BWL and NWAC were not nearly so 
close as Millman suggests 43 
Occasional broadsides in the House of Commons in 1918 continued to decry 
the `fiddling and idiotic waste of public money' by what Ponsonby described as `an 
extravagant fiasco', but there was no further extended discussion of the NWAC. 
Apart from some enquiries into the number of meetings held and pamphlets 
distributed, often from the stridently anti-'pacifist' Conservative, Charles Yate, which 
enabled Committee-members to demonstrate their continuing strenuous activities, 45 
MPs seemingly maintained their tolerant indifference to the NWAC and its 
propaganda. That well over one hundred MPs, of varied political outlooks, consented 
to speak or write for the NWAC over its fifteen-month existence suggests the silence 
of many during the debates was more one of endorsement than opposition (as does the 
heavy defeat of the November amendment). 6 Though some MPs, like Sir Archibald 
Stirling, may have been `not very keen on War Aims meetings' because they were 
`wholly unnecessary' and because of perceived bad treatment during the National 
Service campaign of early 1917, others, like George Peel, were markedly enthusiastic. 
Indeed, MPs sometimes actively sought NWAC assistance. The Conservative MP for 
Denbigh, Captain William Ormsby-Gore, wrote to ask Cox what was being arranged 
there. Similarly, Churchill, as Minister of Munitions, asked Guest in May 1918 to 
provide speakers in Cumberland, not to `deal with any controversial topic [like trade 
43 J. A. Seddon, J. F. Green and Victor Fisher `War Aims' (letter), Times, 23/5/18, p. 7; Millman, 
Managing, esp. pp. 232,245-6. 
44 Speech of John Henderson, PDC(5), 107 (19/6/18), col. 423; question by Ponsonby, PDC(5), 108 
(9/7/18), col. 171. 
45 E. g. questions by Yate, PDC(5), 107 (18/6/18), cols. 180-1 - answered by Parker; 108 (9/7/18), cols. 
170-1, (16/7/18), cols. 886-7 - answered by Guest. On Yate's anti-'pacifism', see his correspondence 
with the Home Secretary, December 1917-January 1918: TNA: PRO H045/10743/263275/300,307. 
46 See pp. 67-9 above for party affiliation statistics. The number of MPs who spoke at meetings may 
considerably exceed those in the incomplete meetings register. For instance, neither Francis Edwards 
(who spoke for the NWAC at Llandrindod Wells) nor W. H. Somervell (at Keighley) were recorded on 
the register. 
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disputes] whatever... [but] to explain the military situation and the need for effort ' 47 
The Asquithian Liberal Aneurin Williams, meanwhile, sought to influence the content 
of NWAC propaganda. As chairman of the Armenian Refugees Lord Mayor's Fund, 
Williams told Greenwood that Armenia should receive equal discussion to Belgium or 
Serbia, and that arrangements could be made for Armenian speakers, subject to 
expense 48 Even some moderate critics, like McKenna and Herbert Samuel, who 
expressed reservations about certain issues during the debates, spoke at NWAC 
events, strengthening the supposition that the Committee had the tacit endorsement of 
most MPs 49 Similarly, the `pacificist', anti-conscription, Asquithian Liberal W. 
Llewellyn Williams, despite an apparently `almost pathological' dislike for Lloyd 
George, spoke at several NWAC events, suggesting that his supposed `recruitment' to 
the `critics of the war' was at most partial 50 If some, like Asquith, `spoke with more 
satisfaction than I generally feel' at these meetings, 
51 the fact of their having done so 
demonstrates that many were either untroubled about the propriety of government- 
funded propaganda or else considered such scruples secondary to patriotic duty. 
Politicians' general indifference towards the NWAC was mirrored in print. 
Those MPs who wrote about it in the press belonged to the noisy dissenting minority. 
Condemning the eventual acceptance of the NWAC's token vote, Philip Snowden 
labelled the Committee `a grotesque and ludicrous absurdity' which had failed `to 
4' TNA: PRO T102/13, Stirling to Vesey, 2/11/17; T102/11, Peel to Wallace Carter, 13/2/18; T102/5, 
Ormsby-Gore to Cox, 7/12/17; T102/2, Churchill to Guest, 24/5/18. 
48 TNA: PRO T102/1, Williams to Greenwood, 22/11/17. See also the encouraging response to 
Williams' suggestion: T102/15, letter, unsigned (Wallace Carter) to Williams, 17/12/17. 
49 McKenna was scheduled to speak in East Denbigh, while Samuel took meetings in Cleveland and 
Paddington. TNA: PRO T102/17, nos. 143-4,865,921. Cf., however, the letter from Vesey to Donald 
McMaster, MP, 22/2/18, regarding the increasing difficulty of getting MPs to speak at meetings by 
February: T102/8. 
50 Williams was scheduled for twenty-one separate campaigns. E. g., TNA: PRO T102/17, nos. 738, 
1675. On Williams' views, see Morgan, `Peace Movements', pp. 409-12. A `pacificist' differed from a 
`pacifist' in believing that war was `sometimes necessary' but should at all costs be avoided where 
possible. Martin Ceadel, Pacifism in Britain 1914-1945: The Defining of a Faith, (Oxford, 
1980), p. 3. 
Desmond McCarthy (ed. ), H. H. A.: Letters to a Friend, First Series, 1915-1922 (London, 1933), 
letter, 28/9/17, p. 35. 
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arouse any public interest in their campaign [while] their meetings, as a rule, are 
miserable fiascos'. Speakers used a scripted address and were `expressly forbidden' to 
take questions in case their answers betrayed ignorance or offered inappropriate 
information, while NWAC pamphlets contained `hackneyed and meaningless phrases 
about the destruction of Prussian militarism' intended `to excite a hatred and a passion 
against the enemy' by recycling disproved atrocity stories. 
52 Ramsay MacDonald had 
made similar criticisms in the Leicester Pioneer. He argued that the Committee's 
purpose was to bolster the political position of jingoistic MPs, but insisted that 
`Government-made opinions advocated by Government-controlled speakers and 
Government-paid propagandists will have no weight in the country'. He suggested the 
government would not seek unlimited funding `to combat ideas unless it [was] afraid 
of these ideas and [was] being beaten by them' 
5.3 Elsewhere, he highlighted the 
ideological inconsistency of NWAC propaganda. Contradicting Snowden's claim that 
speakers followed a script, MacDonald noted that `no two speakers say the same 
thing' and that the NWAC generally discussed peace rather than war aims. These 
`desirable ends' constituted `a programme of reforms which no war can ever carry 
out' and, in MacDonald's view, confirmed a `tendency to keep the war going by 
classing as war aims every democratic reform we want to see... in Europe'. 
54 The 
NWAC's purpose, in this interpretation, was less the maintenance of civilian morale 
to facilitate victory than of war as a permanent status quo. 
`Pacifist' critics tended to exhibit a complacent contempt for the NWAC's 
efforts in their public utterances, suggesting a strategic attempt to undermine it by 
apparent insouciance. Thus MacDonald encouraged Labour Leader readers to buy 
52 Snowden, `Review of the Week', Labour Leader, 20/12/17, p. 1. For the significance of his 
allegation of scripted speeches, see the discussion of political meetings in Lawrence, Speaking. 
53 MacDonald, `From Green Benches', Leicester Pioneer, 16/11/17, p. 4. 
54 MacDonald, "`War Aims"', The Free Man, 7, Nov. 1917, p. 1. A copy is at BLPES, ILP papers, 
ILP/6/17/4. 
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McCurdy's NWAC pamphlet The Truth about the Secret Treaties, because its blend 
of misleading discussion and deliberate omissions of fact provided excellent material 
`to expose the methods of the peace-at-no-price party'. McCurdy was `so busy 
addressing War Aims meetings, that he has not had the leisure to understand any of 
the questions upon which he speaks', therefore rendering him more useful as a 
credulous `Government apologist and advocate' 5.5 However, MacDonald's note in his 
diary of `a vote passed to corrupt public opinion under the guise of War Aims 
propaganda' did not suggest such unconcern. 56 Nor, unsurprisingly, did his public 
reactions to the violent disruption of his May Day 1918 demonstration in Leicester. 57 
In an angry speech the next day, MacDonald labelled the NWAC a `fraudulent 
organisation' which tried to `flout the claims of organised labour' because the local 
committee `was composed almost entirely of men opposed to trades unionism', some 
of them `sweaters'. 58 In the Pioneer, MacDonald attributed the `ignorant, rowdy, 
loud-mouthed' counter-demonstration to central funding, and encouraged `Mr. Guest 
to hire it for general exhibition in the country'. Shortly thereafter, he castigated the 
NWAC's `paid touts and cheap jack orators who will espouse any cause for a fee' 
adding that it was fraudulent because it deliberately withheld `information which was 
essential if it did its work', particularly details of the secret treaties. 59 If `pacifist' 
criticism in the press was generally muted and mocking, therefore, MacDonald's 
reaction to provocation in his own constituency suggests that `pacifists' were not quite 
so relaxed about the NWAC as they claimed. 
Nonetheless, mockery remained a potent technique for the NWAC's critics. 
" MacDonald, `Mr. McCurdy's "Secret Treaties. "', Labour Leader, 18/7/18, p. 5. 
56 TNA: PRO, MacDonald papers, PRO30/69/1753/1, diary, 13/11/17. 
S' See pp. 150-2. 
58 `Women's Labour League. Mr. MacDonald and Sunday's Meeting. ', Leicester Daily Mercury, 
7/5/18, p. 2. 
59 MacDonald, `From Green Benches', Leicester Pioneer, 10/5/18; 24/5/18, both p. 4. 
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MacDonald's UDC colleague, J. A. Hobson, provided the most bitingly satirical 
condemnation of the Committee. In `War Aims: 1920', one of a series of unsigned 
articles produced for The Nation in 1917,60 Hobson imagined a conversation between 
`Charteris', a man keen to understand Britain's war aims, and `Poynton', a NWAC- 
member whose response to Charteris' complaint that he could not find an `explicit, 
and intelligible' statement of war aims was: 
"I should hope not. Why, the whole effort of our Committee is devoted to baulking 
the curiosity of people who are not satisfied to see the show, but want to go behind 
and see how it is worked... 
The people are quite satisfied with what you call our rhetorical stunts about 
the liberation of small peoples, the rescue of the world from German domination, 
making the world safe for democracy, and so forth... It is just fellows like you who 
try to butt in and spoil the game. , 61 
The NWAC's purposes, Poynton explains, are to maintain national unity by avoiding 
difficult or controversial questions like economic protection or a fully-developed 
commitment to the League of Nations; to maintain Allied unity by avoiding awkward 
discussions of territorial claims; and to prevent the enemy from knowing Britain's 
aims since `He might accept them, and then where would our war be? ' Eventually, 
Charteris is warned that `this talk about aims that are definite and intelligible is 
treasonable' as it would interfere with the unified prosecution of the war. For Hobson, 
the Committee's raison d'etre was to prevent the war's resolution by obfuscating 
Britain's war aims sufficiently that no possibility of facilitating discussion remained. 
60 On Hobson's authorship: Swanwick, Builders of Peace, p. 183. 
61 [Hobson, ] `War Aims: 1920', Nation, 24/11/17, pp. 266-7. 
299 
The NWAC's patriotic narrative consisted of platitudes designed to confound critical 
enquiry. NWAC discussion of the League of Nations was conducted from a `safe 
Utopian elevation' rather than `the ground of real and immediate politics'. Hobson's 
view was that such propaganda contained no intellectual or ideological commitment, 
merely gestures toward liberal ideals. As another of his characters commented, `truth 
is a raw material, infinitely malleable and adaptable to the uses of the State'. 2 Once 
again, Hobson's attack revealed an alternative interpretation of patriotism, which 
considered the close scrutiny of governmental action essential, even in wartime, to the 
maintenance of Britain's moral world leadership. 
While the UDC was understandably hostile to the NWAC, other pressure 
groups made different judgements. BWL involvement with the NWAC, while not as 
extensive and malevolent as Millman contends, partly counterbalanced the 
disapproval of pressure groups like the UDC, and its support was augmented by other 
somewhat right-wing `patriotic' groups (or their members) like the British Empire 
Producers' Organisation and the `Never Forget and Never Forgive League'. A 
representative of Havelock Wilson's National Sailors' and Firemen's Union (NSFU, 
previously responsible for preventing MacDonald and F. W. Jowett from travelling to 
the Stockholm socialist conference), meanwhile, asked for seventy-eight copies of a 
poster depicting `British Sailors in Germany with their heads shaved' to hang in each 
of its branch offices. While such right-wing associations were problematic for the 
NWAC's picture of an united Britain, the NSFU (in particular) had considerable 
reach, its nationwide offices purportedly `cover[ing] the seafaring population of Great 
Britain'. 63 They thus constituted an influential endorsement of the NWAC, albeit one 
62 `Lucian' [Hobson], `The Laboratory of War-Truth: 1920', Nation, 27/10/17, pp. 118-9. 
63 TNA: PRO T102/4, F. W. W. Fisher (British Empire Producers' Organisation) to Pembroke Wickes, 
5/10/17; Robert Forsyth ('Never Forget & Never Forgive League'), 19/8/17; T102/7, John Kealey, 
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which the Committee did not have to work very hard to receive. 
The NWAC's establishment was also welcomed by some papers. The 
Conservative Morning Post, asserted that the `importance of [the Committee's]... 
work cannot be over-estimated', TM while in September its editor, H. A. Gwynne, urged 
the Committee and the government on to greater efforts, as did Robert Donald at the 
Daily Chronicle: 
We welcome its activities. A counter-propaganda was necessary to that of the 
pacifists, who are working with tireless assiduity. Judging by a dozen separate 
leaflets... the committee is doing its work with energy and intelligence... But it is not 
enough to circulate leaflets. There is need also for a vigorous propaganda on the 
platform... Opinion at home must be sustained and enlightened. 
65 
In commenting on the November debate Donald, who at this time enjoyed close 
contact with Lloyd George and, as a member of the Press Advisory Committee, knew 
more than most about the NWAC's administration, continued to offer supportive 
commentary. 66 He argued that home propaganda was `necessary'; that, since party 
funds were unavailable, the government was obliged to supply the finance; and that 
this was better than suppressing `mischievous criticism' in the press. 
67 In the British 
Citizen and Empire Worker (the organ of the BWL), meanwhile, Victor Fisher 
defended the token vote, but demanded more strident action against `pacifist' critics, 
National Sailors' and Firemen's Union to NWAC, 10/4/18- On the latter organisation's role in the 
Stockholm controversy: Lloyd George, Memoirs, IV, pp. 1896-8. 
64 `National War Aims. ', Morning Post [henceforth Post], 30/7/17, p. 6. 
65 `The Nation and the War', Daily Chronicle [henceforth Chronicle], 20/9/17, p. 2; `The Marplots', 
Post, 19/9/17. Note the continued fascination with public meetings, on which see pp. 55-8 above. 
66 On Donald's role: TNA: PRO INF4/4B, 7,9; Stephen Koss, The Rise and Fall of the Political Press 
in Britain, II, The Twentieth Century (London, 1984), pp. 315-6. 
67 `Making War Aims Known. ', Chronicle, 15/11/17, p. 2. 
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claiming that total war legitimised restrictions of free speech. 68 
Generally, however, press commentary was antagonistic. With the notable 
exception of Asquith's speeches at NWAC meetings, which newspapers of nearly all 
attitudes praised (though a NWAC meeting in Leeds antagonised both Lloyd George, 
who believed Asquith had exploited it to `make difficulties' for him, and the 
Women's Social and Political Union newspaper, Britannia, which boasted of having 
disrupted it and thus prevented him from reviving his popularity), 69 most of the 
commentary expressed disappointment, or worse, with the NWAC. Naturally, 
dissenting publications like Labour Leader and Common Sense were particularly 
strong critics, but so were other left-leaning papers, like the Daily News and 
Manchester Guardian. Perhaps most damagingly, Horatio Bottomley's John Bull 
offered sustained criticism of the NWAC. Some of this hostility may be attributed to 
the juxtaposition of the NWAC's government-sanctioned free expression with 
increasing restrictions elsewhere, following the introduction of DRR 27c. Such 
restrictions seemed like further evidence of a declining commitment to liberty. 70 This 
was put most caustically by The Nation: 
the Government dips one hand into the public purse for secret funds to subsidize its 
own War Aims campaign, while it chokes the throat of criticism with the other! ... 
The Government is to push its own propaganda of opinion by Press and 
public meetings and circular, using public money for the purpose, but opposing 
opinions are to be crushed by fines and imprisonment. That is one way of getting 
national unity. But what is the worth of a unity based upon ignorance, silence, and 
68 Fisher, `Maligrants and Malcontents. ', British Citizen and Empire Worker, 17/11/17, p. 305. 
69 Cp Scott, diary, 28/9/17, in Trevor Wilson (ed. ), The Political Diaries of C. P. Scott. 1911-1928 
(London, 1970), pp. 303-4; `Asquith Challenged', Britannia, 5/10/17, p. 143. 
70 Cf. Robert Coils, `Englishness and the Political Culture', in Coils and Dodd, Englishness. 
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repression[? ]71 
Access to Treasury funds was indispensable to the NWAC's continued operation but 
had the problematic side-effect of tying it more firmly to the government. Thus, 
although not responsible for either the introduction or administration of DRR 27c, it 
was guilty by association. However, journalistic disdain for restrictions on free speech 
cannot explain the volume of criticism the NWAC received. Individual papers and 
editors reacted according to their own expectations and imperatives. The Daily Mail, 
for instance, saw little value in the NWAC's stated purpose of counteracting 
`pacifists', believing that the Government should instead spend its money on their 
arrest and prosecution. Furthermore, the Committee's creation also demonstrated that 
the propaganda efforts of newspapers like the Mail were insufficient. It therefore said 
little about the Committee. 72 Some publications were implacably hostile from the 
outset whereas others became disappointed by the campaign's progress and effect. 
Even supporters like the Post and Chronicle soon expressed frustration with 
what they considered the NWAC's limited progress. In this was a certain elision 
between criticism of the Committee itself and the government. Gwynne blamed weak 
governmental leadership for the fact that `[n]ecessary measures have too often been 
belated or half-hearted', while Donald noted that many speeches by the most 
prominent politicians remained unpublished and therefore largely unknown, 
lamenting that the government had not realised much earlier the `need for a proper 
national propaganda at home'. 
3 Such limited criticisms were extended by Bottomley, 
self-appointed representative of the `man-in-the-street', and a direct rival to the 
71 `The Assassination of Opinion. ', Nation, 24/11/17, pp. 262-3. 
72 `Pacifist Poisoners. ', Daily Mail, 15/11/17, p. 2; `Pacifist Wreckers. Time to Stop Them. ', Daily 
Mail, 16/11/17, p. 2. 
73 'The Constant Mind', Post, 8/11/17, p. 6; `War Aims and War Propaganda', Chronicle, 20/12/17, p. 
4. 
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NWAC's patriotic activities. He described the NWAC in November 1917 as simply `a 
dodge for doctoring public opinion', a `pretext' for politicians to claim `that they have 
won the war' and scoffed at the suggested involvement of clergymen in the campaign, 
since they took no fighting part. 74 Through the winter, Bottomley's opinion worsened. 
In December, he twice called for the Committee to abandon `politicians' rhetoric' and 
`fine phrases' and provide a plain statement of terms. 75 
In January, Bottomley reported that he had told Lloyd George and Carson that 
the NWAC had `so far dismally failed in its purpose', and was surprised when Carson 
agreed with him. Bottomley `ridiculed the idea of holding packed little meetings' with 
`second-rate speakers'. Carson supposedly blamed the Committee's difficulties on its 
cross-party composition, which entailed `various political rivals watching each other 
in every move', prompting Bottomley to suggest the appointment of a single `Director 
of Propaganda' responsible to Lloyd George. However, Bottomley was `indifferent to 
the outcome' since, officially or otherwise, he was `proud to be the Tribune of the 
Man in the Street'. 76 This may substantially explain his antipathy to the NWAC. A 
national campaign to influence public opinion constituted a challenge to his self- 
proclaimed position as the voice of the people, or `divine omniscience'. 77 Bottomley 
toured the nation throughout the war giving patriotic speeches, sometimes without 
charge, but more often taking a substantial share of the meeting's proceeds, having 
realised he could `keep himself afloat financially by... patriotism'. 78 In early 1917, he 
had embarked on a lecture tour for which he obtained sixty-five to eighty-five percent 
of the gross admission fees. Moreover, he convinced himself that he had a role to play 
74 `Still Taking Odds!, John Bull, 3/11/17, pp. 10-11. 
75 `Hands Down, Lansdowne! '; `Where Do We Stand? ', John Bull, 8/12/17,22/12/17, both pp. 8-9. 
76 `My Visit to the Premier. ', John Bull, 19/1/18, pp. 8-9. 
77 Playne, Britain Holds On, p. 230. 
78 S. Theodore Felstead, Horatio Bottomley: A Biography of an Outstanding Personality (London, 
1936), p. 214. 
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in government. Earlier in the war, Asquith had politely rejected Bottomley's offer to 
act as Chief Recruiting Officer, and on Asquith's fall he apparently expected to play 
an important governmental position. He also believed Northcliffe would recommend 
him for an official mission similar to Northcliffe's own to the USA. All these 
expectations were frustrated, however, and much of Bottomley's ire towards the 
NWAC may be assumed to relate to professional and commercial rivalry. Its activities 
were not only an affront to his governmental pretensions, but also a potential threat to 
his lucrative lecture tours. 79 Bottomley does not seem to have been invited to assist 
the NWAC campaign, despite offering Carson his services `in any capacity', 
presumably further fuelling his disdain for its operations. When Lord Rhondda failed 
to offer him a post at the Ministry of Food, Bottomley responded with an `irritable 
diatribe' against the Ministry. 80 
Bottomley had no use for `fine phrases' which did not conform to his own 
views, while suggestions of political intrigue were sufficient to dismiss the Committee 
as a `collection of Party wirepullers', each striving only to `secure votes for his own 
party at the next election' 
g' He argued that, because of the mistrust between the party 
officials, NWAC meetings were `a laughing stock for the Pacifists and an insult to 
patriotic men', contrasting well-organised, thousand-strong `peace meetings' with 
sparsely attended NWAC events conducted from a `rickety little stand, from which 
someone is bawling at a bare patch of gravel'. For Bottomley, there was, by June 
1918, `no decent excuse for the continuance of this discreditable Committee'. 82 
His castigation of NWAC meetings was a partial interpretation. Between 20 
and 22 June, for instance, successful meetings in Barnstaple were attended by 
79 Julian Symons, Horatio Bottomley [1955] (London, 2001), pp. 148-75. 
80 Henry J. Houston, The Real Horatio Bottomley (London, n. d. [1923]), p. 69. 
81 -War Aims Committee"', John Bull, 20/4/18, p. 1. 
82 `The War Aims Farce. Wild Merriment for Pacifists - Pain for Patriots. ', John Bull, 22/6/18, p. 4. 
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audiences of 100-125,250, and 3-500 people, according to speakers' reports. 83 
Bottomley criticised the cost and political jockeying involved in running the 
Committee - the same issues which exercised many MPs in the funding debates, 
possibly because criticism of such issues was considered more acceptable than 
criticising the general project of patriotic inspiration. Ultimately, however, his 
condemnation reflected his own self-interested and delusional motivations. If the 
government was not prepared to give him the role he felt he so clearly deserved, then 
no other organisation could expect his support. 
Other papers also stressed these concerns, further rejecting the NWAC as an 
affront to liberal and democratic principles. At the Daily News, Gardiner said that a 
`more insolent demand could scarcely be made' than that public funds should be 
supplied without detailed estimates, or else the Government might `abandon the 
country to the horrors of pacifist intrigue'. When the proposal was upheld in 
December, Gardiner, having discussed Carson's Janus-faced view of the League of 
Nations, called for Britain's war aims to be `explicitly declared' by the government, if 
the NWAC was to `have the smallest effect'. 84 In the same paper, the novelist Arnold 
Bennett (later involved in propaganda himself), infuriated by DRR 27c, said that the 
government was `anti-democratic in desire, in tendency, in act'. It was: 
encountering a great deal of opposition up and down the country. The opposition, 
however, is not to the war, but to the Government... And the great Government 
publicity campaign is not really a pro-war campaign but a pro-Government campaign; 
that is to say, an anti-democratic campaign. 85 
83 TNA: PRO T102/23, SDRs - T. Enfield, Barnstaple, 20-22/6/18; G. Crabbe, Barnstaple, 21/6/18. 
&4 `The Latest Economy. ', Daily News, 14/11/17, p. 2; `The War-Aims Propaganda', Daily News, 
15/12/17, p. 2. 
11 Arnold Bennett, `More Dangerous Than Bolo', Daily News, 29/11/17, p. 2. 
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The timing of these criticisms was not coincidental. Discussion of the NWAC in the 
national press frequently followed the pattern of Parliamentary discussion - debates 
on the token vote provoked similar discussion on Fleet Street. Likewise the 
coincidence that DRR 27c was introduced shortly after the first debate prompted the 
same comparisons as in Parliament. DRR 27c was a government measure; the NWAC 
drew upon public funds and, therefore, all-party status notwithstanding, was a 
government organisation. DRR 27c thus made the NWAC appear a more sinister 
example of government assaulting civil liberties than was probably the case. 
At the Manchester Guardian, C. P. Scott carefully avoided so crass an elision. 
Nonetheless, he was hardly complimentary about the NWAC's first fifteen pamphlets. 
He suggested the Committee was `preaching to the converted': 
For those... heartened by denunciations of the KAISER and grim lists of German 
atrocities they provide generous fare, but one had expected from a War Aims 
Committee so weightily constituted something a little more intelligent and effective 
than this clumsy kind of bludgeon-work... [M]uch of the dissension which impedes 
national effort is due to a widespread feeling that civil liberties have been undermined 
to a degree that even war does not make necessary, and that there are in this country 
the makings of a militarism not less definite and dangerous than that which is 
condemned in Germany. 
86 
This was a potent criticism, and Scott appealed to the vanity of the NWAC executive 
to set its propaganda on a more sophisticated level, attuned to public concerns. 
Moreover, while Lloyd George claimed that `[n]obody cared what the Daily News & 
86 `War Aims Propaganda. ', Manchester Guardian [henceforth Guardian], 20/9/17, p. 4. 
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the Nation said because they made it their business to find fault', the Guardian was 
supposedly much more influential 8.7 Previous chapters have shown that the NWAC 
acknowledged such criticism, and while condemnation of Germany and its allies 
continued, it was accompanied by much wider discussion. Propagandists, for instance, 
regularly embraced the UDC-originated calls for a League of Nations, although one 
critic suggested that the term had become simply `a prophylactic against all the ills of 
mankind, the most diverse and most incompatible... a shibboleth and a formula'. 88 
W. S. Sanders' pamphlets on German society drew praise from H. W. Lee, editor of the 
SDF newspaper, Justice. Lee asserted that they were `necessary for the people of this 
country' as much as for foreigners, and insisted that Sanders: 
cannot be regarded as an anti-German, even by the most truculent of pacifists. If 
anything, he has a strong bias in Germany's favour. What he says... is said from the 
point of view of one who has found the facts against what he had hoped to see, and 
regretfully recognises that it is so. 
9 
Reviewing Sanders' pamphlets, Lee (a fierce critic of Labour `pacifism') endorsed the 
majority of their contents and recommended them to those who suffered from a 
delusion that `capitalism is the sole cause of this war' and those who were `Bolshevik 
and Sinn Fein at the same time'. Justice's endorsement extended to stocking copies of 
the pamphlets at its office and offering to send them to readers for the cost of postage, 
alongside reporting their availability at Smith's' bookstalls, while a reply to the 
review in which Sanders elaborated upon his ideas (thus extending his propaganda) 
87 Memorandum by C. P. Scott, 30 April-4 May 1917, cited in Koss, Rise, II, p. 312. 
88 `Notes of the Week', New Age, 3/1/18, p. 183. 
89 Lee, `The Bookshop. "War Aims" Propaganda. ', Justice, 20/6/18, p. 7. 
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was also published 90 By contrast, a Labour Leader article criticised Sanders' 
contribution to an issue of Reality ('the organ of the War Aims Committee for the 
propagation of war passion'). J. Jacks quoted Sanders' description of Germany 
providing workers with just enough education to be an `obedient implement of a 
ruling class he can never enter', and questioned his interpretation, arguing that to 
`make a man intelligent for one purpose is to make him intelligent for all purposes'. 
Jacks asked: `is this the same Mr. Sanders who used to write Fabian tracts to show 
what a lot our Government could learn from Germany[? ]'. 91 
The Guardian seemingly remained unimpressed. Even in October 1918, 
welcoming Arnold Bennett's appointment as a director at the Ministry of Information, 
Scott complained that domestic propaganda had `consisted too much in the 
92 dissemination of the literature of hate', while in February the paper anxiously 
reported the invitation of London publicans to a meeting addressed by the Master of 
Balliol, A. L. Smith, and Colonel Henry Gibbon (both of whom spoke for the 
NWAC). 93 Fear was expressed that the `conversational autocrats of the bar' would 
become `licensed propagandist[s]'. 4 Despite Scott's discomfort with NWAC 
propaganda, however, he arguably accepted the organisation's necessity. The 
Guardian ignored criticism of the NWAC's high salaries and expenses in the Report 
of the Select Committee on National Expenditure in May 1918. Unlike the Chronicle, 
Post, Daily News and Telegraph (which all printed critical excerpts), and Common 
Sense and John Bull, which (later) both produced long condemnations, the Guardian 
omitted any reference to NWAC finances in its editorial and two-page discussion of 
90 `A Personal Explanation' (letter by W. S. Sanders), Justice, 4/7/18, p. 8. 
91 Jacks, `The Madding Crowd. ', Labour Leader, 11/7/18, p. 4. 
92 `Propaganda', Guardian, 2/10/18, p. 4. 
93 PA, Lloyd George papers, LG/F/79/32-3. 
94 `Propaganda and the Publican. ', Guardian, 21/2/18, p. 4. 
309 
the Report 95 While doubting the quality of its propaganda, therefore, it may not have 
disputed its importance. 
Besides John Bull, it was, unsurprisingly, the papers sympathetic to the UDC, 
Labour Leader and Common Sense, which provided the most sustained criticism. 
Together with the direct publication of parliamentary and UDC criticisms, Katherine 
Glasier's Labour Leader poured scorn on the NWAC in February 1918 with the 
reproduction of what it claimed was a `model' war aims speech, issued by the 
Committee, which was `too precious to be allowed to rest in the pockets of speakers 
or to echo in the empty halls they address'. The report ridiculed the speech, noting 
factual inaccuracies and contradictory elements, and encouraged readers attending a 
meeting to listen out for various key phrases. `Mr. Guest' it concluded, `is a great 
asset in these mournful times'. 6 F. W. Hirst's Common Sense, meanwhile, maintained 
consistent criticism of the NWAC. A generally approving review of Asquith's NWAC 
speech at Birmingham nonetheless stressed that `we must remember that Sir Edward 
Carson is Chief War Aims Propagandist to the British Government, with Mr. 
Asquith's parliamentary support', thus undermining its value and sincerity 97 In April 
1918, Common Sense's fire turned upon Denbigh, who was labelled, after Lord 
Leverhulme, the NWAC's `principal star'. Scoffing at his concerns about dissent, the 
article retorted that `[i]f peace meetings could win the war for the other side we 
should have won it long ago' since the press was full of stories of immense German 
and Austrian gatherings, and argued that Denbigh's discussion at meetings of 
91 `£10,000,000 a Year Lost. ', Chronicle, 20/5/18, p. 3; `The Way the Money Goes. ', Post, 20/5/18, p. 
5; `War Propaganda. Method of Financing Criticised by Select Committee. ', Daily News, 20/5/18, p. 3; 
`Waste of Public Money. ', Daily Telegraph, 20/5/18, p. 2; `The War Aims Farce. ', John Bull, 22/6/18, 
4; `Public Expenditure on War Aims, Newspapers, &c. ', Common Sense, 29/6/18, p. 295. 
6 `Junius', `A War Aims "Model Speech. ", Labour Leader, 21/2/18, p. 4. NWAC correspondence 
confirms that such skeleton lectures were prepared: TNA: PRO T102/7, NWAC to Ald. W. E. Lovsey, 
4/12/17. 
97 `Mr. Asquith's Birmingham Speech. ', Common Sense, 15/12/17, p. 372. 
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Germany's Mitteleuropa scheme veiled more sinister preoccupations. `One of the 
main obstacles to a good peace settlement, as well as to success in the war, ' the paper 
argued, `is the lust for Asiatic conquests exhibited by Lord Denbigh and his school'. 
For Hirst and his writers, as for Massingham at The Nation and some MPs, the 
NWAC's involvement with figures like Carson and Denbigh reduced its campaign to 
imperialist and jingoistic posturing, no matter how many mild and encouraging 
speeches figures like Asquith made. In a poem accompanying the article, Denbigh's 
notorious `war map' was lampooned as demonstrating `why we must not cease to 
fight/ Until all Asia's conquered quite' 98 Denbigh's Habsburg heritage was also noted 
in Common Sense, though it was left to the Leicester Catholic News, outraged by what 
it considered Denbigh's near-apostasy, to castigate his `shouting... to assure all and 
sundry that the Count of Hapsburg is a loyal and furious and patriotic Jingo'. 99 
Nonetheless, Common Sense condemned McCurdy, in discussing his pamphlet on the 
secret treaties, as `a good jingo democrat'. 100 
National press attitudes towards the NWAC were thus rarely complimentary. 
Like MPs, editors and writers in several national papers questioned the value for 
money, the implications for civil liberties and the quality of NWAC propaganda. 
Whether such criticism demonstrates its failure, however, is less clear. Although the 
debates on the NWAC's token vote demonstrated marked hostility by some MPs, `the 
Government got their blank cheque with only 22 dissentients'. 1°' Coupled with the 
extensive involvement of MPs as NWAC propagandists, this suggests that such 
qualms as existed among the majority were either insufficiently troubling to prompt 
serious opposition or else overridden by a desire to publicly demonstrate patriotic 
" `Lord Denbigh's Views. '; `A Soliloquy', Common Sense, 27/4/18, p. 211. 
99 `Notes and Comments. The Reason Why! ', Leicester Catholic News, 18/5/18, p. 2. 
10° `War Aims Expenditure', Common Sense, 6/7/18, p. 3. 
101 `Suppressing the Pacifists - And Freedom! ', Labour Leader, 22/11/17, p. 3. 
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commitment to the war effort through propaganda work. 
As for the press, though much commentary ranged between uncomplimentary 
and hostile, the impression is less (excepting three or four publications) of sustained 
opposition to the organisation as of general indifference, interrupted by occasional 
criticism of particularly poor work. Journals linked to organisations like the UDC, 
such as Common Sense, Labour Leader and The Nation predictably offered many 
trenchant criticisms. Nor is it surprising that the Guardian, edited by `an almost 
anachronistic character' of the `old journalistic tradition', made some 
uncomplimentary assessments, though it is interesting that while it complained that 
`some among our governors... think that every time they trample upon a British 
liberty they are defeating the enemy', it did not draw the contrast that other papers did 
between NWAC funding and DRR27c. 102 Apparently the Guardian, like most of the 
`mainstream' national press, accepted the NWAC as an inevitable (if unfortunate) 
necessity, consequently confining itself to occasional critiques of propagandistic 
excesses. The absence of regular or substantial comment from papers like the Mail, 
Express, Times or Telegraph, may be considered craven obedience or collusion with 
the government, but may equally suggest that they simply saw nothing particularly 
significant about the Committee's activities, as well as embarrassment that their own 
propaganda efforts had been so ineffective that a formal organisation was required. 
Bottomley's disdain for the party political organisation of the Committee, which he 
blamed for the supposed weakness of its propaganda campaigns, together with his 
demagogic determination to be `Tribune of the people', accounts for his implacable 
hostility and this last issue perhaps undermines its significance as a `genuine' 
expression of the NWAC's reception. Nevertheless, given its popularity, John Bull 
102 Mark Hampton, Visions of the Press in Britain, 1850-1950 (Urbana/Chicago, II., 2004), p. 135; `The 
Censorship of Opinion. ', Guardian, 16/11/17, p. 4. 
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was certainly an enemy the NWAC could have done without. 
The NWAC's opponents delighted in mocking criticism. It is strange, 
therefore, that such critics, apparently so certain the Committee was a shambolic 
failure, nevertheless demonstrated concern about its influence. Noel Buxton 
complained that the Asquithian Liberal, W. H. Somervell, had been assisted in his by- 
election victory at Keighley by free NWAC literature, disseminated by Smith's' 
bookstalls. 103 Alongside this seeming admission of NWAC propaganda's 
effectiveness may be placed the Parliamentary demands by King and MacDonald that 
NWAC activities would be curtailed during the general election campaign. 104 It is 
curious that an organisation so readily derided by `pacifist' critics as absurdly 
unsuccessful should need to be wound up to ensure a fair election. Once again, this 
suggests the NWAC was slightly more potent an organisation than its critics 
acknowledged. 
In a memorandum on `Industrial Unrest' alternative propaganda arrangements, 
Patrick Hannon, secretary of the right-wing pressure group the British Commonwealth 
Union, averred that the NWAC was: 
grievously handicapped by the political factors involved in its constitution and [its] 
work is largely stultified from the fact that it is maintained by a parliamentary vote. 
Although the War Aims Committee has laboured energetically, and although much 
sound work must be placed to its credit, it is regarded by the people generally as the 
official protagonist of the interests of the Coalition Government. 
105 
Hannon's interpretation certainly represented the expressed reception of the 
103 Buxton, `Liberalism and Keighley', Nation, 4/5/18, p. 108. 
104 Questions of King and MacDonald PDC(5), 110 (14/11/18), col. 2869 - answered by Sanders. 
105 PA, Hannon papers, HNN/1 3/4, memorandum, `Industrial Unrest', n. d. [1918]. Thanks to David 
Thackeray for this reference. 
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Committee by MPs and the national press. The extent to which the public reaction 
corresponded to his negative assessment is discussed in Chapter 11. 
314 
Chapter 11: Public reception of the NWAC 
The NWAC did not enjoy the complete confidence of Parliament or the 
national press, but it was geared towards convincing neither Parliamentarians nor 
pressmen but the general public. This chapter, therefore, discusses the Committee's 
public reception. It is difficult to assess individual civilians' reactions to the NWAC. 
Diaries and autobiographies rarely mention the organisation specifically, and general 
allusions to propaganda must be treated cautiously, particularly since such discussion 
often tends to focus on the recruitment propaganda of the early years. Nonetheless, it 
is possible to make some assessment of the NWAC's reception, through official 
judgements of its effectiveness, including speakers' reports of individual meetings, 
through local press reports of events, and through public correspondence with the 
Committee or with local newspapers. This chapter examines these various indications 
of the NWAC's public reception. In combination, they suggest the Committee 
succeeded in gaining receptive and, significantly, often attentive audiences, even in 
some troublesome areas. While it did not attain universal success, it apparently played 
an important part in maintaining civilian resolution and effort. 
By July 1917, the War Cabinet had two consistent sources of information on 
public opinion; the MoL's weekly reports on the `Labour Situation', and fortnightly 
reports on `Pacifist and Revolutionary Organisations' by Basil Thomson at CID. 
Neither organisation was entirely disinterested, but equally neither had any incentive 
to praise or criticise the NWAC. As such, their reports are valuable guides to official 
assessments of NWAC achievements, and much more impartial than equivalent 
judgements by the Committee itself or by its denigrators. This evidence suggests that, 
at least until May 1918, the NWAC remained an effective tool of industrial 
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pacification. Thereafter, its efforts are rarely mentioned, though other sources indicate 
that it continued to pursue active and reasonably effective campaigns. 
Despite holding nearly 850 days of events in August and September 1917, it 
was not until October that the NWAC's effects began to be noted. 
' Before this, David 
Shackleton (permanent secretary at the MoL), who had earlier recommended the 
NWAC's establishment, lamented the limited effect of opposition to `pacifist' 
propaganda by groups like the BWL, British Empire Union and Women's Social and 
Political Union, and that there had been `little or no attempt to counteract [the ILP's] 
dangerous propaganda' on the Clyde. 2 Thereafter, however, both Shackleton and 
Thomson acknowledged the NWAC's contribution. On 11 October, Shackleton noted 
mixed results. While in Yorkshire NWAC activities were `meeting with success', 
attempts to counteract `pacifist agitation' in Finsbury Park attained `scant success', 
owing to the long period of unchecked dissent there. A week later, the NWAC had 
reportedly `quite definitely... got the upper hand over the pacifist bodies in 
Yorkshire' and held `a number of successful meetings' in the North East, where the 
BWL had also established several new branches. Shackleton further recommended a 
NWAC campaign in South Wales to influence the outcome of a ballot of the South 
Wales Miners' Federation on a proposed `down tools policy' against government 
attempts to `comb-out' mines. 
The resulting campaign, addressed by high-profile speakers like Smuts, the 
Labour Cabinet-member and trade unionist William Brace, and the Admiralty 
financial secretary T. J. Macnamara, was credited with turning local opinion against 
the resolution. Reports proclaimed `outstanding results' and that `serious efforts to 
Register database. Ch. 2 provides detailed discussion. 
2 TNA: PRO CAB24/27, GT2199, `The Labour Situation. Report from the Ministry of Labour' 
[henceforth MoL report], 3/10/17; CAB24/26, GT2087, MoL report, 19/9/17. 
3 TNA: PRO CAB24/28, GT2266, MoL report, 11/10/17; CAB24/29, GT2331, MoL report, 18/10/17. 
316 
organise opposition at Tonypandy [to Smuts' speech]... failed entirely'. The 31 
October report called Tonypandy `the hotbed of pacifism', where trouble was most 
likely; the `pacifists" failure thus suggested its `vociferousness is out of all proportion 
to its influence'. The following week, the report announced that the ballot would be 
`rejected by an overwhelming majority' and argued that the South Wales Pioneer's 
depiction of Smuts' massively overcrowded visit as a `negligible incident' 
demonstrated ILP concern at its effectiveness. Shackleton concluded: 
the success of the War Aims meetings and of the miners' vote on the comb-out is a 
very serious defeat [for the `pacifists'], and the loyal portion of the South Wales 
population is doubtless proportionately encouraged... [However, ] 15,000 men 
practically voted against the war with the eyes of the whole country on them... and 
the number would doubtless have been larger but for the activities of the War Aims 
Committee. It is essential that these activities should continue in order to counteract 
the vigorous and well-organised pacifist propaganda, which unless regularly 
countered may yet produce deplorable results. 
Shackleton left no doubt that serious `pacifist' dissent existed in the nation, and 
required continuing counteraction. Shortly thereafter, the Home Secretary, Sir George 
Cave suggested that, since the South Wales campaign had been so successful, `every 
pacifist gathering should be brought to the attention of the War Aims Committee or 
the British Workers' League, in order that they may (if thought desirable) organize a 
loyal meeting to follow it'. 5 In late November, Thomson reported that the `set-back to 
4 TNA: PRO CAB24/30, GT2457, Mot, report, 31/10/17; CAB24/31, GT2542, Mot, report, 7/11/17. 
Also the report by R. Wherry Anderson, 29/10/17, in Hancock and Van der Poet, Smuts Papers, pp. 
566-7. 
5 TNA: PRO CAB24/4, G173, `Pacifist Propaganda. Note by Sir George Cave and Draft Regulations. ', 
13/11/17. 
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Pacifism in the Provinces and in London [was] largely due to the efforts of the War 
Aims Committee'. Consequently arrangements were made to keep it abreast of 
developments, as Cave proposed. 6 Nonetheless, despite Cave's recommendation, this 
arrangement was apparently not extended to the BWL, which Lawrence contends was 
considered `part of the problem, rather than... of its solution'. While Cave's note and 
the apparent elision in the MoL's October report of NWAC and BWL actions in the 
North-East lends partial credence to Millman's `home front conspiracy theory', ' the 
earlier report of the BWL's limited effectiveness, and Thomson's restriction of praise 
solely to the NWAC, suggests again that there is insufficient evidence for claiming 
that the organisations were brought closer together `to streamline the process of 
suppression'. BWL involvement with the NWAC, while undeniable in certain 
instances, was not a systematic partnership, and Millman's reconstruction of Cave's 
suggestion to imply the existence of a `BWNL WAC - the chosen instrument of 
suppression' is inexcusably misleading. 
8 Not only were many in Whitehall 
uncomfortable with the organisation, but also many provincial Conservatives, as 
Sanders' diary shows. 9 
Having seemingly acknowledged the NWAC's value, MoL reports offered 
praise alongside suggestions for further progress through the winter. In Yorkshire and 
the East Midlands, NWAC efforts attained `uniform success'. In December, it was 
credited with preventing the progress of `pacifism' in Newcastle, while the `quieter 
element' within Barrow-in-Furness were keen to host another large meeting after the 
6 TNA: PRO CAB24/34, GT2809, `Pacifism. (Report by Mr. Basil Thomson)', 24/11/17. 
7 Lawrence, `Public space', p. 298; Lawrence, `Review, Managing', p. 86. 
8 Millman, Managing, pp. 245,251, n. 81; Millman cites Swartz's paraphrase of Cave's suggestion but 
apparently overlooks Swartz's use of the word `or'. See Swartz, Union of Democratic Control, p. 189. 
9 Sanders diary, 3/3/18,24/3/18,9/6/18,14/7/18, in Ramsden, Tory Politics, pp. 101-7. 
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success of one addressed by George Barnes. 10 Repeated assertions of NWAC success 
in Yorkshire offer an interesting contrast to Cyril Pearce's evocation of wartime 
Huddersfield. If that town was `dominated' by unspectacular anti-war sentiment 
`readily and regularly exemplified in the day-to-day conduct of affairs', it was 
seemingly the exception rather than the regional rule. 't 
As 1918 began, Shackleton warned that `class-war propaganda' was sapping 
public morale. Alongside recommending `even more drastic application of the Excess 
Profits Tax' to demonstrate Government opposition to profiteering, and the 
imposition of compulsory rationing to `destroy the charge of inequality of sacrifice in 
regard to food', he argued it was essential to `dispose of the fable that the propertied 
classes... have not made the same sacrifices on the battlefield as the working classes'. 
Shackleton recommended `widespread and continuous' demonstration by the NWAC 
via casualty lists that officers suffered heavier casualties than `the rank and file'. 
Shackleton unwittingly echoed suggestions made by Macnamara, based on his 
experiences at NWAC meetings. Macnamara recommended rationing, clamping down 
on profiteering and hoarding, prompt settlement of public grievances, immediate 
refutation of specious `pacifist' criticism, and the clear statement of war aims. 
12 
Shackleton also recapitulated (more than once) that the NWAC had not commenced 
serious operations on the Clyde. 
13 
This criticism of NWAC inaction was augmented by a memorandum by the 
Labour Minister, G. H. Roberts, who doubted that the government had retained public 
sympathy: 
10 TNA: PRO CAB24/33, GT2716, MoL report, 21/11/17; CAB24/34, GT2886, MoL report, 5/12/17; 
CAB24/35, GT2952, MoL report, 12/12/17. 
" Cyril Pearce, Comrades in Conscience: The Story of an English Community's Opposition to the 
Great War (London, 2001), pp. 216,222. 
12 TNA: PRO CAB24/37, GT3196, MoL report, 2/1/18; PA, Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/6/2/49, 
Memorandum by T. J. Macnamara, `The Civil Population and the War', 27/11/17. 
13 TNA: PRO CAB24/38, GT3293, MoL report, 9/1/18; CAB24/39, GT3369, MoL report, 16/1/18. 
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Speakers sent down by the War Aims Committee, pamphlets, and similar means of 
propaganda are all valuable in their way and much good has undoubtedly been 
done... but the effects which they produce soon pass away, whereas the whole 
essence of successful propaganda is constant reiteration of a few fundamental truths 
through the newspapers which are read every day... To neglect the Press, therefore, 
and to rely principally on public speakers, &c. is a suicidal policy... 14 
Roberts recommended more systematically organised local officials informing 
provincial newspapers about war aims and the war situation, and monitoring pacifist 
propaganda, so that `an effective answer was always forthcoming to local pacifist 
propaganda'. Roberts' memorandum questioned the NWAC's operational basis which 
(as previously discussed) followed pre-war political traditions by privileging public 
meetings and open engagement with civilians as the most important form of 
propaganda. Instead of sporadic meetings, Roberts believed continuous written 
affirmation of important messages would best maintain civilian assent. His arguments 
perhaps presage the declining faith of politicians in the efficacy of claiming civic 
space through public meetings, which Lawrence traces in the post-war period, though 
for Roberts it was not so much a `fear of brutalisation' or a distrust of rowdiness or 
disorder which invalidated public meetings, but their transitory nature. 15 As 
previously shown, however, the NWAC actively placed propaganda in the provincial 
press while also, with M17b and CID assistance, monitoring `pacifist' attitudes in the 
press and in localities. Furthermore, the NWAC's establishment was originally 
14 TNA: PRO CAB24/39, GT3360, memorandum by G. H. Roberts re. use of Press for propaganda 
p! urposes, 16/1/18. 
Jon Lawrence, `Forging a Peaceable Kingdom: War, Violence, and Fear of Brutalization in Post-First 
World War Britain', Journal of Modern History, 75: 3 (2003); Lawrence, `The Transformation of 
British Public Politics After the First World War', Past and Present, 190 (2006). 
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necessitated because press propaganda was considered insufficient, while one 
correspondent warned that published propaganda was insufficient because `the people 
rarely read anything but that awful paper "The News of the World"'. 16 As such, 
Roberts' critique may represent anxiety over a perceived increase in `pacifist' activity 
rather than a sudden decision that NWAC propaganda no longer worked. Shortly 
afterwards, Thomson reported `a rather sudden growth of Pacifism among the actual 
workers... [apparently] due entirely to their desire to save their own skins' in 
response to the comb-out. " Dissenters also sensed a change in mood. UDC Secretary 
E. D. Morel was assured in February by his colleagues MacDonald and Seymour 
Cocks, as well as the Liverpool UDC branch, that he would find himself `in a very 
different world' to the one he had known before his six-month imprisonment in the 
autumn of 1917 (on dubious grounds relating to a pamphlet he sent to the French 
novelist Romain Rolland in neutral Switzerland). Cocks believed there had `been a 
very great change in public feeling... and a distinct alteration in the popular temper' 
in the UDC's favour. ' 8 
This change in temperament, however, was seemingly only temporary. In mid- 
February, Shackleton reported a marked improvement on the Clyde owing, most 
significantly, to the `national loyalty of the majority of the workers', secondly to a 
Scottish press campaign, and finally to the NWAC's `exceedingly satisfactory and 
effective action'. Shackleton emphasised the Committee's important intervention in 
`the two most critical' recent disturbances in South Wales and the Clyde. 19 He 
extended his praise subsequently, arguing that its campaign `had an effect out of all 
proportion to the area in which it was conducted' by inducing a marked `diminution' 
16 TNA: PRO T102/12, H. F. Russell to Cox, 1/5/18. 
17 TNA: PRO CAB24/40 GT3424, Memorandum by Thomson, `Pacifism', 22/1/18. 
18 BLPES, Morel Papers, MOREL F1/5, Cocks to Morel, 3/2/18; also MacDonald to Mrs. Morel, 
12/2/18; David Paterson (Liverpool UDC) to Morel, 17/2/18. 
19 TNA: PRO CAB24/42, GT3606, MoL report, 13/2/18. 
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of the Clyde Workers' Committee, the nation's most influential shop stewards' 
movement. Generally, Shackleton emphasised that industrial conditions were `quieter 
than during any week since this Report was first instituted' in May 1917. Thomson 
agreed that the `Pacifists have not had a good fortnight' attributing this partly to the 
NWAC's efforts. 20 Such evidence is significant. It is commonly asserted that 
industrial workers rallied to the nation and rejected industrial action after the German 
offensive on 21 March'21 yet, demonstrably, `industrial unrest was on the decline even 
before' then. 22 While (as Wilson notes) reports dwelt on the general loyalty of most 
workers, it is noteworthy that the NWAC was also credited with turning opinion 
against labour extremism. There may have been a `loyal' majority in most places, but 
in areas like South Wales, Barrow or the Clyde, it required a mouthpiece. The 
NWAC's Clyde campaign reportedly gave the `revolutionary element' a `decided 
check, and the loyal portion of the community [was] correspondingly encouraged'. 23 
The German offensive enhanced this industrial quietism. The NWAC 
continued its work, successfully attending to pockets of `pacifist spirit' in Coventry, 
Newcastle and Glasgow. 24 However, when unrest recurred after June, calls were no 
longer specifically made for NWAC rebuttals. Shackleton warned in late July that 
`[o]rganised labour is now very suspicious of any measure adopted by the 
Government to interfere with the normal industrial position', but again made no 
recommendation of NWAC involvement25 One possible reason for this is Peters' 
withdrawal as the NWAC's Labour secretary. Despite the continued adherence of the 
20 TNA: PRO CAB24/42, GT3677, MoL report, 20/2/18; GT3674, Thomson, `Pacifist Revolutionary 
Propaganda', 20/2/18. 
21 E. g., Home, `Remobilizing', p. 210; Turner, British Politics, pp. 382-3. 
22 Wilson, Myriad Faces, pp. 654-6. 
23 TNA: PRO CAB24/42, GT3606, MoL report, 13/2/18, 
24 TNA: PRO CAB24/49, GT4329, MoL report, 24/4/18; CAB24/50, GT4407, MoL report, 1/5/18; 
CAB24/52, GT4624, `Pacifism and Revolutionary Organisations in the United Kingdom', 23/5/18. 
Thomson's report also praised the BWL and Navy League's work in Glasgow and Newcastle. 
25 TNA: PRO CAB24/55, GT4984, MoL report, 26/6/18; CAB24/59, MoL report, 24/7/18. 
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`patriotic Labour' MPs Parker and Tootill, critics broadcast Peters' withdrawal 
widely, and the MoL perhaps judged that this discredited NWAC propaganda with 
industrial audiences. 26 Similar criticism attended the report detailing its officials' 
salaries in May, which may also have undermined its credibility. Another limitation 
was highlighted in the Conservative Agents' Journal. In Western England, the 
NWAC's campaign was reportedly: 
extremely successful in some constituencies, while in others the movement has not 
been so apparent... [because] War Savings and Food Control organizations have 
somewhat absorbed the opportunity for War Aims propaganda. 7 
The NWAC was one section of the Government's `formidable armoury of public 
persuasion', and, recognising that civilians might become `not war-weary [but] 
meeting weary' through the efforts of various government agencies, tailored its plans 
around those of other organisations. 8 This, however, does not explain the MoL's 
reluctance to recommend its involvement. The loss of Peters and exposure of its 
officials' salaries probably damaged the NWAC's reputation, though its omission in 
MoL reports may alternatively suggest that it was working efficiently and need not be 
hectored to involve itself. The situation was also not considered so serious when 
industrial unrest recurred in late June. Government action on food shortages, for 
instance, such as active prosecution of hoarding, exemplified by the fining of the 
novelist Marie Corelli (who, perhaps fortunately for the NWAC's reputation, 
26 PDC(5), Vol. 101 (6/2/18), col. 2241; Vol. 106 (6/6/18), cols. 1741-2; Ramsay MacDonald, "`From 
Green Benches. "', Leicester Pioneer, 14/6/18, p. 4. Press coverage of Peters' withdrawal was noted in 
TNA: PRO CAB24/43, GT3769, MoL report, 27/2/18. 
27 Conservative Agents' Journal, no. 47 (January 1918), p. 19. 
28 Waites, Class Society, p. 232; TNA: PRO T102/16, NWAC Meetings Department Report, 10/10/17; 
T 102/3, NWAC to Clement Dennis, 2/4/18; T102/12, Vesey to Capt. H. K. Ryan, 2/4/18 (both re. 
cancelled meeting in Chester-le-Street). 
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apparently did not produce the pamphlet requested by Fiennes), meant, to one diarist, 
that though `all were not fined who deserved to be', by May the `rage' over food 
shortages had `died down'. 29 Equally, familiarity may have bred contempt - as the 
NWAC became part of the social scenery, its work may have gone unremarked upon. 
In any event, its activities continued to the Armistice, as the evidence of its own files 
and of localities demonstrates. 
Once the NWAC had established its organisational structure, it began to assess 
the effect of its propaganda. By December its campaign had reportedly `covered' 186 
constituencies, plus YMCA huts and canteens (for servicemen in Britain). According 
to NWAC speakers, there was `no weakening of public opinion on the war', except 
that people wanted Britain's war aims clearly defined. Assumptions about the strength 
of public opinion may have been partially wishful thinking. MacDonald noted his 
belief in November 1917 that in Leicester `the tide [had] definitely turned' in his 
favour, owing to public concerns over food, `Labour muddles', casualties and the 
government's performance. The report also warned that Government interference with 
daily life might assist `anti-war propaganda'. The Committee resolved that speakers 
should note specific grievances and report them for resolution, in the hope of 
mollifying public opinion. 
0 Additionally, Fiennes warned Cabinet-members that - 
based on attitudes in Sheffield, Barrow and Derby - problems with housing, food 
queues and beer shortages caused discontent. The latter was important because: 
men, in a discontented frame of mind, are left in the streets - where they easily 
become listeners to Pacifist oratory - While [sic] in the public houses they are safe... 
29 imperial War Museum, London (IWM), 06/28/1, W. E. Pead, `War Diary, Aug 5 1914 to Nov 20, 
1918', 26/5/18; on the NWAC and Correlli, seep. 72 above. 
30 TNA: PRO T102/16, NWAC `Report up to 8th December, 1917'; PRO30/69/1753, MacDonald 
Papers, Diary, 21/11/17. 
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as the Pacifists are generally teetotallers who will not show themselves in these bodes 
3l 
of iniquity. 
Evidently, Fiennes disputed Lloyd George's claim that drink was a more deadly foe 
than Germany. 32 Drunken workers were less worrisome than sober malcontents. 
Fiennes recommended reiterating Asquith's pledge to restore pre-war Trade Union 
conditions after the war, a promise of social legislation, and the introduction of 
covered markets to mitigate food queues, and said the NWAC required `a lead from 
the Government'. As with the definition of war aims, therefore, NWAC activity was 
limited by governmental behaviour. An example was provided by a speaker in 
Southport. When Private Wilfred Rhodes' mother died, her separation allowance was 
cancelled. The Derby Scheme volunteer asked for its transferral to his sister, who had 
left service to look after her blind brother. However, this was refused by the War 
Office, `and the neighbours discount War Aims meetings in the light of what locally 
is described "heartless treatment. ,, 33 A local War Pensions Committee investigation 
demonstrated that the sister was not entitled to assistance, but this hardly helped 
speakers obtain sympathetic audiences. 
In September 1918, the Committee received a detailed analysis of its efforts in 
the South-west. R. Wherry Anderson affirmed that the area was provided with `only a 
small amount of propaganda' because `people in Cornwall and North Devon are 
comparatively free from war troubles... [and it] cannot be truthfully said that these 
remote districts are infected with the war-weariness that beats up for seditious 
31 TNA: PRO CAB24/33, GT2798, Memorandum, Fiennes, `Causes of Discontent and Labour Unrest', 
29/11/17. 
32 Lloyd George himself was not wholly committed to this rhetoric. Wilson, Myriad Faces, p. 163; 
Alan Turberfield, John Scott Lidgett: Archbishop of British Methodism? (Peterborough, 2003), pp. 
160-1. 
33 TNA: PRO T102/12, G. H. Bibbings to Wallace Carter, 10/7/18. 
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outbursts'. Anderson insisted that discussions with `representative people' revealed no 
anxiety for extended propaganda efforts. Anderson's report indicates that, though 
extensive propaganda was unnecessary in the South-west, the NWAC remained 
active. He visited Smith's' shops and bookstalls in various towns and reported that 
their distribution of NWAC literature was `thoroughly well done', although the 
Plymouth WAC secretary had never seen Reality, prompting Anderson's 
recommendation that all secretaries should receive weekly copies and information 
about its availability. 34 Such literature distribution was not confined to known 
supporters of NWAC propaganda. Dr. Macleod Yearsley recorded finding `two 
excellent pamphlets' in his letter-box in early February 1918, `evidently counterblasts 
to the pernicious, lying stuff which the Pacifists were spreading'. 35 One pamphlet was 
Sanders' Germany's Two Voices, the other (for which Yearsley affirmed NWAC 
responsibility), was probably Our United War Aims, a precis of Lloyd George's 
January war aims speech. While Yearsley clearly sympathised with NWAC 
propaganda, the pamphlets were anonymously provided, demonstrating that 
distribution of NWAC pamphlets was indiscriminate. Reality's distribution, however, 
was restricted. Although by October 1918 Reality boasted that weekly requests for it 
`now exceed One Million', Fiennes had earlier explained to the Press Advisory 
Committee, after the Newsagents' Review criticised the probable waste of paper, that 
its distribution was `by no means wholesale... [and] we have always concentrated on 
particular districts [with] labour troubles or other agitation at the time of 
publication'. 36 
The closest analysis of the NWAC's public reception was provided by the 
34 TNA: PRO T102/1, R. Wherry Anderson, `Report on Propaganda in Cornwall and Devon', 4/9/18. 
Note Anderson's previous link in reporting on Smuts' South Wales campaign (n. 4 above). 
35 IWM, DS/Misc/17, `The Home Front Diary of Macleod Yearsley, 1914-1918', pp. 253-4. 
36 Reality, 143,10/10/18, p. 1; PA, Beaverbrook papers, BBK/E/3/5, Press Advisory Committee 
minutes, 31/12/17, appended letter by Fiennes, 3/1/18. 
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speakers themselves, who sent daily reports of meetings, stating times, specific 
locations within towns, estimated attendance and summarising the event. A 
breakdown of 1,521 reports of 833 meetings across thirty constituencies enables some 
statistical analysis. 
7 Figures 38-9 show speakers' judgements of their receptions, 
following (where possible) their own terminology. 38 They suggest that a majority of 
speakers considered their meetings to have been `excellent', `very good' or `good'. 
These statistics must be treated cautiously. The speakers who completed these forms 
were lower-level, paid party speakers, whose livelihoods sometimes depended upon 
such meetings. Speakers consistently reporting unsuccessful meetings might fear for 
future employment. Reports, therefore, tended to be positive. Furthermore, while 
some negative reports echoed the Conservative speaker T. H. Batty's lamentation of a 
`ding dong' meeting in Wigan with `plenty of interruption and organised I. L. P. 
opposition' in a town abounding in `pacifists of an evil revolutionary type: regular 
Bolshevics [sic]', many more labelled meetings `poor' or `very poor' because of 
inclement weather or a poor pitch 39 Nonetheless, speakers' judgements cannot be 
dismissed as self-serving vindications. Their descriptions often suggested significant 
audience interest (as discussed below). 
A further means of gauging reception is to assess estimated audience size. 
Across the thirty constituencies examined, the average attendance recorded in 1,521 
reports was 348.8 people varying from zero to twelve thousand at a May 1918 
In Weymouth, a town with a significant ILP presence cinemotor event in Oldham 
4° 
37 Appendix 2 gives details of selected constituencies. 
38 Statistics for this and following discussion based upon the Reports database. Where no explicit 
judgement was made, reception was recorded according to a report's tone - where this was ambiguous, 
it was recorded as `unknown/unclear'. 
39 TNA: PRO T102/22, SDRs - T. H. Batty, Wigan, 1/9/18. Re. bad weather and poor pitch, see, e. g., 
SDRs - Ivan Davies, Leicester, 
30/8/18; B. Bilcliffe, Leicester, 10/7/18. 
40 TNA: PRO T102/26, SDRs - Tom Barnshaw, Oldham, 8/5/18. Many reports were duplicated by 
submissions by both speakers (although attendance estimates 
did not always agree). 
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for which exactly one hundred days' meetings were recorded, the average attendance 
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Figure 39: Speakers' reports - judgements of reception (excluding unknown/unclear) 
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was 376.0, ranging from thirty (excluding twenty-three reports with no recorded 
figure) to 1,800.41 A comparison of events in Weymouth in each September, 
moreover, reveals a compelling further statistic. Over nineteen days throughout 
September 1917, the average reported attendance was 191.2, ranging from fifty to 
1,500. By contrast, a year later, twenty-four days' events yielded an average 
attendance of 526.0, ranging from sixty to 1,800. That is, average attendances in 
Weymouth were 2.75 times larger in September 1918 than a year earlier. This may 
41 The relatively consistent nature of Weymouth's meetings, mainly held in August and September 
1917, and July, August and September 1918 - often near the seafront clock-tower - enables reasonably 
equitable comparisons. Other constituencies showed more variation of dates, times and locations, thus 
offering less equitable comparisons. 
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464,39.2% 
partly be explained by the fact that the 1918 speakers held their second meeting at six- 
thirty in the evening, whereas the 1917 speakers held theirs at three in the afternoon - 
evening meetings, after the working day, usually attracted larger audiences. If, 
therefore, consideration is restricted to meetings held at eleven or eleven-thirty in the 
morning, a more equitable assessment is possible. With these criteria, in thirty-one 
reports of eighteen days' meetings in September 1917, the average attendance was 
133.1 (ranging from fifty to two hundred). By contrast, in thirty-six reports of twenty- 
two days' meetings in September 1918, the average attendance was 280.7 (ranging 
from sixty to eight hundred), more than twice as large as 1917. The NWAC 
undeniably enjoyed larger audiences in Weymouth in September 1918 than in earlier 
days. It may certainly be argued that the Committee's organisational foundations were 
much stronger than in September 1917; however, this reinforces a conclusion that, 
despite reduced official recognition, the NWAC was not defunct by the summer of 
1918. At least in Weymouth, more people heard NWAC propaganda thirteen months 
after its inception than after six weeks. 
Weymouth does not represent the whole nation. In Finsbury, for instance, 
forty-six reports of seventeen days' events in 1917 recorded an average attendance of 
289.3, declining in 1918 to 180.0 in fifty-four reports over twenty-nine days (twenty 
percent of Finsbury reports were also `poor' or `very poor', compared to around six 
percent generally). 
2 Nonetheless, that attendances increased in some places seems 
clear, and even where they declined NWAC speakers still obtained audiences. The 
clearest evidence of public rejection of NWAC propaganda would be continual failure 
to obtain listeners, but this did not apparently happen. There were few reports like 
A. J. Fearnley's, whose meeting was cancelled because `people wouldn't respond at 
42 For comparative purposes, Finsbury is less satisfactory than Weymouth as meetings were more 
scattered, both temporally and geographically, so that the comparison is more generalised - comparable 
months in each year cannot be isolated. 
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all' to his efforts. 3 In most recorded cases, barring poor weather, speakers gathered 
sufficient audiences to make meetings worthwhile. John Williams' explanation that 
people attended public meetings to counteract the `disappearance of so much of 
normal life', 44 seems an inadequate explanation for people's willingness to listen to 
what must have become familiar speeches. Kit Good suggests that `the need to be 
seen to be committed and contributing was almost as important as the contribution 
itself , 45 and it is possible that civilians felt impelled to demonstrate their patriotism 
by attending such meetings. Whether this was so; whether they simply paused through 
curiosity; or whether they were actuated by genuine affinity with the messages 
espoused, however, continuing audiences for NWAC speakers constituted 
endorsement of its purpose and rhetoric. 
A noticeable feature of many speakers' comments on successful meetings 
related to their audience's attentiveness. In several reports during a week in Leicester, 
J. A. Comer emphasised his `very attentive' audience on each occasion (except one 
failed meeting). 6 At Normanton, another speaker, addressing `mostly miners and 
Railway men', `got a good and attentive audience' including `Pacifist[s] of the I. L. P. 
order... [who] took their "medicine" cheerfully', while at Bideford, the Liberal George 
Crabbe asserted that despite `some slight interruption... everything went smoothly 
and the audiences were very attentive'. 
7 In all, 154 separate reports used the terms 
`attentive' or `attentively' to describe an audience. Jonathan Crary has emphasised the 
increasing concern with attentiveness by the late nineteenth century. By 1900, 
`attention' became `key to the operation of noncoercive forms of power', whereby the 
43 TNA: PRO T102/25, SDRs - A. J. Fearnley, Houghton-le-Spring (Fence Houses), 24/8/18. Fearnley 
blamed the large meeting addressed the previous night by Tom Wing, MP, for this outcome. 
44 John Williams, The Home Fronts: Britain, France and Germany, 1914-1918 (London, 1972), p. 185. 
45 Good, `England Goes to War', p. 72. 
46 TNA: PRO T102/22, SDRs - J. A. Comer, Leicester, 23-28/6/18. 
47 TNA: PRO T102/24, SDRs - A. M. Stones, Wakefield (Normanton), 14/7/18; T102/23, SDRs - G. F. 
Crabbe, Barnstaple (Bideford), 25/6/18. 
330 
`attentive subject [was] part of an internalization of disciplinary imperatives in which 
individuals [were] made more directly responsible for their own efficient or profitable 
utilization within various social arrangements'. That is, `through the new imperatives 
of attentiveness... the perceiving body was deployed and made productive and 
orderly'. 8 Civilians who listened attentively to NWAC speakers could also be relied 
upon to fulfil civil functions; attentiveness appears almost an index of civilian 
reliability in the reports 
49 The association of attentiveness and orderliness, explicitly 
linked in reports by the Conservative Robert Orrell, 50 further suggests that the post- 
war concern with orderly public meetings depicted by Lawrence was already 
becoming an issue. By contrast, speakers sometimes despaired of inattentive 
audiences. In Finsbury, one speaker complained that adults were `passing + repassing' 
while `[t]wo aeroplanes overhead [were] of more interest than war aims', and another 
pair blamed their failure on `the large number of noisy children present', whose 
`restlessness' made it difficult for adults to pay attention. 51 Elsewhere, J. Farnsworth 
complained that he had only found a small audience since it was `pay night' and the 
646 pub" was doing a "roaring trade"', particularly among young men, prompting his 
churlish suggestion that `it would be a good place for a "comb out"'. 
52 
It is also clear that attentiveness cannot alone demonstrate the value of NWAC 
meetings. In Weymouth, Rev. T. E. Jackson reported gathering `a number of regular 
48 Jonathan Crary, Suspensions of Perception: Attention, Spectacle, and Modern Culture (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1999), pp. 73-4,22-3. 
49 This is bolstered by the emphasis in a report of a war aims meeting at Downham Market in the 
Dereham & Fakenham Times, 2/3/18, p. 5; and by the first MoL report to mention NWAC work, which 
recorded that audiences were `large, attentive and sympathetic': TNA: PRO CAB24/28, GT2266, MoL 
report, 11/10/17. 
50 E. g. TNA: PRO T102/22, SDRs - R. Orrell, Holderness (Withernsea x2, Pateington, Hornsea, 
Beverley), 26-31/8/18- 
51 TNA: PRO T102/22, SDRs - H. Morgan, Finsbury, 20/8/18; T102/16 and 26, SDRs - J. P. 
Whitestone/T. G. Harper (2 reports), Finsbury (Clerkenwell), 29/8/18. 
52 TNA: PRO T102/23, SDRs - John Farnsworth, Evesham (Crabs Cross), 25/1/18. 
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attenders [sic] who are present at every Meeting' and were `attentive + enthusiastic' 53 
It did not apparently strike Jackson that, in seeing the same faces each day, he was 
preaching to the converted rather than convincing new civilians. Audience 
attentiveness also took other forms. In the same Weymouth campaign, another 
speaker reported: 
We had considerable attention from the Socialists + "Peace by negotiation" pacifists, 
+ outclassed them at answering questions. 
It does seem as if the So' Dorset Labour Secty [sic] supported by his Party... 
made organised efforts to molest us + obstruct our War Aims Meetings. 
The great majority on our side 54 
Speakers often seemingly relished a `pacifist' presence, which added a controversial 
air to proceedings. At Wigan the local secretary described a meeting of 1,200 people 
as `excellent', despite several interruptions and the voting of forty to fifty men for 
peace by negotiation, while at Ripon the public turned against `pacifists' who called 
the speaker a `coward' for refusing to answer a question, and `rushed 3 of them off 
the Market + out of the town'. ss 
However, some speakers apparently enjoyed the combative element too much. 
Two separate Southport incidents provoked complaints about the conduct of NWAC 
speakers. In April 1918, Aeneas Henderson demanded G. L. Paton's address, `to have 
a writ served upon him for a slanderous statement made... in public, to my serious 
hurt and detriment'. 56 Six weeks later, another Southport resident complained 
53 TNA: PRO T102/23, SDRs - Rev. T. E. Jackson, South Dorset (Weymouth), 10/8/18. 
sa TNA: PRO T102/23, SDRs - G. L. Paton, South Dorset (Weymouth), 7/8/18. 
55 TNA: PRO T102/25, SDRs - Thomas Southworth (organiser's report), Wigan, 25/8/18; A. M. Stones, 
Ripon, 5/9/18. 
s6 TNA: PRO T 102/5, Aeneas Henderson to Cox, 16/4/18. 
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strenuously about his treatment by the speakers B. Billcliffe and G. H. Bibbings. 
James Jackson claimed he had sought to correct Bilcliffe's denouncement of 
`pacifists' reluctant to ask questions as "`Cowards" and "Traitors" who dare not assert 
themselves'. Following Jackson's `friendly overture' that such silence was caused by 
DORA's strictures, which `menaced the liberties of Pacifists', Bilcliffe retorted: "`If 
you are not a pacifist you are damned near one"'. On following days, Jackson was 
targeted for abuse. Jackson, who said he had chaired or spoken at thirty NWAC 
meetings, without charge, was: 
not conscious of being less loyal to my sovereign or my services being of less value 
than those of the mob orators... I shall not quietly submit to be held up by contumely, 
scurrility and abuse to the derision of the mob and have my life menaced by War 
Aims hooligans... 
Cox replied that he believed that Jackson `provoked any little difficulty there may 
have been' and lectured him on his duty to Britain, prompting Jackson's scornful 
reply that he had voluntarily assisted his country and `it ill becomes a paid servant to 
lecture a free citizen and voluntary worker'. Concluding, Jackson emphasised the 
competing interpretations of patriotism at stake, asserting that `[for a speaker to first 
invite questions... [then] carry on a campaign of abuse against his victim is certainly 
not playing the game of a Britisher'. 
7 
NWAC correspondence suggests it handled complaints in a high-handed 
manner, unlikely to remedy the situation or regain the complainant's sympathy. In 
October 1918, the Committee corresponded with a Lincolnshire Chief Constable over 
57 TNA: PRO T102/6, James Jackson to Cox, 31/5/18; Cox to Jackson, 11/6/18; Jackson to Cox, 
13/6/18. 
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a dispute between a constable and a cinemotor crew. Captain Mitchell-lnnes wrote in 
defence of Constable Ancliffe who had removed the cinemotor screen from the side 
of his house because his wife (who had allowed the speaker to use the wall) had not 
realised the prolonged disturbance the event would cause to their family. Mitchell- 
Innes objected to the speaker's rude conduct and demanded advanced warning of 
future events. The NWAC criticised Mitchell-Innes' `tone', reminding him that `this 
is a Government Committee charged with carrying out propaganda in all parts of the 
country' and that cinemotor shows were very successful, `the police generally heartily 
co-operating with us'. 
58 Such arrogant dismissal of legitimate complaints again 
suggests the NWAC may have struggled in convincing those not already supportive to 
accept its propaganda. 
59 In January, R. H. Glover, a speaker who `specialised in 
attacks on the peace party', claimed from personal experience in attending NWAC 
meetings that Bottomley's recent characterisation of the Committee as a `dismal 
failure' was `only too true'. Consequently, he demanded an opportunity to 
demonstrate his own abilities. Cox's reply that the Committee had sufficient speakers 
for its purposes suggests that it was not unduly concerned with the problems 
Bottomley and Glover proclaimed, perhaps preferring the opinions of their own (often 
party-based) speakers to such self-serving estimations. 
60 
The Committee seemed more conciliatory to political complaints. Like MPs, 
civilians also sometimes complained about apparent political advantages. A Surrey 
Conservative complained that allowing prospective parliamentary candidates to 
address NWAC meetings `may most disadvantageously affect the Conservative 
cause', while in South London another correspondent objected to `the advertisement 
58 TNA: PRO T102/8, correspondence, Capt. C. Mitchell-Innes and NWAC, 10-19/10/18. 
59 Cf. E. W. Toye's letter praising the Committee's `continued thoughtfulness [which] contrasts so 
favourably with some unappreciative officials of other Depts'. TNA: PRO T 102/14, Toye to Cox, 
28/2/18- 
'0 TNA: PRO T102/5, R. H. Glover to Cox, 17/11/17,23/l/18; Cox to Glover, 24/1/18. 
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of the Conservative Party by a Coalition Government Department' at a meeting in 
Wallington, complaining that both the speaker and chairman were Conservatives, 
while the Conservative secretary was credited with the arrangements. The first 
complainant was telephoned, while the second received a detailed account of local 
cross-party arrangements to demonstrate that the NWAC had `done everything to 
ensure that no one side has an advantage'. 61 The Committee was apparently more 
sensitive to accusations of political exploitation than of ineffective propaganda, 
suggesting its members recognised the precariousness of its role caused by political 
mistrust. 
The NWAC clearly had a mixed reception from two groups - clergymen and 
organised labour. The request that senior Methodists provide the Committee with their 
circuit plans so that propaganda could be circulated to local clergymen met with a 
lukewarm response. In Birmingham, Rev. W. R. Maltby refused to provide his circuit 
plan, fearing that the NWAC wished to propagate to `preachers... certain views... 
which I think are not Christian... I think we have had from the [NWAC] some 
communications which were a gross insult to the Christian ministry'. Others, while `in 
complete sympathy with [the NWAC's] aims' refused to provide their plan as they 
did `not wish [their] pulpits to be used for any War propaganda'. In Manchester, Rev. 
A. E. Hutchinson reported that though five of thirty local clergymen had `pacifist 
views' he believed the majority were doing patriotic work and needed no central 
stimulation. Maltby's condemnation of un-Christian propaganda, together with Rev. 
F. W. Harrison's `disquiet at the revelation of secret treaties', 62 suggest NWAC efforts 
61 TNA: PRO T102/1, J. Allen to Cox, 14/3/18; T102/11, F. J. Palin to the Secretary, Ministry of 
Information (forwarded to NWAC), 22/5/18. 
62 TNA: PRO T102/8, Rev. W. R. Maltby to Wallace Carter, 20/3/19 [sic, but 1918]; T102/5, Rev. A. E. 
Hutchinson to NWAC, 20/3/18; Rev. F. W. Harrison (Bath) to NWAC, 18/3/18. However, cf the 
positive response to the NWAC's request by Rev. R. M. Pope: T 102/11, letter (unsigned) to Pope, 
8/2/18. 
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to incorporate spiritual patriotism as part of its larger message were hampered by 
some other elements and governmental actions. Nonetheless, clergymen were not 
invariably hostile to NWAC propaganda. Both the Anglican Church Times and the 
leading nonconformist newspaper, the British Weekly commended some NWAC 
propaganda. The Church Times recommended the NWAC's initial run of pamphlets 
in September 1917, insisting that `[e]very household should possess' the NWAC's 
Kalendar of Kultur. In February 1918, it publicised the Bishop of Zanzibar's 
pamphlet on German imperialism, claiming that it should be `scattered broadcast over 
the country'. In the following edition it announced that demand for the pamphlet had 
been `so great that the supply is exhausted', while Sanders' pamphlet The Tragedy of 
Russia was recommended as part of `that fine collection of war literature which [W. H. 
Smith] is distributing with patriotic generosity'. 3 The Presbyterian W. R. Nicoll's 
Free Church British Weekly, perhaps the most stridently patriotic representative of a 
generally pro-war nonconformity, also endorsed NWAC propaganda, celebrating the 
Congregationalist theologian P. T. Forsyth's `strong and noble' pamphlet on Britons' 
moral duties (the newspaper regularly published Forsyth's sermons). TM Eminent 
Congregationalists were particularly prominent in NWAC propaganda. Alongside 
Forsyth, J. H. Jowett's views were given prominence in NWAC publications, while 
Rev. P. Campbell Morgan spoke at several NWAC meetings. 65 Nor were Methodists 
apparently particularly susceptible to anti-war sentiment. The leading Wesleyan, Dr. 
Scott Lidgett, had expressed wholehearted support for Methodist enlistments in 1914, 
also renouncing his previous opposition to conscription when it was introduced in 
63 'Summary', Church Times, 21/9/17, p. 223; `A Voice From Africa', Ibid., 22/2/18, p. 235; Ibid., 
28/2/18, p. 249; `Summary', Ibid., 21/6/18, p. 435. For the significance of the newspaper's publicity, 
see, e. g., TNA: PRO T102/6, Rev. H. E. Jones to NWAC, 24/9/17, requesting the pamphlets discussed 
on the 21st. 
64 `War Pamphlet by Dr. Forsyth', British Weekly, 14/3/18, p. 431. 
65 On Jowett, see pp. 237-8 above; On Morgan, see TNA: PRO T102/17, Meetings register, nos. 1072, 
1324,1372,1374,1380-5. 
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1916, while even Primitive Methodists, who before 1914 believed themselves (after 
Quakers) `the most pacifist or peace-loving of all denominations' enlisted in large 
numbers, with only a small minority of Primitive Methodists expressing dissent in the 
Primitive Methodist Leader, the content of which was more usually characterised by 
`patriotic fervour'. In 1916, the Quaker MP Arnold Rowntree was informed that 
`pacifist' Methodist minsters `had been placed on a black list'. Though the passage of 
conscription apparently turned some (most prominently Samuel Keeble) towards an 
opposition based on `the traditional language of 19th-century Nonconformist 
liberalism', `[m]ost Methodists supported the war because they shared the instinctive 
patriotism exhibited by their fellow Britons' 
66 
Alongside the clerical cooperation discussed in Chapter 8, correspondence 
reveals further instances of supportive clergy. In North Walsham, Norfolk, Rev. 
Francis Knowles described the pamphlet The Truth About the War as `just what is 
wanted' to counteract the `wild talk going on among the working-classes in this parish 
and neighbourhood', while in Leeds, Rev. Frank Lord wanted a copy of the Kalendar 
of Kultur `to hang in the church porch' and `hearten my people whose boys are in the 
line of battle'. 67 At East Ham, a Wesleyan minister thanked the Committee for 
sending the American, Judge Henry Neil, to his Mission where two thousand men 
thoroughly enjoyed his speech. Neil, who also wrote a pamphlet for the NWAC, was 
a valuable propagandist, having previously been praised in the `pacifist' press for 
championing a `Mother's Pension scheme'. 
68 If Maltby's criticism was particularly 
' Alan Wilkinson, Dissent or Conform?, esp. pp. 26,29-3 8; Turberfield, Lidgett, pp. 151-62; Stephen 
Koss, Nonconformity in Modern British Politics (London, 1975), p. 134; Michael Hughes, `British 
Methodists and the First World War', Methodist History, 41: 1 (2002), p. 328. 
67 TNA: PRO T102/7, Rev. Francis Knowles to NWAC, 18/9/17; Rev. Frank Lord to NWAC, 25/9/18. 
68 TNA: PRO T102/1, Rev. W. H. Armstrong to Wallace Carter, 9/4/18; George Bernard Shaw, `Judge 
Neil's Business in Britain', Labour Leader, 19/7/17, p. 5; James Leakey, `Judge Neil at Poplar', 
Workers' Dreadnought, 24/11/17, p. 889. On the value and success of American speakers in NWAC 
propaganda, see the letter by `Trade Unionist 12 Years' regarding American Labour delegates in 
Sheffield, Sheffield Daily Telegraph, 17/5/18, p. 4; Brittain, Pilgrims and Pioneers, pp. 164-6. 
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strong, it must be set alongside the endorsement of, and participation in, NWAC 
propaganda by other clergymen, suggesting that, while not universally approved by 
clerics, the Committee nonetheless enjoyed strong support. 
MoL reports suggest the NWAC successfully convinced workers to reject 
strikes in turbulent places like South Wales, Coventry and the Clyde. Further, general 
indications of the public mood in working-class autobiographies suggest attitudes 
which, notwithstanding UDC judgements of changing public opinion, provided an 
environment receptive to some of the NWAC's arguments. An anonymous 
autobiographer, probably in his early forties by 1918, insisted that, despite prevailing 
1930s assumptions that the war had been `one gigantic blunder', `there really was a 
great conflict of ideals involved'. The historian A. L. Rowse, son of a Cornish china- 
clay worker, recalled that in mid-1918, aged fourteen, he was `very anti-German [and] 
drew up peace terms of a Draconian severity', while Arthur Newton, a teenage 
Hackney shoemaker, suggested that in 1917 there was: 
a rather false sense of security... people rather thought that they would never again 
see the dire poverty that they once knew... Had this not been a war to end all wars? 
So things were going to be very different when it was all over. 69 
The NWAC's proprietorial and aspirational patriotic messages would have resonated 
with such attitudes, while Rowse's anti-Germanism offers an indication of adversarial 
patriotism's continuing vitality. However, it should not be assumed that NWAC 
activities were unremittingly successful. Obviously, attitudes varied widely. If some 
`romantic' feminists celebrated women's war work and, `influenced by current 
69 'Authorship unacknowledged', Narrow Waters: The First Volume of the Life and Thoughts of a 
Common Man (London, 1935), pp. 205-6; A. L. Rowse, A Cornish Childhood (London, 1942), p. 205; 
Arthur Newton, Years of Change: Autobiography of a Hackney Shoemaker (London, 1974), pp. 50-1. 
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propaganda[, ] wondered what kind of new society lay ahead', others were more 
interested in returning to the status quo ante bellum. 70 Similarly Robert Roberts, 
discussing the war generally, doubted that: 
any man joined the forces through the politicians' lures of a `better world' to come... 
[H]ow many expected social miracles or in fact even wished for basic change?... 
[Most] were products of a class structure which conditioned them to defend, with all 
its faults and virtues, the country they knew, not to fight for some idealised land of the 
f iture. 71 
Roberts' argument, unlike those above, suggests aspirational patriotism was 
meaningless, except if it promised a return to comfortable familiarity. If NWAC 
messages seemed to match the attitude of some, then, they were apparently 
inappropriate to others, although the flexibility and variety of its patriotic messages 
might have assisted in appealing to those unimpressed by certain aspects. 
The NWAC's difficulty in appealing to organised labour has been discussed. 72 
Many local labour organisations rejected Peters' request to assist the Committee, 
though few went so far as the Brighton Trades' and Labour Council which resolved 
that his letter `be burnt and ashes returned'. 3 Furthermore, correspondence indicates 
that the NWAC's presence was not always beneficial. From the colliery town, 
Ashington, the Committee was asked to clarify the role of Alfred Baker, who had 
been accused at a miners' meeting of being `a paid agent of the National War Aims 
Committee, to go up and down the country to gull the Workers'. Their correspondent 
70 Braybon, Women Workers, pp. 165-6. 
71 Robert Roberts, The Classic Slum: Salford Life in the First Quarter of the Century (Manchester, 
1971), p. 192. 
72 See pp. 53-5 above. 
73 TNA: PRO T102/12, G. Rayner to Secretary of NWAC, 18/8/17. 
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believed this accusation was damaging Baker's credibility, adding that Baker was the 
only person in the area attempting to `further the War Aims Committee's view', and 
was undermined by `a good many pacifists' holding leading positions. Baker himself 
complained that his accuser was: 
a pasifist [sic] or as I call them enemies of our own country and I do not think it is 
right that they should be allowed to make these statements that are not true. I... have 
never been engadeg [sic] by the War Aims Committee I only wish I had but ever 
since I was discharged from the army in 1916 I have felt it my duty to... do what I 
74 
can for my country ... 
A reply confirmed that Baker was not a paid speaker. Association with the NWAC 
was clearly considered counterproductive to successful `patriotic' propaganda here. 
While evidence of voluntary working-class action was doubtless heartening, the fact 
that association with the Committee rendered propaganda amongst workers less rather 
than more successful was alarming. Similarly, despite optimistic reports of NWAC 
success in Coventry, the businessman R. S. Morrish advised that the city was 
`probably past praying for' but that good work might still be possible in 
Leamington. 75 
However, there was also considerable testimony to the NWAC's success 
among workers. Near Ashington, in West Stanley, a mine surveyor with `good 
opportunities going amongst the miners underground', judged that a NWAC lecture 
had noticeably improved local attitudes: 
74 TNA: PRO T102/1, Joseph Armstrong to Cox, 21/8/18; Alfred Baker to Cox, 13/8/18. 
75 TNA: PRO T102/8, R. S. Morrish to Cox, 10/9/18. 
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if you could have heard them yourself, you would have been surprised at the amount 
of good you did ... 
Every person I spoke to after your lecture both patriots, Socialist, 
Independent Labour men, + many Irishmen all expoused [sic] a genuine wish to hear 
you again... 
76 
Likewise, James Wright, formerly an ASE branch president and district Councillor in 
Weymouth, informed Barnes that `the speakers now at Weymouth... are doing a 
great, + grand work'. Arguably, participation is the best index of NWAC reception. 
As with clergymen, so too the involvement of working class figures with NWAC 
propaganda demonstrated commitment beyond mere nodding acceptance. Wright's 
offer to `do anything to help your representative at Weymouth' was a more 
impressive demonstration of the NWAC's reception than simple applause, though this 
was also very welcome. 
77 Generally, correspondents were more positive than 
negative, though this is unsurprising - firm opponents did not generally waste time 
corresponding, but continued their own agitations regardless. However, the very fact 
that so many people contacted the Committee demonstrates some level of committed 
support of the NWAC's cause, and certainly engagement with its message (positive or 
negative) rather than apathy. Furthermore, voluntary activism continued beyond the 
Armistice. In January 1919, a discharged officer asked for one of Lord Denbigh's 
maps showing Germany's Mitteleuropa ambitions, to assist his teaching at a school. 
As with all post-Armistice requests, he was informed that the Committee was no 
longer operating and so unable to help. However, that people continued to approach 
the NWAC after its operations had ceased suggests that it maintained some prestige 
76 TNA: PRO T102/14, Harold Tarbuck to `Stone Esq. ', 21/1/18. 
77 TNA: PRO T102/15, James Wright to Barnes, n. d. 
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throughout the final months of the war (and beyond). 78 At least among civilians 
enthusiastic enough to correspond, the NWAC seemingly remained in public 
consciousness throughout 1918. 
Nonetheless, most local press discussion of the NWAC occurred before the 
summer of 1918. Later commentary usually focused on major events like France's 
Day and the War Anniversary, though this was not universal - in October 1918 
newspapers in Evesham recorded a successful NWAC campaign, where eighty-seven 
meetings had been held since July, attracting around fifty percent of the adult 
populations of the villages visited. 79 The NWAC believed local newspapers were 
`more consistent, less materialistic and more representative of solid English opinion' 
than their national equivalents. 80 As such it monitored their content, and presumably 
valued their comments as guides to the Committee's reception. Further, from an 
analytical perspective, the local press `contributed to... building and maintaining 
communities of locality and belief', `proclaiming an image of the town itself', both 
for the town's inhabitants and for outside observers. 8' Commentary on NWAC 
activities may, therefore, be considered an indication both that the local press wished 
to demonstrate (or inculcate) a locality's patriotism, and that covering NWAC events 
was considered useful to this. As previous chapters demonstrate, local press coverage 
of NWAC events, often including verbatim reports of speeches, was extensive. 
Local newspapers also sometimes commented separately on the importance of 
the NWAC's work. The Liberal Montgomeryshire Express `rejoice[d] to note the 
energetic campaign' commenced by the NWAC in South Wales since `all thoughtful 
78 TNA: PRO T102/6, Major J. S. Iredell to NWAC, 26/1/19. 
79 `County News. Evesham. ', Evesham Standard, 5/10/18, p. 3; `Winchcombe. War Pictures. ', 
Evesham Journal, 5/10/18, p. 3. 
80 See p. 88, n. 31 above. 
SI Aled Gruffydd Jones, Press, Politics and Society: A History of Journalism in Wales (Cardiff, 1993), 
p. 199; Good, `England Goes to War', p. 12. 
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persons recognise the potential dangers of permitting the pacifist an unchallenged 
innings'. 82 Most editorials were prompted by ongoing campaigns. Hence the Liberal 
Radnor Express devoted two editorials to the need for continuing civilian effort 
following meetings addressed by the MPs Sir Francis Edwards and Sidney Robinson. 
Their campaign was `meeting with all the success their promoters desired', and the 
Express' Editor was `glad' that Robinson confronted: 
one of those small groups of people... whose views, as he said, did not savour of the 
most enthusiastic patriotism. They call themselves pacifists or reconciliators... [but it] 
is extremely difficult... to understand... [their] attitude... in certain parts of the 
83 country... 
Similarly, Smuts' Rhondda visit was heralded by the `Liberal and Labour' Rhondda 
Leader as having `once for all, dissipated the notion that the Rhondda was other than 
most loyal' and shown that `pacifism' though noisy, was `more or less a mirage' as 
`the mass are made of the right patriotic mettle', noticeably echoing (or prompting) 
the MoL's assessment. The subsequent defeat of the `down-tools' resolution, 
redounded to the `eternal credit... of the working collier' who refused to `kow-tow... 
to the active anti-war section of the I. L. P. led by the academic Ramsay MacDonald 
and Snowden crowd of agitators'. 
84 These editorial viewpoints demonstrate an 
important element in the NWAC's reception. Successful meetings like Smuts' at 
Tonypandy generated multiple responses. While the crowd's initial enthusiasm 
demonstrated endorsement of the Committee's general principles, it also prompted 
82 `The Perilous Stage'. Montgomeryshire Express and Radnor Times, 25/9/17, p. 5. 
83 `The Testing Time. ', Radnor Express, 4110117, p. 5; `The Real Need. ', Radnor Express, 11/10/17, p. 
5. 
84 `From the Editor's Chair', Rhondda Leader, 3/11/17, p. 2; 17/11/17, p. 2. 
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local press coverage. Speakers' messages were thus brought to larger audiences than 
could be reached in the meeting itself, spreading its effects more widely. 85 
Furthermore, editorial commentary often extended the speaker's arguments, 
extrapolating from these and adding more pointed comments. Hence the Rhondda 
Leader's editor specifically blamed discontent on MacDonald and Snowden, whereas 
NWAC speakers generally avoided direct criticism of MPs. 86 Speakers could, 
therefore, sometimes be allusive, expecting either that the audience would understand 
the implication or that a local newspaper would elucidate it; that is, that both 
journalists and audiences could draw `inferences about inferences' which might not 
all be `derived directly from the signals of the text'. 
87 Local newspapers thus 
generated their own propaganda, extending the official line with their own, less 
regulated, interpretation. While this created potential for inappropriate messages, it 
also meant NWAC propaganda was publicised to civilians who might eschew 
meetings. 
NWAC propaganda began in Leicester in April 1918, with a meeting 
addressed by the Labour NWAC member James Parker, much to the relief of the 
Leicester Daily Mercury's editor, who thought it a `pity it was not called long ago and 
followed by others in the meantime'. The ILP Leicester Pioneer, meanwhile, happily 
reported that an early NWAC meeting was closed prematurely because two audience 
members had settled an argument over conscription `in the old-fashioned style (with 
their fists)'. 88 Following the May Day disruptions, however, the local press (except 
the Pioneer, which was rather less satisfied when violence affected MacDonald's 
8' On this, see Matthew `Rhetoric and Politics'. 
86 This was also sometimes the case with national newspapers, such as Christabel Pankhurst's 
Britannia, which urged the NWAC to maintain an `irreducible minimum' of war aims against calls for 
negotiation: `Review of the Week', Britannia, 
27/7/17, p. 58. 
87 Hans Ruthrof, The Reader's Construction of the Narrative (London, 1981), p. 43. 
88 The War Aims Meeting. ', Leicester Daily Mercury, 13/4/18, p. 4; `Are You Surprised to Hear? ', 
Leicester Pioneer, 19/4/18, p. 4. 
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meeting) took the NWAC's side against MacDonald and his supporters. Shortly after 
May Day, the Mercury printed a digest of public responses, concluding that `a force 
has arisen in the town which will be directed to the rout of MacDonaldism' and the 
removal of the `stain' of `pacifism' from Leicester. 89 Leicester journalists, forthrightly 
critical of MacDonald since 1914, renewed calls for his resignation. They also 
published numerous letters, mostly critical of MacDonald. One woman enquired 
whether `the War Aims Committee agree with the suppression of Free Speech as a 
War Aim', and complained that while she could hear the `patriotic' line anywhere it 
was much harder to get the other side of the story. However, most opprobrium not 
directed at MacDonald and his supporters was taken by Albert Howarth, a local BWL 
organiser arrested for his part in the incident, and who had been warned by the Mayor 
- chairman of 
Leicester WAC - not to violently disrupt MacDonald's meeting 90 
Simply by staging a rival meeting, the NWAC stimulated local opinion to a largely 
self-sustained local campaign against a principal adversary, which did not abate until 
his electoral defeat in December. The NWAC challenged the legitimacy of 
MacDonald's gathering by occupying the same `civic space'. `An Old Trade 
Unionist' asked whether MacDonald `seriously... [claimed] a monopoly of the 
Market-place', adding that ILP trade unionists were merely a noisy minority 91 
Speakers subsequently reported `quite a wave of patriotism' and that `Leicester as a 
whole may be acquitted of any charge in favour of Pacifism'. 
92 NWAC propaganda, a 
compliant local press and public antipathy towards critics like MacDonald formed a 
potent combination seemingly capable of transforming a town from a notorious 
89 For May Day in Leicester: pp. 142-4 above; `Sunday's Meeting. What People are Thinking. ', 
Leicester Daily Mercury, 8/5/18- 
90 Letter by `A Woman with a Vote', Leicester Daily Mercury, 10/5/18, p. 2; 'Ald. Banton's 
Allegation' (letter by Albert Howarth), Leicester Daily Post, 7/5/18, p. 3. 
91 Lawrence, Speaking, p. 181; letter, `An Old Trade Unionist', Leicester Daily Mercury, 8/5/18, p. 6. 
92 TNA: PRO T102/24, SDRs - Abraham Williamson, Leicester, 12/5/18; T102/16, SDRs - T. 
Hemsley, Leicester, 23/8/18. 
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`Pacifists' paradise' to one where `patriotic loyalty is as good as any... I have been 
in'. 93 
Most local editorials discussing the NWAC were similarly positive to those 
discussed above. In Ipswich, the independent East Anglian Daily Times, while 
supportive, was more sceptical about the value of its campaigns. Discussing 
Macnamara's efforts, the paper noted the quality of his argument, but asked `was he 
not preaching to the converted? How are the careless, thoughtless, indifferent people 
to be reached? ' It recommended short speeches in places of entertainment where more 
of the audience would benefit from "`a good talking to" than would be found at any 
"war aims" meeting'. 4 This was a pertinent observation, supported by the comment 
noted above about gathering a regular audience throughout a week in Weymouth and 
by a correspondent's observation that `the working classes do not patronise Smith's 
bookstalls and shops' and so did not see the NWAC's publications. 95 If the same 
people heard the NWAC's speakers each time a campaign was held, there was a risk 
that the message reached only those who did not need to hear it. This difficulty was 
partly addressed by events like France's Day, which combined a public fete with 
speeches, exploiting entertainment in a way similar to that suggested by the East 
Anglian Daily Times. Further, the NWAC attempted to implement the suggestion 
more fully. In April, the entertainment agency, Keith, Prowse & Co., was approached 
to assist in arrangements for short speeches to be made at theatres and music-halls, 
preferably delivered by `prominent actors and music hall "stars"". 96 While this plan 
was abandoned due to running-time restrictions, the Committee maintained the 
93 For the phrase `Pacifists' paradise': `Our War Aims. ', Leicester Daily Mercury, 13/4/18, p. 4; 
TNA: PRO T102/25, SDRs - E. Rhodes, Leicester, 23/8/18. 
94 `War Aims and War Means. ', East Anglian Daily Times, 3/12/17, p. 4. 
95 TNA: PRO T102/1, extract of letter from Dr H. L. P. Baker, 9/7/18. 
96 TNA: PRO T102/7, Vesey to E. M. Briggs, 11/4/18. 
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general idea. 7 Besides the very successful cinemotor campaigns, a special War 
Anniversary message by Lloyd George was sent to over four thousand places of 
entertainment, to be simultaneously opened at nine o'clock to an audience expected to 
number two and a half million people 98 Cox also explained to the Australian 
Directorate of War Propaganda that besides `ordinary meetings exhibitions of war 
pictures and films take place in cinema house [sic], music-halls, theatres and other 
places of entertainment', 99 while the extravagant `British national film', finally 
produced too late for wartime release, would have extended this still further. 
Evidently, the Committee attempted to extend its propaganda to those uninterested in 
public meetings, but these remained the principal means of communication. 
Nonetheless, this should not be dismissed as an outmoded medium. As some of the 
evidence above shows, these meetings were credited with much success. 
In November 1918, Charles B. Little, in Ryhill, near Wakefield, wrote to 
praise the Committee, particularly for: 
the campaign that you are carrying on in the small towns and the villages.., the 
speeches given... did good in enlightening the people... and in stiffening the 
community in their determination to endure and have patience ... 
100 
While also praising the cinemotors, Little's acknowledgement is fitting testimony to 
the importance of the NWAC's work. While the major events addressed by Smuts or 
Asquith garnered most national attention, it was the smaller meetings in villages, 
small towns or city districts which typified the NWAC's output. At these local 
97 E. g. TNA: PRO T102/7, Wallace Carter[? ] to Keith Kenneth (actor), 5/9/18. 
98 TNA: PRO T102/1, Capt. Barber to J. Cabourn, 29/7/18. For the message, see, e. g., Evesham 
Standard, 10/8/18, p. 2. 
99 TNA: PRO T102/3, Cox to D. K. Picken, 28/10/18. 
100 TNA: PRO T102/7, Charles B. Little to Barber, 7/11/18. 
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gatherings, talented speakers like Sergeant A. K. Hamilton `held the people spell 
bound', producing an `abiding' effect which was `just what [was] wanted to rouse up 
more interest in national work'. 101 While not all speakers were so skilled as Hamilton, 
nor all audiences so rapt as the thirty Wiltshire citizens he addressed, it was at this 
level, ultimately, that the NWAC was most important. Through its presence in small 
communities, the NWAC (and organisations like War Savings and Food Control 
Committees) became, in most (English and Welsh) constituencies, a small part of 
British wartime society, linking those `shut away in sheltered nooks of the country' 
with the rest of the nation by reminding preoccupied minds of things outside their 
immediate horizon. 102 Whether individuals fully endorsed NWAC propagandists' 
arguments was arguably less important than that its presence refocused public 
attention on the nation's requirements, `in the interests of maintaining an orderly and 
productive world' capable of seeing the war through to a close. '03 
101 TNA: PRO T102/25, SDRs - A. K. Hamilton, Chippenham (Rodbourne), 10/9/18. Hamilton was 
quoting the local WAC secretary, A. George. 
'2 TNA: PRO T102/3, S. A. Earnshaw to NWAC, 5/10/17. 
103 Crary, Suspensions of Perception, p. 17. 
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Conclusion 
The NWAC's activities ceased shortly after the Armistice. Sanders told MPs, 
on 14 November, that the Committee had warned all WACs ten days earlier that 
NWAC activities would be suspended during a General Election. Sanders reported 
that it `has also been decided to suspend all meetings and publications during the 
period of the Armistice', barring a couple of final newspaper supplements, an edition 
of Reality and a pre-arranged tour of the Western Front for trade unionists. Sanders 
also confirmed that parliamentary candidates would not be permitted to use NWAC 
pamphlets in their campaigns. ' Having been suspended, the Committee effectively 
ceased to exist. Its MPs, secretaries and the party staff speakers addressed themselves 
2 to the Election, while salaried staff sought other appointments? It was seemingly the 
first propaganda organisation to shut down fully, with responsibility for its cinemotors 
transferred to the National War Savings Committee on 14 December, though the 
Ministry of Information, Lord Northcliffe's enemy propaganda organisation at Crewe 
House and the Press Bureau followed shortly thereafter. As Sanders and Taylor note, 
`the reputation which the British government earned for the successful employment of 
propaganda was not one of which many contemporaries felt proud. It was... a 
somehow "un-English" activity' only acceptable in retaliation to enemy efforts. 
Notwithstanding the unease at the use of domestic propaganda, however, 
Gerard Fiennes was appointed Commander of the British Empire in 1920 specifically 
for his wartime role in the NWAC's Publicity Department, suggesting governmental 
1 PDC(5), 110,14/11/18, col. 2869. 
2 E. g. letter by Maynard Saunders (Publicity Department) in TNA: PRO HO139/35/146. 
3 TNA: PRO T102/9, NWAC to Proprietor, North Eastern Railway Hotel Garage, York, 2/1/19. Sanders 
and Taylor, British Propaganda, p. 248. 
349 
appreciation of domestic propaganda's worth. Two other key Committee members 
were less well rewarded. Its two Asquithian Liberal MPs, Marshall and Rea, were not 
given the Coalition `coupon' at the 1918 Election, Marshall subsequently receiving 
only 14% of the vote at Wakefield behind a Coalition Conservative and a Labour 
candidate, while Rea managed just 12.1 %, finishing fourth and failing to win either of 
Oldham's two seats (behind `couponed' Conservative and Liberal candidates and 
Labour). 5 While Marshall and Rea benefited little politically from their involvement 
with the Committee, however, Guest and Sanders' collaboration as Chairman and 
Vice-chairman probably helped facilitate their arrangements for the post-war 
coalition. 6 
In February 1920, Major-General Sir George Aston, who had written for the 
NWAC and been involved in coordinating the various propaganda organisations, 
claimed that British propaganda, unlike Britain's enemies', was based solely on truth: 
`We never lied in our propaganda... great care was taken not to use a word or a story 
that was not strictly true'. 7 However the general post-war attitude towards propaganda 
overlooked the truthful elements within propaganda and focused upon the excesses of 
atrocity stories, resulting in the permanent assumption that propaganda was an activity 
based upon lies and deception. Though the NWAC was largely geared towards 
`truthful' propaganda, post-war criticism touched upon some NWAC propaganda. 
Referring to a nastily anti-Semitic allegation - which appeared in Reality in 
November 1917 -a 1920 discussion of `The 
"Propaganda" Morass' recalled: `At one 
time we were told that Bolshevism was run by a little gang of Jews. That was found to 
4 `Civilian War Honours', Times, 31/3/20, p. 18. 
5 Craig, Parliamentary Election Results, pp. 261,211. 
6 See, e. g., Sanders' diary, 24/3/18,14/7/18, in Ra. msden, Tory politics, pp. 101,106-7. 
Aston, `Propaganda', pp. 239-40. 
350 
be untrue'. 8 Arthur Ponsonby's 1928 condemnation of British propaganda included a 
section discussing the Bishop of Zanzibar's disavowal of the pamphlet The Black 
Slaves of Prussia, based on his letter to Smuts, which he said had been doctored, 
omitting inconvenient discussion of the British Empire's flaws. Ponsonby also 
strongly criticised propaganda relating to war aims, ridiculing many key arguments 
(used by NWAC propagandists) as `general high-sounding ideals which might give 
the war the character of an almost religious crusade'. He insisted that militarism, far 
from being crushed, was stronger than ever, citing Britain's higher post-war military 
expenditure, and complained that despite talk of fighting for small nations, 
`Montenegro was wiped off the map by the Peace Treaties, although the restoration of 
Montenegro was specially mentioned by the Prime Minister on January 5,1918 
(National War Aims pamphlet No. 33)'. Moreover, the Empire had expanded, despite 
assertions that Britain had no territorial goals. The ambition to `make the world safe 
for democracy' had been vitiated by several dictatorships in Europe and elsewhere, 
while the `war to end war' had resulted in wars all over the world. 9 Harold Lasswell, 
with trademark ironic cynicism, suggested that the `truth about the relation of truth to 
propaganda seems to be that it is never wise to use material which is likely to be 
contradicted by certain unconcealable events before the political objective of 
propaganda is attained'. To this extent, the NWAC largely succeeded - no question 
was raised about the Bishop of Zanzibar's letter in 1918; rather, following 
advertisement by the Church Times, demand for it exceeded supply. 1° 
The NWAC's propaganda, this thesis has argued, offered Britons a complex 
and flexible narrative of patriotic identity. Building upon many familiar pre-war 
8 `The "Propaganda" Morass', Guardian, 15/1/20 - cutting in University of London, Special 
Collections, GB 0096 MS 1112, Caroline Playne papers, folder 135. See pp. 144-5 above. 
9 Ponsonby, Falsehood, pp. 114-5,162-6. 
10 Lasswell, Propaganda Technique, p. 208. See p. 333 above. 
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patriotic themes, its core message of duty was contextualised by several sub- 
patriotisms, which explained what being British meant through the explication of key 
civilisational values, claimed that these were British creations but were shared by 
their `civilised' allies, and warned that they were threatened by adversaries, external 
and internal, whose conduct showed that Britain must maintain its effort to victory. 
Building on the celebratory elements of its evocation of duty, moreover, the 
`concrescent community' was encouraged to believe that the post-war society would 
be a vast improvement on the struggle and division of pre-war Britain. The nation's 
`holy war' had brought people together through shared sacrifice and, provided 
civilians maintained their effort and resolution long enough to win the war, the British 
way of life would be preserved, and the life of the individual and community 
improved. As Part III has shown, despite the cynicism of some Parliamentary and 
journalistic critics and concerns about the continued (though by no means 
omnipresent) use of atrocity stories and anti-German rhetoric, this message apparently 
succeeded in capturing the public's imagination. 
After twenty years of obscurity, the Second World War brought domestic 
propaganda back into public attention. In response to the 1938 Munich crisis, a 
Ministry of Information was re-established, following plans begun in 1935. Despite 
the transferral of the NWAC's records to the Public Record Office in 1931, planners 
complained in 1938 that they knew nothing about its activities, and it was not until 
1941 that a report examined the NWAC's papers and summarised its activities for the 
Ministry of Information. " A Home Publicity Sub-Committee was established in 1938 
to assess the need for domestic propaganda in the event of war. Its former members 
reacted poorly to a Ministry of Information memorandum on 13 September 1939 
11 Ian McLaine, Ministry of Morale: Home Front Morale and the Ministry of Information in World War 
II (London, 1979), pp. 13-4; TNA: PRO INF4/4A, `Home Publicity During the Great War'. 
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which expressed strong distrust for the reliability of the public. As Ian McLaine notes, 
morale `was to be sustained by the propagation of three basic themes: the justice of 
the British cause, Britain's strength, and the commitment of the whole community to 
the war effort'; principles reminiscent of much NWAC propaganda. The Ministry of 
Information not having investigated its predecessors' methods, however, the first 
period of the war was characterised by `unnecessary and inept' propaganda based on 
`misunderstanding and distrust of the British public'. Familiar problems recurred. As 
in 1917, for instance, Second World War propagandists were hamstrung by 
Churchill's refusal to make a statement of war aims. 12 
In September 1940, The Times published a letter by the Anglo-Jewish 
historian Albert M. Hyamson, arguing that the Ministry of Information was 
attempting to fill too many functions and concentrating excessively on domestic 
propaganda: `Public opinion in this country during the last war was in the hands of 
quite a small organization, the War Aims Committee, of which little was heard'. ' 3 In 
calling for the reinstitution of this supposedly unobtrusive body, Hyamson was 
presumably unaware that a War Aims Committee had been established in July, 
comprising Duff Cooper (Minister of Information since May), Neville Chamberlain, 
Lord Halifax, Clement Attlee, Ernest Bevin and Sir Archibald Sinclair. This 
Committee of luminaries, unlike its namesake, did not become responsible for 
conducting propaganda, but advocated the discussion of a `New Jerusalem' following 
the war (in Correlli Barnett's terms), celebrating - in strikingly similar terms to 
NWAC evocations of a concrescent community and aspirational patriotism - that `the 
war has broken down many old barriers and prejudices' and `aroused' the public's 
social conscience'. Commitments should therefore be made to make `Britain in every 
12 McLaine, Ministry, pp. 27-30,10,173. 
13 Albert M. Hyamson, `Work of the M. O. I. A Diversity of Functions. ' (letter), Times, 11/9/40, p. 9. 
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way worthy of her heroic citizens'. 14 
Echoes of the NWAC's approach also resonate in the BBC's recognition that 
`loosely-defined nostalgia for home provided a far more potent and popular morale- 
booster both home and overseas than thumping jingoism'. The examples supplied had 
evolved - landscape and the countryside, for instance, though somewhat prominent in 
1917-18, had become a much more important part of national identity during the 
1920s - but the portrayal of Britain as `essentially one vast and picturesque village' 
clearly shared the same ideological territory as the NWAC's concrescent community 
rhetoric. However, Sian Nicholas suggests that civilians felt considerable 
`ambivalence about some of the implications of wartime community feeling', while 
assertions of `national unity' often seemed `an aspiration rather than a statement of 
fact'. 15 This, of course, was also true between 1917 and 1918, but while NWAC 
propaganda identified internal adversaries like `pacifists', strikers or profiteers with 
which to contextualise its exhortation and celebration of duty, this seemed much less a 
part of Second World War propaganda strategies - those in Britain targeted for 
criticism were more likely to be foreign `fifth columnists', or Jews accused of running 
the black market and avoiding war work, among other things. `Pacifism', the great 
concern of NWAC propaganda, did not, apparently, much trouble Second World War 
propagandists. 16 Clearly, propaganda, and the patriotism it propounded, had changed 
since 1918, but traces of the NWAC's patriotic narrative are still discernible after 
1939, further supporting the suggestion that the First World War, though a time of 
great upheaval, remains also a place of continuity in British history. 
14 Corelli Barnett, The Audit of War: The Illusion & Reality of Britain as a Great Nation (London, 
1986), pp. 20-2; McLaine, Ministry, pp. 105,172-3. 
15 Sian Nicholas, The Echo of War: Home Front Propaganda and the Wartime BBC, 1939-45 
(Manchester, 1996), pp. 239,233; Nicholas, `From John Bull to John Citizen: Images of National 
Identity and Citizenship on the Wartime BBC', in Richard Weight and Abigail Beach (eds. ), The Right 
to Belong: Citizenship and National Identity in Britain, 1930-1960 (London, 1998) pp. 53-4. 
16 McLaine, Ministry, pp. 55-8,74-5,116-7,166-8. 
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My thesis has explored the NWAC's wartime activities. It provides the fullest 
discussion of its day-to-day operations available to historians, and demonstrates that 
the Committee, often dismissed as `amateurish' and `inefficient', actually constituted 
a substantial presence in late British wartime society. Though mocked by critics, it 
held meetings and issued publications to the Armistice, its audiences apparently 
growing in some places later in the war, and was considered to have contributed 
effectively to maintaining social stability before the remobilising influence of 
Germany's 1918 offensive. Propagandists developed a diverse patriotic narrative, 
alterable to the tastes of particular localities or types of audience. While many 
elements I discuss have been recognised to an extent by other historians, " no other 
study relates the NWAC's rhetoric so extensively to the wider context of British 
patriotism, nor offers any great examination of the NWAC's work in local 
communities. It was the speeches made to local audiences, often of only a few dozen, 
which constituted (in its own estimation) the NWAC's most important means of 
propaganda, and speeches were not simply verbalised pamphlets. My extensive 
examination of these, alongside NWAC publications, has produced a more 
comprehensive and nuanced interpretation of its representation of patriotism, which is 
significant not only to the history of the First World War, or propaganda, but to wider 
understandings of British patriotism and national identity. The NWAC's evocation of 
patriotism was clearly tailored to a particular situation, but it seems likely that the 
patriotic categories identified as elements of a wider narrative may also resonate in 
other areas of modem British history. 
17 E. g. Sanders and Taylor, British Propaganda, pp. 139-42,149-51. 
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Appendix 2: Loeal ease studies 
In order to survey an adequate sample of propaganda in local areas, together 
with the relevant number of Speakers' Daily Reports, thirty local case studies were 
selected. A representative survey required that these constituencies should represent 
varied regions (ten from each); different types of social composition (and their 
numerical significance within each region); different secretarial affiliations; WACs 
established at varying times throughout its period of operations. These four issues 
were all judged using the non-card-index data table (see Appendix 1.4). It also 
required examination of WACs of varying levels of activity. This was judged by the 
number of successful grant applications recorded in the Constituency economic 
activities table (see Appendix 1.3). An analysis of this data provided the following 
conclusions: 
Regions and constituent classifications: lassi ications: 
The `non-card-index data' table in the Card-index database (see Appendix 1.4 for 
sample) shows that the three regions (as defined in Appendix 1.4) contain broadly 
similar numbers of constituencies, and much more similar numbers of constituencies 
with WACs: 
1) North: 146 (108 with WACs; 107 excluding 1 unclassified constituency) 
2) Midlands/Wales: 186 (120 with WACs; 113 excluding 7 unclassified 
constituencies) 
3) London/South: 196 (116 with WACs) 
Each region is, therefore, broken down to ten case studies each. The percentages of 
classification of constituencies with WACs are then taken into account in each region 
(ignoring unclassified constituencies). Smallest classifications may have to be ignored 
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altogether in one region (for example, urban, mainly middle-class constituencies in 
North). Percentages in parentheses are the percentage of each constituency with a 
WAC classification in a region, excluding unclassified constituencies. 
North: (discrepancy with Rural and middle-class constituencies resolved by fitting to 
national totals) 
  Urban working class: 3 (30.84%) 
  Urban mixed: 3 (25.23%) 
  Mining: 2 (19.63%) 
  Urban/Rural: 1 (14.95%) 
  Rural:! (6.5%) 
  Urban middle class: 0 (2.8%) - since so small a percentage. 
Midlands/Wales: (discrepancy for urban/rural and mining constituencies resolved by 
comparing prospective numbers of classifications examined to national percentages). 
  Rural: 3 (33.63%) 
  Urban mixed: 2 (18.58%) 
  Urban/Rural: 2 (15.93%) 
  Mining: 1 (15.04%) 
  Urban working class: 1 (9.73%) 
  Urban middle class: 1 (7.08%) 
London/South: 
  Urban working class: 2 (21.55%) 
  Urban/Rural: 2 (20.69%) 
  Rural: 2 (19.83%) 
  Urban mixed: 2 (19.83%) 
  Urban middle class: 2 (18.10%) 
  Mining: 0 (0%) 
TOTALS (percentage of constituencies with WACs, excluding unclassified): 
  Urban mixed: 7 case studies (21.13%). 
  Urban working class: 6 (20.54%). 
  Rural: 6 (20.24%). 
  Urban/Rural: 5 (17.26%). 
  Mining: 3 (11.31 %). 
  Urban middle class: 3 (9.52%). 
  Total: 30 (100%) 
These are, therefore, reasonable allocations of classification in each region. Rural 
constituencies are technically over-represented in North but under-represented 
in Midlands, so this balances. 
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Party representation: 
Of 344 WACs: 
  In 31 cases the party affiliations of the secretaries are unknown. 
  Of the remaining 313: 
  295 (94.25%) had a Conservative representative 
  281 (89.78%) had a Liberal representative 
  27 (8.63%) had a Labour representative. 
Therefore: 
- no more than 3 of the 30 case studies should have a Labour representative. 
- no more than 1 or 2 of the 30 should not have a Conservative representative. 
- no more than 3 of the 30 should not have a Liberal representative. 
Further, of the 313 WACs with known affiliations: 
  238 (76.04%) comprised Conservative and Liberal reps. 
  32 (10.22%) were Conservative only. 
  22 (7.03%) were Conservative, Liberal and Labour. 
  16 (5.11%) were Liberal only. 
 3 (0.96%) were Unionist and Labour. 
 2 (0.64%) were Liberal and Labour. 
Therefore: 
- at least 22 of the 30 case studies should be WACs with Conservative and 
Liberal secretaries. 
of the remaining 8: 
-3 should be Conservative only. 
- the three WACs with Labour reps should have Conservative Liberal and 
Labour secretaries. 
-2 should be Liberal only. 
Establishment date j? roup: 
Of the 344 WACs the date of origin of 4 cannot be established. If the remaining 340 
are divided into 3 groups of 4 months and 1 group of 5 ((1) July-October 1917; (2) 
November 1917 to February 1918; (3) March-June 1918; (4) July-November 1918): 
  230 (67.65%) were established in (1) 
  42(12.35%)in(2) 
  27 (7.94%) in (3) 
  41 (12.06%) in (4) 
Therefore: 
- at least 20 of the 30 case studies should have been established before November 
1,1917 
-3 or 4 should have been established between Nov. 1 1917 and Feb 28 1918. 
-2 should have been established between March 1 and June 30 1918. 
-3 or 4 should have been established between July 1 and November 11 1918. 
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Grants: 
About a third (10) of the case studies should only have received 1 grant from the 
NWAC, about a fifth (6) should have received 2, and the others should be reasonably 
evenly spread between 3 and 8 grants. Since the highest number of grants (12 to 
Forest of Dean) is so anomalous, it should be omitted. 
With these requirements in mind, therefore, the following constituencies were 
selected for examination: 
NORTHERN CASE STUDIES: 
Case- Classification Constituency Paj! y Establishment Grants 
study affiliations group 
no. 
1 Urban, w-c Keighley UL Jul-Oct17 2 
2 Urban, w-c St Helens ULLA Jul-Oct17 2 
3 Urban, w-c Oldham UL Nov-17Feb18 1 
4 Urban, mixed Liverpool City UL Jul-Oct17 1 
5 Urban, mixed Sheffield City UL Jul-Oct17 1 
6 Urban, mixed Wakefield UL Jul-Oct17 4 
7 Mining Wigan U Jul-Oct17 3 
8 Mining Houghton-le- 
Spring 
UL Jul-Oct17 4 
9 Urban/ Rural Ripon UL Jul-Oct17 5 
10 Rural Holderness UL Jul-Nov18 3 
MIDLANDS/WALES CASE STUDIES: 
Case- Classification Constituency 1 Establishment Grants 
stud no. affiliations ou 
1 Rural Evesham ULLA Jul-Octl7 7 
2 Rural Radnorshire UNK Jul-Octl8 2 
3 Rural South West 
Norfolk 
UL Novl7-Febl8 1 
4 Urban mixed Lichfield UL Jul-Octl7 3 
5 Urban mixed Ipswich L Nov17-Feb18 3 
6 Urban/Rural Nuneaton U Mar-Jun18 1 
7 Urban/Rural Shrewsbury UL Jul-Nov18 1 
8 Mining Rhondda UL Jul-Octl7 2 
9 Urban, w-c Leicester UL Jul-Oct17 8 
10 Urban, m-c Cheltenham UL Jul-Octl7 4 
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LONDON/SOUTH CASE STUDIES: 




1 Urban, w-c Battersea U Jul-Oct17 3 
2 Urban, w-c Finsbury UL Jul-Oct17 2 
3 Urban Rural St Albans UL Jul-Nov18 1 
4 Urban/Rural Barnstaple UL Jul-Oct17 3 
5 Rural Bodmin South 
East Cornwall 
UL Nov17-Feb18 1 
6 Rural Chi enham UL Jul-Oct17 5 
7 Urban mixed Croydon ULLA Mar-Jun18 1 
8 Urban mixed South Dorset UL Jul-Oct17 3 
9 Urban, m-c Dulwich UL Jul-Nov18 1 
10 Urban, m-c Eastbourne UL Jul-Oct17 2 
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thesis, 2009). 
Database user-guide 
These databases were not initially intended to have been supplied alongside the thesis 
and have not, therefore, been designed with either aesthetic considerations or other 
users' needs in mind. Users wishing to use these databases will need to be familiar 
with Microsoft Access. 
Using material from the databases: 
Anybody using information from these databases should acknowledge the source as 
follows: 
David Monger, `Card index database/Meetings register database/Speakers' reports 
database/Articles database [as appropriate]', attached to `The National War Aims 
Committee and British patriotism during the First World War' (King's College 
London, unpublished PhD thesis, 2009). 
Opening the databases: 
All three files have had security features added in order to avoid either malicious or 
(more likely) inadvertent interference with the data. Users' access is therefore on a 
read-only basis, though users may generate their own queries. When users open a file, 
they will be prompted to enter a name and password. The name should automatically 
be entered as `User'; if not, this should be entered. The password should be left blank. 
This will give users access to the database. 
Finding relevant material: 
Two of the databases - the Card index database and the Speakers' reports database are 
incorporated in the same file. This is because some of the tables are linked to each 
other. Tables and forms have been clearly label so that it is evident to which database 
they belong. Each database contains several forms, but in each case, one is the main 
form within which the others are contained. These are as follows: 
Card index database: `Card index DB - Constituencies: card index data (T102/26)'. 
Speakers' reports database: `Reports DB - Speakers' Daily Reports Form'. 
Meetings register database: `Meetings register form'. 
Articles database: `Authors and publications Form'. 
Users can use the filters on forms to search for specific things such as names within 
the database. More complex searches can be done using queries. When running a 
query, it is important to ensure that the tables/queries selected in order to generate 
results are related to each other properly (this is shown in the query design form by 
linking `relationship' lines between the tables. 
For instance, if looking for all records of a particular speaker, users need to add the 
`speakers', `Speakers standardised table' and `Speaker list' tables in order to conduct 
a successful search. 'Speaker list' provides the most comprehensive data about 
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speakers, having incorporated the standardisation of the `Speakers standardised 
table' - this means that misspelt names in the records have been taken into account. 
405 
